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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and  ) 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondents, ) 
      ) 
vs.      ) Supreme Court No.  44719 
      ) 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually,  ) 
      ) 
   Defendant/Respondent/Appellant   )                                  
      )  
and      ) 
                                     )            
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; )   
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND    ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; )  
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation;  ) 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., ) 
A corporation; and DOES 1 through 50  ) 
Inclusive,     ) 
      ) 
 Defendants.    ) 
_______________________________________ )   
  
 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL    ERIN CLARK 
PO Box 3372      PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340     Ketchum, ID 83340 
        
       
 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/   Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners/ 
Appellant      Respondents 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Date: 3/29/2017 Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County User: CRYSTAL
Date  Judge
Other Claims
ROA Report01:48 PMTime:
Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 1 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Notice Of Filing foreign judgment Robert J. Elgee6/1/2012
Affidavit in support of filing goreign judgment Robert J. Elgee
Clerks Notice Of Filing Foreign Judgment Robert J. Elgee
New Case Filed - Other Claims Robert J. Elgee6/6/2012
Filing: K7 - Filing a foreign judgment   Paid by: Lawson Laski Clark Pogue
Receipt number: 0004508  Dated: 6/6/2012  Amount: $7.00 (Check) For:
C&M Investment Group, LTD (plaintiff)
Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff: C&M Investment Group, LTD Appearance Erin F. Clark Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff: Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership Appearance Erin F. Clark Robert J. Elgee
Civil Disposition entered for: Campbell, Neil David, Defendant; Guanana
Gris S.a.,, Defendant; Powers Investments And Management, Inc. S.A.,
Defendant; Powers, Philip Richard, Defendant; Proteccion Forestal De
Teca S.S., Defendant; C&M Investment Group, LTD, Plaintiff; Karlin
Holdings Limited Partnership, Plaintiff.  Filing date: 6/6/2012
Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed Robert J. Elgee
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Lawson Laski Clark Pogue Receipt number:
0004511  Dated: 6/6/2012  Amount: $6.00 (Check)
Robert J. Elgee
Motion for Issuance of Order of Domestication Robert J. Elgee6/19/2012
Order of Domestication Robert J. Elgee6/21/2012
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Conforming A Prepared
Record, Per Page Paid by: lawson laski clark pogue Receipt number:
0005023  Dated: 6/25/2012  Amount: $3.00 (Check)
Robert J. Elgee6/25/2012
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For
Certificate And Seal Paid by: lawson laski clark pogue Receipt number:
0005023  Dated: 6/25/2012  Amount: $2.00 (Check)
Robert J. Elgee
Abstract of Judgment Robert J. Elgee
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid by: Lawson Laski Clark &
Pogue, PLLC Receipt number: 0005279  Dated: 7/22/2013  Amount: $2.00
(Check)
Robert J. Elgee7/22/2013
Affidavit For Amount Due on Writ of Execution Robert J. Elgee
Writ of Execution Robert J. Elgee
Writ:  Document Service Issued:  on 7/22/2013 to Neil David Campbell;
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00.
Robert J. Elgee
Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption Robert J. Elgee8/30/2013
Memorandum in Support of Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of Motion Contesting Claim of
Exemption
Robert J. Elgee
Notice Of Hearing on Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption Robert J. Elgee9/3/2013
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Motion Contesting Robert J. Elgee9/4/2013
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  09/09/2013 03:00 PM)  Contest Claim of
Exemption
Robert J. Elgee9/6/2013
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed pending clerk action Robert J. Elgee 2 of 636
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Date  Judge
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ROA Report01:48 PMTime:
Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 2 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 9/9/2013
Time: 3:00 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee9/9/2013
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 09/09/2013 03:00 PM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Contest Claim of
Exemption less 100
Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  closed Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption Robert J. Elgee9/12/2013
Writ:  Document Returned Served on 8/13/2013 to Neil David Campbell;
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00.
Robert J. Elgee10/16/2013
Unsatisfied Return of Service Robert J. Elgee
Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination Robert J. Elgee3/20/2015
Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination Robert J. Elgee3/23/2015
Hearing Scheduled  (Debtors Examination  05/04/2015 01:30 PM) Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed pending clerk action Robert J. Elgee
Continued  (Debtors Examination  05/11/2015 01:30 PM) Robert J. Elgee4/1/2015
Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination Robert J. Elgee
Motion for order finding Neil Campbell in contempt Robert J. Elgee4/23/2015
Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in support of motion for order finding Neil David
Campbell in contempt
Robert J. Elgee
Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee4/24/2015
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  05/18/2015 11:30 AM)  Motion for Order
finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee4/27/2015
Notice Vacating Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Debtor's
Examination
Robert J. Elgee4/30/2015
Hearing result for Debtors Examination scheduled  on 05/11/2015 01:30
PM:   Hearing Vacated
Robert J. Elgee
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 5/18/2015
Time: 11:32 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee5/18/2015
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Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 3 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 05/18/2015 11:30 AM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Motion for Order
finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt less 100
Robert J. Elgee5/18/2015
Second amended order granting motion for judgment debtor's examination Robert J. Elgee8/3/2015
Hearing Scheduled  (Debtors Examination  08/24/2015 02:00 PM) Robert J. Elgee8/4/2015
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Debtors Examination
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 1:49 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee8/24/2015
Hearing result for Debtors Examination scheduled  on 08/24/2015 02:00
PM:   District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  closed Robert J. Elgee
Motion for Order Finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt and Notice of
Hearing Thereon
Robert J. Elgee11/3/2015
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion for Contempt  12/07/2015 02:00 PM)  Neil
David Campbell
Robert J. Elgee
Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Order Finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of Motion for Order Finding Neil David
Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Shaun Paisley in Support of Motion for Order Finding Neil David
Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed pending clerk action Robert J. Elgee11/4/2015
Opposition and Declaration of Neil Campbell to Motion for Contempt Robert J. Elgee11/23/2015
Supplemental Affidavit of Shaun Paisley in support of motion for order
finding Neil David Campbell in contempt
Robert J. Elgee12/2/2015
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Contempt
Hearing date: 12/7/2015
Time: 2:23 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee12/7/2015
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Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 4 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Hearing result for Motion for Contempt scheduled  on 12/07/2015 02:00
PM:   District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Neil David
Campbell less 100
Robert J. Elgee12/7/2015
Hearing Scheduled  (Hearing Scheduled  12/21/2015 03:00 PM)  Admit /
Deny
Robert J. Elgee12/9/2015
 Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Admit/Deny Hearing
Hearing date: 12/21/2015
Time: 2:57 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee12/21/2015
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled  on 12/21/2015 03:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Admit / Deny less
100
Robert J. Elgee12/22/2015
Hearing result for Clerk's Status scheduled  on 02/01/2016 04:59 PM:
Hearing Vacated
Robert J. Elgee2/1/2016
Notice Of Admit/Deny Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Hearing Scheduled  02/22/2016 04:00 PM)
Admit/deny
Robert J. Elgee
Charging Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of Motion for Order Finding
Neil David Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 2/22/2016
Time: 3:58 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee2/22/2016
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled  on 02/22/2016 04:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Admit/deny less
100
Robert J. Elgee
Advisement of Rights Regarding Contempt Robert J. Elgee2/23/2016
Notification of Rights Robert J. Elgee
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Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 5 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Hearing Scheduled  (Court Trial  05/04/2016 09:00 AM)  1 day Robert J. Elgee2/25/2016
Hearing Scheduled  (Pretrial Conference  04/11/2016 01:30 PM) Robert J. Elgee
Notice Of Trial Setting, Pre-trial Conference, and Order Governing Futher
Proceedings
Robert J. Elgee
Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Finding Neil David
Campbell in Contempt
Robert J. Elgee3/10/2016
Objection to Affirmative Defenses Robert J. Elgee3/17/2016
Amended Certificate Of Service of Objection to Affirmative Defenses Robert J. Elgee3/24/2016
 Civil Case Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial
Order
Robert J. Elgee4/4/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 4/11/2016
Time: 1:36 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee4/11/2016
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled  on 04/11/2016 01:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of Motion Striking Affirmative Defenses
Filed by Defendant Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee4/20/2016
Motion for Order Striking Affirmative Defenses Filed by Defendant Neil
Campbell and Notice of Hearing
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  05/02/2016 02:00 PM)  to Strike Affirmative
Defenses
Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiffs' Request  for Judicial Notice Robert J. Elgee4/22/2016
Plaintiffs' Exhibit List Robert J. Elgee4/27/2016
Motion for admission pro hac vice Robert J. Elgee4/28/2016
Notice of vacating hearing on motion for order striking affirmative defenses
filed by Defendant Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee5/2/2016
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 05/02/2016 02:00 PM:   Hearing
Vacated  to Strike Affirmative Defenses
Robert J. Elgee
Stipulation to continue hearing and trial dates Robert J. Elgee
Order continuing hearing and trial dates Robert J. Elgee5/5/2016
Continued  (Court Trial  05/25/2016 09:00 AM)  1 day Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion to Strike  05/23/2016 04:00 PM)  strike def's
affirmative defenses
Robert J. Elgee
Order granting motion for pro hac vice admission Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff: C&M Investment Group, LTD Appearance Luke L. Dauchot Robert J. Elgee 6 of 636
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CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Plaintiff: Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership Appearance Luke L. Dauchot Robert J. Elgee5/5/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 5/11/2016
Time: 10:00 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee5/11/2016
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Application For Appointment Of Attorney Robert J. Elgee
Document sealed
Defendant: Campbell, Neil David Order Appointing Public Defender Public
defender R. Keith Roark (for Criminal Contempt portion of the case only)
Robert J. Elgee5/12/2016
 Order Appointing Public Defender Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Hearing Scheduled  05/18/2016 11:00 AM)  public
defender application review
Robert J. Elgee5/17/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 5/18/2016
Time: 11:04 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: R. Keith Roark
Robert J. Elgee5/18/2016
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Lawson & Laski Receipt number: 0003128
Dated: 5/18/2016  Amount: $4.00 (Cash)
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled  on 05/18/2016 11:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  public defender
application review less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Lauren Schweitzer Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff: C&M Investment Group, LTD Appearance Lauren Schweitzer Robert J. Elgee
Order Revoking Appointment Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiffs' trial brief Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff's' Revised Exhibit List Robert J. Elgee
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CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Strike
Hearing date: 5/23/2016
Time: 4:03 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee5/23/2016
Hearing result for Motion to Strike scheduled  on 05/23/2016 04:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  strike def's
affirmative defenses less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled  on 05/25/2016 09:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated  1 day
Robert J. Elgee5/26/2016
Hearing Scheduled  (Scheduling Conference  06/13/2016 10:30 AM) Robert J. Elgee
 Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Defendant: Campbell, Neil David Order Appointing Public Defender Public
defender Lee Philip Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Robert J. Elgee
Document sealed
Ex Parte Affidavit of Neil Campbell Robert J. Elgee
Document sealed
Order Regarding Appointment Robert J. Elgee6/1/2016
Notice of intent to appear by telephone Robert J. Elgee
Notice of intent to appear by telephone Robert J. Elgee6/2/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 6/13/2016
Time: 8:29 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number:
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: Lee Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee6/13/2016
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled  on 06/13/2016 10:30
AM:   Hearing Held  Erin Clark to appear by telephone
Ritzau to appear by telephone
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  07/18/2016 03:30 PM)  motion to strike,
motion enlarge time
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Court Trial  07/26/2016 09:00 AM)  2 days Robert J. Elgee
 Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee
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Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 8 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Robert J. Elgee6/13/2016
Supplemental Notice of Affirmative Defenses Robert J. Elgee6/20/2016
Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert Affirmative Defenses Robert J. Elgee6/21/2016
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert Affirmative
Defenses
Robert J. Elgee
Motion to Dismiss Contempt of Court Charges and Notice of Hearing
thereon
Robert J. Elgee6/30/2016
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Contempt of Court Charges Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion to Dismiss  07/18/2016 03:30 PM)  contempt
of court charges
Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Robert J. Elgee
Document sealed
7/1/2016
Notice of vacating motion  for order striking affirmative defenses Robert J. Elgee7/11/2016
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 07/18/2016 03:30 PM:   Hearing
Vacated  motion to strike, motion enlarge time
Robert J. Elgee
Opposition To motion to enlarge time to assert affirmative defenses Robert J. Elgee
Opposition To motion to dismiss contempt charges Robert J. Elgee
Reply memorandum to petitioners' opposition to motion to enlarge time to
assert affirmative defenses
Robert J. Elgee7/13/2016
Reply memorandum to petitioners' opposition to motion to dismiss
contempt charges
Robert J. Elgee
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
Hearing date: 7/18/2016
Time: 3:34 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Diana Weinberger
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Robert J. Elgee7/18/2016
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled  on 07/18/2016 03:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Diana Weinberger
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  contempt of court
charges
Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated July 19, 2016 Robert J. Elgee7/20/2016
Respondent's Exhibit List Robert J. Elgee
Respondent's supplemental exhibit list Robert J. Elgee7/21/2016
Respondent's trial Brief Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiffs' revised trial brief Robert J. Elgee7/22/2016
Plaintiffs Amended Request for Judicial Notice Robert J. Elgee
Order Denying Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert Affirmative Defenses and
to Dismiss Contempt Charges
Robert J. Elgee7/25/2016
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CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 7/26/2016
Time: 9:06 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: Lee Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee7/26/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 7/27/2016
Time: 9:00 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: Lee Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee7/27/2016
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled  on 07/26/2016 09:00 AM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  2 days more than
500
Robert J. Elgee
Exhibit/Witness List Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated August 1, 2016 Robert J. Elgee8/1/2016
Ex parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated August 12, 2016 Requesting Funds
to Pay for a Copy of the Trial Transcript
Robert J. Elgee8/12/2016
Order Granting Funds to pay for a copy of the trial transcript Robert J. Elgee8/17/2016
Plaintiffs' proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Robert J. Elgee8/19/2016
Neil Campbell's Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Funds to Pay for Attorney's Fees Submitted in the Ex Parte
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated August 1, 2016
Robert J. Elgee8/30/2016
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated September 1, 2016 Robert J. Elgee9/1/2016
Neil Campbell's Response to Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Robert J. Elgee9/2/2016
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Neil Cambell's Proposed Finding of Fact
and Conclusions of Law
Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Funds to Pay for Attorney's Fees Submitted in the Ex Parte
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated September 1, 2016
Robert J. Elgee9/12/2016
Case Taken Under Advisement Robert J. Elgee9/28/2016
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Re: Civil and Ciminal Contempt Robert J. Elgee11/3/2016
No Longer U/A Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Sentencing  11/28/2016 01:30 PM) Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau regarding information for sentencing hearing Robert J. Elgee11/14/2016 10 of 636
Date: 3/29/2017 Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County User: CRYSTAL
Date  Judge
Other Claims
ROA Report01:48 PMTime:
Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 10 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Points of Law for Sentencing hearing Robert J. Elgee11/14/2016
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Sentencing Brief Robert J. Elgee11/21/2016
Motion to Reconsider, Clarify, Terminate Appointment, and Require
Reimbursement
Robert J. Elgee11/22/2016
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 11/28/2016
Time: 1:28 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: Lee Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee11/28/2016
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled  on 11/28/2016 01:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Sentencing Orders Regarding Civil and Criminal Contempt Robert J. Elgee12/1/2016
Judgment Robert J. Elgee
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed Robert J. Elgee
Civil Disposition entered for: Campbell, Neil David, Defendant; C&M
Investment Group, LTD, Plaintiff; Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff.  Filing date: 12/1/2016
Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated December 1, 2016 Robert J. Elgee12/5/2016
Order Granting Funds to Pay for Attorney's Fees Submitted in the Ex Parte
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau dated December 1, 2016
Robert J. Elgee12/8/2016
Notice Of Appeal Robert J. Elgee12/14/2016
Motion for Order Recommending Waiver of the Appellate Filing Fee, the
Reporter's Transcript Fee, and the Clerk's Record Fee
Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Neil Campbell Regarding Inability to Pay Fees Robert J. Elgee
Motion to Continue Appointment of Lee Ritzau as Appellate Public
Defender for Neil Campbell and Notice of Hearing Thereon
Robert J. Elgee
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue Appointment of Lee Ritzau
as Appellate Public Defender for Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee
Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Notice of Hearing Thereon Robert J. Elgee
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Robert J. Elgee
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Robert J. Elgee
Appealed To The Supreme Court Robert J. Elgee12/15/2016
STATUS CHANGED:  Inactive Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion to Stay  01/09/2017 04:30 AM) Robert J. Elgee
Order Recommending Waiver of Appellate Filing Fee, Reporter's
Transcript Fee and Clerk's Record Fee
Robert J. Elgee12/16/2016
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Date: 3/29/2017 Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County User: CRYSTAL
Date  Judge
Other Claims
ROA Report01:48 PMTime:
Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 11 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Second Motion to Terminate Appointment of Public Defender, Clarify
Scope of Representation, and Require Reimbursement
Robert J. Elgee12/29/2016
Affidavit of Timothy K. Graves in Support of Second Motion to Terminate
Appointment of Public Defender, Clarify Scope of Representation, and
Require Reimbursement
Robert J. Elgee
Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee12/30/2016
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  01/09/2017 04:30 PM)  Second Motion to
Terminate Appointment of Public Defender, Clarify Scope of
Representaiton, and Require Reimbursment
Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendant Neil David Campbell's Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment
Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiffs' Request to Supplement the Clerk's Record on Appeal Robert J. Elgee
Plaintiff's Opposition To Defendant Neil David Campbell's Motion to
Continue Appointment of Lee Ritzau as Appellate Public Defender for Neil
Campbell
Robert J. Elgee
Supplemental Affidavit of Lee Ritzau in Support of Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment
Robert J. Elgee1/3/2017
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Stay
Hearing date: 1/9/2017
Time: 4:32 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell, Attorney: Lee Ritzau
Robert J. Elgee1/9/2017
Hearing result for Motion to Stay scheduled  on 01/09/2017 04:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Ex Parte Affidavit of Lee Ritzau dated January 10, 2017 Robert J. Elgee1/10/2017
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 01/09/2017 04:30 PM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  Second Motion to
Terminate Appointment of Public Defender, Clarify Scope of
Representaiton, and Require Reimbursment less 100
Robert J. Elgee1/12/2017
Hearing Scheduled  (Status  03/13/2017 01:30 PM)  re civil contempt Robert J. Elgee
Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Robert J. Elgee
Order Terminating Appointment of Public Defender Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Status  01/25/2017 03:00 PM) Robert J. Elgee
 Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee
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Date: 3/29/2017 Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County User: CRYSTAL
Date  Judge
Other Claims
ROA Report01:48 PMTime:
Case: CV-2012-0000407  Current Judge: Robert J. ElgeePage 12 of 12
CM Investment Group, LTD, etal.  vs. Philip Richard Powers, etal.
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court    Paid
by: Campbell, Neil David (defendant)  Receipt number: 0000496  Dated:
1/25/2017  Amount: $129.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Campbell, Neil David
(defendant)
Robert J. Elgee1/25/2017
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 497 Dated 1/25/2017 for 100.00) Robert J. Elgee
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 498 Dated 1/25/2017 for 200.00) Robert J. Elgee
Hearing result for Status scheduled  on 01/25/2017 03:00 PM:   Hearing
Vacated
Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Funds to Pay for Attorney's Fees Submitted in the Ex Parte
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Dated 1/10/17
Robert J. Elgee1/26/2017
Bond Converted (Transaction number 48 dated 2/1/2017 amount 200.00) Robert J. Elgee2/1/2017
Motion to Resume Judgent Debtor's Examination Robert J. Elgee2/7/2017
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 832 Dated 2/8/2017 for 212.55) Robert J. Elgee2/8/2017
Hearing Scheduled  (Debtors Examination  04/03/2017 01:30 PM) Robert J. Elgee
Order Granting Motion to Resume Judgent Debtor's Examination Robert J. Elgee
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Clerk's Record For Appeal
Per Page Paid by: Campbell, Neil David Receipt number: 0001162  Dated:
2/23/2017  Amount: $189.15 (Check)
Robert J. Elgee2/23/2017
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Providing Information for Status Conference Robert J. Elgee3/6/2017
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 3/13/2017
Time: 1:38 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: C&M Investment Group, LTD, Attorney: Erin Clark
Party: Neil Campbell
Robert J. Elgee3/13/2017
Hearing result for Status scheduled  on 03/13/2017 01:30 PM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  re civil contempt
Ms. Clark appearing by phone less 100
Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Scheduled  (Status  05/15/2017 02:00 PM) Robert J. Elgee3/27/2017
 Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Robert J. Elgee3/29/2017
Bond Converted (Transaction number 175 dated 3/29/2017 amount
212.55)
Robert J. Elgee
Bond Converted (Transaction number 176 dated 3/29/2017 amount
100.00)
Robert J. Elgee
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
Jolynn Dmge, C!r:;irk District 
Ccurr Bt,f~1e County, ld:1ho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12- L/07 
NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
ROBERT J. ELGEE 
TO: NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, and his attorneys of record. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT PLAINTIFFS, C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD. and KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, by and through their counsel of 
record, Erin F. Clark of the law firm Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC has filed that certain 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL against you that was 
NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT - I 11259-001 
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entered on December 13, 2011, in Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County 
of Los Angeles pursuant to I.C. § 10-1302. 
The name and post office address of the judgment creditors are C&M Investment Group, 
c/o Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership, 11755 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1600, Los Angeles, CA 
90025 and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership, 11755 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1600, Los Angeles, 
CA 90025. 
The name and post office address of the judgment creditors' lawyer in the State of Idaho 
is Erin F. Clark, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, P.O. Box 3310, Ketchum, Idaho 83340. 
DATED: May~, 2012 LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May _}L, 2012, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
P.O. Box 6214 
2804 Summit Drive 
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353 
NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT - 2 
Erin Clark 
_/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
11259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
JUN 1 9 2012 
Jolynn DfaQe, ci.rk District 
Court Bla/M County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF 
ORDER OF DOMESTICATION 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN 
HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel 
of record, and moves this Court for an Order of Domestication of the Judgment entered against 
Defendant NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL ("Defendant") on December 13, 2011, in Superior Court 
of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles (the "Judgment"). The basis for 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDER OF DOMESTICATION - 1 
11259-001 
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this Motion is that the Court files on this case establish that a certified copy of the Judgment was 
filed with the Court pursuant to I.C. § 10-1302 on June 1, 2012 through the Affidavit in Support 
of Filing Foreign Judgment, Notice of the Filing of Foreign Judgment was served on Defendant 
by Plaintiffs on May 31, 2012, Notice of the Filing of Foreign Judgment was served on 
Defendant by the Deputy Clerk on June 6, 2012 and more than five days have passed since the 
filing of the judgment pursuant to I.C. § 10-1306A. 
DATED: June_!&, 2012 LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDER OF DOMESTICATION - 2 
1259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 FILED A.M~~·=-P .~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
JUN 2 1 2012 . 
I 
Court Blsine c!i/:'* District JoLm,, Ora~ . u 
----,!1__1Y~o 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
ORDER OF DOMESTICATION 
Pursuant to Plaintiffs' C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP motion for Issuance of Order of Domestication and the Certified 
Judgment on file herein, the Affidavit in Support of Filing Foreign Judgment, and good cause 
appearing, the Court orders as follows. 
ORDER OF DOMESTICATION - 1 1259-001 
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.. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT NEIL 
DAVID CAMPBELL entered on December 6, 2011 in Superior Court of the State of California 
in and for the County of Los Angeles is hereby domesticated to be a judgment in the State of 
Idaho. 
DATED this ~ day of June 2012. 
ROBERT J. ElGE 
District Judge 
ORDER OF DOMESTICATION - 2 1259-001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June M. 2012, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
P.O. Box 6214 
2804 Summit Drive 
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353 
Erin F. Clark 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
ORDER OF DOMESTICATION - 3 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
C}~~, / 
Deputy Clerk 
11259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
FILED ~:~I/ J./=I\ 
\ m 23 201s] 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
MOTION FOR ORDER FINDING 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN 
CONTEMPT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN 
HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel 
of record, and moves this Court to issue an Order finding Defendant Neil David Campbell 
("Judgment Debtor") in contempt for failure to comply with this Court's March 23, 2015 Order 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination. 
MOTION FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 1 
11259-001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 2...( , 2015, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
340 River Street East, Unit 124 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
_. Telecopy ~ F-<0. ~¥-fvtS _) 
MOTION FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 5 
11259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, !SB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Fae imile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorney for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
I r A_ 
FILED ~~-: t < 
APR 2 4 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD. and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually· 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FOREST AL DE TECA, S.S. a 
corporation; and DOES l through 50 inclu ive, 
Defendants. 
Ca eNo.: CV-12-407 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
ORDER FINDING NEIL DAVID 
CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named Plaintiff C&M INVESTMENT 
GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (collectively 
"Plaintiffs"), by and through their coun el of record, will call up for hearing it Motion for Order 
Finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt on the 181h day of May, 2015 atll:30 a.m., or a 
OTICE OF HEARi G FOR MOTIO FOR ORDER 
Fl DI G NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL IN CO TEMPT - I 11259-001 
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oon thereafter a counsel may be beard in the Blaine County Courthou e, 1st and Croy Streets, 
Hailey, Idaho. 
DATED: ApriJ fl.,2015 
NOTICE OF HEARJ G FOR MOTIO FOR ORDER 
Fl DING EILDAVIDCAMPBELLI CO TEMPT -2 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I 1259-00 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 2'.-~2015, I cau ed to be erved a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addre ed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
340 River Street East, Unit 124 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
NOTICE OF HEARi G FOR MOTIO FOR ORDER 
FINDrNG EIL DAVlD CAMPBELL IN CO TEMPT - 3 
__ U.S. Mail, Po tage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
\.../"'Federal Express 
11259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
FILED ~·~· 22 : 
FEB - 1 2016 
Jolynn Drage, o .~ istrict 
Cc,:rt Bk2ir:e C.?u:~ty, td;,ho 
-·-~·--..J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
NOTICE OF ADMIT/DENY 
HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named Plaintiffs C&M INVESTMENT 
GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (collectively 
"Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, will call up for hearing to have Defendant 
Neil David Campbell admit or deny the civil and contempt charges set forth in the 
contemporaneously filed Charging Affidavit of Erin F. Clark on the 22nd day of February 2016 
NOTICE OF ADMIT/DENY HEARING - 1 11259-001 
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'-. 
at 4:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the Blaine County Courthouse, 1st 
and Croy Streets, Hailey, Idaho. 
DATED: January 28, 2016 
NOTICE OF ADMIT/DENY HEARING - 2 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
11259-001 
28 of 636
.... _. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~'). 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on~ ·U , 2015, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
340 River Street East, Unit 124 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
NOTICE OF ADMIT/DENY HEARING - 3 
Erin Clark 
~. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ Federal Express 
11259-001 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMETNS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANNANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
CHARGING AFFIDAVIT OF ERIN 
F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ORDER FINDING 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN 
CONTEMPT 
Erin F. Clark, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs, C&M Investment Group, Ltd. and 
Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership ("Plaintiffs") in the above-entitled action. 
2. On March 18, 2015, I caused Defendant Neil David Campbell ("Campbell") to be 
served by federal express with Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIN F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 1 
11259-001 
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3. On March 23, 2015, the deputy clerk served the Order Granting Motion for 
Campbell's Examination on Judgment Debtor. This Order was later amended so as to change the 
date for the examination. Therefore, on April 1, 2015, the deputy clerk served the Amended 
Order Granting Motion for Campbell's Examination ("Amended Order") on Judgment Debtor. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Amended Order. 
CIVIL CONTEMPT CHARGES 
4. Part of the April 1, 2015 Amended Order required Campbell to produce "all 
documents evidencing any payments made by Defendant to any legal counsel over the period of 
2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those 
payments." To date, Campbell has produced no documents whatsoever that are responsive to 
this portion of the Amended Order. 
5. In Campbell's November 20, 2015 Opposition and Declaration, Campbell 
testified that he has employed six attorneys over the last several years, including David Flyer, 
Michael Taiteman, Robert Turffs, Jonathan Michaels, Steve Thompson and Dyke Huish. At his 
Debtor's Examination, Campbell also identified Susan Roy as an attorney that he engaged during 
the relevant time period. 
6. Another part of the April 1, 2012 Amended Order required Campbell to produce 
"all records relating to financial accounts (savings accounts, checking accounts, or otherwise) 
maintained in Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for the time period 
commencing January 1, 2012 to the present date, including but not limited to documents that 
identify any deposits made into and/or any disbursements of funds made from said account(s)." 
7. In Campbell's August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination, he admitted that he had 
opened an account with HSBC in Hong Kong and that he deposited $300,000 into this account. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIN F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 2 
11259-001 
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To date, Campbell has not produced any documentation evidencing this bank account, or where 
the $300,000 was used or transferred. 
8. Campbell also failed to produce the canceled checks from his Bank of America 
account. Instead, he merely produced records that show withdrawals by checks, but with no 
notation of the payee on the checks. 
9. Campbell also failed to produce all of the Bank of America account records. The 
first month's records for this account that was produced is the June 2012 account statement. 
This statement, however, states that the interest paid to date is $2.11, yet the interest paid during 
that month was only $1.23. Therefore, the account had to have been open and earning interest 
prior to June 2012. 
10. Under Idaho Code§ 7-601(5), Idaho courts have the constitutional, statutory, and 
inherent authority to compel obedience to their lawful orders. Campbell, therefore, is in 
contempt of this court for his refusal to produce the documents responsive to this order. The 
charges of civil contempt are as follows: 
COUNT ONE: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the documents 
evidencing the payments he made to David Flyer over the period of2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
COUNT TWO: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the documents 
evidencing the payments he made to Michael Taiteman over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those 
payments. 
COUNT THREE: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the 
documents evidencing the payments he made to Robert Turffs over the period of 2009 to 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIN F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 3 
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present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those 
payments. 
COUNT FOUR: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the documents 
evidencing the payments he made to Jonathan Michaels over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those 
payments. 
COUNT FIVE: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the documents 
evidencing the payments he made to Steve Thompson over the period of 2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
COUNT SIX: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the documents 
evidencing the payments he made to Dyke Huish over the period of 2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
COUNT SEVEN: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce the 
documents evidencing the payments he made to Susan Roy over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those 
payments. 
COUNT EIGHT: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce all records 
relating to his HSBC bank account, including documents that identify any deposits made 
into and any disbursements of funds from that account. 
COUNT NINE: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce all records 
relating to his Bank of America account, including records evidencing the payee on the 
checks written out of that account. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERJN F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 4 
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COUNT TEN: Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce all of the 
statements for his Bank of America account, specifically all records for the account pre-
June 2012. 
11. Under Idaho Code § 7-611, the court is authorized to incarcerate Campbell until 
he has performed the act(s) he was ordered to perform. Therefore, Campbell should be 
incarcerated until he has produced all documents evidencing the payments, and the source of 
those funds, to each of the seven attorneys he engaged during the 2009 to present time frame, as 
well as all records relating to the bank accounts he opened with HSBC and Bank of America. 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES 
12. I took the debtor's examination of Campbell on August 24, 2015 ("Examination") 
after the court had Campbell put under oath. A true and correct copy of the Examination is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
13. In advance of the debtor's examination, Campbell did produce some bank records 
from two accounts: (1) a Bank of America account that was opened in June 2012 and closed 
February 2013; and (2) a Zion's Bank account with records from December 2011 through May 
2015. These documents contained information regarding Campbell's receipt of funds and his 
monthly spending. 
14. During the examination, Campbell repeatedly testified that "he did not know the 
answer" to questions related to the source(s) oflarge sums of cash that he deposited into his 
accounts, or how he paid he paid his bills when his bank account records failed to evidence their 
payment. No reasonable person would think his testimony was truthful given his admissions that 
he has no income other than his monthly social security payment of just under $1600/month. 
15. Under Idaho Code§ 7-601(4), deceit by a party to a special proceeding constitutes 
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a contempt of court. The charges of criminal contempt are as follows: 
COUNT ELEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 2012 opening 
balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
Q. So this is the statement from June 81\ 2012, through July 91\ 2012: 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June st\ 2012, as 
being $24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea at this point. 
Id. at 33:22-34:4. 
COUNT TWELVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000 into it. Did 
it come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 34:5-7. 
COUNT THIRTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
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Q. What possibly-where possibly could this money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the 
possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
COUNT FOURTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own any assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. 
COUNT FIFTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
COUNT SIXTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
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A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
COUNT SEVENTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of 
America account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
*** 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000 and you were 
living solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for 
you to be able to put $24,000 into a bank account in June of2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
* * * 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are 
here under penalty of perjury. 
A. Urn-mm. 
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Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when 
you're saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social 
Security, it just does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
COUNT EIGHTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. And that on November 30, 2012, you deposited $3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Where could it have come from? 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 38:18-24. 
COUNT NINETEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with 
HSBC? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank 
account and put $300,000 into it? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Id. at 41 :15-22. 
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COUNT TWENTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully regarding cash deposits he made in his Zion's bank account as follows: 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. Where could this have 
come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did someone give you $10,000 in cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was back in 2011. 
Id. at 49:10-15. 
COUNT TWENTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was 
worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage units, 
correct? 
A. Well, I to answer your question, I don't I didn't bring anything 
with me that I would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Id. at 49:24-50:16. 
COUNT TWENTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct: 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe 
some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part 
of a venture capital group that we were involved with. 
* * * 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by 
my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000- end of201 l what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
COUNT TWENTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating 
to enable you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month, correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
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A. I believe this was part - I believe this was and I don't know for sure, 
but I think this was part of that stock settlement. 
* * * 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
COUNT TWENTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock 
- why were you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in 
cash in your condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits, right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
Id. at 56:21-57:3 
COUNT TWENTY-FIVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIN F. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER FINDING NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL IN CONTEMPT - 12 
11259-001 
41 of 636
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in 
one month. And if you're telling me that that money came from a 
stock sale, that would mean that you were having that cash from the 
stock sale somewhere within your reach; isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would have gotten it if the money weren't in your reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I 
don't remember if it did or not. 
Q. So where- if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash 
have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then - you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of 
cash that you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up corning up 
with these deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
COUNT TWENTY-SIX: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated 
February 21st, 2012; right. 
* * * 
Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 
deposit, a $2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous 
month of $10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the 
cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of 2012; 
right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you- so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made 
deposits of, yes. 
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Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in 
cash at the beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in 
your possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the 
cash you had in your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
COUNT TWENTY-NINE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would have obtained additional cash if not somebody providing it 
to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives 
you one piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of ash; right? Because you liquidated everything when you 
were in Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 
while you were in Florida and before you moved to Idaho other than 
what was in your storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any 
assets worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage 
unit, right? 
A. Nothing that was worth more than $10,000 to my recollection, yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:21-61 :17. 
COUNT THIRTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're- on February 22nd there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 
2ih a $2,600 deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
COUNT THIRTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully about why his bank records no longer showed him paying his rent with a 
check as he had done for the previous five months. Specifically, Campbell testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
A. I assume so. 
Q. Who was paying your rent? 
A. I don't know-I was, I assume. 
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Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 65:9-14. 
COUNT THIRTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid your rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from 
the two bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of 
money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71:17-20. 
COUNT THIRTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten what source of funds could you have 
possibly used to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't 
remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you 
could have paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and 
your expenses, and we're talking about $1,500 every month that 
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you're saying that you didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with 
checks from the two bank accounts that you're telling us are the only 
bank accounts that you have. 
A Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at 
that time. 
Id. at 71:23-72:4. 
COUNT THIRTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another 
bank account out there; right? Those are my only options that I can 
think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is 
there any other possible ways. That's the only other possible way I 
can understand that it was being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you gone to Atkinson's 
with cash to obtain a money order? 
A. I have. 
* * * 
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Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to 
pay for it, that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at 
that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either -
that stock that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into 
your Zion's account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of 
A. I don't remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
16. Under Idaho Code§ 7-610, the court is authorized to incarcerate Campbell for a 
period not exceeding five (5) days for each finding of guilt on the criminal contempt charges. As 
such, Campbell can be incarcerated up to 120 days for the 24 criminal contempt charges. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this Zis_ day of January 2016. 
Name: ': cYY tz JI") ' 
Notary Public . 
Residing at {+tu_ lv.1 I 0 
My commission expires 7// 0 _ (}(Z. I&, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January2.8, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of 
the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
P.O. Box 3372 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
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/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ Federal Express 
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Erin F. Clark, Esq. ISB 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
Post Office Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
efc@lawsonlaski.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
COPY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR'S EXAMINATION 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. 
and KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP's Motion for Debtor's Examination, 
requesting an Amended Order directing that Defendant Neil Campbell, the judgment debtor 
herein, appear and testify under oath concerning the extend and whereabouts of his non-exempt 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEBTOR'S EXAMIN?::°N - 1 
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property that may be used to satisfy the outstanding judgment entered against him on December 
6, 2011 by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles, 
and domesticated by this court on June 21, 2012 to be a judgment of the State of Idaho. The 
Court, being fully advised, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Debtor's Examination is GRANTED. 
2. Defendant Neil Campbell, residing in Blaine County, shall appear pursuant to the 
jurisdiction of this Court for a debtor's examination on the 11th day of May, 2015 at the hour 
of 1:30 p.m. at the Blaine County Courthouse, 201 2"d Ave. S., Hailey, Idaho to be examined 
under oath concerning any property Defendant may have, as well as any money or property that 
may be owed to Defendant, or which Defendant may owe to others. 
3. Thirty (30) days prior to the date of the examination referred to in Paragraph 2 
above, Defendant shall produce true and correct copies of the following documents to Plaintiffs' 
counsel of record: 
a. All filings in Defendant's current divorce proceeding that relate to or evidence 
any assets purporting to belong to Defendant or the marital community. 
b. All documents evidencing any payments made by Defendant to any legal counsel 
over the period of 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of 
the funds used to make those payments. 
c. All financial statements prepared by Defendant or on behalf of Defendant and/or 
given at the request of any bank, financial institution, taxing authority, or any 
other creditor on behalf of Defendant during the time period commencing January 
1, 2012 to the present date. 
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d. All records relating to financial accounts (savings accounts, checking accounts, or 
otherwise) maintained in Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for 
the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to the present date, including but not 
limited to documents that identify any deposits made into and/or any 
disbursements of funds made from said account(s). 
e. All documents, including any rental or other agreements, related to Defendant's 
occupancy of the property at 340 River Street, Unit 124, Ketchum, ID. 
f. All documents related to the California Franchise Tax Board's tax lien for 
$133,208.91 filed against Defendant in Orange County, California (Certificate 
No. 14015388391), including any communications with the California Franchise 
Tax Board about the lien. 
g. All federal and state income tax returns and supporting schedules and 
documentation for Defendant for 2012 and 2013. If the filing of the 2014 return 
is pending but the return has been prepared or the information is available, that 
information is to be provided as well. 
h. All certificates of title of any vehicles owned by Defendant. 
i. Records of all personal property owned by Defendant including but not limited to 
stocks, ownership of any interest in partnerships or limited liability companies, 
trusts, notes, judgments. U.S. bonds, equipment, machinery, tools and computers. 
J. Any documents evidencing the sale of any personal property owned by Defendant 
since January 2010. 
k. All records of any real property, or portion of real property, owned by Defendant. 
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' ' 
DATED this~ day of March, 2015. 
Honorable l:!!Jlt:~' I z_:--L.j 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\_ day of~2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Neil David Campbell 
340 River Street East, Unit 124 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Erin F. Clark, Esq. 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
--1.:- Federal Express 
_i._ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., 
and KARLIN HOLDING LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, ) 
individually; NEIL DAVID ) 
CAMPBELL, individually; ) 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, ) 
S.A., a corporation; ) 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, ) 
S.S., a corporation, and DOES) 
1 through 50, inclusive, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
Case No. CV-2012-407 
EXAMINATION OF NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
(JUDGMENT DEBTOR) 
Testimony taken on Monday, August 24, 2015, at the 
Blaine County Courthouse, Hailey, Idaho. 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs: ERIN F. CLARK, ESQ. 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P. 0. Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244 
P. 0. Box 1379 
Ketchum, ID 
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MONDAY, AUGUST 24, 2015 
1:57 P.M. 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, 
called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiffs, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
MS. CLARK: Okay. Well, today is August 24th, 
2015. We're here for the debtor's examination of Neil 
Campbell. 
My name is Erin Clark, counsel for the 
plaintiffs in this case. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MS. CLARK: 
Q. Mr. Campbell, would you state your full name 
for the record? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Neil David Campbell. 
And do you go by any other name? 
No. 
Have you ever gone by --
No. 
any other name? 
If you could wait to answer until I finish 
speaking, otherwise it will be very hard for the person 
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transcribing the tape to understand. 
I would like to show you what we'll mark as 
Exhibit 1. 
So Exhibit 1 is the amended order -- second 
amended order granting motion for judgment debtor's 
examination and it was ordering you to appear today, the 
24th of August, 2015, at 2:00. 
Now, you understand that you're here to answer 
questions regarding your income and assets; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you were put under oath by Judge 
Elgee; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So this is -- testifying here today, although 
it's an informal setting, it is the same as testifying in 
court. Okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That means you have to tell the whole truth and 
that if you don't, then you could be at risk of being held 
under penalty of perjury. 
Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any questions about your obligation 
to tell the whole truth? 
A. No. 
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Q. All right. So if you don't understand any of 
my questions, please just let me know and I will restate 
them. Okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you do answer a question, then I'm going 
to assume that you did understand the meaning of it. Is 
that all right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
number? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Where do you currently live? 
2804 Summit in Elkhorn, Idaho. 
Is there a unit number or is that the unit 
That is the unit number. 
Okay. 
How long have you lived there? 
Not quite two months. 
Do you live with anybody else? 
My daughter. 
How old is she? 
Seven. 
And what is your current mailing address? 
A. I've given that, too; 3372, I believe it is, 
Post Office Box. 
Q. Still in Ketchum? 
A. Correct. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you pay rent for your current housing? 
It's being subsidized with help, but, yes. 
So what is the rental on the condo in Elkhorn? 
I believe 1500 a month. 
Who is subsidizing it? 
It's in a friend of mine's name. 
Do you have a lease agreement? 
I do not. 
What friend so your friend has a lease 
agreement with the owners? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
last name. 
Q. 
A. 
Correct. 
Who is the friend? 
Robert Duringer. 
Have you ever seen a copy of the lease? 
No. 
Who are the owners? 
Saralynn and Allan. I don't remember their 
How much of the $1,500 a month do you pay? 
A portion. I don't -- it's, I believe, less 
than -- I believe it's less than a thousand. 
Q. Have you had conversations with Mr. Duringer 
about how long he will continue to subsidize your rent? 
A. 
longer. 
It's coming to a close. 
6 
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Q. Have you had any conversations with 
Mr. Duringer about that issue? 
A. Yes. He's been kind enough to let me get 
established and that's -- but I don't have a time frame, 
no. 
Q. When was the last time you had a discussion 
with Mr. Duringer about his subsidizing your rent? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A few months ago. 
And what was the content of that conversation? 
That he was going to help me get on my feet. 
And he, in fact, has been subsidizing your rent 
for many months; right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
How long has he been subsidizing your rent? 
Since December of last year. 
So December of 2014; right? 
Correct. 
Do you pay the gas bill for this rental? 
I -- it's being paid by Durin 
What about the electric bill? 
He's paying the electric bill. 
Do you see the bills? 
No, I do not. 
Mr. Duringer. 
How long have you known Mr. Duringer? 
Quite a while. I don't know the exact date. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Are we talking ten years? Twenty years? 
At least fifteen years. 
And how did you meet him? 
Through work through South -- when I was 
working for South Bay Lexus. 
Q. When you were working -- I'm sorry, I didn't 
catch that. 
A. Through South Bay Lexus. 
Q. South --
A. Bay Lexus, L-E-X-U-S. 
Q. What was your role with South Bay Lexus? 
A. Sales manager. 
Q. And what was Mr. Duringer's association with 
South Bay Lexus? 
A. He was covering their advertising. 
Q. When did you stop working together? 
A. I don't have the exact date. It was when I 
left South Bay Lexus. I don't know the date. 
Q. Was it in the 2000s? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then did you have any more work relationship 
with Mr. Duringer after you left South Bay Lexus? 
A. Not working relation, no. 
Q. Just a friendship? 
A. Correct. 
8 
63 of 636
. . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
how long. 
today? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What does Mr. Duringer do now for a living? 
I'm not sure what he's doing. 
Is he still working at South Bay Lexus? 
No. 
Did he leave at the same time as you did? 
No, he continued much longer, but I don't know 
And where does he live now? 
In Colorado. 
What's his address? 
I do know -- I don't know. 
Do you have a mobile phone? 
No, not with me. 
Do you have a mobile phone? 
Yes, I do. 
Is there a reason you didn't bring it with you 
I don't carry it. 
I'm going to need his address and phone number, 
so you can either voluntarily provide that to me after 
today or we can schedule another one of these and you can 
come down with that information with you. 
A. 
Q. 
So, how would you like to proceed in that area? 
I can give you the information. 
Okay. 
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So you have no idea what he does for a living 
now? 
A. I don't know what role he's playing in 
advertising. I know that he's expanded, but I have no idea 
what he's doing at the present time. 
Q. When you say "expanded," does he own his own 
advertising firm? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did, yes. 
In Colorado? 
Yes. 
Do you know the name of it? 
No, I do not. 
Have you ever been to Colorado to visit him? 
Yes, I have. 
Did you go to his place of business? 
No. 
Have you ever seen one of his business cards? 
Not in some time, no. 
Do you have his work number on your cell phone? 
No, I do not. 
What city in Colorado does he live? 
Larkspur. 
Is he married? 
Yes. 
How long has he been married? 
10 
65 of 636
. ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't know. 
Does he have children? 
He does. 
How many? 
He has a son. 
Is that all? 
Yes. 
Is his son younger than 18? 
No. 
How old is Mr. Duringer? 
I don't know. 
Is he around your age? 
Younger. 
Q. Younger. 
Does Mr. Duringer -- has he been to Idaho to 
visit with you or been to Idaho to your knowledge in the 
past four years? 
A. Not to my -- I don't know. I don't know. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
He hasn't been out to visit you in four years? 
No. 
Who found the apartment -- or the condo in 
Elkhorn that you are currently living in? 
A. I did. 
Q. Has Mr. Duringer had any conversations at all 
with the owners? 
11 
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A. I don't know. 
Q. How -- to your knowledge how did the lease 
agreement get executed? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you have conversations with the owners of 
the condo prior to you renting it? 
A. They're friends of mine. 
Q. Did you give them Mr. Duringer's contact 
information so that they could get in touch with him to get 
a lease executed? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
So Mr. Duringer has never seen the condo that 
he's on the lease for? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't know that. I don't know. 
Would Mr. Duringer come to Blaine County and 
not visit you, do you think? 
A. I don't believe -- I don't believe so, but I 
don't know if he's seen this on the Internet or -- has seen 
the property on the Internet or not. 
Q. How long is the lease that you get to live in 
the place subsidized by Mr. Duringer? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Have you had conversations with the owners 
regarding how long you plan to stay? 
A. They've asked me, yes, and I don't know yet. 
12 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
How big is the condo? 
I don't know the square footage. 
How many bedrooms? 
There's three. 
Have they ever rented it to your knowledge to 
anybody before they rented it to you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
a month? 
A. 
Yes. 
Who came up with the $1,500 rent amount? 
I don't know. 
How did you learn that the rent would be $1,500 
Saralynn had 
paying on the unit prior to 
that was the rent that I was 
it's the same unit that I 
was into when I first moved to Idaho. 
to --
your 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
it 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
was 
portion 
Okay. So now you're renting the same place? 
Correct. 
When you rented it before, you paid your rent 
an agency, wasn't it? High Country? 
Correct. 
Are you paying rent to High Country now? 
I'm not paying rent to High Country, no. 
Who do you pay rent to? 
Mr. Duringer. 
And do you write checks to Mr. Duringer for 
of the rent? 
13 
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No. 
How do you pay him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It's being covered through another entity. 
What entity is that? 
Jonathan Michaels. 
Who's Jonathan Michaels? 
He's my attorney. 
So Mr. Michaels is writing a check to 
Mr. Duringer? 
A. I don't know how that's being covered. 
Q. So what money is John -- Mr. Michaels using in 
order to pay your portion of the rent to Mr. Duringer? 
A. He has made a loan to me. 
Q. How much of a loan? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you sign any loan documents? 
A. I have, yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you have copies of those loan 
documents? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Where are the loan documents? 
A. In Mr. Michaels' office. 
Q. Why do you not have a copy of the loan 
documents? 
A. I don't know. 
14 
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Q. Did you ever have a copy of the loan documents? 
A. I can't remember if I did or not, but I don't 
have any at the present time. 
Q. Is it your testimony that you have a loan with 
Mr. Michaels of no set amount of money? 
A. There is not -- there is no set amount of 
money. 
Q. And there -- I'm sorry. 
There's no ceiling on the amount of money that 
he's willing to lend to you? 
A. You would have to ask Mr. Michaels. I don't 
know. He's helping me at the present time, yes. 
Q. Mr. Michaels, what city does he live in -- or 
does he work in? 
A. Newport Beach. 
Q. How did he come to be your attorney? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
He was a friend of mine. 
When did you first meet him? 
I don't know. 
One decade ago? Two decades ago? 
Within one decade. 
I'm sorry, did I ask you, how did you meet him, 
do you remember? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember how we met. 
Did you pay Mr. Michaels for the services that 
15 
70 of 636
' ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
he provided to you, legal services? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from what time frame to what time frame was 
he your lawyer? 
A. He handled the criminal defense, that 
particular segment of time, and was helping me prior to 
that, but I don't know how long it was before that. 
Q. Did you provide Mr. Michaels with a retainer? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you make payments to Mr. Michaels in order 
to pay the legal bills? 
A. You would have to find out from Mr. Michaels 
because this was taken care of while I was in -- while I 
was in jail. 
Q. Well, in fact, we did ask for all of the 
documents showing any payments you made to any of your 
lawyers, and you didn't provide any documents, did you? 
A. I explained that completely in my statement to 
you about that. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
You did not provide any documents, did you? 
No, I did not. 
Who pays your cell phone? 
That's being covered through Mr. Michaels. 
Does Mr. Michaels pay -- who is your carrier? 
I don't know. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You don't know who the carrier on your phone is? 
No, I don't. 
Do the bills come to you? 
No. 
The bills go to Mr. Michaels? 
Correct. 
When was the last time you had a discussion 
with Mr. Michaels regarding how much money you currently 
owe him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Have you had a conversation in the past month? 
I don't think it's been in the last month, no. 
Last two months? 
Probably within the last two months. 
And what amount did he tell you that you owed 
at that point? 
A. 
just the 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't think he gave me a full dollar amount, 
I don't remember. 
Do you pay any child support? 
No. 
Do you pay for your daughter's child expenses? 
Yes. 
What camps did she go to this summer? 
She went to the I think it's the 
St. Joseph's Camp; she went to Mountain Adventures; and I 
17 
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1 think she went to Galena Camp. 
2 Q. How much was the St. Joseph's Camp? 
3 A. I don't remember. 
4 Q. Did you pay for that? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. How did you pay for it? 
7 A. Social Security. 
8 Q. Did you pay with a check? Did you pay in cash? 
9 A. I paid in cash. 
10 Q. Why did you not write a check? 
11 A. I just decided that I wanted to pay in cash. 
12 Q. How long was the St. Joseph Camp? 
13 A. Two weeks. 
14 Q. How long was the Mountain Adventures Camp? 
15 A. I don't remember. 
16 Q. How did you pay for that? 
17 A. I paid that in cash as well. 
18 Q. How long was the Galena Camp? 
19 A. I don't remember if it was four days or five 
20 days. 
21 Q. Did you pay for the entire amount of that camp? 
22 A. I did, yes. 
23 Q. Did you pay in cash? 
24 A. I don't remember how I paid that. 
25 Q. Does your daughter also participate in ballet? 
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A. 
Q. 
She is not presently, no. 
Does she intend to -- does that intend to start 
up again in the fall? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
her skiing? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't know yet. 
Does she participate in any skiing? 
Yes. 
Does she ski with any team? 
No. 
Do you have any expenses whatsoever relating to 
For this coming season? 
Yes. 
No. 
In the past have you? 
Yes. 
Who pays for her ski pass? 
I think that was -- if I remember right, I 
think that was covered by Mr. Duringer. 
Q. Have you spoken with Mr. Duringer about paying 
for her ski pass again this year? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Do you buy your daughter clothing? 
A. I've bought her a few things, yes. 
Q. And how do you pay for her clothing? 
A. I don't remember how it was paid for. Probably 
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by cash I'm assuming. 
Q. Who's responsible for paying for her health 
insurance? 
A. Her mother and myself. 
Q. And how do you -- have you made those payments 
for the health insurance? 
A. 
Q. 
by check? 
A. 
check. 
We're supposed to be splitting that, yes. 
And how do you make those payments, by cash or 
I can't remember if it was done by cash or 
Q. How much is the insurance for you and for your 
daughter? 
A. I have no insurance. For her I think it was 
right around a hundred dollars. 
Q. Okay. 
How do you pay for food, grocery store, 
restaurants? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, food is -- I pay in cash. 
And do you ever go out to restaurants? 
Very seldom. 
How much a month do you spend on food? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you have any other -- do you have ongoing 
legal bills? 
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A. I don't know that as of yet. 
Q. Is there anything else that you pay for on a 
monthly basis? 
A. If it is, I don't know. I can't -- I don't 
know. 
Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 
is the original order granting the motion for the judgment 
debtor's examination, and this order has all of the 
documents that you were ordered to produce in this case. 
Looking on the second page of this exhibit, 
under 3{b) it's ordering you to produce all documents 
evidencing any payments made by you to any legal counsel 
from 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the 
source of the funds used to make those payments. 
the order? 
A. 
Q. 
the order? 
A. 
What did you do to comply with that portion of 
I did everything that I could possibly do. 
What did you do to comply with that portion of 
Well, I contacted each of the attorneys to ask 
them for help in obtaining this, and I gave you my answer 
on how that was stated. 
Q. When you -- how did you -- I believe that you 
presented me with a list of the people that were your legal 
counsel. The first is Michael Taitelman. What state is he 
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in? 
A. 
Q. 
California. 
Who did you -- how did you contact 
Mr. Taitelman? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
By phone. 
Did you speak with Mr. Taitelman? 
No, I did not. 
Who did you speak to? 
I left a message for him. 
What did you say in your message? 
I explained exactly what is stated here. 
Did you read the category of documents you were 
ordered to produce? 
A. Correct, I did. 
Q. Did you ever hear back from Mr. Taitelman? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No, I did not. 
Did you call him back again? 
I did. 
When? 
Shortly after that -- shortly after that period 
of time and before this was due. 
Q. Okay. And when you called him again, did you 
speak with Mr. Taitelman? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you speak to anybody else in his office? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Okay. 
And did you leave another message? 
Yes, I did. 
Okay. 
What happened then? Did you get a call back 
from Mr. Taitelman? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. Did you call back again? 
A. No, not a third time. 
Q. Did you ever ask anybody in his office, his 
assistant, a paralegal, for these documents? 
A. I can't remember the conversation, but -- I 
don't remember. 
Q. So you left two messages and then that was it; 
is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
Did you ever write him a letter saying that you 
wanted the documents sent to you? 
A. Did I write -- no, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever send him an email, putting it in a 
writing that you needed these documents? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I didn't have his email. 
Do you have access to a computer? 
Yes, I do. 
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Q. Have you ever gone onto the firm website that 
he works for? 
A. 
Q. 
I have, yes. 
Is it -- to your knowledge is his email address 
there on the website? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Did you do anything else other than leave two 
messages for Mr. Taitelman? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. So Mr. Taitelman never told you that he would 
not provide you with those documents, did he? 
A. I never had a conversation with Mr. Taitelman. 
Q. Okay. So he never said anything about not 
sending you the documents? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. You also stated that you worked with David 
Flyer; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
Where is he located? 
In California. 
What part of California? 
I think Newport. 
What did he represent you in connection with? 
He was handling the civil case. 
And Mr. Taitelman, what was he helping you 
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with? 
A. 
Q. 
The civil case. 
Did you contact Mr. Flyer and ask him to send 
you these documents? 
A. I did. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So when did you contact Mr. Flyer? 
I don't have the exact date. 
How did you contact him? 
By telephone. 
Did you speak with Mr. Flyer? 
Eventually, yes. 
Did you read to him the category of documents? 
I did. 
What did he say to you? 
A. He said this was work related, that this was 
a -- how is it put? -- attorney-client privilege, and he 
refused to send me those documents. 
Q. He said that although you were the client --
A. 
Q. 
Um-mm. 
-- that he would not send you documents because 
there is the attorney-client privilege? 
A. I'm just telling exactly what he said. He said 
it was work related and he would not do it. 
Q. Okay. 
What firm does Mr. Flyer work with? 
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A. I have no idea. 
Q. Did you inform Mr. Flyer that you are the one 
that possesses the privilege? 
A. I'm not an attorney, I don't have that 
expertise, but I explained to him what I needed, and he 
adamantly refused. 
Each one of the attorneys that I talked to 
basically stated that if you want that information, 
subpoena them, go after them, ask them, your firm or 
Michelson's firm. 
Q. You asked your lawyer to send you these 
documents; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You said I need them to comply with an order; 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Correct. 
And they refused to provide them to you? 
Correct. 
Okay. 
Again, they stated it was work related and that 
there was an attorney-client privilege based upon that 
reasoning. 
Q. What does it -- work related, what does that 
mean? 
A. I don't know. I would think that that would be 
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something you would understand. I'm not an attorney. 
Q. 
A. 
No, none of this makes sense, Mr. Campbell. 
All right. I'm just telling you exactly what I 
was told by 
Q. Mr. Campbell, what makes sense is that if a 
client calls a lawyer and says I want these documents, the 
documents are sent. That's what happens. They don't say 
it's work related. They don't say, oh, I can't send my 
client the documents because they're privileged. That 
doesn't make any sense. 
A. Again, that's exactly what they told me. 
Q. The other person you said was Jonathan 
Michaels? 
Correct. A. 
Q. And he's the one who is lending you money? 
A. Correct. 
Q. When did you speak with him about providing you 
these documents? 
A. At the same time I had talked to Taitelman and 
to David Flyer. 
Q. Tell me exactly the words that you used with 
Mr. Michaels to ask him for these documents. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you inform him that you were under an order 
to produce these documents? 
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A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And that you would be in violation of this 
order if you did not provide the documents; correct? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What about Dyke Huish, H-U-I-S-H, did you speak 
with Mr. Huish? 
A. No, Mr. Michelson [sic] spoke to Mr. -- to 
Dyke. 
Q. Do they work in the same office? 
A. No. 
Q. So you never spoke to Mr. Huish? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You never made a request for the documents with 
Mr. Huish? 
A. I made the request through Michelson [sic] for 
him. They were co-counsels on the criminal case. 
Q. Is there somebody named Michelson or is it 
Michaels? 
A. 
Q. 
Mr. Huish? 
A. 
Q. 
It's Michaels. 
How do you know that Mr. Michaels contacted 
He told me. 
But you have no independent knowledge that he 
actually did contact him; right? 
A. Other than the fact that he told me that he did. 
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Q. The next person you list is Turffs, 
T-U-R-F-F-S; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What did he represent you in connection with? 
A. The civil case in Florida. 
Q. Did you speak with Mr. Turffs? 
A. 
Q. 
I did -- well, I left a message. 
And did he return your call? 
A. He I can't remember how -- I can't remember 
if he returned it or how he contacted me. I don't remember 
at this point. 
Q. 
that he --
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What was Mr. Turffs' response to your request 
The same as the others. 
What did he say? 
Client privilege, work related. 
Anything else? 
I can't remember. 
So the only reason that people are not 
providing you documents is because of the attorney-client 
privilege? 
A. I don't know. They said it was work related. 
Again, I don't know what that means. 
Q. Anything else? Any other reason provided to 
you for why they won't provide you with the documents that 
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you requested from your lawyers? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. You wrote in that memo to me on May 28th, 2015, 
that they said that they would not provide you the 
documents because you're no longer their client. Was that 
accurate? 
A. I think -- I think that that's what I wrote. 
don't remember. 
Q. You don't know if anybody ever said that to 
you? 
A. I can't remember who said it. It was said to 
I 
me by one of the attorneys, but I don't remember which one. 
I think it was by David Flyer, but I'm not sure. 
Q. Did you receive any response in writing from 
any of these attorneys? 
email? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I can't remember. 
Do you use email? 
I do. 
Do you communicate with your lawyers through 
At times. 
Do you save the records relating to your 
communications with your lawyers? 
A. I do not. 
Q. How -- what is your protocol for deleting 
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messages? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand the question. 
Do you have a set rule for when you delete 
emails from your email system? 
A. I don't keep emails if that's what -- as far as 
deleting, I delete them at the time -- at that time. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You read and delete? 
Correct. 
So you don't save any emails? 
No. 
Looking at Exhibit 2, on the next page under 
subcategory (d) you were ordered to provide all records 
relating to financial accounts maintained in your name or 
to which you had access for the time period from January 
1st, 2012, to the present. 
You provided documents from Bank of America and 
Zions Bank; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So Exhibit 3 are the Bank of America records 
that you provided to me. These documents are for the 
period of June of 2012 to February of 2013; correct? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
When did you open this account? 
I don't remember. 
Did you ever -- did you open it before June of 
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2012? 
A. You have my complete records, so I'm assuming 
it was at that -- at that time frame. 
Q. How did you obtain these documents, these Bank 
of America records? 
A. Through the bank. 
Q. What did you ask the bank for? 
A. I just gave them a copy of what you were 
requesting, and they complied. 
Q. So you provided them actually with the order? 
A. Correct. 
Q. At the time you opened this account you already 
had an account with Zions Bank; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Can you repeat that? 
At the time you opened this Bank of America 
account you were working 
with Zions; correct? 
or you already had an account 
A. I don't know which one was first. 
Q. The order stated that you were to produce all 
documents from January 1st, 2012, to the present; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And --
A. That's what I did. 
Q. So then the bank gave you documents starting 
from June of 2012 until February of 2013; correct? 
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Correct. A. 
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that your 
account was opened prior to 2012? 
A. I don't -- I don't remember. 
Q. You gave -- you produced to me everything the 
bank gave you; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the bank knew that you needed everything 
from your records from January 1st, 2012, on; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So this account is now closed; isn't that 
right? 
A. The Zions Bank account or --
Q. The Bank of America account. 
A. No, the Bank of America account is still open. 
Q. Why did you not 
A. Oh, wait a second. No, I'm sorry. No, it's 
closed. I'm sorry. 
Q. If you would go to, on Exhibit 3, the second 
tab on that document, that pink tab that I put on, the 
second one. 
So this is the statement from June 8th, 2012, 
through July 9th, 2012; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on 
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June 8th, 2012, as being $24,715.35; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Where did that money come from? 
I have no idea at this point. 
Well, you opened an account and you put nearly 
$25,000 into it. Did it come from your Zions account? 
A. 
Q. 
check? 
A. 
Q. 
you? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Did you put that balance in through cash or a 
I don't remember. 
As of 2012, you owed my client money, didn't 
I don't know what you mean by owing him money. 
There was a judgment entered against you. 
A. I don't know the exact day, but there was a 
judgment, yes. 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the 
origination of this money? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand the question. 
What possibly -- where possibly could this 
money have come from? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
I understand you don't remember. I want to 
know what the possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
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Q. 
sold? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you own any assets at that time that you 
I don't remember. 
Did you own a car at that time? 
I don't remember. 
You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
No, I don't. 
In 2012 what were your sources of income? 
Social Security. 
Anything else? 
That was it. 
Where were you living? 
In 2012? 
June of 2012. 
I don't remember. 
When did you move to Idaho? 
From this date, it would have to be roughly 
right around four years ago. I'm guessing. 
Q. 
A. 
So in 2011 you moved to Idaho? 
I don't know. 
I'm trying to backdate. 
I don't remember, but it's in 
I lived in Idaho for almost two 
years before I was arrested, and I was in jail for almost 
17 months, and I've been out since November, so you just 
backtrack from there. 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you 
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opened up the Bank of America account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
Correct. A. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000 value did 
you bring with you from Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. So you didn't have any assets worth more than 
$10,000 when you moved to Idaho? 
A. With me? 
Q. Anywhere. 
A. You took my storage areas. So I had that. 
Q. Okay. So you had what was ever in the storage 
unit. Did you have any other asset that was worth more 
than $10,000 at the time that you moved to Idaho? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Did you own a car? 
A. At that time I had a leased vehicle that was in 
my wife's name. 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than 
$10,000 and you were living solely off of Social Security, 
what were the possible sources for you to be able to put 
$24,000 into a bank account in June of 2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
Q. Would Mr. Duringer have lent you that much 
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money? 
money? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Would Mr. Michaels have lent you that much 
No. 
Was this money that you brought with you in 
cash from Florida? 
A. No. 
Q. Was this money that you had in cash and then 
you put into a checking --
A. You know, you're asking the same question over 
and over again. I told you I don't remember. I don't 
know. You can ask it 15 different ways, I don't know. 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind 
you again that you are here under penalty of perjury. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. And to say that you don't remember where 
$24,000 came from when you're saying that you have no 
assets and no income other than Social Security, it just 
does not ring true. 
from. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the 24,000 came 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Or how I obtained that. 
If you could move to the other tabbed page, 
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this is Page 2 of 3 of the November 7, 2012, through 
December 6th, 2012, Bank of America statement; right? 
2012. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Can you repeat that? 
This is Page 2 of 3 --
Okay. 
-- of the Bank of America statement. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And this is for November through December, 
And at the top it says that there's a counter 
credit. That's a deposit; correct? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, it's in the deposits 
A. I see the counter credit. I don't know what 
that means. 
Q. It's in the section under Deposits and Other 
Additions; correct? 
A. Deposits and Other Additions, yes. 
Q. And that on November 30th, 2012, you deposited 
$3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Where did that money come from? 
I have no idea. 
Where could it have come from? 
I don't know. 
Did you have just cash lying around? 
38 
93 of 636
' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Did you -- you testified that you went into 
Bank of America and you showed them the order and requested 
all the responsive documents; right? 
A. Well, Bank of America doesn't exist in Idaho as 
far as my knowledge, it doesn't exist in Ketchum, but I 
went to the -- they -- I had -- I gave them this order, 
yes, and this is what they -- and they gave me all the 
documents. 
Q. So how did you go about doing that? Where did 
you physically go? 
A. There's a -- Bank of America has now become 
another entity, and I don't remember the name of it, the 
bank, but they obtained that. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
So you went to Washington Federal and --
Correct. 
showed that bank the order? 
If that's -- I think that was it, from 
Washington Federal. 
Q. Okay. And then were they able to produce those 
documents right away or did they need a few days to get it 
to you? 
A. No, on both Zions and the others, it took a 
couple weeks. 
Q. What other banks did you visit or did you 
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inform of this order in order to get responsive documents? 
You have the other one; Zions. 
Did you contact any other bank? 
I don't have any other bank. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Now, you see that this says that you were to 
produce all records of any bank account you had from 
January 1st, 2012, to the present; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And did you contact HSBC in Hong Kong to obtain 
those bank records? 
A. That's virtually -- I mean, I have no 
documents. When I did try to contact them, they it was 
virtually impossible to try to get anything from them. 
Q. 
A. 
When did you contact HSBC? 
The same time that you had given me these 
documents, this order. 
Q. How did you contact them? 
A. I believe by -- I don't remember now. I don't 
know if it was by telephone or -- I don't remember. 
Q. Did you keep notes? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Do you know what the response was when you 
contacted HSBC? 
A. They asked me for my account numbers, and I 
don't have those. 
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Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the company? 
That account was under the name of a company; 
(No response.) 
It was under the name of a company, wasn't it? 
Yes, it was. 
Did you ask them to search under the name of 
A. I did give them that information, but that 
became -- again, that became very problematic. 
Q. Why problematic? 
A. I didn't have -- I didn't have anything 
identifying me as far as account numbers that they asked 
for, but it was very difficult to try to obtain any 
information from this entity. 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the 
bank account with HSBC? 
A. What was the name of the company? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that 
you set up a bank account and put $300,000 into it? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Q. How did you obtain the HSBC phone number? 
A. 
website. 
I believe off their -- I believe off their 
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Q. 
A. 
And who did --
But then that, again, presents a problem 
because there's two different entities. There's one here 
in the United States and there's another in Hong Kong. 
Q. HSBC has facilities here in the states? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And did you contact them in the states? 
A. No, I tried contacting them in Hong Kong. 
Q. Did you try why didn't you try contacting 
them in the United States? 
A. It's two separate entities. 
Q. Okay. So you knew that already, so you didn't 
bother trying to call the entity in the United States? 
A. It's -- I wish you would try to obtain any 
information from these -- from this bank. 
impossible. 
How many times did you try? 
Several times. 
It's virtually 
Q. 
A. 
Q. So -- and how did you contact them, on a 
landline or on your cell phone? 
phone? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you have a landline? 
No. 
Okay. So then it would have to be by your cell 
42 
97 of 636
1 ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Unless I was in one of the offices that I 
was -- I can't remember if we did this -- that I tried to 
do this at -- I can't remember. I don't know. 
Q. So your cell phone bill should show the call to 
HSBC in Singapore several times? 
A. No. I told you, I don't remember if I made it 
from my cell phone. 
Q. Okay. So your cell phone bill won't show any 
call; right? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. And what other place would you have made that 
call from? 
A. Jonathan Michaels' office. 
Q. Anywhere else? 
A. I don't know if I used a friend's landline or 
not. I don't remember. 
Q. What friends would let you make an 
international call? 
A. I don't remember how I did that. You're asking 
me a question I don't remember. 
Q. You provided the documents to me in May, 2015; 
correct? 
A. I'm sorry? 
Q. You provided these documents, your banking 
records, in May, 2015; right? 
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A. I think that was it, right in that area. 
Q. So you were making those calls to the banks in 
May of 2015? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you call them before I wrote to you, I 
wrote a letter to you stating that you needed to provide 
these documents to me? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Had you done anything to contact the banks 
prior to the date that you arrived here in court for the 
motion on the contempt? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand the question. 
Had you contacted any bank to obtain the 
banking records before the court hearing on the motion for 
contempt? 
A. I was just complying with your order to get the 
bank records. I don't remember when it was done or the 
time frame, what month it was in. 
supplied those for you. 
I don't remember. And I 
Q. You provided some documentation to us, but not 
everything. You didn't get the HSBC documents. 
A. I don't have access to that. I don't have 
account numbers, and it's -- again, I supplied what I could 
get and what was available to me to obtain. 
Q. Did you give HSBC your name and Social Security 
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number and ask them to search? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
You testified in a -- on February 20th, 2015, 
in a debtor's exam in Los Angeles; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in that examination you had stated that you 
didn't know -- you didn't know how the $300,000 was 
transferred out; is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Michaels. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
believe. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
At that time, no. 
Do you know now? 
I believe it was transferred to Jonathan 
It was wired to Mr. Michaels? 
I don't know. 
Why do you believe it was? 
It was paying -- it was paid for legal fees, I 
So that's what happened to the $300,000? 
Correct. 
Is that $300,000 now being loaned to you by 
Mr. Michaels? 
A. That was used for legal fees. 
Q. Okay. How much in legal fees in total did you 
pay to Mr. Michaels? 
A. I don't know. 
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Q. 
A. 
Was it more than a hundred thousand? 
I don't know. 
Q. You don't have any idea about how much money 
you spent in legal fees with Mr. Michaels? 
A. Well, this goes back to where we are as far as 
privileged information, as far as client privileged 
information. 
Q. No, that's not privileged information, how much 
money was spent. 
A. Okay. Well, I don't know. 
Q. Exhibit 4 are the Zions Bank records that you 
provided to me. And did you obtain these the same way that 
you did the Bank of America documents, by going into the 
Zions branch, showing the branch person the order, and then 
this is what was produced? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So in here we have documents dated from 
December 19th, 2011, until May 18th, 2015; right? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. So looking at the first page, under the section 
called Deposit/Credits 
A. Yes. 
Q. -- it shows that on November 21st, 2011, you 
deposited $4,000, and then on November 30th you deposited 
$2,000; correct? 
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A. I don't see where you're seeing that. 
Q. Do you see the section called 3, Deposits/Credits, 
on the very first page? 
A. On the very first page? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Oh, I'm sorry, I thought you said the first 
(unintelligible). 
Q. Do you see those two deposits, $4,000 on 
November 21st and 2,000 on November 30th, 2011? 
A. 11-21 I see a deposit of 4,000. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And what was the other date? 
11-30. 
Correct. 
Were those deposits made in cash? 
I don't remember. 
If you could move to the first tabbed page, 
then. Oh, I'm -- yes, let's go to the first tabbed page. 
This is the statement for the next month, so it's January 
18th, 2012; right? 
A. January 18, 2012, correct. 
Q. And in the Deposits/Credits section it shows a 
$5,000 deposit, a $2,500 deposit, a $700 deposit, and a 
$1,500 deposit; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you know if those were made in cash? 
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A. 
Q. 
I do not. 
Okay. 
If you could move to the second tabbed page, 
these are -- this is the Page 5 of 6 of that January 18, 
2012, statement. And the top four items are the copies of 
the deposit slips that you made for those four cash 
deposits; right? 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. So each one of those deposits was made in cash; 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't know. 
If you look at the deposit slip that's been 
copied, and it says under Cash, $5,000? 
A. I don't see where you're saying you see that. 
Q. Do you see where the 5,000 is written up top on 
the very first mimeographed one? 
right? 
A. I do. 
Q. And directly to the left of that it says Cash; 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It does, yes. 
And that's because the deposit was cash; right? 
I would assume so, yes. 
And each one of those four deposits was in 
cash; correct? 
A. I don't know. 
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Q. Well, if they had been checks, they would have 
been written under the Check section, wouldn't they? 
A. I don't know. I don't know how that works, but 
I just assume that what you're saying is correct. 
Q. You filled these deposit slips out, didn't you? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. 
deposits? 
Where did the cash come from to make these 
I don't remember. A. 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. 
Where could this have come from? 
I don't remember. A. 
Q. Did somebody give you $10,000 in cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was 
back in 2011. 
Q. Right, this is in 2011, after you had moved to 
Idaho from Florida. Did you come to Idaho from Florida 
with cash? 
A. No. 
Q. So you have no explanation for how $10,000 was 
deposited into your account? 
A. I must have sold off some type of assets, but I 
don't remember what it was or how it was done. 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't 
have any asset that was worth more than $10,000 other than 
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what was in the storage units; correct? 
A. Well, I -- to answer your question, I don't 
I didn't bring anything with me that I would liquidate 
unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this 
time? 
A. I was living on things that were being 
liquidated in that time. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Florida? 
A. 
Q. 
Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
I was. 
So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in 
No, I was doing that in Florida. 
So everything had been liquidated before you 
moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. So the first deposit slip is to -- or not 
deposit slip, the first check on this page is to High 
Country for $1,500. That's your rent; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you remember what your Social Security 
payments were at that time? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. If you could move back to the previous tab on 
this exhibit, so it's the first statement [sic] of the 
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January 18th, 2012, statement. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. I think you're looking at the very first page. 
I said to the first tab. And down under the deposits and 
credits, on January 1st, 2011, it shows a payment of 
$1,561. Is that your Social Security payment? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. So you were receiving just a little under 
$1,600 a month from Social Security at that time? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And your condo that you were renting was $1,500 
a month? 
Correct. A. 
Q. So you had approximately $70 to pay for the 
rest of your expenses? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, your expenses each month were clearly far 
more than $70, weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, the check for 375 to the Yarnall 
Company, Y-A-R-N-A-L-L, what is that? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. We can go through all these records, but you 
made that payment to the Yarnall Company every month for 
$375. 
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A. 
Q. 
it was for? 
A. 
Q. 
Company? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And you're saying that you don't remember what 
No, I don't remember. 
Are you still making payments to the Yarnall 
No, I'm not. 
So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your 
income; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Correct. 
So how did you make up the difference? 
I told you, I liquidated -- I had liquidated 
assets that I had. I believe some of it came from stock 
that I was holding in Florida that was part of a venture 
capital group that we were involved with. 
Q. What stock was that? 
A. It was part of a venture capital group. 
Michelson was in the same group. He can give you all the 
information. 
Q. Well, apparently not, because he won't provide 
you with the information when you request it; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Michelson, your client. 
Okay. 
We were both in the same venture capital. 
So explain to me what this venture capital 
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group was. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
You can get that information from Mr. Michelson. 
Well, I'm asking you. 
I don't -- he's the one that set me up in that. 
So you invested money with this group --
Correct. 
-- who would then go and invest in other --
Correct. 
Did you sell your stock in that? 
Yes, I did. 
When did you sell it? 
I don't remember. 
How much did you obtain? 
I don't understand the question. 
Q. How much money did you get in return for 
selling your stock? 
it? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Did it exceed the investment that you made in 
I don't think so. 
When did you make this investment? 
Again, you could get those dates from Dr. Michelson. 
Just give me a ballpark date. 
I don't know. 
Did you sell it before or after the judgment 
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was entered against you by my client? 
A. 
Q. 
Before. 
So in 2000 -- end of 2011 what assets were you 
still liquidating? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
You already testified you didn't own a car, you 
were leasing one; correct? 
A. I was leasing it -- I was not leasing one. My 
wife was leasing the car. 
Q. So you had no car at that point? 
A. I had my wife's car. 
Q. Which was being leased? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you have any pieces of art in 2011 that 
were worth more than $10,000? 
A. Well, that was you saw what was -- my 
artwork was all in storage and you handled that sale. 
Q. Okay. 
So just to be clear on that, I'm going to 
exclude everything that was in the storage units. Did you 
have any other piece of art, other than what was in the 
storage unit, that was worth more than $10,000 in 2011? 
A. 
Q. 
Not to my knowledge. 
So you can't remember any asset that you would 
have been liquidating to enable you to make nearly $10,000 
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in deposits this month; correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
A. I believe this was part -- I believe this 
was -- and I don't know for sure, but I think this was part 
of that stock settlement. 
Q. And then the stock settlement was enabling you 
to live with expenses far exceeding your Social Security 
payment? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So your stock sale must have been a hundred 
thousand dollars? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Well, you did live beyond your Social Security 
for many, many months, didn't you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
remember. 
Q. 
deposited? 
Correct. 
How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
I believe in the form of a check. I can't 
So why is there no record of the check being 
A. Well, that was far -- that was earlier than 
this particular date. 
Q. 
A. 
How much prior to that date? 
I don't remember. 
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Q. Do you remember when the judgment was issued 
against you? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Because the stock sale took place prior to 
that; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you use any of those funds to pay for the 
civil attorneys that you had? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How much was your initial investment in that 
venture capital group? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Was it a hundred thousand? Was it a million 
dollars? 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Less than a million. 
Was it more than a hundred thousand? 
I believe so. 
But you received less than what you invested; 
I believe so. 
Why would you have held this money from the 
liquidating your stock -- why were you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of 
thousands of dollars in cash in your condo in Elkhorn? 
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right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did I hold money? No. 
But you're making cash deposits; right? 
I made cash deposits, yes. 
Large cash deposits, $5,000 in one deposit; 
In one deposit, yes. 
So you had to walk in with a roll of money to 
the bank; correct? 
A. Are you saying that 5,000 is a roll of money? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Again, I don't know -- I don't know where that 
particular $5,000 came from. I'm assuming it was part of 
that, but I don't remember. 
Q. And then -- so you made a deposit of 5,000 on 
December 20th, 2011, and then eight days later -- or, I'm 
sorry, that was not right. 
You know, you walked into a bank four times 
with cash to deposit in one month. And if you're telling 
me that that money came from a stock sale, that would mean 
that you were having that cash from the stock sale 
somewhere within your reach; isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would you have gotten it if the money 
weren't in your reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly 
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from the stock sale. I don't remember if it did or not. 
if it wasn't from the stock sale, Q. So where 
where would that cash have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then -- you liquidated them, and 
then you just had a wad of cash that you came to Idaho 
with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I 
ended up coming up with these deposits at this particular 
time. 
Q. Okay. 
Then let's move to the next tab, and this is 
the Zions statement dated February 21st, 2012; right? 
A. What was the date? 
Q. February 21st, 2012. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
The next tab I have is January 18th, 2012. 
Okay. Then go to the next tab. 
Okay. 
And on this one it's showing deposits of three 
separate times; a $1,000 deposit, a $2,000 deposit, and a 
$2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one 
month after the previous month of $10,000 in cash deposits, 
and you don't remember where the cash came from? 
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A. 
Q. 
each month? 
A. 
Q. 
time frame? 
A. 
No, I do not. 
Was somebody regularly providing you with cash 
I don't know how to answer that question. 
Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this 
Unless it was something I was selling at that 
time, I don't remember. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. So Mr. Duringer was not --
No. 
-- providing you with envelopes of cash? 
No. 
No one else was providing you with cash? 
No. 
Q. And yet you still say that you didn't have a 
box somewhere filled with cash from the liquidation of the 
items in Florida? 
A. I don't remember the -- where this money was 
coming from directly, if it was from that stock sale. I 
don't remember. This is back in 2012. 
Q. Right. And I don't know if it came from the 
stock sale, either, but you're dealing with large amounts 
of cash, and yet you're telling me that the cash is not 
being given to you by somebody. So that means that you had 
that cash in your possession. 
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A. I made the deposit, yes. 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in 
February of 2012; right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in 
January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you -- so in January you had $15,000 at 
least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's 
what it says that I made deposits of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and 
thousands of dollars all in cash at the beginning of 2012; 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all 
the cash you had in your possession at that point, and then 
the next month deposit all the cash you had in your 
possession that month? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
How would you have obtained additional cash if 
not somebody providing it to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you 
liquidated assets, that gives you one piece of cash. 
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A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of cash; right? Because you 
liquidated everything when you were in Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were 
worth more than $10,000 while you were in Florida and 
before you moved to Idaho other than what was in your 
storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't 
come to Idaho with any assets worth more than $10,000 other 
than what was in the storage unit; right? 
A. Nothing that was worth more than $10,000 to my 
recollection, yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you 
moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I would think you would remember something if 
it was worth more than $10,000; right? 
A. I'm trying to remember if I had anything -- not 
to my knowledge. 
Q. If you can go to the next tab, this is dated 
March 19th, 2012, the Zions Bank record. And, again, on 
this one it shows two separate cash deposits, one of 1,500 
and one of 2,600; right? 
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Where are you? A. 
Q. On the deposits. This is Page 1 of 5 with the 
March date. 
A. What date are you referring to? 
Q. They're -- on February 22nd there's a $1,500 
deposit and on February 27th a $2,600 deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Q. If you move a few pages in, maybe it's the 
next -- where the canceled checks are, it shows that you're 
still paying that Yarnall Company $375; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you're still paying $1,500 to High Country 
for your rent? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've got Idaho Power, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, Cox Communications, all those bills; right? 
A. 
Q. 
18th, 2012? 
Correct. 
Let's go to the next one. 
A. Correct. 
Is that the April 
Q. Now we have three separate deposits; one of 
$4,000, one of $1,600, and one of $3,000. Right? 
A. Correct. 
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Q. So we're now up to well over $20,000 in the 
four-month period that has been deposited into your 
account; correct? 
A. I don't know the exact amount, but that sounds 
correct (unintelligible). 
Q. And all in cash; right? 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. Okay. 
Well, then, let's go to the next tab. You have 
the three deposit slips up at the top; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And they're all saying that all the money was 
deposited in cash; right? 
Correct. A. 
Q. Yet no one was providing you with cash each 
month; right? 
A. Well, obtaining -- as I go back before, I had 
liquidated assets and made deposits. 
Q. And, again, on this page it's showing your 
typical bills, Cox Communications, Idaho Power, High 
Country, the Yarnall Company; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now we go to the next tab. That's the 
statement -- the first page of the May 18th, 2012, 
statement; right? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And now there are no cash deposits, are there? 
It's just your Social Security; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And if you go to the canceled checks page for 
May 18th, 2012, there's no check for your rent, is there? 
I don't know. A. 
Q. There's no canceled check for the rent, is 
there? 
A. Are you talking about where it says Volkswagon 
Credit and Corrock? 
Yes. 
No. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. And there's no payment for any health 
insurance, is there? 
A. There's only the two checks there. 
Q. So no Idaho Power, no Cox Communications, no 
mobile phone payment, nothing like that; right? 
A. Not on that page, no. 
Q. Okay. 
Let's go to the next tab. This is the June 18, 
2012, statement; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, the only deposit is your Social 
Security; right? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. And if we go to the next tab, those are the 
canceled checks. And, again, there's no payment for your 
rent, no Idaho Power, no Blue Cross; is there? 
A. There's five checks here. 
Q. And there's no rent payment, no Idaho Power, no 
Blue Cross; right? 
A. No. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So was your rent being paid at that time? 
I assume so. 
Who was paying your rent? 
I don't know -- I was, I assume. 
And how were you paying it? 
I don't remember. 
Did you ever make your rent payments in cash? 
Not to my knowledge, no. 
So if we spoke to your landlord there, they 
would confirm that you never made a rent payment in cash? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, who possibly would be paying your rent at 
this point? 
know. 
A. I don't remember what -- why they -- I don't 
Q. 
A. 
Did you ever pay your Idaho Power bill in cash? 
Not to my knowledge. 
65 
120 of 636
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Do you know who was paying the Idaho Power bill 
this month? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Are you talking about in 2012? 
Yes. 
No, I don't remember. 
Let's go to the next one. This is the July 
18th, 2012, statement and, again, the only deposit is your 
Social Security; right? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. On the first page of that statement is July 
18th, 2012? 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And the only deposit is your Social Security; 
Correct. 
And then we go to the canceled check page of 
that one and you wrote out a check for cash for $1,500. 
Why would you have done that? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. But there's no canceled check for your rent, is 
there? 
A. Not here, no. 
Q. Well, how else were you going to be paying your 
rent if not through this account? 
A. I don't remember. Was it on the other account? 
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I don't know. 
Q. You didn't have the other account open -- or 
you had just opened it at this time. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You can check the records. Did you pay --
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't remember. You've gone through it. 
Well, take a look at it. 
Well, this was going -- some of this might have 
been paid through this account. I don't remember. I was 
using both accounts. I'm assuming that checks were written 
on this account as well. 
Q. And this is the account that you don't know 
where the $24,000 came from to open it, the Bank of America 
account? 
Correct. A. 
Q. Looking at the Exhibit 4, which is the Zions 
Bank, still on that canceled check page, these are the July 
payments that you made; correct? 
A. July 18, 2012, Page 3 of 3? 
Q. Yes. 
Correct. A. 
Q. So -- and then looking at Exhibit 3, your BofA 
account records, on the July 10th - August 9th statement, 
so it's pretty far to the end, have you found that? 
A. No. 
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Q. 
9th, 2012. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
It's near the end, July 10th through August 
What's your question? 
I just want you to get to that page. 
July 9th, 2012? 
July 10th through August 9th. 
No, I don't -- I've got July 9th, 2012; 
correct? Daily balance summary? 
Q. Okay. So you're on Page 2 of 3. 
A. I'm on Page 3 of 4 -- 2 of 4. 
Q. Are you on the last tabbed page? 
Yes. A. 
Q. Okay. Then you need to move forward -- move 
backwards one, two, three, four pages. 
A. Page 2 of 3? 
Q. Yes. 
Yes. A. 
Q. So these are the checks that you wrote on the 
Bank of America account for this statement period; right? 
They show two checks, one for $315 and one for 
$1,000; right? 
A. I have no idea what you're -- I don't see the 
315. I see a check for $1,000, Check 1016. 
Q. Check 1016 in the amount of $315; Check 1017 in 
the amount of $1,000; right? 
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A. 
Q. 
Okay. Yes, I see that. 
Okay. 
So there's no $1,500 check being written from 
the BofA account; right? 
A. At that particular date, no. 
Q. Okay. 
And if you look at the previous month -- or the 
later month, August -- it goes the opposite direction, 
actually -- Page 2 of 3 of the August 10th through 
September 6, 2012, statement. 
A. Page 2 of 3, statement 8-10-12? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you go down to where the checking 
subtractions are, there's no check for $1,500, is there? 
A. 
Q. 
Not on this page, no. 
Okay. 
So you weren't using the BofA account to pay 
the rent of $1,500 each month, were you? 
A. Not for those two months, no. 
Q. Okay. 
Well, let's go to September, then. 
A. All right. 
Q. Have you gotten to the Page 2 of 3 of the 
September 7, 2012, statement? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And there's no check for $1,500 showing that 
you paid your rent out of this bank account; right? 
A. No. 
Q. And, in fact, the balance in this at the end 
of this statement period, your ending balance is $75.75; 
right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you weren't going to be able to pay the rent 
the following month out of this account, either; right? 
A. Out of the September [sic) account, no. 
Q. And how would this account get additions to it? 
What were the source of funds? You had the Social Security 
going to your Zions account. Where would you get money to 
then put into this Bank of America account? 
A. At that time? 
Q. Yes. 
I don't remember. A. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you had no 
other source of income; right? 
A. I had no income coming in at that time, no. 
Q. Other than Social Security? 
Correct. A. 
Q. And it's still your testimony that nobody was 
handing you money? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
So this money just would show up miraculously? 
I don't remember. 
Did you ever get any statements from your 
landlords at this time stating that you had not paid your 
rent? 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Yet you have no proof of paying your rent; 
Not here, no. 
And what other proof would there be that you 
paid your rent? 
A. 
Q. 
in cash. 
A. 
Q. 
I wasn't evicted. 
But you testified you had never paid your rent 
That's correct. 
So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay 
it through a check from the two bank accounts that you had. 
So what possible source of money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I want to know what's possible, what could it 
have been, not what you remember doing. 
Where could you have gotten -- what source of 
funds could you have possibly used to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at 
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this time. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of 
money with which you could have paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is 
all about your assets and your expenses, and we're talking 
about $1,500 every month that you're saying that you didn't 
pay in cash and you didn't pay with checks from the two 
bank accounts that you're telling us are the only bank 
accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember 
how it was being paid at that time. 
paid? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So what are my possibilities on how it was 
I don't know. 
Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, 
so either somebody was paying it for you, you were paying 
it in cash or you have another bank account out there; 
right? Those are my only options that I can think of. 
A. 
remember. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Can you think of any other? 
It might have been a money order. I don't 
And how would you have obtained a money order? 
Through Atkinson's. 
So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and 
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purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, 
but you're asking is there any other possible way. That's 
the only other possible way I can understand that it was 
being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you 
gone to Atkinson's with cash to obtain a money order? 
A. 
Q. 
I have. 
Okay. So it's possible that you went into 
Atkinson's with $1,500 in cash and got a money order with 
which to pay your rent? 
A. I don't remember if that's what happened, but 
you're asking me if that was a possibility. 
Q. Okay. So how many times have you done that, do 
you think, used Atkinson's to get a money order? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. More than five times? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy 
the money order to pay for it, that came from cash that was 
sitting around in your condo at that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of -- no, 
it was liquidation of either -- that stock that I referred 
to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be 
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this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock 
sale and put it into your Zions account and then write a 
check to pay your rent instead of --
A. I don't remember why I did that. 
Q. So you took the course of keeping cash 
somewhere in your condo and then going down to Atkinson's, 
buying a money order, and then using that to pay your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. But that was the only other way it could have 
been paid; right? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. If you could go to the -- it's several tabs, 
I've skipped over a few of these, but go to the July 18th, 
2013, statement. 
A. July 18th what? 
Q. 2013. 
A. 
Q. 
July 18th, 2013? 
Yes. 
And, actually, before we get to this point, in 
your February 20th, 2015, examination you testified that 
you provided your lawyer, Susan Roy, with a $10,000 
retainer, and that was prior to your arrest; right? 
A. I don't know if it was prior to my arrest or 
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not. 
Q. That's what you testified to. 
Would you have been able to pay the retainer 
after your arrest? 
A. I don't remember if it was before or after the 
arrest. 
Q. Okay. 
How did you make that payment? 
I don't remember. A. 
Q. I'll represent to you that I've searched the 
records all around, near, close to, before, and after the 
time of your arrest. I can't find a $10,000 check to Susan 
Roy or a $10,000 wire to anybody. 
If it did not come out of one of these bank 
accounts, where would that money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you go down to Atkinson's with $10,000 
buy a money order? 
A. I don't remember. 
and 
Q. Is that possible that you would have done that? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you provide $10,000 in cash to Ms. Roy? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. And, again, this is just money that you had 
lying around from having liquidated assets in Florida? 
75 
130 of 636
> 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
So at this July 18th, 2013, statement, was this 
the first payment that you got, the Social Security 
deposit, after you were in jail? 
A. 
Q. 
Can you repeat that question? 
Was this the first Social Security payment that 
you received after being incarcerated? 
A. Well, I was incarcerated in June, so I don't 
know if there was a payment in June or not. 
Q. If you go to the statement before, just a 
couple pages prior, you were still -- in this one you were 
still paying bills; right? 
A. 
18th, 2013? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Are you talking about the statement of June 
Yes. 
Correct. 
Okay. And, actually, your Social Security 
payment at that time was 1482; right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
down? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Did it go down as a result of being incarcerated? 
I don't know. 
You don't know why your Social Security went 
No. 
Well, if you just look over the next few 
76 
131 of 636
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
months, while you're in jail none of -- your balance just 
kept increasing; right? You were getting Social Security 
payments but no expenses; correct? 
A. I wasn't drawing anything out of that account, 
no. 
Q. Okay. So you're just getting your Social 
Security deposit of almost $1,500 put in each month? 
one, 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. 
Now if you can go to the next tab after that 
this is the January 20th, 2015, statement? 
A. Correct. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So this is now you're out of jail; right? 
Correct. 
And it shows that the balance in the account as 
of January 20th, 2015, is just a little over $30,000; 
right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. 
If you can go to the next tab, and these are 
two checks written to yourself? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
One on January 29th, one on February 12th, 
2015, each for a thousand dollars in cash; right? 
A. Correct. 
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cash? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Why would you write checks out to yourself for 
I needed the money. 
I don't -- why would you not spend just 
write a check where you went? Why do you need to have 
cash? 
A. I needed the money. 
Q. Okay. But you don't have any -- you had, 
what -- you had moved into a different condo in Ketchum at 
that point; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the rent there was how much? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 5. So Exhibit 5 is a 
letter of understanding between you and Johnny Ellison --
A. Correct. 
Q. -- about a 5-month rental of a Horizons 4 unit; 
is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And the monthly rent was $1,200; right? 
Monthly rent was 1,200, correct. 
Was Robert Duringer with you at the time that 
you signed -- is that your signature at the middle of the 
page? 
A. Yes. 
78 
133 of 636
r • 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
yours? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And is that Mr. Duringer's signature below 
Correct. 
Did he sign it in front of you? 
Yes. 
So he was in Ketchum at that time? 
No. 
Where were you located? 
We were in Colorado. 
So you traveled to Colorado in November of 2014? 
Yes. 
Q. And this was -- did you live anywhere in 
Ketchum prior to moving into the Horizons 4 unit? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
How did -- had you been to Idaho -- returned to 
Idaho at all before November 26, 2014? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
So how did you come to learn about this rental? 
I believe through a friend, if I remember right. 
Who created this letter of understanding? 
It would be Mr. Ellison. 
Had you -- so you were the actual tenant under 
this lease agreement; right? 
A. It had me as tenant and cosigner for tenant was 
Robert -- Mr. Duringer. 
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Q. So he was not the tenant, he was just a 
guarantor for you; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. When did you move into this unit? 
A. I believe it was right in the middle of 
December. 
Q. So you would have started paying rent 
mid-December? 
A. If I remember right; correct. 
Q. Looking back at this statement on the Zions 
Bank records and going to the statement dated December 
18th, 2014 -- are you there? 
A. No, I don't know where you're at. 
Q. December 18th, 2014. 
A. December 18th, 2014. 
Q. Okay. So up to December 18th, 2014, you didn't 
write a check to Johnny Ellison for your rent; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then let's go to the next month's 
statement. This is the January 20th, 2015. And, again, 
this is where you have $30,000 in the account, but there's 
no check written to the rent; right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
That's correct. 
So who was paying the rent? 
Mr. Duringer. 
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Q. 
$30,000? 
Why was he paying for your rent if you had 
A. There was -- he was helping me. That's all I 
can tell you. 
Q. So you have $30,000, but he's going to pay your 
rent, that was the deal you had with him? 
A. The rent was -- basically, it's in his name and 
mine. 
Q. Well, actually, the lease agreement says that 
you are the tenant and he is the cosigner, so that if you 
don't pay the rent, then he's responsible for it. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So why were you not writing the check out for 
your rent? 
A. Again, Mr. Duringer was helping me out. 
Q. Okay. 
Let's go to the next -- the next tab we've 
already talked about. 
Let's go to the tab after that. These are the 
checks and deposit slips for the March 18th, 2015, Zions 
Bank statement; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in that you wrote a check out on February 
12th, 2015, to Robert Duringer in the amount of $7,500 and 
another check to him for $9,000 on February 19th, 2015; 
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right? 
A. 
Q. 
statement. 
I don't know where you're at. 
I'm on Page 3 of 3 of the March 18th, 2015, 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Why did you write these checks out to him? 
A. He had covered a bunch of expenses of mine 
while I was incarcerated. 
Q. What expenses did you have when you were 
incarcerated? 
A. He put money on my banks on a monthly basis. 
He covered my daughter's expenses while I was incarcerated. 
I don't remember if he had -- I think he covered some of 
her medical insurance. He supplied me with books. I can't 
remember all the expenses that he covered; quite a few. 
Q. Okay. So he put money in your bank on a 
monthly basis. Is that a bank in the jail? 
basis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much money did he put in on a monthly 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
A hundred dollars? Two hundred dollars? 
Several hundred every month. 
Okay. 
And then when he covered your daughter's 
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expenses, how was that facilitated? Would he send money to 
your ex-wife? Would he pay bills directly? 
A. I don't remember how that was done. 
Q. When you paid him $17,000 in one month, what 
was that based on? Did you have an accounting done of the 
money that he had provided you while you were incarcerated? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So where is that document? 
A. He just told me that that's how much money that 
he put out. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So you never saw an accounting? 
No. 
Why would you pay him back for those funds 
instead of just paying your rent? 
A. It was just the way it was done. 
You have to understand something about 
perception and reality. Maybe I should do this off the 
record. 
Q. I don't need to know anything about perception 
and reality. All I need are the answers to my questions. 
A. All right. 
Q. So you made these transfers of $17,000 in the 
days before you were to be deposed in your debtor's exam 
with Mr. Paisley; right? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Q. The first debtor's exam was February 20th, 
2015; right? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. I can show you the transcript if you would 
like. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Here's a copy of the transcript. Were you 
deposed on February 20th, 2015? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you made a transfer of $9,500 the day 
before you were deposed? 
A. I guess I was, yes. 
Q. Did you make that transfer to Mr. Duringer so 
that you could testify that you were penniless at the time 
of your examination? 
A. No. 
Q. I'm sorry, what was that? 
A. I don't understand. I was penniless? They 
knew that I I don't -- go back and -- I don't understand 
the question. 
Q. You testified in your February 20th, 2015, 
examination that you couldn't even afford to fly to Los 
Angeles; isn't that right? 
A. No, they asked me if I -- how I paid for that 
flight. 
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Q. And then you testified that Mr. Tomati allowed 
you to use his --
A. Mr. Tomati. 
Q. Tomati, T-0-M-A-T-I? 
A. That's correct. I think so. 
Q. That he gave you airline miles so that you 
could have a ticket? 
A. Correct. Correct. 
Q. And didn't you also testify that if he hadn't 
done that, you would have had to have taken the bus to 
arrive in Los Angeles for the examination? 
A. I don't remember I stated that. 
Q. If you could turn to Page 52 of the 
examination, of the transcript, and on Line 4 the question 
was, "But did you tell him that you had no money to pay for 
the flight? ANSWER: I had planned on taking a bus out 
here and he was the one that allowed me to use his miles." 
A. 
Q. 
Did I read that correctly? 
That's correct. 
So you were testifying that you didn't have 
enough money to even purchase a flight to Los Angeles, that 
you would have had to have taken the bus if you hadn't 
gotten the mileage; right? 
A. I don't know how this was being signified, but 
at that time I definitely was under close scrutiny on every 
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dollar that I had, that's correct. 
Q. Okay. 
And if you could also turn to Page 59 of the 
transcript, and on Line 9 of Page 59 the question was, 
"You're basically saying that you're penniless today; 
correct? ANSWER: Correct." 
And isn't it true that you were penniless 
because you had just transferred $17,000 to Mr. Duringer in 
the week before? 
A. I had no idea what -- what I had as far as 
assets and what I owed at that particular time. 
Q. Well, you testified under oath that you were 
penniless, didn't you? 
A. At that particular time I thought that I was. 
Q. You knew that you had at least $13,000 in your 
account and that you had just transferred $17,000 to your 
friend; right? 
A. But I still didn't know at the time how much I 
still owed. I was going through a divorce, I was still 
trying to get -- I was still trying to get established, I 
had no idea how much more legal fees I was going to have, 
and I had and at that time, based upon what I thought, I 
was close to being penniless, yes. 
Q. Yet in your -- again, on February 20th, on Page 
71 of the transcript you testified that you were not aware 
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of anybody that you owed money to other than the plaintiffs 
in this case; isn't that right? 
A. At that particular time I was not -- I did not 
know at that particular time. 
Q. Okay. 
And since February 20th have there been any 
other people, individuals, corporations, firms, that you 
have come to owe money to? 
A. I am as I explained to you, with -- with 
Jonathan Michaels. 
Q. When did Mr. Michaels start lending you money? 
A. I don't know the particular day. It was after 
I got out of jail. 
2015? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Was it before you testified on February 20th, 
I don't remember. 
If it had been before February 20th, 2015, then 
your testimony was not accurate; was it? 
A. I don't remember what date that he started 
helping me, no. 
Q. Do you own a vehicle? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Now, you testified in February that you borrow 
Mr. Duringer's Mercedes; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
87 
142 of 636
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the car? 
A. 
Q. 
Are you still borrowing it? 
Yes. 
What year is it? 
I think it's a 2015. 
So it was new when you started borrowing it? 
Yes. 
Did he buy it or lease it? 
I believe he leased it. 
Has he ever driven it? 
Yes. 
How often has he been in Idaho since he leased 
He has not. 
So when did he ever drive it? 
A. I'll take that back. He's never driven the 
car, that is correct. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Where is it registered? 
It's -- I believe in California. 
Why would it be leased in Cal -- I mean 
registered in California? 
A. I believe that's where Mr. -- Doc -- where 
Mr. Duringer purchased the vehicle. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
But he lives in Colorado? 
That's correct. 
Does he have a California address? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
You would have to ask Doc -- Mr. Duringer. 
Whose name is it registered under? 
Mr. Duringer's. 
And what address is on the registration? 
I believe his Colorado address. 
Who pays the insurance? 
Mr. Duringer paid the first insurance. 
I paid the second, but I'm not sure. 
I think 
Q. So his Colorado address, is that his business 
address or his home address? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
His home address. 
Okay. 
Did you drive the Mercedes here today? 
I did. 
Okay. Why don't we just take a quick break, 
you can run out, grab the registration, because then I can 
get his address. 
A. All right. 
Q. Okay. And then we'll just finish up. 
A. Do you want to finish up and then I'll get it? 
Q. No, actually, I would rather -- let's do it now 
and then I'll finish up. 
4:05 p.m.) 
A. 
(Short interruption at 4:01 p.m.; reconvene at 
4299 Cheyenne Drive, Larkspur, Colorado. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
(By Ms. Clark) 
Correct. 
Cheyenne Drive? 
Correct. 
Okay. 
4299? 
Now, at the February 20th examination you 
testified that you were aware of the auction of the items 
in the storage units that you had down in Bellevue; right? 
sale? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And you knew that your ex-wife attended the 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you did not know whether or not your friend 
Kim Page attended that sale; right? 
A. I know now that she did, yes. 
Q. So she did attend? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And Page is P-A-I-G-E? 
A. I think it's P-A-G-E. 
Q. Now, did you have any conversations with Kim 
Page prior to the auction regarding the upcoming auction? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Did you speak with her while you were in jail? 
I did. 
And how often did you speak with her? 
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A. I don't remember how often. There was some 
time that I didn't speak to her at all. I don't know. 
week? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Would you speak to her approximately once a 
I don't believe it was that often. 
So you've had conversations with her about the 
auction since the auction happened; right? 
A. Since the auction happened, yes. 
Q. Okay. When was the -- when was the -- how many 
conversations have you had with her regarding the auction? 
A. I don't like to talk about it so I don't bring 
it up, but I think only once. 
Q. Okay. When was that? 
A. Oh, that was after I was out of jail. I don't 
know. It would have been within 30 days after I was out of 
jail probably. 
Q. Okay. And what was the content of the 
conversation? 
A. That she attended, that you were there, that it 
was a pretty sad scene. 
Q. Did she tell you why she attended? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I think she just was curious. 
Well, you know she bought items; right? 
I understand that she did. 
Now, you had quite a few paintings by a single 
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artist, didn't you? Somebody with the initials BKB? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that stand for? 
A. You could get that information from Julie. I 
don't remember -- it's Brenda, but I don't remember the 
Q. So the artist's name is Brenda? 
A. Her first name. 
Q. And did you ever have Brenda paint works 
specifically for you, commission works? 
A. Specifically, I think she did one. 
Q. And that was one for your daughter; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it has her name on it? 
A. I don't remember if it has her name on it or 
not. 
Q. Did you instruct Kim to purchase that painting 
at the auction? 
now 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No, not that I remember. 
Do you have possession of that painting now? 
No, I do not. 
Does Kim have possession of that painting 
I have no idea. 
to your knowledge? 
So it's not in your condo in Elkhorn? 
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A. 
Q. 
Do you want to come over and take a look? 
I'm asking the questions here. 
A. No, it's not there. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Is any of my artwork in your house? 
Q. And so prior to the auction did you have a 
cradle that had been in your family for a while? 
A. I did. 
Q. And did you instruct Kim to purchase that 
cradle? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't remember. 
Do you have possession of that cradle now? 
I do not. 
Did you speak with Kim at all about the cradle? 
I don't remember. 
What does Kim do for a living? 
I don't know. 
You don't know what she does for a living? 
No, I do not. 
Where does she live? 
She lives in Idaho. 
What city? 
I don't have her address. 
Is it in your phone? 
No. 
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Q. 
A. 
Do you have her phone number in your phone? 
I don't -- I don't know. 
Q. So is it your belief that Kim is going to 
testify under oath that you did not instruct her to 
purchase those items? 
A. I don't remember talking to Kim about 
purchasing any items. 
Q. Okay. Well, we'll ask her. 
All right. That's it for today. You can leave 
all those documents there. 
(WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded at 
4:10 p.m.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR #244, Official Court 
Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, consisting of 
Pages 1 to 94, inclusive, is a true and accurate record of 
the proceedings had on the date and at the time indicated 
therein as stenographically reported by me from a digital 
recording to the best of my ability and contains all of the 
material requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 7th day of September, 2015. 
SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR NO. 244 
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vs. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 'fltWf FULLS fJ-At tN I=. 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. <... V-I ~ - l{_O/ 
ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS 
REGARDING CONTEMPT M:B 2 3 2016 
JqLym °""18, Cle,t Dlnit,1 
r.n1H1 Rl!f/r,p (',nontv. ldalro __ 
--------------) 
A Motion And Affidavit seeking to hold you in contempt of court for allegedly violating an order of 
this court has been filed against you. The maximum penalty for each contempt of court is a fine of $5,000 
and/or five (5) days in jail, except that the jail sentence can be up to thirty (30) days if the contempt is for 
failing to obey an order or judgment for the support of minor children. Sanctions for multiple contempts of 
court can be ordered to be served consecutively. 75(f)(l){b); 75(g)(l){b) 
RIGHTS 
The purpose of the initial appearance is to advise you of both the charge(s) against you and your 
rights. You are advised that: 
• You have the right to be informed of the nature of the charge(s). 75(f)(l)(b); 75(g)(l)(a) 
• You have the right to remain silent (often called the privilege against self-incrimination). You are 
not required to make a statement and any statement you make can be used as evidence against you 
at trial. 75(f)(l)(c) 
• You have the right to the presumption of innocence. 75(h)(2) 
• You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you desire an attorney but cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed to represent you at public expense. You may be required to 
reimburse the county for the cost of that attorney. 75(f)(2); 75(h)(2); 75(1) 
• You have the right to a public trial on the issue of whether or not you are in contempt of court. At 
the trial, you can watch the witnesses as they testify, and you have the right to confront the 
witnesses testifying against you by asking them questions. 75(f)(l)(d); 75(h)(2) 1,, 
• You have the right to testify yourself, as well as the right to call witnesses on your behalf. Y 6u 
have the right to compulsory process (subpoenas) to compel the presence of witnesses at trial. 
75(h)(2) 
• You have the right to the protection of the exclusionary rule, and you can seek to exclude evidence 
that was obtained in violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. 75(h)(2) 
• You have the right to the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co. 
• If you have been arrested under a warrant of attachment, you have the right to bail. 75(f)(l)(f) 
EFFECT OF ADMITTING THE CONTEMPT 
If you choose to admit you are in contempt of the court's order, you waive your right to silence, the 
right to a trial, the right to call or confront witnesses at trial, and your right to testify at trial. 75(g)(l)(d) 
EFFECT OF DENYING THE CONTEMPT 
If you choose to deny that you are in contempt of the court's order, the matter will be set for trial. 
You will be given at least fourteen (14) days to prepare for trial, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
75(g)(2) 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
In order to assert an affirmative defense at trial to the contempt charge, you must file and serve a 
written response stating such defense, including any of the following: 
• You were unable to comply with the court order at the time of the alleged violation ( only a defense 
to a criminal sanction). 
• You lacked the present ability to comply with a court order (only a defense to a civil sanction). 
• You were unaware of the order allegedly violated. 
• The court lacks personal jurisdiction over you. 
• The court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order allegedly violated. 
The written response must be filed within seven (7) days after entering a plea denying the contempt 
charged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 75(b) 
SENTENCING 
If you admit to the contempt or the court finds after trial that you committed the contempt, the 
matter will be set for sentencing. At sentencing, you have the right to call witnesses in mitigation of the 
sanction and the right to speak to the court in order to present matters in mitigation or to otherwise attempt 
to make amends with the court. 75(1)(2) 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS 
I have read this entire document and I understand it. 
Date 
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MAY-26-2016-THU 03:02 PM L,W,F & R, P.A. 
Lee P. Ritzau 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FAX No. 20:3-726- 3750 P. 002 1020 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
460 Sun Valley Road, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Tel: 208/726-8219 
Fax: 208/726-3750 
FILED~~~~ 
JUN -1 2016 
ISB No. 5239 
Attorneys for Defendant, Neil David Campbell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD., and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, ) 
individually; NEIL DAVID ) 
CAMPBELL, individually; ) 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUAN.ANA GRIS, ) 
S.A., a corporation; PROTECCION ) 
FORESTALDE TECA, S.S., a ) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through ) 
50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2012-407 
ORDER REGARDING APPOINTMENT 
This matter came before the Court on May 23, 2016, the Honorable Robert Elgee 
presiding. Erin Clark of LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC represented the Plaintiffs, 
ORDER REGARDING APPOINTMENT/I 
153 of 636
MAY-26-2016-THU 03:03 PM L,W,F & R, P.A. FAX No. 208-726-3750 P. 003/020 
and Mr. Neil Campbell represented himself. Lee P. Ritzau provided the Court with the Ex Parte 
Affidavit of Lee Ritzau and the Ex Parte Affidavit of Neil Campbell addressing topics addressed 
at the May 23, 2016 hearing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lee P. Ritzau ofLuboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield and 
Ritzau, P.A. is appointed to represent Mr. Neil Campbell in this case. Mr. Ritzau's 
representation of Mr. Campbell shall be of a hybrid nature consisting of two parts. First, Mr. 
Ritzau will represent Mr. Campbell at his customary rate of $275.00 per hour until the retainer 
provided by Mr. Campbell and identified in the Ex Parte Affidavit is exhausted. Second, if the 
retainer provided to Mr. Campbell is exhausted, Mr. Ritzau will bill Blaine County at the rate of 
$13 5. 00 per hour for payment of necessary legal services required in representing Mr. Campbell. 
This appointment is made under the Blaine County Public Defender Contract and/or LC. § 19-
851 and/or J.C. § 19-852, as the Court detennines Mr. Campbell is a needy person and facing a 
serious crime. Judge Robert Eglee shall determine what legal services provided by Mr. Ritzau 
are necessary and thus required to be paid by Blaine County. J\.1r. Ritzau shall present his 
billings, in the form of an affidavit. to Judge Robert Elgee on or before the 1 ot1• of the month, and 
payment of necessary legal expenses shall be due to Mr. Ritzau from Blaine County 011 or before 
the 301h of the same month. 
If Mr. Ritzau is not being paid by either Mr. Campbell or Blaine County as discussed 
above, then Mr. Ritzau shall be free to withdraw from this case after meeting the requirements of 
Idaho law relating to withdrawing from representing a client. 
If there is any need to request Blaine County provide the payment of funds or expenses 
not covered in this order, the request for payment by 11r. Campbell shall be submitted ex pa.rte. 
ORDER REGARDING APPOINTMENT/2 
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DATED this _.iL day of May, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2Jt_ day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney named below, in the manner noted: 
Erin F. Clark 
Lawson laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax: 208-725-0076 
Luke L. Dauchot 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Fax: 213-680-8500 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same. 
~ By transmitting copies of the same to sai attorney by facsimile machine process. 
ORDER REGARDING APPOINTMENT/3 
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CERTJFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ \_ day o~6, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney named below, in the manner noted: 
Erin F. Clark 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P .0. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax:208-725-0076 
Luke L. Dauchot 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Fax:213-680-8500 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. 
P .0. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Fax: 208-726-3750 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same. 
_1_ By transmitting copies of the same to said attorney by facsimile machine process. 
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Lee P. Ritzau 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
460 Sun Valley Road, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Tel: 208/726-8219 
Fax: 208/726-3750 
ISB No. 5239 
IF~ 
L. ~~,;;;0,,, . ,c:' ::~ ':0:~;' J 
Attorneys for Respondent Neil David Campbell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD., and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, 
individually; NEIL DAVID 
CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, ) 
S.A., a corporation; PROTECCION ) 
FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a ) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through ) 
50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
~} 
Case No. 9fl-2012-407 
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF 
Comes now, Neil Campbell, by and through his attorney of record, Lee P. Ritzau of 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A., and hereby submits his Trial Brief. 
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF/1 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
Petitioners', C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
filed a Charging Affidavit with the Court seeking to find Mr. Neil David Campbell in contempt 
of court on ten counts of civil contempt and twenty-four counts of criminal contempt. 
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT. 
A. Idaho Law Regarding Contempt of Court. 
1. "Criminal contempt is the commission of a disrespectful act directed at the 
court itself which obstructs justice. A criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and 
simply to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the 
public in violation of an order of the court." Camp at 862. 
2. " ... contempt is an extraordinary proceeding and should be approached with 
caution. This Court has recognized contempt is an extraordinary proceeding. Phillips 95 Idaho 
at 405, 509 P.2d at 1326. This inherent power must be exercised with great caution .... The 
contempt power is readily susceptible of abuse and fraught with danger not only to personal 
liberties but to the respect and confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a 
power is universally recognized as essential to an orderly and effective administration and 
execution of justice, it should be exercised with utmost caution .... Since a contempt citation is a 
'potent weapon, .... courts rightly impose it with caution .... Imposing a willful standard 
ensures that courts cannot abuse their inherent contempt power. It also ensures that courts only 
impose such an extraordinary remedy when the alleged contemnor has wrongfully disobeyed a 
court order." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. 
John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005). 
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF/2 
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3. "If a party does not obey a court order requiring a certain act, and no longer has 
the present ability to comply with that order, then only criminal contempt sanctions are 
available." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. 
John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,281 (2005). 
4. Willful means, '"an indifferent disregard of duty' or 'a remissness and failure 
in performance of a duty' but not a 'deliberately and maliciously planned dereliction of 
duty'-applies to contempt proceedings under LC.§ 7-601(5)" In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,281 (2005). 
B. The Civil Contempt Charges. 
Petitioners are seeking civil contempt of court charges under Idaho Code§ 7-601(5). 
Idaho Code § 7-601 ( 5) states, "disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court." J.C.§ 7-601(5). 
"(1) Civil Sanction. In order to impose a civil sanction, the court must find, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that all of the elements of contempt have been proved and that the 
contemnor has the present ability to comply with the order violated, or with theat portion of it 
required by the sanction." IRCP 75(j)(l). 
"(k) Nonsummary proceedings; Findings of fact. If the contempt allegation is tried to the 
court without a jury, the court must make specific findings of fact. In order to impose either a 
civil sanction or a conditional ( civil) provision as part of a criminal sanction, the findings must 
include the facts upon which the court bases its determination that the contemnor has the present 
ability to comply with the order violated, or with that portion of it required by the sanction." 
IRCP 75(k). 
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"(2) Burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses. In order to prevent a civil sanction 
from being imposed, the respondent must prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of 
the evidence ... " IRCP 75(h)(2). 
"(3) Written Order. The court must issue a written order reciting the conduct upon which 
the contempt conviction rests; adjudging that the contemnor is guilty of contempt; and setting 
forth the sanction for that contempt. If the sanction is civil or includes a condition provision, the 
order must specify precisely what the contemnor must do in order to avoid that sanction or have 
it cease." IRCP 75(/)(3). 
The Charging Affidavit sets forth ten counts of alleged civil contempt. The alleged civil 
contempt charges are as follows: 
1. Count One alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
documents evidencing payments he made to David Flyer over the period of2009 to the present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
2. Count Two alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
the documents evidencing the payments he made to Michael Taiteman over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
3. Count Three alleges Mr. Campbell is in contempt for his failure to produce 
documents evidencing payments he made to Robert Turffs over the period of 2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
4. Count Four alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
the documents evidencing the payments he made to Jonathan Michaels over the period 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF/4 
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5. Count Five alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
the documents evidencing the payments he made to Steve Thompson over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
6. Count Six alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
the documents evidencing the payments he made to Dyke Huish over the period of 2009 to 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
7. Count Seven alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to 
produce the documents evidencing the payments he made to Susan Roy over the period of 2009 
to present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments; 
8. Count Eight alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to 
produce all records relating to his HSBC bank account, including documents that identify any 
deposits made into and any disbursements of founds from that account; 
9. Count Nine alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
all records relating to his Bank of America account, including records evidencing the payee on 
the checks written out of that account; and 
10. Count Ten alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to produce 
all of the statements for his Bank of American account, specifically all records for the account 
pre-June 2012. 
In Respondent's Exhibits 501 through 510, Mr. Campbell provided Petitioners a limited 
power of attorney to obtain the records which form the subject matter of the civil contempt 
charges set forth in counts one through ten. 
IRCP 75(a)(6) Civil Sanction. A civil sanction is one that is conditional. The contemnor 
can avoid the sanction entirely or have it cease by doing what the contemnor had previously been 
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ordered by the court to do. A civil sanction can only be imposed if the contempt consist of 
failing to do what the contemnor had previously been ordered by the court to do. 
"The district court has the authority to impose sanctions for failure to timely comply with 
a court order, but it also has the discretion to not impose sanctions once the order has been 
complied with." Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297. 
Given Exhibits 501 through 510, Mr. Campbell has complied with the Amended Order by 
giving Petitioners a Limited Power of Attorney which will permit them to obtain the records they 
are seeking in counts one through ten. Even if Mr. Campbell is found to have committed civil 
contempt of court, no sanction should be imposed given the language in IRCP 75(a)(6) stating, 
"the contemnor can avoid the sanction entirely or have it cease by doing what the contemnor had 
previously been ordered by the court to do." Mr. Campbell has done this by providing 
Petitioners exhibits 501 through 510. 
For these reasons, Mr. Campbell asserts that, first, he has not acted in a manner consistent 
with finding him liable for civil contempt of court, and second, that if he has acted in a manner 
consistent with finding him liable for civil contempt of court, that no sanction be imposed upon 
him as he has provided Petitioners exhibits 501 through 510 which will permit them to obtain the 
records covered in the Amended Order and requested in counts one through ten. 
C. The Criminal Contempt Charges. 
In their May 18, 2016 Trial Brief, Petitioners argue Idaho Code§ 7-601(4) is the basis for 
the alleged criminal contempt they pursue in this case. Idaho Code§ 7-601(4) states, "deceit or 
abuse of the process or proceedings of the court by a party to an action or special proceeding." 
J.C. 7-601(4). 
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"(2) Criminal Sanction. In order to impose a criminal sanction, the trier of fact must find 
that all of the elements of contempt have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." IRCP 
750)(2). 
"Perjury and treason. Perjury and treason must be proved by testimony of more than one 
(1) witness. Treason by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act; and perjury by the 
testimony of two (2) witnesses, or one (1) witness and corroborating circumstances." J.C. 9-501. 
"(2) Burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses .... In order to prevent a criminal 
sanction from being imposed, there need only be a reasonable doubt as to whether the respondent 
is guilty of the contempt." IRCP 75(h)(2). 
"(I) Nonsummary proceedings; Imposition of sanctions. If the respondent ... is found in 
contempt following a trial, the court may impose sanctions as permitted by law, under the 
following conditions: ... (2) Right to call witnesses and speak regarding the sanction. The court 
cannot impose a criminal sanction without first giving the contemnor the right to call witnesses 
in mitigation of the sanction and the right to be heard in order to present matters in mitigation or 
otherwise attempt to make amends with the court." IRCP 75(/)(2). 
Petitioners also seek to have Mr. Campbell found guilty of twenty-four counts of criminal 
contempt of court. Of the twenty four alleged counts of criminal contempt, all twenty four are as 
a result of Mr. Campbell answering he didn't know the answer or he does not remember the 
information sought by the answer. Additionally, all twenty four counts of alleged criminal 
contempt of court involve situations more than three years old at the time his August 24, 2015 
deposition was taken. The alleged criminal contempt charges are as follows: 
COUNT ELEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 2012 
opening balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
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Q. So this is the statement from June 8th, 2012, through July 9th, 2012: 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June 8th, 2012, as being 
$24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea t this point. 
Id. at 33:22-34:4. 
COUNT TWELVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000.00 into it. Didn't 
come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. At 34:5-7. 
COUNT THIRTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. What possibly - where possibly could this money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
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COUNT FOURTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own an assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. 
COUNT FIFTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
COUNT SIXTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
COUNT SEVENTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of America 
account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
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Q. What assets of a more than $10,000.00 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
*** 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000.00 and you were living 
solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for you to be able to 
put $24,000 into a bank account in June of2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
*** 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are here under 
penalty of perjury. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when you're 
saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social Security, it just 
does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
COUNT EIGHTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. An that on November 30, 2012, you deposited $3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Where could it have come from? 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 38:18-24. 
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COUNT NINETEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with HSBC? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank account and 
put $300,000 into it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 41 :15-22. 
COUNT TWENTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully regarding cash deposits he made in his Zion's bank account as 
follows: 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. Where could this have come 
from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did someone give you $1 O,OOOin cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was back in 2011. 
Id. at49:10-15. 
COUNT TWENTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was worth more 
than $1 O,OOOother than what was I the storage units, correct? 
A. Well, I - to answer your question, I don't - I didn't bring anything with me that I 
would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
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Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 49:24-50: 16. 
COUNT TWENTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct: 
A. Correct. 
Q. so, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe some of it 
came from stock that I was holding in florida that was part of a venture capital 
group that we were involved with. 
*** 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000 - end of2011 what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
COUNT TWENTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating to enable 
you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month, correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
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A. I believe this was part - I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, but I think 
this was part of that stock settlement. 
*** 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far - that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
COUNT TWENTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock - why were 
you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in cash in your 
condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits, right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
Id. at 56:21-57:3. 
COUNT TWENTY-FIVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in one month. 
And if you're telling me that that money came from a stock sale, that would mean 
that you were having that cash from the stock sale somewhere within your reach; 
isn't that right? 
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A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would have gotten it if the money weren't in your reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I don't 
remember if it did or not. 
Q. So were - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then - you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of cash that 
you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up with these 
deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
COUNT TWENTY-SIX: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated February 
215\ 2012; right. 
*** 
Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 deposit, a 
$2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous month of 
$10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
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Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of2012; right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you - so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made deposits 
of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in cash at the 
beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in your 
possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the cash you had in 
your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
COUNT TWENTY-NINE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would have obtained additional cash if not somebody providing it to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives you one 
piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
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Q. One pile of ash; right? Because you liquidate everything when you were in 
Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 while you 
were in florida and before you moved to Idaho other than what was in your 
storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any assets worth 
more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage unit, right? 
A. Nothing that was wroth more than $10,000 to my recollection yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:21-61:17. 
COUNT THIRTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're - on February 22nd there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 27th a $2,600 
deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
COUNT THIRTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully about why his bank records no longer showed him paying his 
rent with a check as he had done for the previous five months. Specifically, 
Campbell testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
A. I assume so. 
Q. Who was paying your rent? 
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A. I don't know - I was, I assume. 
Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 65:9-14. 
COUNT THIRTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid you rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from the two 
bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71:17-20. 
COUNT THIRTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten - what source of funds could you have possibly used 
to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you could have 
paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and your 
expenses, and we're talking about $1,500 every month that you're saying that you 
didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with checks from the two bank accounts that 
you're telling us are the only bank accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at that time. 
Id. at 71 :23-72:4. 
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COUNT THffiTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for month you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody was paying it 
for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another bank account out there; 
right? Those are my only options that I can think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A. Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is there any 
other possible ways. That's the only other possible way I can understand that it 
was being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you one to Atkinson's with cash to 
obtain a money order? 
A. I have. 
*** 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to pay for it, 
that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either - that stock 
that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into your Zion's 
account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of -
A. I don't' remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
Counsel for Mr. Campbell was unable to locate any Idaho case law analyzing "I don't 
know" or "I don't remember" as a basis for a finding of criminal contempt. 
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Petitioners cite two cases as authority for the proposition the "I don't know" answers or 
the "I don't remember" answers are sufficient for a finding of criminal contempt. These case are 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkel, 179 Ohio App.3d 747 (Ohio App. 2008) and In Re 
Gitkin, 164 F. 71 (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania, 1908). Petitioners use of the cases cited 
above, illustrates Mr. Campbell is not guilty of criminal contempt given the answers provided in 
his deposition. 
Regarding Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkel, 179 Ohio App.3d 747, Petitioners cite 
the case as standing for the proposition "debtor was held in contempt for evasive and false 
answers regarding his assets." Plaintiff's Trial Brief dated May 18, 2016 at page 8. This case 
actually has no relevance to evasive answers like "I don't know" or "I don't remember." The 
holding in Ohio Department of Taxation stated, "a review of the record and proceedings below 
reveals that at the debtor's examination of July 19, 2004, appellant blatantly lied about his 
interest in real property ... " Ohio Department of Taxation at 753 and 754. There is no holding 
in Ohio Department of Taxation that answers similar to "I don't know" or "I don't remember" 
are sufficient to establish criminal contempt of court. To the contrary, the Ohio Department of 
Taxation Court stated, "a well-founded belief of the testimony's untruthfulness is not sufficient." 
Ohio Department of Taxation at 753. This holding in Ohio Department of Taxation ties into 
Idaho case law requiring willfulness and cautioning that contempt is an extraordinary proceeding 
and should be approached with caution. 
As stated above, " ... contempt is an extraordinary proceeding and should be approached 
with caution. This Court has recognized contempt is an extraordinary proceeding. Phillips 95 
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Idaho at 405, 509 P.2d at 1326. This inherent power must be exercised with great caution .... 
The contempt power is readily susceptible of abuse and fraught with danger not only to personal 
liberties but to the respect and confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a 
power is universally recognized as essential to an orderly and effective administration and 
execution of justice, it should be exercised with utmost caution .... Since a contempt citation is a 
'potent weapon, .... courts rightly impose it with caution .... Imposing a willful standard 
ensures that courts cannot abuse their inherent contempt power. It also ensures that courts only 
impose such an extraordinary remedy when the alleged contemnor has wrongfully disobeyed a 
court order." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. 
John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005). 
Additionally, willful means, "'an indifferent disregard of duty' or 'a remissness and 
failure in performance of a duty' but not a 'deliberately and maliciously planned dereliction of 
duty'-applies to contempt proceedings under LC. § 7-601(5)" In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,281 (2005). The willful element would appear to apply to the 
different subparagraphs on contempt contained in Idaho Code § 7-601. 
I don't know or I don't remember is not "deceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of 
the court by a party to an action or special proceeding" as required by LC.§ 7-601(4) which 
would lead to a conviction for criminal contempt of court. This is especially true for events that 
happened more than three years prior to his debtors examination. 
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Deceit is "a fraudulent and cheating misrepresentation, artifice, or device, used by one or 
more persons to deceive and trick another, who is innocent of the true facts, to the prejudice and 
damage of the party imposed upon." BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY, (Revised 4th Edition 1968). 
Abuse is "to make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner 
contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use; to make an extravagant or excessive use, as to 
abuse one's authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (Revised 4th Edition 1968). 
Convicting Mr. Campbell for criminal contempt of court for responding "I don't know" 
or "I don't remember" is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's guidance stating, "contempt is an 
extraordinary proceeding and should be approached with caution." In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005). 
"Criminal contempt is the commission of a disrespectful act directed at the court itself 
which obstructs justice. A criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and simply to 
vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in 
violation of an order of the court." Camp at 862. If the Court uses the Camp Court's definition 
of criminal contempt ( a disrespectful act directed at the court itself which obstructs justice ) it 
appears there is no plausible circumstance in this case which would lead to Mr. Campbell's 
conviction. 
Regarding Petitioners' reliance on In Re Gitkins, 164 F. 71 (District Court, E.D. 
Pennsylvania, 1908) is also misplaced. Petitioners use the language stating, "he presented to be 
ignorant of facts which obviously would have been known to anyone who had sufficient intellect 
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to perform the most ordinary duties of life, and the evasion and falsity of the answers are so 
palpable, so clear, and so persistent as to establish beyond any possibility of a doubt the findings 
as reported by the referee." In Re Gitkins at 73 & 74. 
The testimony provided by Mr. Campbell is factually distinguishable from the testimony 
provided by Mr. Gitkins. 
First, the events involved in the alleged criminal contempt were more than three years old 
at the date of the debtor's examination. 
Second, criminal contempt of court counts eleven through thirty-four have been set forth 
above. Mr. Campbell testified as follows: 
A. "Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct? A. 
Correct. Q. So how did your make up the difference? A. I told you, I liquidated - - I had 
liquidated assets that I had. I believe some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida 
that was part of a venture capital group that we were involved with. Q. What stock was that? A. 
It was part of a venture capital group. Michelson was in the same group. He can give you all the 
information." Exhibit 1, 52:8 through 52:15. 
B. "Q. Was this money that you had in cash and then you put it into a checking -
- A. You know, you're asking the same question over and over again. I told you I don't 
remember. I don't know. You can ask it 15 different ways, I don't know." Exhibit 1, 37:9 
through 37:19. 
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C. "So what money is John - - Mr. Michaels using in order to pay your portion of 
the rent to Mr. Duringer? He has made a loan to me." Exhibit 1, 14:11 through 14:13. 
There is further testimony about the liquidation of assets that Petitioners actually 
cite in the criminal contempt of court counts they seek. Mr. Campbell's testimony provides a 
general description of the source of funds at his disposal. 
"If a party does not obey a court order requiring a certain act, and no longer has the 
present ability to comply with that order, then only criminal contempt sanctions are available." 
In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick 
and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005). Mr. Campbell 
provided his testimony regarding liquidating assets prior to the conclusion of his debtor's 
examination, thus he complied with the Amended Order. 
Petitioners' also seek to convict Mr. Campbell of criminal contempt of court for failing to 
remember ifhe owned a car in 2012 (count 15), where he lived in June of 2012 (count 16), and 
what assets he was still liquidating in 2011 (count 22). In the Ohio Department of Taxation v. 
Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, case cited by Petitioners, the Ohio Department of Taxation Court 
states, "in order to sustain a conviction for contempt for giving false testimony, it must be shown 
that the false testimony had an obstructive effect, that the court had judicial knowledge of the 
falsity of the testimony, and that the questions were pertinent to the issues in the case." Ohio 
Department of Taxation at 753. None of the questions or answers discussed in counts 15, 16, 
and 22 were false testimony that had an obstructive effect on issue pertinent to the case. This 
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF/23 
179 of 636
proposition would also apply to other counts of the criminal contempt charges they seek in this 
case. 
:1,d 
DATED this 11_ day of July, 2016. 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A . 
. Ritzau 
Attorneys for Respon t, Neil David Campbell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~y of July, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney named below, in the manner noted: 
Erin F. Clark 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax:208-725-0076 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same. 
~ By transmitting copies of the sam to said attorney by facsimile machine process. 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
JUL 2 2 2016 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk DiGtrict 
Court 8!§.lne Q9y17_tJ~ f<!al?o _.._ ____ _ 
Luke L. Dauchot, CA Bar No. 229829, OH Bar No. 0039935, IL Bar No. 6193611 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW, Plaintiffs C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. and KARLIN 
HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (collectively "Plaintiffs"), and respectfully submit their 
Trial Brief. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"If the credibility of court orders and the integrity of our judicial system are to be 
maintained, a litigant cannot ignore court orders with impunity." Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 N.Y.2d 118, 
123 (1999). Neil David Campbell ("Campbell") has a long, proven history oflying and evading 
his legal obligations. On December 13, 2011, the Los Angeles Superior Court found Campbell 
guilty of fraud and entered judgment against him for over $24 million, which includes damages 
for fraud and sanctions for discovery abuses. Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Exs. F & G. 
In the more than four years since judgment was entered, Campbell has continued his pattern of 
obfuscation, lies, and flouting the discovery process. Plaintiffs now bring both criminal and civil 
contempt charges against Campbell because, yet again, he has defied a court order and lied. 
Campbell continues to play games, even as Plaintiffs have tried in good faith to settle the 
current contempt proceeding: Campbell induced Plaintiffs to agree to a continuance by, inter 
alia, consenting to sit for an informal interview regarding his finances. Ex. 33. Then, after the 
original trial date was continued, Campbell cancelled the interview at the last minute. Id. 
Campbell did not provide any explanation or offer to reschedule-he simply said that he "will 
not be attending tomorrow's meeting." Id. Moreover, in his latest maneuver, Campbell now 
tries to put the onus on Plaintiffs to go about collecting his documents for him. This Court 
ordered Campbell to produce his documents. This he did not do. In light of Campbell's antics, 
Plaintiffs have no choice but to proceed with trial. 
Campbell committed criminal contempt and made a farce of his sworn debtor's 
examination by responding to numerous questions with lies. Campbell testified under oath that 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF - 1 
182 of 636
he did not know or remember the answers to questions regarding: (1) the source of thousands of 
dollars in cash that he admittedly deposited into his bank accounts during the relevant time 
period; (2) the name of the company he founded and in whose name he deposited $300,000 in an 
offshore account; or (3) how he paid his rent during times when his bank records do not show 
any such payments being made. Ex. 1 at 33:22-38:24, 41:15-22, 49:10-50:16, 52:8-60:20, 
62:5-9, 65:9-14, 71 :17-74:6. These claims are demonstrably false. For example, Campbell 
recently admitted that he stashed "less than 1 OOK" of cash in boxes that his movers delivered to 
Idaho. Ex. 5. Moreover, the sum of the basic information that Campbell-a man of supposedly 
limited means-claims he does not know about his own finances reveals beyond any reasonable 
doubt that his testimony is patently false. 
Campbell is guilty of civil contempt because he refuses to produce certain bank records 
and attorney payment records responsive to the Court's April 1, 2015 Amended Order (the 
"Amended Order") directing him to do so. Ex. 13. Prior to April 25, 2016, Campbell did not 
produce a single attorney payment record. He also failed to produce any records regarding a 
bank account with HSBC Hong Kong (the "HSBC Hong Kong account") and failed to produce 
complete records as to another bank account with Bank of America. Notwithstanding his cries of 
impossibility, on the eve of the previously scheduled May 4, 2016 trial, Campbell produced a 
portion of the responsive documents that Plaintiffs have sought for over a year. Exs. 4, 6, 32. 
Even now, Campbell continues to play games. Based on this (incomplete) production, 
Plaintiffs offered to drop civil contempt Counts Two through Seven and Count Nine if Campbell 
executed and filed an affidavit of compliance certifying that he has produced all existing 
documents relating to these Counts. Campbell signed and served the affidavit on Plaintiffs, but 
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inexplicably refuses to file it. Ex. 34. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs remain willing to drop these 
Counts ifhe will do so. 
Not including these counts, Plaintiffs assert three civil contempt charges against 
Campbell for his failure to produce documents, and twenty-four criminal contempt charges for 
his lies. Campbell's most recent document production, considered against his long and 
consistent history of obfuscation, makes clear that Campbell only responds to threats of prison. 
Campbell will continue to play games unless this Court imprisons him until he fully complies 
with his discovery obligations. Moreover, Campbell's flagrant discovery abuses and blatant lies 
warrant the most severe punishment allowable. As to their civil charges, Plaintiffs therefore 
respectfully ask that this Court imprison Campbell until he complies fully with the Amended 
Order. Plaintiffs also respectfully ask that this Court imprison Campbell for five days per charge 
for each of their twenty-four criminal contempt charges. 
During this trial, the Court must decide the following issues: 
1. Campbell claimed under oath that he did not know the answer to twenty-four 
basic questions about his finances and payment of living expenses. Is there any reasonable doubt 
that Campbell was lying? 
2. What are the elements, and the burden of proof, for establishing civil contempt? 
3. This Court ordered Campbell to produce bank records and attorney fee payment 
records. Campbell failed to produce all records responsive to the Amended Order. Is Campbell 
guilty of civil contempt for violating the Amended Order? 
II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Campbell's History of Fraud and Discovery Abuses 
This proceeding is the latest chapter in a saga that began with a fraud case against 
Campbell's partner-in-crime, Philip Richard Powers ("Powers"). In October 2007, Plaintiffs 
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sued Powers and his corporate entities in Los Angeles Superior Court for fraud and related 
claims (the "California suit"). RJN Ex. A. Plaintiffs alleged that Powers cheated them out of 
millions of dollars in connection with a Costa Rican teak farm business, with which Campbell 
was also involved. Id. at 16-26, Ex. A. 
In the summer of 2008, with the fraud case pending, Dr. Gary Michelson ("Dr. 
Michelson")-the co-owner ofplaintiff C&M Investment Group Ltd. ("C&M") and Campbell's 
close friend-bought Campbell's ownership stake in C&M for $500,000. Ex. 10 at 142:9-23. 
Unbeknownst to Dr. Michelson, however, Campbell had secretly received millions of dollars in 
improper kickbacks from Powers. When Plaintiffs discovered the kickbacks in late 2008, they 
amended the complaint to add Campbell as a defendant. RJN Ex. B. 
On February 4, 2010, the California court entered partial summary judgment against 
Campbell for over $1.5 million-the amount of secret profits Plaintiffs were able to prove at that 
time. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex.Fat 2. 
Undeterred by the $1.5 million judgment, Campbell flouted the discovery process related 
to Plaintiffs' remaining claims. Between February and November 2010, Campbell's discovery 
abuses were sufficiently egregious that the California court imposed terminating sanctions, 
struck his answer, and entered a default against him. RJN Ex. D; RJN Ex. F. at 2. 
Still undaunted, Campbell again failed to respond to written discovery and did not attend 
his deposition. RJN Ex. E. The California court thus imposed monetary sanctions. Id. 
On December 13, 2011, the California court granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs' 
favor, finding Campbell liable for fraud and related claims. RJN Ex. F. The Court entered 
judgment against Campbell for over $24 million. RJN. Ex. G. On June 21, 2012, after filing the 
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California Judgment in Idaho, Plaintiffs obtained an order from this Court domesticating the 
Judgment. Ex. 12. And so began the next phase of Campbell's evasive maneuvers. 
B. Recent Procedural History 
Plaintiffs bring the current contempt charges because Campbell has again abused the 
discovery process-thwarting Plaintiffs' efforts to collect on their judgment against him. On 
June 18, 2016, this Court denied Campbell's motion to dismiss the Charging Affidavit. The 
Court also denied Campbell's request to file three untimely supplemental affirmative defenses 
based on sufficiency of service, ruling that Campbell may only assert the two ( also untimely) 
affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs stipulated that Campbell could file: past inability to comply 
with the Court's order (as to the criminal counts) and present inability to comply with the Court's 
order (as to the civil counts). 
III. ISSUES FOR TRIAL 
A. Elements of Criminal Contempt 
A party's "[d]eceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court" is punishable as a 
contempt. Idaho Code§ 7-601. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75G), criminal contempt 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75G). Reasonable doubt "is not 
mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." Idaho Crim. Jury Instr. 1707. Instead, 
"it is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." Id. 
Plaintiffs' criminal contempt charges arise from Campbell's false testimony given under 
oath during his August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination. 
B. Campbell Lied Under Oath 
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During his Debtor's Examination, Campbell repeatedly testified that he did not know or 
did not remember the answer to questions that any reasonable person would be able to answer. 
These questions include: 
• Where the $24,715.35 in Campbell's Bank of America account as of June 2012 came 
from; 
• Whether the nearly $25,000 in Campbell's Bank of America account came from his 
Zions bank account; 
• Whether Campbell sold any assets in June 2012; 
• Whether Campbell owned a car in 2012; 
• Where Campbell was living in June 2012; 
• The source from which Campbell obtained $3,410 that he deposited on November 30, 
2012; 
• The name of the company for which Campbell set up a bank account into which he 
deposited $300,000; 
• The source from which Campbell obtained nearly $10,000 in cash that he deposited 
into his Zions bank account as evidenced in his January 2012 statement; 
• Whether all of Campbell's assets in Florida were liquidated before he moved to 
Idaho; 
• What assets Campbell was still liquidating in the end of 2011; 
• How and when the proceeds of a substantial stock sale were provided to Campbell; 
• Why Campbell would have held the proceeds from liquidating a substantial amount 
of stock in cash; 
• The source from which Campbell obtained $5,500 in cash that he deposited in 
February 2012; 
• Whether someone was regularly providing Campbell with cash each month; 
• Whether the substantial cash deposits that Campbell made in early 2012 constituted 
all of his cash on hand for each of those months; and 
• How Campbell paid his rent during a period of months when his bank accounts do not 
show any rent payments. 
Ex. 1 at 33:22-38:24, 41 :15-22, 49:10-50:16, 52:8-60:20, 62:5-9, 65:9-14, 71 :17-74:6. 
This testimony defies credulity. Campbell claimed that the only income he has received 
since 2012 is his monthly Social Security payment of roughly $1,600 per month. Ex. 3 at 1; Ex. 
1 at 51:8-10. Campbell also testified that he did not have any assets worth more than $10,000 
when he moved to Idaho in roughly 2011. Ex. 1 at 35:16-36:16. Nevertheless, Campbell made 
over $20,000 in cash deposits into his Zions account in Idaho during the first four months of 
2012. See Ex. 3 at 45-68. Campbell thus regularly had large wads of cash on hand during this 
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time period. He nevertheless testified that he did not know where any of this cash came from. It 
is inconceivable that anyone-let alone a person receiving nothing more than $1,600 per month 
in Social Security-would not know or remember the source of over $20,000 in cash. 
Moreover, the documents and statements that Campbell provided on the eve of trial 
amply prove that all of Campbell's claims of ignorance and memory loss are false. These 
documents and statements prove that, contrary to his testimony, Campbell had substantial assets, 
a car, and sources of cash during the relevant timeframe. 
First, contrary to his sworn testimony, Campbell now admits that when he moved to 
Idaho he concealed a still undisclosed sum of "less than 1 OOK" of cash in the boxes of toys and 
clothes that his movers transported for him to Idaho. Ex. 5 at 2. 1 Thus, the roughly $10,000 in 
cash deposits reflected on Campbell's January 2012 bank statement likely came from this trove 
of cash. The same is likely true of over $5,500 in cash that Campbell deposited in February 
2012. 
Second, Campbell now admits that he owned a 2006 Corvette which he sold "either in 
2011 or 2012." Id. This was purportedly the last car that Campbell owned. Id. According to a 
canceled check that Campbell recently produced, on March 28, 2012, he received $27,900 from a 
Toyota dealership in Colorado Springs. Ex. 6 at 3-6. He deposited this check into his Bank of 
America account on May 23, 2012. Id. It is unclear from the records whether this transfer is 
related to the sale of Campbell's Corvette or some other transaction that Campbell still has not 
disclosed. Either way, Campbell apparently possessed and liquidated a car in 2012, which is the 
source of the large starting balance reflected in his Bank of America account in June 2012. 
Campbell moved to Idaho in approximately June of 2011. See Ex. 1, at 35:16-24. 
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Third, Campbell now reveals the name of the company in whose name he opened the 
HSBC Hong Kong account: Mosaic Orange. Ex. 5 at 2. Campbell offers no explanation of how 
he now knows this information or why he couldn't obtain it over one year ago when this Court 
ordered him to produce bank records. 
Campbell may believe that he can avoid his obligation to testify truthfully by answering 
questions with "I don't know" or "I don't remember." The law, however, provides otherwise. 
Testifying under oath that one does not know the answer to a question, when one actually does 
know that answer, constitutes perjury. For example, in In re Gitkin, 164 F. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1908), 
the court found that the debtor committed perjury by pretending not to know the answers to the 
questions posed to him by the trustee. As the court stated: 
[The debtor] pretended to be ignorant of facts which obviously 
would have been known to anyone who had sufficient intellect to 
perform the most ordinary duties of life, and the evasion and falsity 
of the answers are so palpable, so clear, and so persistent as to 
establish beyond any possibility of a doubt the findings as reported 
by the referee. 
Other courts have likewise held that blatantly evasive responses constitute a contempt of court. 
See Ohio Dept. of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, 752 (2008) (holding debtor in 
contempt for evasive and false answers regarding his assets). 
The same is true here: It defies credulity that during the course of one examination 
someone could forget or not know: (1) that he shipped himself an unspecified sum of cash "less 
than lOOK"; (2) that he possessed a Corvette several years earlier; (3) that he sold the last car he 
owned and deposited the proceeds in his bank account; and ( 4) the name of a company in whose 
name he opened an account and deposited $300,000. Campbell knew the answers to the 
questions posed to him at the debtor's exam; he simply chose to lie. This is nothing more than 
evas10n. 
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Campbell's asserted defense of inability to comply with the Court's Order(s) at the time 
of his alleged contempts does not save him from this conclusion. First, Plaintiffs' contempt 
counts are based on giving false testimony under oath, not violating a Court Order. Second, to 
the extent that Campbell asserts that he was unable to tell the truth during his debtor's exam, the 
evidence discussed above conclusively shows that he could have told the truth but chose not to. 
Finally, Campbell bears the burden of proving his affirmative defense-which will be impossible 
for him to do given its inapplicability and the substantial contrary evidence. 
For these reasons, Campbell should be held in criminal contempt under Idaho Code§ 7-
601(4) for the twenty-four charges set forth in the charging affidavit underlying these contempt 
proceedings. 
C. Elements and Burdens of Proof Re Civil Contempt Charges 
It is a contempt of court to disobey a court order. Idaho Code § 7-601 ( 5). A civil 
contempt claim must be proven to a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(j)(l). 
Notably, the failure to comply with a court order need not be intentional or willful to impose a 
civil contempt sanction. Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297, 304 (2012). Rather "[c]ivil 
as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the 
court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance." McComb 
v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949). "When the contempt consists in the 
omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be 
imprisoned until he has performed it[.]" Idaho Code§ 7-611. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(j)(l) states that the court must find by a preponderance 
of the evidence "that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the order violated[.]" 
However, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(h) establishes that present inability to comply is an 
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affirmative defense, which the alleged contemnor must prove to a preponderance of the 
evidence. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(h). These rules are thus in tension. 
Other courts applying similar laws put the burden regarding ability or inability to comply 
on the defendant. Thus, in Lamb v. Eads, the Iowa Supreme Court found that "the general rule 
holds that an applicant for a contempt citation establishes a prima facie case by proving the duty 
which is on the contemner and the contemner's [sic] failure to perform the duty. The contenmer 
then has the burden of showing he could not perform the duty, if he relies on that ground." 346 
N.W. 2d 830, 832 (1984); see also Foust v. Denato, 175 N.W.2d 403,405 (Iowa 1970) ("[W]hen 
the evidence clearly shows the order of court has been disobeyed, a party who seeks to purge 
himself of contempt by showing his inability to comply with the order of court has the burden to 
prove it").2 Similarly, Spabile v. Hunt held that, while a court must find that a contemnor has the 
present ability to comply before imposing sanctions, it is the contemnor who bears the burden of 
proving his inability to comply. 360 A.2d 51 (Vt. 1976). 
To satisfy his burden, an alleged contemnor must prove his defense of present inability to 
comply with admissible evidence. He cannot avoid his burden by claiming a Fifth Amendment 
privilege. US. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761 (1983). Campbell thus bears the burden of 
proving his inability to comply with the Court's order. 
D. Campbell's Civil Contempts 
The Charging Affidavit asserts civil contempt charges arising from Campbell's failure to 
produce attorney fee payment records and bank records in violation of this Court's Amended 
2 See also 17 C.J.S. Contempt§ 141 (2015) ("When the moving party in a contempt action 
has shown that the alleged contemnor has failed to comply with the judgment or order, the 
burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to show why he or she should not be held in contempt. ... 
If the alleged contemnor makes a sufficient showing, the burden of proof shifts back to the party 
seeking a finding of contempt, who ultimately bears the burden of showing an ability to comply 
with the order.") 
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Order. On April 1, 2015, more than one year ago, the deputy clerk served on Campbell the 
Amended Order requiring him to produce (1) documents evidencing payments to his lawyers and 
(2) financial records. Ex. 13 at 2-3.3 
1. Campbell's Failure to Produce Records of Payments to David Flyer 
(Charge One) 
The Amended Order required Campbell to produce "all documents evidencing any 
payments made by Defendant to any legal counsel over the period of 2009 to present, including 
documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments." Until one week 
before the originally scheduled trial date, Campbell had not produced a single page evidencing a 
single payment to any of the seven lawyers he admittedly hired and paid during this time frame. 4 
Ex. 3 at 2; Ex. 2 at 68:7---69:3; Ex. 8 at 5-6. 
Initially, Campbell asserted that he was not producing a single document related to 
payments to his attorneys because he claimed attorney client privilege. Ex. 15 at 1. Campbell 
then claimed that he could not produce any of these documents because he had contacted Flyer, 
Taitelman, Michaels, Huish, and Turffs (but not Roy or Thompson) and they each "refuse to 
produce documents stating two reasons, attorney work products and that [Campbell was] no 
longer there [sic] client." Ex. 3 at 2. It is simply not credible to assert that five separate lawyers 
would independently refuse to provide copies of bills and/or payment records on the same 
3 The Deputy Clerk served the Amended Order on Campbell at his residence via Federal 
Express. Ex. 13-5. As discussed in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Campbell's Motion to Dismiss, 
service by Federal Express is proper under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5. It also sufficed to 
give Campbell actual notice of the Amended Order. 
4 These lawyers are David Flyer, Michael Taitelman, Jonathan Michaels, Dyke Huish, 
Robert Turffs, Susan Roy and Steve Thompson. Ex. 3 at 2; Ex. 2 at 68:7---69:3; Ex. 8 at 5-6. 
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erroneous grounds-which coincidentally mirrored the invalid ground that Campbell himself 
originally devised. 5 
Not surprisingly, once faced with imminent incarceration, Campbell successfully 
obtained responsive documents from nearly all of his attorneys.6 Ex. 4 at 4-6, 23-25, 95-104, 
153-67; Ex. 32. However, Campbell still has not produced any documents relating to payments 
he made to Flyer, nor does he provide anything beyond his frivolous ''justifications" to explain 
this failure. 
Additionally, Campbell's recently produced documents reveal for the first time that 
Campbell employed another attorney during the relevant time period-Michael France. 7 Ex. 4 
at 153-55. It is troubling that Campbell did not disclose France until now, over one year after 
the Court's Amended Order directing him to produce attorney payment records. 
In sum, Campbell's recent document production shows that responsive documents exist 
and that Campbell is capable of obtaining them. After a year of excuses and lies, Campbell still 
has not produced all of the documents that this Court ordered him to produce. He should 
therefore be held in civil contempt until he produces all documents evidencing the payments he 
made to David Flyer. 
2. Campbell's Failure to Produce Any Records Related to the HSBC 
Hong Kong Account (Charge Eight) 
The Amended Order also required Campbell to produce "all records relating to financial 
accounts (savings accounts, checking accounts, or otherwise) maintained in Defendant's name or 
to which Defendant has access for the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to the present 
5 Attorney payment records are not work product because they are not documents 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation[.]" 2 Federal Evidence§ 5:38 (4th ed.). 
6 As noted above, due to this recent production, Plaintiffs will drop Charges Two through 
Seven as long as Campbell agrees to file the affidavit of compliance that he signed. 
7 The records also reveal dealings with Brent Nielson, who is a member of the same firm 
as Susan Roy. Ex. 4 at 156-59. 
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date, including but not limited to documents that identify any deposits made into and/or any 
disbursements of funds made from said account(s)." Ex. 13. Campbell originally claimed that 
he had only one account, and refused to produce documents related to this account because he 
claimed it contained only social security funds which are exempt from judgment collection. Ex. 
15. This statement proved false. 
In fact, at his February 20, 2015 Debtor's Examination, Campbell admitted that in 2010 
he opened an account with HSBC in Hong Kong and deposited $300,000 into this account ( of 
which Campbell is the beneficiary). Ex. 2 at 23:2-32:5; Ex. 11 at No. 8. Campbell initially 
claimed that he cannot get records related to the HSBC Hong Kong account because he forgot 
the name of the corporation that he founded, of which he is an officer, and in whose name he 
opened the account with a $300,000 initial deposit. Ex. 1 at 41:15-22; Ex. 2 at 24:12-18. 
More than one year later, and on the eve of trial, Campbell finally disclosed that the name 
of the company is Mosaic Orange. See Ex. 5; Ex. 4 at 95-96. Campbell does not explain how he 
suddenly became aware of this information. Additionally, though Campbell admits that he now 
knows·the name of the company-and thus that the purported barrier to obtaining records has 
been removed-Campbell still has not produced a single record relating to this account; nor does 
he claim that he even tried to get records since he suddenly "remembered" this company's name. 
In sum, Campbell can and must do more to obtain the HSBC Hong Kong bank account 
records. Campbell should therefore be held in civil contempt and jailed until he produces them. 
3. Campbell's Failure to Produce All Responsive Records from his Bank 
of America Account (Charges Ten) 8 
This Court ordered Campbell to produce "all records relating to financial accounts ... 
maintained in Defendant's name ... for the time period commencing January 1, 2012[.]" Ex. 13. 
8 As discussed above, if Campbell will file the affidavit of compliance, Plaintiffs will drop 
Count Nine relating to cancelled check images. 
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On the eve of the original trial date, Campbell produced (for the first time) cancelled checks 
from his Bank of America account. Several of these checks are from May 2012 or the first week 
of June 2012, and thus show that Campbell's Bank of America account was opened prior to June 
8, 2012-the starting date of the earliest statement that Campbell produced. E.g., Ex. 6 at 3-7, 
11, 13, 18, 20, 22. Campbell thus still has not produced all of the bank statements from his Bank 
of America account that this Court ordered him to produce. 
Furthermore, Campbell's recent document production makes plain that he has never 
provided Plaintiffs with the financial transparency to which they are entitled. These documents 
reveal that Campbell has multiple accounts that he never disclosed. First, the checks that 
Campbell paid to Turffs reveal that, at least as of 2010, Campbell had a checking account in his 
name with Comerica Bank in Florida. Ex. 4 at 97-98. Campbell has not indicated whether this 
account still existed during the period covered by the Amended Order. Next, Campbell produced 
statements from two credit cards in his name with a combined credit limit of $6,500. Contrary to 
Campbell's portrayals of himself as a pauper just trying to make ends meet to take care of his 
daughter, these credit card statements show that in the past few years Campbell has spent 
thousands of dollars on hotels, a river rafting trip, and other personal entertainment charges. 
See, e.g., id. at 49-62, 77-82. 
Campbell was ordered to produce all bank records from January 1, 2012 to the present. 
He still has not done so. For the aforementioned reasons, Campbell should be held in civil 
contempt and imprisoned until he complies with this Court's Orders. 
4. Campbell's Affirmative Defenses and Irrelevant Evidence 
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This Court held that Campbell may only assert two affirmative defenses: Past and present 
inability to comply with the court's orders.9 Only one of these-present inability to comply with 
the Court's orders-is relevant to Plaintiffs' civil contempt counts. Campbell bears the burden 
of proving this defense as to each of Plaintiffs' civil contempt claims, which he will not be able 
to do. Campbell has the present ability to comply with the Order to produce payment records 
from Flyer because California requires attorneys in that state (including Flyer) to provide clients 
with their payment and billing records upon demand. RJN, Ex. K & L. Campbell has the 
present ability to comply with the Order to produce the Bank of America and HSBC Hong Kong 
Records because both American and Hong Kong banking regulations require banks to retain the 
type ofrecords that Campbell was required to produce. RJN, Ex. H-J. The applicable retention 
periods indicate that these banks still have the records that Campbell was order to produce. 
Campbell recently served on Plaintiffs documents he intends to offer as Exhibits 501-10. 
These documents are each a "Limited Power of Attorney" purportedly authorizing Plaintiffs 
counsel to obtain records from one of the lawyers or banks at issue. These documents are not 
relevant to Campbell's present ability to comply with the Amended Order, or any other disputed 
issue in this case. Instead, they are nothing more than an invalid attempt to force Plaintiffs to do 
what this Court ordered Campbell to do, without the benefit of Campbell's knowledge of his own 
documents and their whereabouts. Additionally, there is no evidence that these documents are 
sufficient to enable Plaintiffs to obtain the records at issue-which is particularly dubious with 
respect to the HSBC Hong Kong Account. It is unlikely that a foreign bank governed by foreign 
law would release records to a third party based on an English-language U.S. power of attorney. 
9 Plaintiffs note that in addition to the defenses based on sufficiency of service that 
Campbell tried to file and which the Court rejected, Campbell also waived the affirmative 
defense of unawareness of the Order violated because he did not timely assert it. 
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Plaintiffs therefore respectfully ask the Court to exclude these documents as irrelevant. See 
Idaho R. Evid. 401,402. 
More importantly, Campbell does not deny that he himself can approach the relevant 
entities and request the documents. Instead, he argues that signing these powers of attorney 
satisfies his obligations under the Court's Order directing him to produce the documents. 
Contrary to Campbell's belief, it does not. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Campbell has told numerous lies under oath and has defied this Court's order directing 
him to produce documents. The actions underlying this contempt proceeding are but the latest in 
Campbell's long series oflies, disobedience, and discovery abuses. To protect the integrity of 
this Court's orders and the judicial system, this Court must coerce Campbell to obey It and 
punish his lies. 
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that Campbell be incarcerated for five days for 
each of the twenty-four counts of criminal contempt. Plaintiffs also respectfully ask that this 
Court imprison Campbell until he complies fully with the Amended Order by producing: (1) 
documents related to Campbell's payments to Flyer that are responsive to the Amended Order; 
(2) documents related to the HSBC Hong Kong Account for the time period commencing 
January 1, 2012 to the present date; and (3) all records related to the Bank of America account 
from the time period from January 1, 2012 to June 8, 2012. 
DATED: July'1.2;2016 
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Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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APPENDIX A: TESTIMONY UNDERLYING CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES 
COUNT ELEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 2012 opening 
balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
Q. So this is the statement from June st\ 2012, through July 9th, 2012; 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June gth, 2012, as 
being $24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea at this point. 
Id. at 33:22-34:4. 
COUNT TWELVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000 into it. Did 
it come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 34:5-7. 
COUNT THIRTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
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Q. What possibly-where possibly could this money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the 
possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
COUNT FOURTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own any assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. 
COUNT FIFTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
COUNT SIXTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
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A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
COUNT SEVENTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of 
America account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
* * * 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000 and you were 
living solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for 
you to be able to put $24,000 into a bank account in June of 2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
* * * 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are 
here under penalty of perjury. 
A. Um-mm. 
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Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when 
you're saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social 
Security, it just does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
COUNT EIGHTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. And that on November 30th, 2012, you deposited $3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Where could it have come from? 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 38:18-24. 
COUNT NINETEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with 
HSBC? 
A. What was the name of the company? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank 
account and put $300,000 into it? 
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A. No, I don't remember. 
Id. at41:15-22. 
COUNT TWENTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully regarding cash deposits he made in his Zions bank account as follows: 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. Where could this have 
come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did somebody give you $10,000 in cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was back in 2011. 
Id. at 49:10-15. 
COUNT TWENTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was 
worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage units; 
correct? 
A. Well, I- to answer your question, I don't- I didn't bring anything 
with me that I would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
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Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 49:24-50:16. 
COUNT TWENTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe 
some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part 
of a venture capital group that we were involved with. 
* * * 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by 
my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000- end of 2011 what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
COUNT TWENTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating 
to enable you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month; correct? 
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A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
A. I believe this was part - I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, 
but I think this was part of that stock settlement. 
*** 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far - that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
COUNT TWENTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock 
- why were you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in 
cash in your condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits; right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
Id. at 56:21-57:3 
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COUNT TWENTY-FIVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in 
one month. And if you're telling me that that money came from a 
stock sale, that would mean that you were having that cash from the 
stock sale somewhere within your reach; isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would have gotten it if the money weren't in your reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I 
don't remember if it did or not. 
Q. So where - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash 
have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then - you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of 
cash that you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up 
with these deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
COUNT TWENTY-SIX: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated 
February 21 5\ 2012; right? 
* * * 
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Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 
deposit, a $2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous 
month of $10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the 
cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of2012; 
right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you - so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
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A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made 
deposits of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in 
cash at the beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in 
your possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the 
cash you had in your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
COUNT TWENTY-NINE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would have obtained additional cash if not somebody providing it 
to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives 
you one piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of cash; right? Because you liquidated everything when you 
were in Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 
while you were in Florida and before you moved to Idaho other than 
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what was in your storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any 
assets worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage 
unit; right? 
A. Nothing that was worth more than $10,000 to my recollection, yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at60:21-61:17. 
COUNT THIRTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're- on February 22nd there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 
2ih a $2,600 deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
COUNT THIRTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully about why his bank records no longer showed him paying his rent with a 
check as he had done for the previous five months. Specifically, Campbell testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
A. I assume so. 
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Q. Who was paying your rent? 
A. I don't know- I was, I assume. 
Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 65:9-14. 
COUNT THIRTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid your rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from 
the two bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of 
money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71:14-20. 
COUNT THIRTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten-what source of funds could you have 
possibly used to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't 
remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you 
could have paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and 
your expenses, and we're talking about $1,500 every month that 
you're saying that you didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with 
checks from the two bank accounts that you're telling us are the only 
bank accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at 
that time. 
Id. at 71:23-72:12. 
COUNT THIRTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another 
bank account out there; right? Those are my only options that I can 
think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A. Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is 
there any other possible way. That's the only other possible way I can 
understand that it was being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you gone to Atkinson's 
with cash to obtain a money order? 
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A. I have. 
* * * 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to 
pay for it, that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at 
that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either -
that stock that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into 
your Zions account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of -
A. I don't remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF - 30 
211 of 636
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 2~2016, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Neil David Campbell 
P.O. Box 3372 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
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P.O. Box 3310 
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Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
JoLynn Drage. Clerk District 
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Luke L. Dauchot, CA Bar No. 229829, OH Bar No. 0039935, IL Bar No. 6193611 
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333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
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Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 44(d), Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 and Idaho 
Code § 9-1 O 1, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice of the following 
documents: 
1. October 10, 2007 Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, 
Ltd. v. Philip Richard Powers et al. (Case No. BC378888). A true and correct certified copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. November 17, 2008 Amended Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M 
Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers et al. 
(Case No. BC378888). A true and correct certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B. 
3. Los Angeles Superior Court's February 4, 2010 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Adjudication Against Defendant Campbell for Constructive Fraud. A true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
4. Los Angeles Superior Court's November 2, 2010 Minute Order Imposing 
Terminating Sanctions and Entering Default as to Defendants in the case captioned C&M 
Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers et al. 
(Case No. BC378888). A true and correct certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
D. 
5. Los Angeles Superior Court's November 1, 2011 Minute Order Imposing 
Monetary Sanctions Against Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M Investment 
Group, Ltd., and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers et al. (Case No. 
BC378888). A true and correct certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
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6. Los Angeles Superior Court's December 13, 2011 Order Granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Neil David Campbell in the case captioned 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard 
Powers et al. (Case No. BC378888). A true and correct certified copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit F. 
7. Los Angeles Superior Court's December 13, 2011 Judgment Against Defendant 
Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers et al. (Case No. BC378888). A true and correct 
certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
8. Chapter 615-the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
(Financial Institutions) Ordinance, Part 3, § 20. A true and correct copy of the English version of 
this ordinance, obtained from the official website of the Hong Kong government, is attached 
hereto as Exhibit H. 
9. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.430. A true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit I. 
10. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.410. A true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit J. 
11. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6148. A true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit K. 
12. Cal. Prof. Conduct Rule 3-700. A true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit L. 
13. Fl. St. Bar Rule 4-1.4. A true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit M. 
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Luke L. Dauchot (S.B.N. 229829) 
Shelley D. Cordova (S.B.N. 234230) 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
777 South Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Email: ldauchot@kirkland.com 
Email: scordova@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd. 
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Case assigned "" 1>-51> 
Judge }A wJ\P_<A ~J -~ 
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd., a partnership, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Philip Richard Powers, individually; Powers ) 
Investments and Management, Inc., S.A., a ) 
corporation (a.k.a. Powers Investment and ) 
Management; Powers Management and. ) 
Investment; Powers Management & Investments) 
Inc.; Powers Investments; Powers Management ) 
& Investments Co.; Powers Investment & ) 
Management Co.; Powers Investments & ) 
Management Co.); Guanana Gris, S.A., a · ) 
corporation; Proteccion Forestal de Teca, S.A., lf) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive., ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
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1 S.A., Protecci6n Foresta} de Teca, S.A., and DOES 1 through 50 as follows: 
2 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
3 1. Plaintiff C&M Investment Group, Ltd. ("C&M") is a limited liability company 
4 established under the laws of Costa Rica with its registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
5 C&M's principal shareholder is Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership ("Karlin Holdings"), a Limited 
6 Partnership established under the laws of Nevada with its principal place of business in the City and 
7 County of Los Angeles. 
8 2. Dr. Gary K. Michelson ("Dr. Michelson") is an individual domiciled and doing 
9 business in the City and County of Los Angeles. 
10 3. Defendant Philip Richard Powers ("Powers") is a United States citizen domiciled in 
11 Costa Rica. At all relevant times mentioned herein, Defendant Powers represented himself to be an 
12 individual doing business as Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. 
13 4. Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. is a Costa Rican 
14 Corporation with its registered domicile in Heredia, Costa Rica. At various relevant times 
15 mentioned herein, Defendant Powers referred to "Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A." 
16 as "Powers Investment and Management," "Powers Management and Investment," "Powers 
17 Management & Investments Inc.," "Powers Investments," "Powers Management & Investments 
18 Co.," "Powers Investment & Management Co.," "Powers Investments & Management Co.," anp. 
19 other variations of Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. not mentioned herein. 
20 Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A., along with all variations thereto, are 
21 collectively referred to as "Powers Investments." 
22 5. Defendant Guanana Gris, S.A., ("Gris") is a Costa Rican corporation with its 
21!~ ,., 
2~i ,., 
2!~ 
registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica 
6. Defendant Protecci6n Forestal de Teca, S.A., ("Teca") is a Costa Rican corporation 
with its registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
26 7. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, 
27 of DOES 1 through SO, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by 
28 such fictitious names and will ask leave to amend the Complaint to show their true names and 
2 
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1 capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges 
2 that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events 
3 and happenings therein referred to, and there is now due, owing, and unpaid from Defendants and 
4 each of them to Plaintiff the sums alleged in this Complaint. 
5 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all relevant times 
6 mentioned herein, the Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, employees and/or the 
7 principals of all the other Defendants, 'and each of them, at all times mentioned herein, were acting 
8 · within the scope and course of their agency, employment, and/or other relationship by and with the 
9 other Defendants, and each of them. 
10 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all relevant times 
11 mentioned herein there existed a unity of interest and ownership between Powers, Powers 
12 Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 such that any individuality and separateness 
13 between Powers, Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 has ceased, and that 
14 Powers is the alter ego of Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50. 
15 10. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Powers at all relevant times 
16 mentioned herein has completely dominated and controlled the assets, operations, and activities of 
17 Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50, failed to observe important corporate 
18 formalities, and used the assets and facilities of Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 
19 through 50 for personal affairs and purposes, as if those assets and facilities belonged to Powers 
20 personally. 
21 11. Any adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of Powers, Powers Investments, 
22 Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 as an entity distinct from Powers would permit the abuse of a 
2\ corporate privilege and would promote injustice by allowing Powers, Powers Investments, Gris, 
i)) 
2! Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 to evade liability or veil assets that should in equity be used to 
2 '?.' satisfy the judgment sought by Plaintiff. ~~ 
26 12. In this action, Plaintiff is suing Defendants for fraudulent inducement, fraud, 
27 constructive fraud, conversion, breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, and unfair 
28 business practices in connection with Defendants' theft of Plaintiff's property and Defendants' 
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2 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3 13. This Court has jurisdiction over this action in that the transactions giving rise to this 
4 action occurred in substantial part in the City and County of Los Angeles, California. This Court has 
5 personal jurisdiction over Defendants by virtue of Defendants': (1) solicitation of, and business with, 
6 California citizens; (2) personal appearance in the City and County of Los Angeles to transact said 
7 business; and (3) telephone, facsimile, and e-mail contacts with California citizens as a result of 
8 Defendants' business conducted within California and within this district for more than six years. 
9 FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
10 14. Dr. Michelson met Mr. Powers in the Summer of 1999 in Los Angeles, California. 
11 When they met, Powers told Dr. Michelson that he was an experienced real estate investor and could 
12 help Dr. Michelson in the purchase of properties in Costa Rica. The parties agreed, inter alia, that 
13 Powers would be engaged to purchase properties, and Powers would charge no more than six percent 
14 (6%) commission for purchasing the properties. 
15 15. Towards this end, Powers registered "C&M Investment Group, Ltd." (Plaintiff) to be 
16 the owner of the properties Powers found and negotiated. Powers had power of attorney from 
17 Plaintiff in order to purchase properties on behalf of Plaintiff. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A. POWERS' FRAUD, CONCEALMENT, AND SPOLIATION 
16. Generally from June, 2000 through March, 2006, Powers purchased on behalf of 
Plaintiff more than 14 7 properties in Costa Rica, totaling more than 23,000 acres, by finding and 
negotiating the price of the properties, representing to C&M, through Dr. Michelson, the purchase 
price of the properties and the closing fees, and requesting C&M, through Dr. Michelson, to wire the 
funds for the represented price and fees, with an 6% mark-up for Powers' services to a specific 
account of Powers. Some of the accounts Powers requested the money to be sent included accounts 
in the names of Powers Investments, Gris, and Teca. From June, 2000 through March, 2006, funds 
in the amount of $25,592,289 were wired to Powers on behalf of C&M to purchase the properties. 
17. Unbeknownst to C&M, Powers was in fact marking-up the purchase prices of the 
28 properties for far more than the represented 6% commission rate. 
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1 18. In 2005 and 2006, C&M, through Dr. Michelson and others, repeatedly asked Powers 
2 to disclose adequate books and records showing the actual purchase prices of the properties, and the 
3 commissions Powers charged for the property purchases. But Powers continually refused to disclose 
4 records. His excuses for such conduct varied and were contradictory. 
5 19. For example, Powers initially claimed that he paid for the properties in cash, and that 
6 there was no documentary evidence of how much he actually paid for the properties. When C&M 
7 told him that there should at least be checks made out to "cash" in the amount paid to the sellers, 
8 Powers said that he destroyed his copies of such checks. Thereupon, C&M, through Dr. Michelson 
9 and others, insisted that, at a minimum, Powers' bank would have records of the checks. Powers 
10 refused to disclose those records, stating that the information of what he paid for the properties was 
11 confidential. 
12 20. Upon continued pressure from C&M, Powers finally admitted that he charged C&M 
13 in excess of 6% for commissions. However, Powers refused to provide records that would show the 
14 actual amount Powers marked-up the properties. 
15 21. Upon information and belief, Powers marked-up the purchase prices of the properties 
16 by an average no less than 506%, and Plaintiffs investigation into the amount of overcharges 
17 continues (at significant expense) to date. 
18 22. Despite repeated requests from C&M to disclose in full the commissions Powers 
19 charged for all properties purchased from 2000 to 2006, Powers has refused to do so. 
20 
21 
B. THE PARTIES' CONTRACT AND DEFENDANTS' BREACH THEREOF 
23. The parties entered into a written Professional Services Agreement ("Agreement") on 
22 or about October 3, 2003, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and is incorporated herein 
23 by reference. The Agreement was between C&M and "Richard Powers d/b/a Powers Investment 
·11.. 211 and Management" (Defendants) and required, among other things, that Defendants keep adequate 
:11. 21l books and records in purchasing property on behalf of C&M. As alleged hereinabove, Defendants 
s;, 
26 breached this duty. 
27 24. The contract also provided that C&M "shall have access to and the right to examine 
28 any pertinent books, documents, papers and accounting records of Consultant [Defendants] which 
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pertain to transactions under this Agreement during the pendency of this Agreement and for a period 
of three (3) years after expiration of this Agreement." Ex. 1, Article 11. As alleged hereinabove, 
Defendants breached this duty. 
25. The contract further provided that Defendants must "report all ... accounting records, 
5 budgets, and projections ... ". Id at Ex. A,§ 4. Defendants breached this duty, at significant 
6 expense and injury to Plaintiff. 
7 26. An attorney's fees provision in the contract provides: "the prevailing party shall be 
8 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any other relief to which it may be entitled." Id. 
9 at Article 18. If Plaintiff prevails on any of its claims, Plaintiff is contractually entitled to reasonable 
10 attorney's fees. 
11 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
12 (Against All Defendants) 
13 27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 26 as 
14 if fully set forth herein. 
15 28. As alleged hereinabove, to induce Plaintiff to engage Defendants, Defendants 
16 promised to purchase properties on behalf of Plaintiff for a commission not to exceed 6%. In 
17 reliance on such promises, Plaintiff engaged Defendants to purchase properties, and sent Defendants 
18 more than 25 million dollars over the course of approximately five years to purchase the properties. 
19 29. Defendants' promises were false at the time that they were made. Upon information 
20 and belief, Defendants intended at the time of the initial engagement to pursue a pattern and practice 
21 of taking from Plaintiff far in excess of the agreed-upon commission rate. 
22 30. Defendants in fact took millions of dollars from Plain~iffby charging fraudulent 
23 commissions by an average no less than 506%. The investigation into the overmarking continues at 
2~1 significant expense to date and the figure will likely be significantly higher. 
2j~ 31. Moreover, Defendants engaged in purposeful concealment to prevent Plaintiff from 
s~ 
2(j discovering Defendants' wrongdoing. Defendants misrepresented the purchase prices of the 
27 properties to Plaintiff. And upon information and belief, Defendants refused to disclose and/or 
28 destroyed books and records to prevent Plaintiff from detennining the full amount Defendants 
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misappropriated. 
32. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' fraud and deceit as set forth above 
3 and with particularity throughout this Complaint, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages in an amount 
4 no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
s 33. The aforementioned fraud and deceit was committed through oppression, fraud, and 
6 malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiff through willful and conscious disregard of Defendants' 
7 promises and Plaintiffs rights and subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious 
8 disregard of its rights, and/or deprive it of property and legal rights through intentional 
9 misrepresentation, deceit, and concealment of material facts. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an 
10 award of exemplary and punitive damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in 
11 an amount to be proven at trial. 
12 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AND DECEIT 
13 (Against All Defendants) 
14 34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 33 as 
15 if fully set forth herein. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2is I' 2~~ 
t1' .  
26 
27 
28 
35. As alleged hereinabove in the Facts Common To All Causes of Action, Defendants 
misrepresented to Plaintiff the amount of money needed to purchase the properties and the 
commissions Defendants took for purchasing the properties. Examples of Defendants' 
misrepresentations, fraud, and deceit include: 
• Representing on or about May 12, 2004 that a property cost $127,500 when, based on 
infonnation available to date, the property cost approximately $13,000, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of 970%; 
• Representing on or about March 2, 2004 that a property cost approximately $70,000 
when, based on information available to date, the property cost approximately $8,600, 
constituting a fraudulent markup in excess of 803%; 
• Representing on or about October 1, 2002 that a property cost $130,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $34,500, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of 366%; 
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• Representing on or about May 12, 2004 that a property cost $183,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $75,500, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of232%; and 
• Representing on or about August 13, 2002 that a property cost $374,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $216,300, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of 162%. 
36. Such representations were false when made and made with the intention of causing 
8 Plaintiff to rely thereon and send the requested sums. 
9 37. Plaintiff did in fact rely on Defendants' misrepresentations and sent Defendants the 
10 sums they requested in excess of $25 million. Plairttiff s reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations 
11 was justifiable. 
12 38. Moreover, to conceal Defendants' fraud and misrepresentations alleged hereinabove, 
13 Defendants engaged in a pattern of fraud and deception by failing to disclose to Plaintiff adequate 
14 books and records with which to verify Defendants' representations, and instead gave false 
1 S assurances, misleading explanations, and evasive excuses to fore~tall the revelation of Defendants' 
16 fraud, deceit, and misrepresentations. 
17 39. The $25 million in funds transmitted by Plaintiff to Defendants were excessive and 
18 represented far more than what the Defendants represented they were in fact requesting (namely, the 
19 purchase price plus a 6% commission). Indeed, based on information to date, Powers marked-up the 
20 properties by an average no less than 506%. The investigation into the overmarking continues at 
21 significant expense to date and the figure will likely be significantly higher. 
22 40. As a direct and proximate cause of Defend.ants' fraud and deceit as set forth above 
23 and with particularity throughout this Complaint, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages in an amount 
24!~ no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
I' 
2~J 41. The aforementioned fraud and deceit was committed through oppression, fraud, and 
h 25" malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiff through willful and conscious disregard of Defendants' 
27 promises and Plaintiffs rights and subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious 
28 disregard of its rights, and/or deprive it of property and legal rights through intentional 
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1 misrepresentation, deceit, and concealment of material facts. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an 
2 award of exemplary and punitive damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in 
3 an amount to be proven at trial. 
4 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
5 (Against All Defendants) 
6 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 41 as 
7 if fully set forth herein. 
8 43. As alleged hereinabove, Defendants induced Plaintiff to engage it to purchase 
9 properties, and act as Plaintiffs power of attorney for the acquisition of the properties from June, 
10 2000 through March, 2006. Such fiduciary relationship entitled Plaintiff to implicitly trust 
11 Defendants and to expect absolute loyalty and full material disclosures from Defendants. 
12 44. At all relevant times, Plaintiff did, in fact, place full and total trust, confidence, and 
13 reliance upon Defendants, and Plaintiff justifiably relied upon the continuing integrity and fidelity of 
14 Defendants. 
15 45. Despite having voluntarily accepted such trust and confidence given by Plaintiff, 
16 Defendants violated such trust and confidence and abused their fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff 
17 as set forth above. 
18 46. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants engaged in the 
19 wrongdoings alleged in this Complaint with specific intent to take advantage of their fiduciary 
20 relationship with Plaintiff to deceive and defraud them, conceal such deceit, fraud, and other 
21 material facts from it, and to induce further reliance. 
22 
23 
.;IL 
2',f.) 
,, 
2ij 
2~~ 
27 
28 
47. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty as set 
forth above, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
48. The aforementioned constructive fraud was committed through oppression, fraud, and 
malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiff through willful and conscious disregard of Defendants' 
promises and Plaintiffs rights, and subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious 
disregard of its rights, and/or deprive it of property and legal rights through intentional 
misrepresentation, deceit, and concealment of material facts. Ther~fore, Plaintiff is entitled to an 
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I award of exemplary and punitive damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in 
2 an amount to be proven at trial. 
3 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION 
4 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 48 as 
5 if fully set forth herein. 
6 50. As alleged hereinabove in the Facts Common To All Causes of Action, to induce 
7 Plaintiff to engage Defendants, Defendants promised to purchase properties on behalf of Plaintiff for 
8 a commission not to exceed 6%. In reliance on such promises, Plaintiff engaged Defendants to 
9 purchase properties, and sent Defendants more than $25 million over the course of approximately 
10 five years to purchase the properties. 
11 51. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Powers was in fact marking-up the purchase prices of the 
12 properties for far more than the represented 6% commission rate. Indeed, based on information 
13 available to date, Powers marked-up the properties by an average no less than 506%. The 
14 investigation into the overmarking continues at significant expense to date and the figure will likely 
15 be significantly higher. 
16 52. All amounts Powers took in excess of the property purchase prices and his 6% 
17 commission was property belonging to Plaintiff, and thus constituted a wrongful taking of Plaintiff's 
18 property and interfered with Plaintiffs possession of its property. 
19 53. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' conduct as set forth above, 
· 20 Defendants converted an amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
21 
22 
23 
24!~ ,., 
.:IL 21'.> 
/ 
it> 267 
27 
54. The aforementioned conversion was committed through oppression, fraud, and malice 
with intent to cause injury to Plaintiff, and subject Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship as a result 
thereof. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
(Against All .Defendants) 
55. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 54 as 
28 if fully set forth herein. 
10 
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56. At all relevant times, Plaintiff had competence and capacity to enter into contracts, 
2 and standing to bring actions thereon. 
3 57. On or about October 3, 2003, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a written 
4 Agreement whereby Defendants agreed to keep adequate books and records concerning the 
5 properties purchased on behalf of C&M, and make such records available to C&M upon demand. 
6 See Ex. 1. 
7 58. By virtue of Defendants' acts and omissions alleged hereinabove, Defendants 
8 breached said contract by failing to keep adequate books and records, and/or refusing to disclose 
9 such records, and/or destroying such records regarding the fees Defendants charged for the 
l O properties they purchased on behalf of Plaintiff. 
11 59. Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on its part to be 
12 performed in accordance with said contract, or are legally excused from doing so. 
13 60. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' contract breaches as set forth 
14 above, Plaintiff~as suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
15 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT 
16 (Against All Defendants) 
17 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 60 as 
18 if fully set forth herein. 
19 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff had competence and capacity to enter into contracts, 
20 and standing to bring actions thereon. 
21 63. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an oral agreement whereby Defendants agreed 
22 to acquire properties for Plaintiffs for a total of no more than 6% of the actual selling price in 
23 commissions. 
2f) 64. By virtue of Defendants' acts and omissions alleged hereinabove, Defendants 
2~~ 1, breached said contract. 
2t> o" 65. Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on its part to be 
27 performed in accordance with said contract, or are legally excused from doing so. 
28 66. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' contract breaches as set forth 
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1 above, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 
3 67. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 66 as 
4 if fully set forth herein. 
5 68. Defendants' acts as set forth hereinabove constitute business practices that are 
6 unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent in violation of California Business & Professions Code 
7 Section 17200 et seq. 
8 69. Defendants' unfair business acts and practices have caused irreparable injury and 
9 other losses to Plaintiff for which it has no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
10 restitution from Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
11 JURY DEMAND 
12 
13 
14 
70. Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial in this action. 
PRAYER 
71. As to the First through Sixth Causes of Action, a money judgment for general, 
15 special, and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
16 72. Additionally as to the First through Fourth Causes of Action, an award of exemplary 
17 punitive damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be 
18 established at trial; 
19 73. As to the Seventh Causes of Action, restitution from Defendants in an amount to be 
20 proven at trial; 
21 
22 
23 
2i~ 
,, 
2i, 
2,~ 
27 
28 
II 
II 
II 
II 
74. An award of attorney's fees as allowed by contract and law; 
75. Award of costs of suit as allowed by law; 
76. Interest on damages allowed by law; 
77. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper, fair, equitable, and just. 
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DA TED: October 10, 2007 Respectfully submitted, 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
By:a·~ 
Luke~B.N. 229829) 
Shelley D. Cordova (S.B.N. 234230) 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
777 South Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Email: ldauchot@k.irkland.com 
Email: scordova@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff C&M Investment Group, Ltd. 
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PROLSSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT 
This Professional Services A cement (this "Agreement") is made as of this 3rd day of October 
2003 between C&M lnvestm. Group Limited, a limitada company formed under the laws of Cost; Rica,(hereinafter re to as "COMPANY .. ), and Richard Powus an individual doing 
business as "Powers lnveatm t and Management" (hercinaf\cr referred to as ''Consultant"). 
. . . 
WHEREAS. COMPANY : tts affiliates are engaged in tne business of purchasing and 
maintaining pasture lands for eforestar:ion in the Guanacaste zone of Costa Rica. and . 
COMP ANY desires to engas · the aeivicea of Consultant to provide the services se.t forth herein; 
and ' 
WHEREAS. Consultant is an ndependent contractor able and willing to provide such services 
under the terms and conditio set fonh herein, 
NOW 'Tl:IElffiFORE, in cons eration of the premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set 
forth. tb.c parties hereto ro · y agree as follows: 
Article 1. Period or Pe 
shall remain in fuU force and 
tmance. This Agreement shall (:Ommence on the date hereof and 
ect until completion or termination as provided herein. 
Article 2. Character an' Extent of Services. Consultant shall perforJll the services. 
dcsaibed in Exhibit "A" (tb Services"}, which exhibit is attached to this Agreement and 
incorporated herein by this r erence. ne Services shall be performed at the lime and location 
set forth iJ> ijxlu1>it A · 
Article 3. Compcnutio: . The ScrviCC& shall be perfonncd for the compensation set forth 
in liXhibit A. Consultant shaJ submit invoices in duplicate to COMP ANY, together with such · 
supporting documentation as MP ANY may reasonably require, at the end of each month. 
litvOIQ;f &hall include:; 
Current Asrcement dget 
Gross Amount lnvoi · 10 Date 
Details of the Servi~ Provided in the Current Period Billing 
I 
COMPANY agrees to pay th amount due to Consultant for the Services on or before the 
thirtieth day following receip of Consultant's invoice. properly documented as set forth above. 
Article 4. Anignment. obligations 9( either party under this Asreement are not 
assignable or 111Ul3ferat>1c w·. out prior written approval ofthe other pany; proVided, however. 
that consent shall not be r . red to any transfer by the Coropany of its rights and obligations 
hereunder to any person or e tity suc:ceeding to substantially all of the business of the Company . 
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Article 5. · Responsibir Liability. Consuliant warrants mat it will citercise in its 
ped'onnance of the Services :l' standard of care normally exeroiscd by recognized organizations 
engaged in performing comp;J;btc services using the "best commercial practices" in the 
management of assets such· as, sc owned by the Company. E-ia:ept as set forth in Anicle 6, 
Consultant·s liability to CO ANY hereunder shall not cxo:ed Consult:sm's total wmpemsa~oia 
for the Services together with y amounts re<:eived by Consultant relating to brokerage services 
in connect.ion with acquisition of asaets owned by the Cnmpoany. 
Article 6. Jndenu,ificati n. Consultant specifically agtees to bold harmless and indemnify 
COMP ANY against au Clai $1litS, losses, liabiHUCS. damages and 6xpenses arisi_ng out of 
injury, dea:lh ot property d c if and to the extent caused by the willful misconduct or . 
negligent acts or omisaiol\11 o oncuhant, its employees or agenis bereUnder. However, net.ther 
partj shall bave Ii.ability tot other undertlli, Agreement fur consc:quc::ntial, incidental, special 
or exemplary damages. 
Article 1. Ownersbip o ork l'rodua. All technical data, evaluations, reports and other 
work product orConsultant h 0 cundcr s~l become the propcny of COMl'ANY and shall be 
delivered t.o COMPANY upo termination ofthi, agreement or upon completion of the Services 
as mnhodzed hereunder. Co hant may- retain copies of its work product hereunder for 
. research and other int~ us s.; however. no inform.aion eontained therein shall be disct~ to 
any tliird party or used for t ' benefit of any entity other than COMP ANY without -
CO'MP ANY"s ptior wrlnen nscnt'. Coll3Uhant shall not be liable for use by COMP ANY of its 
work product on. projects oth than that covered by this Agreement. 
Article 8. Independent . ontractor Rel•tionship. In the performance of the Services 
hereunder. Consultant shall an independent contractor and not an employee of COMP ANY. 
with the sole authority to and direct the performance of the details of the worlc, 
COMP ANY being interested n1y in the results obtained. 
Article 9, 
a. Consultant J comply with all applical>le ~omestic and fore.i&n on:ti.nancos. 
laws. orders. rules and rcgula ons pertaining 10 its Services hereunder, and shall obtain an . 
necessary authority to p such SetVices. 
I 
b. Consultant b y represents and wanants that it is aware of and familiar with the 
provisions of the U.S. Porei Corrupt Practices Act (the "'FCPA") and its purposes. and will 
take no action and make no ent in violation of. or tbat might causo COMP ANY or any or 
its affilililC:. ur ,ubaidiariC!l . C in viul!Lliun ut: lb FCP A. Cumwhtmt. wiU l&Cl in ruu 
compliance witll the FCP Ai I connection with its engagement by COMP ANY. 
c. Consultant by represents and wanants that it has not made and will not make, 
dim.tly or indirectly. any pa· cnt, loan or gift (or any offer. promise or authorization of any 
such. paymem. loan or gttt) o money or anything of value to or ror the use or. (i) any 
government official; (ii) any olitical party or official or any candidate for political office; or (iii) 
TRANSFER.DOC 
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any other person under cirai . t111Ce$ in which Consultant knows or has reason to know that all 
or any portion of such money· r thing of value will be offered, given or promised. direetly or 
indircctli to any person nam = in items (i) and {il) above for the purpose of-inducing 1he 
aforemeniioned person to do . ':'J act or make any decision in his offi~al capacity (including a 
dceision to 1ml oo pcttorm bisl fficial function) or use h~ influcl1QC.w1th II go~nt or 
instrumentality to affect any or decision of such government or matrumentallty in order to 
a.~ COMPANY in obtaini4 or retaining any business. For purposes of this Agi-eement. the 
term "gO'\lernment official" in.1 an employee of a government-owned or government -
controlled commercial enterp · 
d. Consultant 
WJll not become owned or co 
government of the countty in 
a l)Oliti<:al party or candidate 
y rq>resents and warrants that it i& not owned or controlled, and 
Oed during the term of this Agreement. by any official of the 
r as to which the Services will be performed or by any official of 
political office therein. 
e. · esent'I. t\lat it has fuUy disclosed to COMP ANY, al\d bas a 
continuing obligii.tion to di se, whether any of its officers, dirc:ct.ors or any per.son k~own by 
Consultant to hold more than OOA of Consultant's outstanding sharos is. or has a fiunily 
rei.tionship with. a govcmm official, a political party official or a candidate for .political 
office. Consultant further that it will cooperate with COMP ANY to ensure that 
COMI> AN'l receives adequat assurances, whether in the fonn of a certification. a formal refusal 
by ihe relevant family mcsnb or some other funn ot reasonable usura.nco, to satisfy 
COMP ANY tbat no violatio . of the FCP A will Arise as a result of any such officer's, director's, 
shareholder's or family mem 's position. Should COMP ANY determine in good faith that 
Consultant has failed to c such adequate assuraru:es, COMP'ANY reserves the right to 
tenninatetbis Agreement im iatcly. 
£. Consultant wledges and undertakes _that the feea and expenses paid by 
COMP ANY to it hereunder a intended solely as oompensation for the Services pt_ovided by 
Consultant pwsuant to this ment and are not to be shared with, or paid to, any other person 
or persons. 
g. Consultant ~C$ents and warrants that the execution and implc:mc:mation of this 
Aateemcnt and its receipt of feu and e,cpen1ea h-,niunder do not violate the Jaws, decrees or 
regulations of the country in as to which the Services will be penormed and that no consent of 
·or notice to any agency of emmen_ t of such countty is required or necessary in connection 
the[ewith. 
Artldc 10. Conf'fflentlali . Consultant shnll not, ~ith" durin3 or for II pmod of three (3) 
years after the termhtation or xpiration ofthis Agreement. disclose to any thitcl party any 
Confidential Information (as efined below), or use the same for its own benefit or fbr the 
benefit of any entity other COMPANY. without the prior written ~onsent of COMP ANY. 
Consultant shall limit disclo o of Confidential Information to those ofits employees. a.gents 
nnd oontcactora to whom d aurc is icaaotiably ·pl:Cl:3slU)' tu pcnonn the Services hereunder 
and who agree to hold it c ! ential. Comuhant shall prevent its employees, agentS and 
TRANSFER.DOC 
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••b""''""'"'; liom diool...l Confidemial -ion to Ullalllhorized persons or misusing !he 
same. As used herein, "Confii ential Information" sbaU mean financial, teehofoal, and business 
information and documentati: relating to COMPANY or the Services which COMP ANY 
designates in writing as "Con dcntia1," "Secret." or "Proprietary" or with words of like meaning. 
-Confilkntial Information sh ' not include infunnation which Cu11whant can dt!mumtnste: (a) is 
or lx:oomes in the public do~ ·n other than by the fault of Consultant, (b) was in Consultant's 
pos!leSSion prior to 1he time disclosure. (c) is obtained from a third party which Consultant 
reasonably believed did not • n the infunnation directly or indirectly ftom COMP ANY. or 
(d) ia independ,ently develop by those of Consultant's employees, agenas or contractors who 
do not have access to the Co · dentiql Information_ 
.Article 11. Exsuniaatioa · r R~corda;, Access to Work. Consultant agrees that_ COMP' ANY 
or any of its duly authori%ed resentatives shall have access to and the right to· ~ine any 
pertinent books, documents. pers and accounting recanis of Consultant which pertain to 
transactions under this Agru, nt during the pendcncy of this Agreement and for a period of 
thn:c ()) years after c:xtJiratiosi of this Agreement. COMP ANY's representative shall at all times 
hove access to the work for · , rposos of inspecting same and determining chai the Services arc 
· being performed in accordan · with the terms of this Agr-cemenl. 
Article 12. Jniuralice. ;' 
a: During tho co of paformam:c of the Services. Consultant shall maintain thc-
following insurance coveras at no additional cost to COMP ANY, and Consultant wih pay the 
deductibles under such ge: 
Workmen's C mpensation Insurance as requiml by law. 
Automobile L. bility Insu~ covering claims for injuries to or death of 
. one or more p ns and damage to property caused by motor vehicles, 
owned°' hiJ: : , with assresate limits of not less than SS0,000. 
b. Consultant s · I furnish certificates showing that the a.hove insurance coverages 
~ill be i~ effect during tbe te of thit Atreement. and spec;ifying that COMP ANY must be 
given thirty (30) days prior ·tten notice of cancellation, termination. or alteration of the 
policies evidenced by such c iticates. · . 
Article 13. Termination ' rthe Agreeinent 
a. .ThJ:mm.ation fc Co veni e. COMP ANY may upon written notice terminate 
this Agree~~ fot COMPAJfiY'a convenience, with or 'Without cause, and iqardless ofwhcthec 
Consultant lS sn default. J. 
b. Termination ;_ . COMPANY may terminate this Agreement a+ any time, 
by giving written notice to C sultant specifying the effective date oftennination, if: 
. ; 
I 
(4) 
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(1) CoilSllh-SshaJI become insol~t. or make a general assigrunent fur the 
beneftt or creditors, or any . og_ is brought by or against Consultant seeicing any 
~ arrangement. sition. readjustment, liquidation, dissolution. or similar relief 
under the present or any futu federal bantmptcy acts or under my other applicable federal or 
!ltB law or regu]atiun. ar ing ill brought. scckiag the appointment of a rcc;civcr or 
similar offic:er ~f court with Ii to Consultant's business; 
(2) CoJJtmltmtltepealtedly. Idbses or fails to supply enough propcdy skilled 
workmen or equipment or. • of the proper quality_ or quantity to perform the Services; 
(3) COIISIJl1tanfldisregards laws. ordinances. government rules or regulations. or · 
repeatedly dia-ogarda • of COMP ANY'• reptesentatrve which are conciltent with thls 
Agrccmcnt; or 
(4) Coosu 
Agreement, and fails to 
written notice foe COMP 
is guilty ofa material bread!<»- violati0n of any·pr~on af tbis 
such bteaeh or violation within thirty (lO} days after rcc;cipt of 
o. ~~r.Ym~&[~mnmn. In the event oftennination hereof, whether for 
convenience orfor cause: 
(l) All 6 · or unfinished~ data, ~diQ. M'VCJ~ drawWS3> 
maps, models, photograplls reports or other materials prepared or-(qject however to 
Consultants nonexclusive · to use·thc ame as set foitn in Article 7) equipment purchased 
by Consultant under this ~itam:nt shall become the propa:ty of COMPANY; and -
11tamlahaD t,e endtlecl lO iecel~ just and equitable conipensation for any 
such documents and other materials. 
Article 14. Arll.erldllleab. · instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the 
parties covering 1he subject and atperSedes any and all or.her prior agsuments and 
undermndlnga, elther oril or writing, bctwctft tbc parties hereto with respect to the subject 
matter hereo£ No modi • or IUDClldmcnas to tbis Agreement shalJ be valid unles$ in writing 
and signed by the parties. 
Arndt 15. Nodes. Any ·cc to be given bereundu by either party to the other may be 
effected either by perso.aal MB,,,,,..., in writing. or by cenified mail. return receipt requested, 
postage prepaid. e1fective received or on the fifth day fullowing the date mailed, whichever 
is sooner. The ad~ for • oc: 1lwl be thoso set forth OQ the first page-of this Agrccmont. 
unless such addteases are ed by written notice gn,en in compliante with this Article 15. 
Article 16. Liens. 
1°AANSfEROOC 
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a. Consultant sha promptly pay all bills iru:nrred by COnsultant in petfonnancc or · 
the Services hereunder, inolu ng, without limitation. bills for labor. $ei'vices, equipment and · 
material$. · · 
b. C~ltant sha( not-voluntarily permit any laborer's~ matc:rialmcn's. mec:hanio1a, 
or other liens to be filed or ot · sc imposed on any of COMPANY's property on the behalf of 
Consultant or any or its empl s. agents, or subcootm;tors. If any such lien or claim is filed 
and if Consultant does not such lien to be released and discharged futlhwith. or file a bcllid 
in lieu thereof; COMP ANY havo the right-to pay an sum& JICCCISal)' to obtain ldeasc and 
~and dcduGt all so paid ~om thepaym~ duo ihcmor ~ hcrc:uudcr. 
Article 17- GovlM'lline La . By selection oftlie panles. this AJpement al1d all questions 
·ccoccrnins the execution. val' ity or invalidity. capacity of'6- partia and th~ performance of· 
this Agreement, shall be inte eted in accordance with the laws of the State of California · 
apptieable to agreements . ed and to be wholly performed in such state. 
AJticle 11. Attomeys• .Fe · . rt any action at law or in equity is brousbt to enforce or 
intCJpret the provisions ot'tbi mcnt, the prevailing party 5ball be entitled to reasonable 
auomr:ys' fees in addition to · y other relicho which it mey be entitled. · 
JN WITNBSS WHEaEOP, panics hcrcto have (;allscd 1his Agn=oment to be duly executed in 
their respective oames as or - rar first abov9 written. 
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S.n Joso, Co$ Rica 
E-mail: C()!tarca@n,.csit.Q.,,q 
Te!: 506-203-213~ 
F~: $06.203-2267 
PROFESSI NAL SERVICES AGREEMENT EXHIBIT "A" 
:Property size: a · roximately 5,000 acres. (C & M) October 3, 2003 
SERVICES 
ible fur the planting and maintenance of all trees on C & M's 
. tenance of the existing natural furest surrounding the plan.tations. 
This also includes all in ctures on roads, bridges and fences. 
~ 
will be r:tpo:_-ible for all employees and their compensation as well as their 
Social S ·. and vacation pay. 
respo. ible for loss of any new plantings as a result of hurricane, fire, 
. Po~s investments are responsible at his expense to replant any lo_ss of 
year t, give C & M coverage of 100%.of the planted area. 
! 
report a~activities pertaining to the progress of the plantations as well as 
rds, bud ts and projections as described further in Article 3 of this doc. 
investments e also responsible for the acquisition of new properties both 
reforested and fur re fores · on fur C & M Powers is also respoIISl"ble to see that all related 
property leases whether lated to government forest restrictions or olhel'wise are cancelled 
or cleaned. Powers is ' responsible to report and present all documents relating to closing to 
the offices of Munoz and, ias. 
COMPENSATION 
Powers investment will receive r compensation two dollars for every new tree planted: From this 
compensation Powers investmen will be responsible to carry out all the functions as described above. 
The planting cost for the first y will be approximately $2 per tree: This includes preparation of the 
property {cleaning, etc.). Certifi teak seedlings from nursery and transportation to site. Forest 
engineer who sets lines, dis and spaces and-monitors trees throughout the year. Holes prepared 
for fertilizing (There will be . stages of fertilizing in the first and second yeat .) and planting. 
Maintenance of surrounding fe and boarders. Fire lines are made in December and revised 
· · · · are included in this maintenance ·schedule. It will 
or itnnaintenance; 
.................... - .... 
Noveml,er I 0, 1001 
Page2 
Teak Tree mai enance schedule fir t rs 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Seven 
Cost mb Trees per acre i Based on 4mt.X4mt. 
$~.00 243 
11.00 
'9 .50 II ·.so. .so 
.. 25 
.2S 
Cost per Acre . 
$485 
243 
121 
121 
121 
60 
60 
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ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIORNEY (Na Bar number, and address): 
UKE L. DAUCHOT (S.B;N. 229829) 
SHELLEY D. CORDOVA (S.B.N. 234230) 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
777 So. Figueroa Street, Suite 3400 
Los Angeles, California 90011 
TELEPHONENO.: (213} 680-8400 FAXNO.: (213} 680-8500 
ATTORNEYFOR Name: C&M Inves ment Grou Ltd. a artnershi 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Los Ange 1 es 
sraeETAooREss:111 N. Hill Street 
MAILING AOORESS: same 
CITYANozwcooe:Los Angeles, CA 90012 
BRANCH NAME: Central 
CASE NAME: C&M Investment Group, Ltd. v. P. Richard Powers; Powers 
Investments and M t.; Guanana Gris· Pr-oteccion Forestal de Tec·a 
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation 
OCT 102007· 
JOH~~RKE,CLERK 
BY MARY~. DEPUTY 
CASE NUMBER: 8 C378888 0.0 Unlimited D Limited D Counter D Joinder 
~~~~~~~d ~':i~~~~d is Filed with first appearance by defendant, 
exceeds $25 000 $25 ooo or less {Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402} · 
JUDGE: 
DEPT: 
Items 1-6 below must be completed see instructions on a e2. 
1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case: 
Auto Tort Contract 
CJ Auto (22) D Breach of contract/warranty (06) 
D Uninsured motorist (46) 0 Rule 3.740 collections (09) 
Other Pl/PO/WO (Personal Injury/Property D Other collections (09) 
DamageJWrongful Death) Tort D Insurance coverage (18) 
D Asbestos (04) D Other contr:act (37) 
[::] Product liability (24) Real Property r, Medical malpractice (45) D Eminent domain/Inverse 
L_J Other PlfPD/WD {23) condemnation {14) 
Non-Pl/PO/WO (other) Tort D Wrongful eviction (33) 
[:::-_l Business tort/unfair business practice (07) [ I Other real p~operty (26) 
[__~ Civil rights (08) Unlawful Detainer 
[.-:J Defamation (13) D Commercial (31) 
LX..] Fraud (16) D Residential (32) 
r--·11ntellectual property (19) D Drugs (38) 
["_::] Professional negligence (25) Judicial Review 
i =:J Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35) D Asset forfeiture (05) 
Employment D Petition re: arbitration award (11) 
! I Wrongful termination (36) D Writ of mandate {02) 
CJ Other employment (15) . D Other judicial review (39) 
Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403) 
D Antitrustrrrade regulation (03) 
o· Construction defect { 10) 
D Mass tort (40) 
D Securities litigation (28) 
[=:J Environmental/Toxic tort (30) 
D Insurance coverage claims arising from the 
above listed provisionally complex case 
types (41) 
Enforcement of Judgment 
D Enforcement of judgment (20) 
Miscellaneous Civil Complaint 
0 RIC0(27) 
D Other complaint (not specified above) (42} 
Miscellaneous Civil Petition 
D Partnership and corporate governance (21) 
D Other petition (not specified above) (43) 
2. This case D is OD is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the 
factors requiring exceptional judicial management: 
a. D Large number of separately represented parties d. D Large number of witnesses ... 
b. D Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel e. D Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts 
issues that will be time-consuming _to resolve in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court 
c. D Substantial amount of documentary evidence f. D Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision 
3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a. IJ[] monetary b. D nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c. L.X] punitive 
4. Number of causes of action (specify): Seven 
5. This case O is IJ[] is· not a class action suit ORIGINAL 
6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You 
Date: ober 10, 2007 · . I.. 
EL YD. CORDOVA S.B~N. 234230r ~-.,.,.~~~~~~~~~~~=-~~-(TYPE OR PRINT NAM£) 
: . . N~~ ... 
• · Plainfiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except sm(illl claims cases or cases filed 
undef.lhe Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result 
in sanctions. .. · . · 
• File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. . . 
• lf·this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court. you must seNe a copy of this cover sheet on all 
other parties to the action o.r proceeding. · . · . · · 
• Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only. 
· · · · · Pa e1ol2 
Fonn Adopted for t.tandatory Use 
Judicial Coundl of C&lifomla 
CM-010 [Rev. July I, 2007) · u S' Cel. Standards of Jvd,c,al AdmfntslratiOn, Sid. 3. tO 
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET* Cal. RulesofCaurt.rules2.~.~220.3.~,403,3.740; 
. . . ~ . . 
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. . -.. INST.IONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THE co&eeT CM~o10 
To Plaintiffs and Others Filing Fir~pers. If you are filing a first paper (for example, a complaint) in a civil case, you must 
complete and file, along with your first paper, the Civil Case Cover Sheet contained on page 1. This information will be used to compile 
statistics about the types and numbers of cases filed. You must complete items 1 through 6 on the sheet. In item 1, you must check 
one box for the ~ type that best describes the case. If tbe case fits both a general and a more specific type of case listed in item 1, 
check the more specific one. If the case has multiple causes of action, check the box that best indicates the primary cause of action. 
To assist you in completing the sheet, examples of the cases that belong under each case type in item 1 are provided below. A cover 
sheet must be filed only with your initial paper. Failure to file a cover sheet with the first paper filed in a civil case may subject a party, its 
counsel, or both to sanctions under rules 2.30 and 3.220 of the California Rules of Court. 
To Parties in Rule 3.740 Collections Cases. A "collections case" under rule 3.740 is defined as an action for recovery of money owed 
in a sum stated to be certain that is not more than $25,000, exclusive of interest and attorney's fees, arising from a transaction in which 
property, services, or money was acquired on credit. A collections case does not include an action seeking the following: (1 ). tort 
damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) recovery of real property, (4) recovery of personal property, or (5) a prejudgment writ of attachment 
The identification of a case as a rule 3.7.40 collections case on this form means that it will be exempt from the general time-for-service 
requirements and case management rules, un!ess a defendant files a-responsive pleading. A rule 3.740 collections case will be subject 
to the requirements for service and obtaining a judgment in rule 3.740. 
To Parties in Complex Cases. In complex cases only, 'parties must also use the Civil Case Cover Sheet to designate whether the 
case is complex. If a plaintiff believes the case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, this must be indicated by 
completing the appropriate boxes iil items 1 and 2. If a plaintiff designates a case as complex, the cover sheet must be served with the 
complaint on all parties to the action. A defendant may file and serve no later than the time of its first appearance a joinder in the 
plaintiffs designation, a counter-designation that the case is not complex, or, if the plaintiff has made no designation, a designation that 
the case is complex. CASE lYPES AND EXAMPL~S 
Auto Tort 
Auto {22)-Personal Injury/Property 
Damage/Wrongful Death 
Uninsured Motorist ( 46) (if the 
case involves an uninsured 
motorist claim subject to 
arbitration, check this item 
instead of Auto) 
Other PJIPD/WD (Personal Injury/ 
Property Damage/Wrongful Death) 
Tort 
Asbestos (04) 
Asbestos Property Damage 
Asbestos Personal Injury/ 
Wrongful Death 
Product Liability (not asbestos or 
· toxic/environmental) (24) 
Medical Malpractice (45) 
Medical Malpractice-
Physicians & Surgeons 
Other Professional Health Care 
Malpractice 
Other Pl/PO/WO (23) 
Premises Liability {e.g., slip 
and fall) 
. Intentional Bodily Injury/PD/WO 
(e.g., assault, vandalism) 
Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
Other PUPO/WO 
Non-Pl/PD/WO (Other) Tort 
Business Tort/Unfair Business 
Practice (07) • 
Civil Rights (e.g., discrimination, 
· faEI e arrest) (not civil 
h ment) (08) 
Defam'. ion (e.s., slander, libel) 
Frau~,6) 
lntel~al Property (19) · 
ProfesAironal Negligence (25). 
Legal Malpractice 
Other Professional Malpractice 
..r (not medi~I or legal) 
Other Non-Pl/PD/WO Tort (35) 
Employment . 
Wrongful Termination (:36) 
Other Employment (15) 
CM-0101Rev.July 1. 2007} 
Contract 
Breach of Contract/Warranty (06) 
Breach of Rental/Lease 
Contract (not unlawful detainer 
or wrongful eviction) 
Contract/Warranty Breach-Seller 
Plaintiff (not fraud or negligence) 
Negligent Breach of Contract/ 
Warranty 
Other Breach of Contract/Warranty 
Collections (e.g., money owed, open 
book accounts) (09) 
Collection Cas-seller Plaintiff 
Other Promissory Note/Collections 
· Case 
Insurance Coverage (not provisionally 
complex) (18) 
Auto Subrogation 
Other Coverage 
Other Contract (37} 
Contractual Fraud 
Other Contract Dispute 
Real Property 
Eminent Domain/Inverse 
Condemnation (14) 
Wrongful Eviction (33) 
Other Real Property (e.g.,.quiet title) (26) 
Writ of Possession of Real Property 
Mortgage Foreclosure 
QuietTrtle 
.Other Real Property (not eminent 
domain; landlord/tenant, or 
foreclosure) • 
Unlawful Detainer • 
Commercial (31) 
Residential {32) 
Drugs (38) (if the case involves illegal 
drugs, check this itt1m; otherwise, 
report as Commercial or RHldential) 
Judicial Review 
Asset Forfeiture (05) 
Petition Re: Arbitration Award {11) 
Wri~ of Mandate (02) 
Writ-Administrative Mandamus. 
Writ-Mandamus on Limited Court 
Case Matter 
Writ-Other Limited Court Case 
Review 
Other Judicial Review (39) · 
Review of Health Officer Order 
· Notice of Appeal-Labor 
· Commissioner Appeals 
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET 
Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. 
Rules of Court Rules 3.40o-3.403) 
Antitrustrrrade Regulation (03) 
Construction Defect (10) 
Claims Involving Mass Tort (40) 
Securities litigation (28) 
EnvironmentalfToxic Tort (30) 
Insurance Coverage Claims 
(arising from provisionally complex 
case type listed above) (41) 
Enforcement of Judgment 
Enforcement of Judgment (20) 
Abstract of Judgment (Out of 
County) 
Confession of Judgment (non· 
domestic relations) 
Sister State Judgment 
Administrative Agency Award 
(not unpaid taxes) 
Petition/Certification of Entry of· 
Judgment on Unpaid Taxes 
Other Enforcement of Judgment 
Case 
Miscellaneous Civil Complaint 
RIC0(27) 
Other Complaint (not specified 
above) (42) · ... 
Declaratory Relief Only 
Injunctive Relief Only (non-
harassment) 
Mechanics Lien 
Other Commercial Complaint 
Case (non~tortlnon-complex) 
. Other C,ivll Complaint 
(non-tort/non-complex) 
Miscellaneous Clvil Petition 
Partnership and Corporate 
Govemance (21) 
Other Petition (not specl"ed 
above) (43) · 
CMI Harassment 
· Workplace Violence 
Elder/Dependent Adult · 
'AbU$e · 
Election Contest 
Petition for Name.Change 
Petition for Relief from·Late 
Claim 
Other Givil Petition 
P1!9e2of2 
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SHORTTITI.E: . C&M Investment Group, • v. P. Richard Po~ers; Powers CASE NUMBER BC37BS88 Investments and Mgt.; Guanana Gris; Proteccion Forestal de Teca 
ClVlL CASE COVER SHEET ADDENriUM AND STATEMENT OF LOCATlON-
(CERTIFICATE OF GROUNDS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO COURTHOUSE LOCATION) 
This form is required pursuant to LASC Local Rule 2.0 in all new civil case filings in the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
Item I. Check the types of hearing and fill in the estimated length of hearing expected for this case: 
JURYTRIAL? 00 YES cLAssAcnoN? OYEs L!MTTEDCASE? Oves TIMEESTIMATEDFORTRIAL 5 · D HOURS/ DO oAvs 
Item JI. Select the correct district and courthouse location-(4 steps - If you checked "Limited Case", skip to Item Ill, Pg. 4): 
Step 1: After first completing the Civil Case Cover Sheet Form, find the main civil case cover sheet heading for your case in 
the left margin below, and, to the right in Column A, the Civil Case Cover Sheet case type you selected. 
Step 2: Check ~ Superior Court type of action in Column B below which best describes the nature of this case. 
Step 3: In Column C, circle the reason for the court location choice that applies to the type of action you have checked. 
For any exception to the court 10<?8tion, see Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 2.0. 
Applicable Reasons for Choosing Courthouse Location (See Column C below) 
1. Class Actions must be filed in the County C!;>urthouse. Central District 6. Location of property or pennanenUy garaged vehicle. 
2. May l>e filed in Central (Other county, or no Bodily Injury/Property Damc1ge). 7. Location where petitioner resides. 
3. location where cause of action arose. 8. Location wherein defendan\/respondent !unctions wholly. 
4. Location where bodily injury, death or damage occurred. 9. Location where one or more of the parties reside. · 
5. Location where performance required or defendant resides. 10. Location of Labor Commissioner Office. 
Step 4: Fill in the information requested ori page 4 in Item Ill; complete Item IV. Sign the declaration. 
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Civil Case Cover Sheet 
Category No. 
Auto(22) D 
Uninsured Motorist (46) D 
Asbestos (04) . CJ 
LJ 
Product liability (24) D 
Medical Malpractice D 
(45) D 
Other D 
Personal Injury D 
Property Damage 
Wrongful Death 
(23) D 
D 
Business Tort (07) · D 
Civil Rights ( 08) D 
Deta!1tion (13) ~ .. D 
9 
Frf(!f (16) lxl 
,r 
B C 
Type of Action Applicable Reasons -
(Check only one) See Step 3 Above 
A7100 Motor Vehicle - Personal lnjurJ/Property Damage/Wrongful Dea\h 1., 2 .• 4. 
A711 O Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death - Uninsured Motorist 1 .• 2., 4 . 
A6070 Asbestos Property Damage 2. 
A7221 Asbestos - Personal Injury/Wrongful Death 2. 
A7260 Product Liability (not asbestos or toxlcJenvironmental) 1., 2., 3., 4., 8. 
A7210 Medical Malpractice - Physicians & Surgeons 1., 2.,4. 
A7240 Other Professional 1:Jealth Care Malpractice ., .• 2., 4. 
A7250 Premises Liabitity (e.g., slip and fall) 1., 2., 4. 
A7230 Intentional Bodily Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (e.g., . 
assault, vandalism, etc.) 1 .• 2., 4. ... 
A7270 Intentional lnlliclion of Emotional Distress 1., 2., 3. 
A7220 Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death 1., 2., 4. 
A6029 Other Commercial/Business Tort (not fraud/breach of contract) 1., 2 .. 3. 
A6005. Civil Rights/Oiscrimin~tion 1., 2 .• 3. 
A6010 Defamation (sl~nder/libel) 1., 2., 3. 
A6013 Fraud (no contract) 1'..2 .. €) 
ORIGINAL 
zo ____________________________________ _ 
LACIV 109 (Rev. 01/07) 
LASC Approved 03-04 
. CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET ADDENDUM 
AND STATEMENT OF LOCATION 
LASC, rule 2.0 
Page 1 of4 
LA-4B1 
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SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Philip Richard Powers, individually; Neil David ) 
Campbell, individually; Powers Investments and) 
Management, Inc., S.A., a corporation (a.k.a. ) 
Powers Investment and Management; Powers ) 
Management and Investment; Powers ) 
Management & Investments Inc.; Powers ) 
Investments; Powers Management & ) 
Investments Co.; Powers Investment & ) 
Management Co.; Powers Investments & ) 
Management Co.); Guanana Gris, S.A., a ) 
corporation; Protecci6n Foresta! de Teca, S.A., a) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
CASE NO. BC 378888 
Hon. Maureen Duffy-Lewis 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR: 
1. CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
2. FRAUD AND DECEIT 
3. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
4. UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 
5. FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
6. CONVERSION 
7. BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
8. BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT 
9. AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD 
10. BREACH OF DUTY OF LOYALTY 
11. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (Against 
Campbell) 
12. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (Against 
Powers) 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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1 Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. ("C&M") and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
2 ("Karlin Holdings") allege for their·Complaint against Philip Richard Powers, individually, Neil 
3 David Campbell, individually, Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A., (a.k.a. Powers 
4 Investment and Management; Powers Management and Investment; Powers Management & 
S Investments Inc.; Powers Investments; Powers Management & Investments Co.; Powers Investment 
6 & Management Co.; Powers Investments & Management Co.), Guanana Gris, S.A., Protecci6n 
7 Forestal de Teca, S.A., and DOES 1 through 50 as follows: 
8 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9 1. Plaintiff C&M is a limited liability company established under the laws of Costa Rica 
10 with its registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. C&M's sole shareholder is Plaintiff Karlin 
11 Holdings, a Limited Partnership established under the laws of Nevada with its principal place of 
12 business in the City and County of Los Angeles. 
13 2. Dr. Gary K. Michelson ("Dr. Michelson") is an individual domiciled and doing 
14 business in the City and County of Los Angeles. Karlin Holdings is owned almost entirely by Dr. 
15 Michelson's living trust (the Gary Karlin Michelson MD Living Trust), of which Dr. Michelson is 
16 the sole trustee. 
17 3. Defendant Philip Richard Powers ("Powers'') is a United States citizen domiciled in 
18 Costa Rica. At all relevant times mentioned herein, Defendant Powers represented himself to be an 
19 individual doing business as Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. 
20 
21 
2z~, 
-=ti;::; 
23~_: 
,d~.: 2,q 
4. Defendant Neil David Campbell ("Campbell") is now an individual domiciled in 
Orange County and was previously domiciled in Los Angeles County. At all times relevant herein 
and before July 23, 2008, he was a co-owner of C&M. 
S. Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. is a Costa Rican 
Corporation with its registered domicile in Heredia, Costa Rica. At various relevant times 
.i'":'r~ 
2S:,.J mentioned herein, Defendant Powers referred to "Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A." 
:F~t 
26 as "Powers Investment and Management," "Powers Management and Investment," "Powers 
27 Management & Investments Inc.," "Powers Investments," "Powers Management & Investments 
28 Co.," ''Powers Investment & Management Co,.," "Powers Investments & Management Co.," and 
2 
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1 other variations of Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A. not mentioned herein. 
2 Defendant Powers Investments and Management, Inc., S.A., along with all variations thereto, are 
3 collectively referred to as "Powers Investments." 
4 6. Defendant Gu.anana Gris, S.A., ("Gris") is a Costa Rican corporation with its 
5 registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. Defendant Protecci6n Forestal de Teca, S.A., ("Teca") 
6 is a Costa Rican corporation with its registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
7 7. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, 
8 of DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue said Defendants by 
9 such fictitious names and will ask leave to amend the Complaint to show their true names and 
l O capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege 
11 that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events 
12 and happenings therein referred to, and there is now due, owing, and unpaid from Defendants and 
13 each of them to Plaintiffs the sums alleged in this Complaint. 
14 8. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all relevant times 
15 mentioned herein there existed a unity of interest and ownership between Powers, Powers 
16 Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 such that any individuality and separateness 
17 between Powers, Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 has ceased, and that 
18 Powers is the alter ego of Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50. 
19 9. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Powers at all relevant 
20 times mentioned herein has ~ompletely dominated and controlled the assets, operations, and 
21 activities of Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or DOES l through 50, failed to observe important 
2:t corporate formalities, and used the assets.and facilities of Powers Investments, Gris, Teca, and/or 
:'i~ 
23,, DOES 1 through SO for personal affairs and purposes, as if those assets and facilities belonged to 
2~; Powers personally. 
2t 10. Any adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of Powers, Powers Investments, 
~J 
2~1 Gris, Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 as an entity distinct from Powers would permit the abuse of a 
27 corporate privilege and would promote injustice by allowing Powers, Powers Investments, Gris, 
28 Teca, and/or DOES 1 through 50 to evade liability or veil assets that should in equity be used to 
3 
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1 satisfy the judgment sought by Plaintiffs. Given the unity of interest of Powers, Powers Investments, 
2 Gris, and Teca, Plaintiffs will refer to them collectively as the "Powers Defendants." 
3 11. In this action, Plaintiffs are suing the Powers Defendants for civil conspiracy, 
4 fraudulent inducement, fraud, constructive fraud,.conversion, breach of written contract, breach of 
5 oral contract, unfair business practices, and tortious interference with contractual relations in 
6 connection with their theft of C&M' s proP,erty and their purposeful concealment of such theft. 
7 Plaintiffs are suing Campbell for civil conspiracy, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, constructive 
8 fraud, breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious interference with contractual relations, and unfair 
9 business practices. 
10 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
11 12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Powers Defendants by virtue of their: 
12 (1) solicitation of, and business with, California citizens; (2) personal appearance in the City and 
13 County of Los Angeles to transact said business; (3) telephone, facsimile, and e-mail contacts with 
14 California citizens over the course of more than six years in connection with this business; and (4) 
15 conspiracy with a California resident to defraud Plaintiffs over the course of more than six years. 
16 This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Campbell because he is a California resident 
17 and was a California resident at all times relevant to the transactions at issue. Venue is proper in this 
18 Court in that the transactions giving rise to this action occurred in substantial part in the City and 
19 County of Los Angeles, California. 
20 FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
21 
22,,; 
r.ti=;.1 
2Jt 
.~l 
24t 
r~? 
25/ () 
2tt~ 
27 
28 
A. The Parties Agree That Powers Will Purchase Properties For C&M In Costa 
Rica. 
13. In the Summer of 1999, Dr. Gary Michelson met Richard Powers ("Powers") in Los 
Angeles, California. They were introduced by a mutual friend, Neil Campbell ("Campbell"). 
Campbell and Powers met in the 1970s, and worked together as car salesmen before Powers left the 
United States to live and work in Costa Rica. 
14. In 1999, Powers came to Los Angeles to persuade Dr. Michelson to enter into a 
business relationship with him related to teak farms. Powers accessed Dr. Michelson through 
4 
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l Campbell. In Los Angeles, Powers told Dr. Michelson that he was an experienced real estate 
2 investor and expert in all aspects of teak farming. Powers represented that he had expertise in 
3 identifying ideal teak properties, negotiating best possible prices for the properties, and the planting 
4 and maintenance of teak farms, which under his management returned an annualized rate of return of 
5 25% to 30%. It was agreed that Powers would charge no more than a six percent (6%) commission 
6 for purchasing the properties on behalf of C&M. 
7 15. Campbell vouched for Powers and assured Dr. Michelson that Powers was truthful in 
8 his representations about his experience and generally trustworthy. As a purported show of faith in 
9 Powers and the proposed venture, Campbell represented to Dr. Michelson that he would invest a 
10 substantial portion of his own assets toward the venture. In reliance on these representations, Karlin 
11 Holdings, through Dr. Michelson, agreed to proceed with Campbell as a partner in the venture 
12 proposed by Campbell and Powers. At or about this juncture, Campbell represented that he had sent 
13 to Powers 50% of the purchase price of the first property for the venture. 
14 16. In or about June, 2000, Powers registered C&M Investment Group, Ltd. to be the 
15 owner of the properties Powers found and negotiated to purchase. C&M stands for Campbell and 
16 Michelson. Given his alleged contributions to the venture, Campbell received a share in this newly-
17 formed company. After his purported initial payment to Powers, Campbell contributed no further 
18 payments to Powers and, instead, encouraged Dr. Michelson to continue to expand C&M by 
19 increasing investments in teak property, through funding from Karlin Holdings. As C&M grew, 
20 Campbell's interest became smaller percentage-wise, but supposedly more valuable. In July 2008, 
21 Campbell asked Dr. Michelson to buy out his-interest in the venture citing alleged financial hardship. 
221, Dr. Michelson, who considered Campbell a dear friend, agreed to have Campbell bought out of the 
.dt 
23::: venture at a substantial premium to Campbell. 
24'.t 17. To facilitate the property transactions, in or about June, 2000 and thereafter, C&M 
' 
2~) granted Powers power of attorney to act on C&M's behalf in purchasing the properties in Costa 
t:i 
26 Rica. At all times relevant herein, Powers acted as the manager of C&M in Costa Rica, and 
27 represented himself as such to third parties. 
28 18. From June, 2009 through March, 2006, Powers purchased on behalf of Plaintiff C&M 
5 
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l more than 147 properties in Costa Rica, totaling more than 23,000 acres. Powers, on behalf of 
2 C&M, was purportedly finding properties ideal for teak, and negotiating the best possible purchase 
3 prices for the properties. He then faxed to Dr. Michelson and e-mailed to Campbell the purported 
4 negotiated purchase price of the properties and the_ closing fees. Powers requested that C&M, 
5 through Dr. Michelson and Karlin Holdings, wire the funds for the represented purchase price and 
6 fees (with no more than a 6% mark-up for Powers' services) to a specific account of Powers. These 
7 accounts included accounts in the names of Powers Investments, Gris, and Teca. 
8 19. From June, 2000 through March, 2006, at the request of Powers and with the 
9 encouragement of Campbell, C&M wired $25,592,289 to Powers to purchase properties in Costa 
10 Rica. Other than $133,762 purportedly invested by Campbell, all of the funds sent to Powers came 
11 from Dr. Michelson, through Karlin Holdings, on behalf of C&M. 
12 20. During the period when C&M was purchasing properties through Powers in Costa 
13 Rica, Campbell traveled on numerous occasions to Costa Rica on behalf of C&M to assess Powers' 
14 activities and C&M's investment. Campbell made several visits to Costa Rica to look at the 
15 properties and generally oversee the transactions, and would report back to Dr. Michelson. 
16 Campbell represented that he had seen purchases take place, and that while the transactions were 
17 complicated, Powers was honest and competent, and C&M was receiving value for money. 
18 Campbell also represented that Powers was being ably assisted by Walter Suarez, whom had 
19 previously been identified by Powers to Dr. Michelson as an experienced teak farmer. Specifically, 
20 Powers represented-and Campbell later confirmed-that Mr. Suarez was a graduate from the 
21 University of Costa Rica with a degree in silviculture, that he had been the head of reforestation for 
22-t the government of Costa Rica in the Guanacaste region, and that he-a native of Guanacaste-had 
-{, 
::i-1.~ 
23! served as Powers' right-hand person in optimizing the purchase and maintenance of teak properties . 
.. i~ 
247 These representations were false. 
26 
B. 
21. 
Powers and Campbell's Conspiracy To Defraud Dr. Michelson and C&M. 
While Campbell claimed to be looking out for the interests of C&M and Dr. 
27 Michelson, he was in fact secretly in partnership with Powers. Upon information and belief, from 
28 their very first meeting with Dr. Michelson, Powers and Campbell's intent was to defraud Dr. 
6 
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1 Michelson out of millions of dollars. Powers and Campbell conspired to have Powers falsely 
2 represent to Plaintiffs the purchase price of a property in excess of the true purchase price (plus the 
3 maximum permitted 6% commission), and have Powers keep most of the remaining proceeds for 
4 himself. Campbell, in return for providing false reassurances to Dr. Michelson about the value of 
5 the land being bought and the'legitimacy of Powers' transactions, would receive regular kickbacks 
6 from Powers. 
7 22. From 2000 to 2006, Powers and Campbell executed this scheme. Powers sent faxes 
8 to Dr. Michelson in Los Angeles, in which he grossly exaggerated the purchase prices of properties, 
9 and Karlin Holdings wired the requested funds from Los Angeles to Costa Rica. In so doing, Dr. 
10 Michelson relied on Campbell's regular assurances about Powers' integrity and the legitimacy of the 
11 transactions. Upon information and belief, Powers misappropriated for himself millions of dollars 
12 from the more than $25 million wired to him by Plaintiffs. For his role in and facilitation of this 
13 fraudulent scheme, Campbell received kickbacks from Powers of more than $1.3 million, over $1 
14 million of which was paid through international wire transfers from Powers to Campbell's bank 
15 accounts in California. 
16 23. On November 5, 2008, Campbell admitted to Dr. Michelson that he, among other 
17 inappropriate behavior, wrongfully received the foregoing sums from Powers, in return for 
18 encouraging Karlin Holdings and C&M to continue investing in the acquisition and management of 
19 teak farms through Powers. 
20 
21 
C. 
24. 
Powers' Concealment of the Fraud and Spoliation of Evidence. 
Starting in lat~-2005 through early-2006, Dr. Michelson asked Powers for records 
2:z;L detailing how C&M's money was being spent. During this period, C&M, through Dr. Michelson 
\~ 
,.it•; 
2~'.' and others, repeatedly asked Powers to disclose adequate books and records showing the actual 
;~ .. 
24'.? purchase prices of the properties, and the com.missions Powers charged for the property purchases. 
2SJ 25. C&M had a contractual right to inspect the books and records it requested from 
26 Powers. On October 3, 2003, Powers and C&M entered into a written Professional Services 
27 Agreement ("Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and is incorporated 
28 herein by reference. The Agreement was between C&M and "Richard Powers d/b/a Powers 
7 
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1 Investment and Management" and required, among other things, that Powers keep adequate books 
2 and records in purchasing property on behalf of C&M. The Agreement provided that C&M "shall 
3 have access to and the right to examine any pertinent books, documents, papers and accounting 
4 records of Consultant [Defendants] which pertain to transactions under this Agreement during the 
5 pendency of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years after expiration of this Agreement." 
6 Ex. 1, Article 11. The Agreement further provided that Defendants must "report all ... accounting 
7 records, budgets, and projections ... ". Id. at Ex. A,§ 4. 
8 26. In spite of his contractual obligations to turn over documents, Powers continually 
9 refused to disclose records in response to C&M's requests. Powers' excuses for refusing to provide 
10 documents varied and were contradictory. 
11 27. For example, Powers initially claimed there was no documentary evidence of how 
12 much he actually paid for the properties because he paid for the properties in cash. When C&M 
13 responded that there should at least be checks made out to "cash" in the amount paid to the sellers, 
14 Powers said that he destroyed his copies of such checks. Thereupon, C&M, through Dr. Michelson 
15 and others, insisted that, at a minimum, Powers' banks would have records of the checks. Powers 
16 refused to disclose those records, stating that the information of what he paid for the properties was 
1 7 confidential. 
18 28. After repeated requests by C&M for records to show what he had paid for the 
19 properties, Powers finally admitted that he charged C&M in excess of 6% for commissions. 
20 However, Powers still refused to provide records that would show the actual amount Powers paid to 
21 acquire the properties. Despite repeated requests_from C&M to disclose in full the commissions 
22L Powers charged for all properties purchased from 2000 to 2006, Powers has refused to do so to this 
l. 
~ 
day. 
1'-fm·i 
24'? 29. Upon information and belief, Powers was marking up the purchase prices of the 
25.) properties by amounts as high as 870%. C&M's investigation into the amount of overcharges 
f.~~~~ 
26 continues (at significant expense) to date. 
27 30. Finally, Powers represented to Dr. Michelson that he and his entities were immune 
28 from accountability in the United States-and the discovery and due process secured by its courts-
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1 for any alleged wrongdoing by virtue of Costa Rican agrarian law. According to Powers and his 
2 legal advisors, Costa Rican law mandated that all matters pertaining to C&M, including Powers' 
3 duty to maintain records under his agreement with C&M, were exclusively subject to Costa Rican 
4 agrarian law, to be adjudicated under the exclusive jurisdiction of Costa Rican "agrarian courts." In 
5 a retaliatory suit filed in agrarian court in Costa Rica after the filing of the original complaint in this 
6 matter, Powers took the position that he could only be held accountable for his actions relative to 
7 C&M in agrarian court. In a decision dated·August 29, 2008, the highest court in Costa Rica on the 
8 subject of agrarian law rejected Powers' contention and ordered the case out of agrarian courts, to 
9 ordinary civil courts with no claim of exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the C&M 
10 relationship. 
11 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
12 (Against All Defendants) 
13 31. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 30 as 
14 if fully set forth herein. 
15 32. Powers and Campbell agreed that Powers would grossly exaggerate the purchase 
16 prices of properties to Dr. Michelson, Campbell would provide false reassurances to Dr. Michelson 
17 to prevent him from inquiring further into the transactions, and Powers and Campbell would share 
18 the amounts in excess of what was actually paid for the properties. 
19 33. Powers and Campbell executed this agreement, inducing Karlin Holdings into 
20 initiating a business relationship with Powers, and inducing C&M to wire more than $25 million to 
21 Powers with the representation that this money would go towards purchasing properties in Costa 
22J Rica. In fact, Powers wrongfully kept millions of dollars for himself and/or his associated entities, 
' 21, and gave more than $1.3 million of C&M' s money to Campbell. 
2l)f 34. As a result of this conspiracy between Powers and Campbell, C&M and Karlin 
(·3 
2$.;~ Holdings were defrauded, in amounts to be proven at trial. 
26 35. The aforementioned conspiracy was committed through oppression, fraud, and malice 
27 with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs and subject them to cruel and unjust hardship as a result 
28 thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
9 
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l California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AND DECEIT 
3 (Against All Defendants) 
4 36. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 3 5 as 
5 if fully set forth herein. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22t 
23/ 
:.i .. 
247 
/ 
25) 
1~~ 
26 
27 
37. As alleged hereinabove in the f·acts Common To All Causes of Action, the Powers 
Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiffs the amount of money needed to purchase the properties and 
the commissions Defendants took for purchasing the properties. Examples of the Powers 
Defendants' misrepresentations, fraud, and deceit, made through Richard Powers, include: 
• Representing on or about May 12, 2004 that a property cost $127,500 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $13,000, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of 870%; 
• Representing on or about March 2, 2004 that a property cost approximately $70,000 
when, based on infonnation available to date, the property cost approximately $8,600, 
constituting a fraudulent markup in excess of 700%; 
• Representing on or about October 1, 2002 that a property cost $130,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $34,500, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of270%; 
• ~epresenting on or about May 12, 2004 that a property cost $183,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property ~ost approximately $75,500, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of 142%; and 
• Representing on or about August J3, 2002 that a property cost $374,000 when, based on 
information available to date, the property cost approximately $216,300, constituting a 
fraudulent markup in excess of'72%. 
38. Such representations were false when made and made with the intention of causing 
Plaintiffs to rely thereon and send the requested sums. 
39. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on these misrepresentations and sent Defendants the sums 
28 they requested in excess of $25 million. Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations was 
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justifiable. 
40. 
e 
Moreover, to conceal Defendants' fraud and misrepresentations alleged hereinabove, 
3 Defendants engaged in a pattern of fraud and deception by failing to disclose to C&M adequate 
4 books and records with which to verify Defendants' representations, and instead gave false 
5 assurances, misleading explanations, and evasive excuses to forestall the revelation of Defendants' 
6 fraud, deceit, and misrepresentations. 
7 41. The $25 million in funds transmitted by Plaintiffs to Defendants was excessive and 
8 represented far more than what the Defendants represented they would in fact request (namely, the 
9 purchase price plus no more than a 6% commission). While Plaintiffs' investigation continues, 
10 based on information to date, Powers marked up the properties by several times the purchase price, 
11 and in some cases as high as 870%. 
12 42. In addition, Defendant Campbell, with knowledge that Powers was paying far less for 
13 the properties than he was representing, and that Powers did not have the experience both he and 
14 Powers represented to Dr. Michelson, falsely represented to Dr. Michelson on several occasions that 
15 Karlin Holdings should invest in C&M, that it and C&M were receiving value for money, and that 
16 Powers should be trusted. 
17 43. Campbell's statements were false when made and were designed to conceal Powers 
18 and Campbell's scheme to defraud C&M out of millions of dollars, induce Karlin Holdings into 
19 entering into the relationship with Powers through C&M, and induce C&M to do business with 
20 Powers. C&M's and Karlin Holdings' reliance on these statements was reasonable, given that 
21 Campbell had greater knowledge of the transactions from his visits to Costa Rica, and given that he 
2i]!, owed a duty to C&M and Karlin Holdings. 
:et~: 
: ~· 
23;, 44. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' fraud and deceit as set forth above 
:-::f~ 
:,--~ :~· 
24''. and with particularity throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs have suffered actual damages in an 
2f; amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
~ ... -: 
26 45. The aforementioned fraud and deceit was committed through oppression, fraud, and 
27 malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs and subject them to cruel and unjust hardship as a 
28 result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
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1 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
3 (Against All Defendants) 
4 46. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs l through 45 as 
5 if fully set forth herein. 
6 47. As alleged hereinabove, the Powers Defendants induced Karlin Holdings to engage it 
7 to purchase properties through C&M. Plaintiffs granted Powers power of attorney for purposes of 
8 acquiring properties for C&M from June, 2000 through March, 2006. Defendant Campbell, the co-
9 owner and agent of C&M, and partner and joint venturer with Karlin Holdings, went to Costa Rica 
10 under Plaintiffs' financing, for the purposes ofreporting back to Plaintiffs with information about 
11 the Costa Rican transactions. These fiduciary relationships entitled Plaintiffs to implicitly trust 
12 Defendants and to expect absolute loyalty and full material disclosures from Defendants. 
13 48. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs did, in fact, place full and total trust, confidence, and 
14 reliance upon Defendants, and Plaintiffs justifiably relied upon the continuing integrity and fidelity 
15 of Defendants. 
16 49. Despite having voluntarily accepted such trust and confidence given by Plaintiffs, 
17 Defendants violated such trust and confidence and abused their fiduciary relationships with Plaintiffs 
18 as set forth above. 
19 50. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Defendants engaged in 
20 the wrongdoings alleged in this Complaint with specific intent to take advantage of their fiduciary 
21 relationship with Plaintiffs to deceive and defraud them, conceal such deceit, fraud, and other 
2ill, material facts from them, and to induce further reliance. 
•"•ii 
=~:i.:,,, 
23-~'. S 1. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty as set 
2if i forth above, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at 
.. •· 
26 52. The aforementioned constructive fraud was committed through oppression, fraud, and 
27 malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs and subject them to cruel and unjust hardship as a 
28 result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
12 
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1 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 
3 (Against All Defendants) 
4 53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs l through 52 as 
5 if fully set forth herein. 
6 54. Defendants' acts as set forth hereinabove constitute business practices that are 
7 unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent in violation of California Business & Professions Code 
8 Section 17200 et seq. 
9 55. Defendants' unfair business acts and practices have caused irreparable injury and 
10 other losses to Plaintiffs C&M and Karlin Holdings for which they have no adequate remedy at law. 
11 C&M and Karlin Holdings are therefore entitled to restitution from Defendants in an amount to be 
12 proven at trial. 
13 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
14 (Against The Powers Defendants) 
15 56. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 55 as 
16 if fully set forth herein. 
17 57. As alleged herein, to induce C&M to engage the Powers Defendants, the Powers 
1,8 Defendants promised to purchase properties on C&M' s behalf for a commission not to exceed 6%. 
19 In reliance on such promises, C&M entered into an agreement with the Powers Defendants, and sent 
20 them more than $25 million over the course of approximately five years to purchase the properties. 
21 58. The Powers Defendants' promises were false at the time that they were made. Upon 
2il· information and belief, the Powers Defendants intended at the time of the initial engagement to 
~·l~: 
211 pursue a pattern and practice of taking from C&M far in excess of the agreed-upon commission rate . 
... :: 
59. The Powers Defendants in fact took millions of dollars from C&M by charging 
25:::: fraudulent excessive commissions. While C&M' s investigation continues, based on infonnation to 
:';::;' 
26 date, Powers marked up the properties by several times the purchase price, and in some cases as high 
27 as 870%. 
28 60. Moreover, the Powers Defendants engaged in purposeful concealment to prevent 
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1 C&M from discovering their wrongdoing. The Powers Defendants misrepresented the purchase 
2 prices of the properties to C&M. And upon information and belief, the Powers Defendants refused 
3 to disclose and/or destroyed books and records to prevent C&M from determining the full amount 
4 Defendants misappropriated. 
5 61. As a direct and proximate cause of the Powers Defendants' fraud and deceit as set 
6 forth above and with particularity throughout this Complaint, C&M has suffered actual damages in 
7 an amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at trial. 
8 62. The aforementioned fraudulent inducement was committed through oppression, fraud, 
9 and malice with intent to cause injury to C&M and subject it to cruel and unjust hardship as a result 
10 thereof. Plaintiff C&M is therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
11 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
12 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION 
13 (Against The Powers Defendants) 
14 63. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 62 as 
15 if fully set forth herein. 
16 64. As alleged hereinabove in the Facts Common To All Causes of Action, to induce 
17 C&M to engage the Powers Defendants, the Powers Defendants promised to purchase properties on 
18 behalf of C&M for a commission not to exceed 6%. In reliance on such promises, C&M engaged 
19 the Powers Defendants to purchase properties, and sent them more than $25 million over the course 
20 of approximately five years to purchase the properties. 
21 65. Unbeknownst to C&M, Powers was in fact marking-up the purchase prices of the 
22.:c, properties for far more than the represented 6% commission rate. While C&M's investigation 
:1(; 
23/ continues, based on information to date, Powers marked up the properties by several times the 
::tj 
241; purchase price, and in some cases as hi~h as 870%. 
66. All amounts Powers took in excess of the property purchase prices and his 6% 
26 commission was, property belonging to Plaintiffs, and thus constituted a wrongful taking of 
27 Plaintiffs' property and interfered with Plaintiffs' possession of their property. 
28 67. As a direct and proximate consequence of the Powers Defendants' conduct as set 
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1 forth above, the Powers Defendants converted an amount no less than $20,000,000 to be proven at 
2 trial. 
3 68. The aforementioned conversion was committed through oppression, fraud, and malice 
4 with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs, and subject Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship as a result 
5 thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of e-xemplary and punitive damages under 
6 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
7 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
8 (Against The Powers Defendants) 
9 69. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 68 as 
10 if fully set forth herein. 
11 70. At all relevant times, C&M had competence and capacity to enter into contracts, and 
12 standing to bring actions thereon. 
13 71. On or about October 3, 2003, C&M and the Powers Defendants entered into a written 
14 Agreement whereby the Powers Defendants agreed to keep adequate books and records concerning 
15 the properties purchased on behalf of C&M, and make such records available to C&M upon demand. 
16 See Ex. 1. 
17 72. By virtue of the Powers Defendants' acts and omissions alleged hereinabove, the 
18 Powers Defendants breached said contract by failing to keep adequate books and records, and/or 
19 refusing to disclose such records, and/or destroying such records regarding the fees the Powers 
20 Defendants charged for the properties they purchased on behalf of C&M. 
21 73. C&M performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on its part to be 
2tl performed in accordance with said contract, or are legally excused from doing so. 
74. As a direct and, proximate consequence of the Powers Defendants' contract breaches 
24) as set forth above, Plaintiff C&M has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2s~:.: 
26 
27 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT 
(Against The Powers Defendants) 
75. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 74 as 
28 if fully set forth herein. 
15 
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76. At all relevant times, C&M had competence and capacity to enter into contracts, and 
2 standing to bring actions thereon. 
3 77. C&M and the Powers Defendants entered into an oral agreement whereby the Powers 
4 Defendants agreed to acquire properties for C&M for a total of no more than 6% of the actual selling 
5 price in commissions. 
6 78. By virtue of the Powers Defendants' acts and omissions alleged hereinabove, the 
7 Powers Defendants breached said contract. 
8 79. C&M performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on its part to be 
9 performed in accordance with said contract; or are legally excused from doing so. 
10 80. As a direct and proximate consequence of the Powers Defendants' contract breaches 
11 as set forth above, Plaintiff C&M has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
12 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD 
13 (Against Campbell) 
14 81. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 80 as 
15 if fully set forth herein. 
16 82. Defendant Campbell knew that the Powers Defendants' conduct in marking up the 
17 prices of properties and keeping the excess funds, as alleged herein, was fraudulent. He also knew 
18 that Powers could not be trusted and did not have the qualifications he represented to have in the 
19 area of teak farms. 
20 83. Nevertheless, Campbell provided substantial assistance and encouragement to the 
21 Powers Defendants' fraud against C&M, and actively encouraged Karlin Holdings into entering into 
22t a business venture with Powers by actively concealing it in return for kickbacks . 
. :"l-.: 
21/ 84. As a result of Campbell's aiding aq.d abetting fraud, C&M and Karlin Holdings have 
2-IL 
24'.? been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
/ 
2SD 
!E~ 
85. The aforementioned aiding ~nd abetting fraud was committed through oppression, 
26 fraud, and malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs, and subject Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust 
27 hardship as a result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive 
28 damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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1 
2 
3 
e 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
(Against Campbell) 
86. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 85 as 
4 if fully set forth herein. 
5 
6 
87. 
88. 
As an officer of C&M and an agent of C&M, Campbell owed C&M a duty of loyalty. 
As a partner with Karlin Holdings in C&M, Campbell owed Karlin Holdings a 
7 fiduciary duty. 
8 89. Campbell, however, breached those duties by concealing the fraud perpetrated on 
9 C&M by the Powers Defendants, perpetrating a fraud of his own by misrepresenting the state of 
10 transactions in Costa Rica, and accepting kickbacks in the form of money that properly belonged to 
11 C&M. 
12 90. As a result of Campbell's breach of his duty ofloyalty to C&M and Karlin Holdings, 
13 C&M and Karlin Holdings have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
14 91. The aforementioned breach of duty of loyalty was committed through oppression, 
15 fraud, and malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs, and subject Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust 
16 hardship as a result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive 
17 damages under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
18 ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
19 
20 
21 
221;' 
. 6-
21'._ 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
(Against Campbell) 
92. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 91 as 
if fully set forth herein. 
93. C&M entered into a valid contract with the Powers Defendants, whereby Powers was 
;:;.~ to acquire properties for C&M in return for no more than a 6% commission. 
24:'. 
/ 94. Campbell knew about this contract, but intentionally induced its breach by entering 2§? 
-- into an agreement with Powers that Powers should charge more than a 6% commission and give part 
26 
27 
28 
of the excess to Campbell. 
95. Powers did in fact take far in excess of the agreed-upon 6% commission in breach of 
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1 the contract between the Powers Defendants and C&M. 
2 96. Campbell's agreement with Powers was a proximate cause of the Powers Defendants' 
3 breach of contract. 
4 
5 
97. 
98. 
Campbell's conduct was independently wrongful, as alleged herein. 
As a result of Campbell's tortious interference, C&M has been damaged in an amount 
6 to be proven at trial. 
7 99. The aforementioned tortious interference was committed through oppression, fraud, 
8 and malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs, and subject Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship 
9 as a result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore eJ?.titled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages 
10 under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
11 TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
(Against Powers) 
100. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 99 
as if fully set forth herein 
101. Karlin· Holdings and Campbell had a valid ownership agreement, under which they 
were to share in the profits and losses of C&M according to their respective ownership percentages. 
102. Powers knew about this contract, but intentionally disrupted it by conspiring with 
Campbell to defraud C&M out of millions of dollars, and by carrying out that fraud by diverting 
C&M's money into Campbell's and Powers' personal accounts. 
103. Powers' conspiracy with Campbell to defraud C&M was a proximate cause of the 
,= disruption of the contractual relationship between Karlin Holdings and Campbell. 
22} 
23;;L 
24/ 
2S;~if 
26 
27 
28 
104. 
105. 
Powers' conduct was independently wrongful, as alleged herein. 
As a result of Powers' tortious interference, Karlin Holdings has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
106. The aforementioned tortious interference was committed through oppression, fraud, 
and malice with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs, and subject Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship 
as a result thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages 
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1 under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2 JURY DEMAND 
3 
4 
5 
I 07. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial in this action. 
PRAYER 
108. As to the First through Third and Fifth through Twelfth Causes of Action, a money 
6 judgment for general, special, and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
7 I 09. Additionally as to the First through Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Through Twelfth 
8 Causes of Action, an award of exemplary punitive damages under California Code of Civil 
9 Procedure Section 3294 in an amount to be established at trial; 
10 110. As to the Fourth Cause of Action, restitution from Defendants in an amount to be 
11 proven at trial; 
12 
13 
14 
15 
111. An award of attorney's fees as allowed by contract and law; 
112. Award of costs of suit as allowed by law; 
113. Interest on damages allowed by law; and 
114. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper, fair, equitable, and just. 
16 DATED: November 17, 2008 Respectfully submitted, 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22:' 
23',, 
24} 
2~;~ 
26 
27 
28 
I I 
Luke .1Dauchot (S.B. 
Jeffrei§ S. Sinek (S.B. 35508) 
Shaun Paisley (S.B.N. 244377) 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
777 South Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Email: ldauchot@kirkland.com 
Email: jsinek@kirkland.com 
Email: spaisley@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. 
and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
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This Professional Services A 
2003, between C&M loves 
Cosl1 Rh;a,{herdnafter re 
busines1 as ''Powers Innstm 
e 
·ssIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT 
ent {tbiir .. Agreement") is made as of t~is 3rd day of October 
Group Limited, a limitada company formed U~:f ~ laws. of 
to a.s '."COMP.ANY"), ;mdRichard Powers an 1nd1vnlual doJJ1g 
t aud Management" (.hereinafter referred to as "Co111ultant•). 
WH51\EAS COMPAN'i . ts affllla\0$ are engag«\ in tile businesl ofl)Ur<:huing and 
mliataining.pasturo lands :for' eforestanon in the Guanacaste zone of Costa Rii;a,. and 
COMPANY des.ire, to eng119 the services: of Consultant to provide the -services m fortb. h~~ 
and 
WHEREAS. Co~tant is an ndependent contractor able and willing to provide suoh setVices 
uru1er the terms and aindltio set fortb herein, 
NOW nmREFORE, iiJ on of the pmnise1 and the mutual covenants hereinafter set 
forth, tbe parties hereto mutu ly agreo as follows: 
Article 2. Character a 
dcacribeei in :Exhibit "A" (l 
incorponted herein by this r 
.set f<lrtfl in &hibit A 
rinanct. This Agreement shall commence on the date hereof and 
cct until completion or tmnination u-provided herein. 
Extent of Services. Consultant shall perform the services. 
Services"}, _which exhibit Is attached to tbi$ Agreement and 
~ce. The Servicea shall be perfomted at the time and location 
Article 3. CodlpellSatio . The Scrnccs shall be pctfor:rool for the compensation set forth. 
in lixhil>it A. Consultant . . submit invoi= in clUplicatc to COMPANY, tosether with such . 
. aul!PCJ{ting doQUmentatioa. as MP ANY ma.y fflllOnably require, at the ead of each mDnth. 
In~~ shall inc:lude: · 
get 
tGDate 
Provided in the Current Period Billing 
·COMPANY agree. to pay th amount due co Coasultant for tho Seivices on or befoic the 
. ihiltieth d1y foll~-recei ofCOnsultanl's invoicn. prl)perly docum~ed u· set tbrth above.· 
e obligationi ot either party under thls Agreement· are not 
prior written approval otthe Other .pany; provided, however, 
that t0nsent .shall not bn . · to any IJ:IUlSfer by the Company ofits rights mid obligitions 
'hereunder to 8111 p~it or 1i1Y s,ucc:cedina to subs.tantially.all ofthe·.1,usineas of the Company • 
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Aljklc 5. Raponllltj 1Jab1111J. eon,u,.;........,...,. hill~ .. ;au, . . 
p~rmanc11 of the Services standard of eare no~lly exercised o/ ra:og!11z.~~ _organizations 
eag,tged in performing comp able act'Vices using the best cormnetcial pacnces 1n the 
:manasement of assets suGh as e OWJled by the Company. E~pt as set, forth in Anicle 6,_ 
Consultant's liability to CO . ANY hereunder shall not excc:ed Coa.sul';U1t s total wmpcnllll~on 
· for the Services together with y amounts rmlvcd by Coll5uhant relatmg to brokerage services 
. in connection with.llCquisitio of' auets owned by the C'.ompoany. 
Article 6. Jadm1Dificati 
COMPANY ag~ all clai 
~. death or property dam 
~igent acts or omiaaio1111 o 
party man have liability to 
or CltCIXlplary damages. 
Artlele 7. OW11enblp o 
work produ..i orColllN\bim 
deQvcred to COMPANY up 
as authorized hereunder. Co 
.research and ~ther intefnal u 
any diird party or used for 
toMr ANY"s prior Written 
work product on pn,jecti 
. Consultant specifically agrees to m:,ld hannless and indemnify 
1Uits, lOSS81, llabl.litlcs, dal"Qaget and 4',q>e!lse& arising out or 
if and to tho extent caused by the willl:ut miscoaduc:t or 
onsuttant, its employees or &Qemt hereunder. However, neither 
other under this Agreement fur amscquairial, incidental, special 
ork l'rOduct. AU "tllChnical data, evaluations, report; and other 
oulidcr i~ 1*ome the~ ot'COMP-ANY and Mtall be:: 
termination o£this agreement or upon c:omplation of the Services 
Jtant may rctaiJ1 cooics of its work product hereundec fur 
· hoWCYcr, no information contained thctein shall be disclosed to 
benefit of any entity othtrtban COMPANY without · 
nscm. Consultant sliall not be Hable ibrw;c by COMP ANY of its 
than that covered by this Agreement. 
Article I. lndepndent . ,ntrActor Relationship. In the performance of'thc Services 
hereunder, Coaaultant Bball b an independent con\rlttor and not an employee of COMP ANY, 
with the sole au~rity tO and direct the performance of the dotails oftbc work, 
COMP ANY being intere~ed yin the results ohtaincd.. 
Arllclc9. 
a. Consultant comply with aJI app~le ~omestic and fi>rcign ordbianccs, 
laws, crdtfs, TUlca ud Ttg11l ons perwmng to its Setvices hereunder, and sbalJ obtain all 
oece~ry authority top SU<:h SetVicos, 
. b. Ccllllllltaat· 
provisions o/thc U.S. Po,ei 
take no .actioa and·make no 
ill! dl"wlilQ ur ltWllidiarii::ii 
tcnjplimce with the FCP A. 
represe.ala and wamnts that it is aware of and familiar with the 
Comzpt Practices Act (the "FCPA .. ) and hs purpose,, and will 
en.tin violation of; er that might cause COMPANY or any of 
a in violation of; thc.:FCPA: Cumul1llllt will act iu full 
conn=ction with its engagement by COMPANY, 
_Y- · Coasultant y repl:$ltt& and wanauts that it has not nllldc ind will not •c. 
dira:tly or indirectly, any ·cnr, loan or gift(or any offer, pmrmsc or authorization of any . 
such pa~cm, loan or gift) o money or anythiDS otvatui: to or for 1hc ui,c ot. (I) any 
govemme_m ofti~a~ {ii) any· olitical party or. official. m- any candidate for :political office; or {iii) 
(2) 
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llDY other person under circu.' · ances in which C?nsultant knoW:J ot has~ to.Jc?owthat all 
or any poJtion of such money . r thiNI of value will be offered, given _or pr~ised, .du·ectly or 
indirectly to any pcnon nam in items (iJ and (ii) above for the purpose of-1nduc1ng the 
aforemeuiioned person to do , . act or ~c any decisi?n. in his offi~al capacity (including a 
dc:ciSlOn '° ·1'iiil i.o perform bi1 fficial ib~on) or me h~s 1Jlilutl)(;O. with a ~~nt Of 
instrumeatality to affi!ct any or decision of s1u;h government or 1nstrumen~ty in order to 
311.'lbf. COMPANY in obtai • or retainina any business. For purposei; of this AgrecmcnL the 
tetm *government official" • des III e111ployee of a government.owned or govemmeat ~ 
controlled cormnercial ebleq> 
y represents and warrantS that it is not owned or contrOlled, and 
ed durifls tbe tean of this Agreement. by any official otthe 
aa to whli:h lhe Services will be perf'onned or by any official of 
r political office therein. 
c. esents that it has fully disclosed to COMP ANY, arid has i 
oontmuing obliptioa. to di .io, whothi:r any of its officers, dircctora or iu,y per$0t1 kti0wn by 
Coruutwit to hold ~re than 0% ofCo11.1u11an,·s outstanding abares is. or has a fiunily 
relation,hip with. ll govemm offic:iaJ, a politicaJ party official or a candidate for .political 
office. C.011$Ultant further that it will cooperate with COMP ANY to ensure thu 
COMP ANY receives adequa assuta1K1CS. whether in the fonn of a cemfication. a formal refusal 
by the tolnant f'lmily mcmb or come a.ther tonu of'~le assurance. to ntisfy . 
COMP ANY that no vi.olatio of tho FCP A will arise as A result of any such offi(;CI'' s, director's, 
shareholder's or family mem a posiliou. Should COMPANY determine in good faith that · 
Conmltant has failed to er such adequate assurances, COMP ANY n:scrvcs the rlsht to 
tcnninatethls Agteem• uu ediatdy. · 
t'. Consultant 
COMP ANY to ii. ha-1m11ldt!r 
Consultant pursuant to 1his 
orper,ons. 
owledges and undertakes that the tees and expemes paid by 
~ended so1&Sy as compensation for the Service.s F.O'Yided by 
emeni and are not to be lhared with, or paid to, aJJY other person 
. · g. Consult,i:it and wammts that the execution and implcmc:utauon .of this 
Agl:ecznent and its nceipt Of . feec W ~ h\lRUMer GO l\ol ... ialtl\e \he la'W$, d-1>T 
. regulations of the coW1frY in as to wbieh the Services will be ~ed and that no oonseut of 
or notice to any agency -ofthe1!1!(Jw:rirlllllmt of"sucb counny is uquired or necessary in connection . 
therewith. 
Arddt 10. :co-orldeotlali . CcKmmant ,hell not, eiilltr dwing «fora pc.nod '1f'thrce (3) 
years a1ter the tenninition or piratioo of ibis Agreement. disclosa to arty lhitd plllty any · 
Confidential ln~on (u · fined below), or use 1M ~ fot its ovm bent.fit or fl>'t 1he 
benef'tfof any ontity other : COMPANY, withoutthe prior writtCJJ rol2SCDt of COMP ANY. 
Col\SUhant lhall limit disclo of Confidential Information to those¢it&. employees, aiems 
1111d GOntrac:t'1R to whom dl e is tcaaouably i=:easlll')' to pe,rcmn tha ScrvJccs hereunder 
and who a.sree to "IIOld it COllifllential ~t sbaU.pr~vem its employees, ageou and 
! . 
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5Ulx:ontri\l.lon tiom di.s~losin C<>utideutial fufonnatio[l to unauthorized persons or misu$ing 1he 
same. ~ used herein, "Co ential Infoffl.\ation" shall mean financial, tedu>.ical, and b\Jsincss 
.information and dOllUMtntati 1~g to CO'MP /\NY ~ the Ser/ices which COMP AN'l 
designates in writing as "C~ dcntial," "Sc:act." or '*Proprietary" or with words of like meaning. 
-ConiidlmtW lnfonuittiwi ll nOl inclu.de inlbtmllliun which~ am d1:IOOms1:oo": (a),,. 
or beoomes in the public do ·n other than by t~ fault of Consultant, (b) was in Consultant's 
possession prior to, the time disclosure, (c) is obtained fi:om a third party which Consultant 
JCa50Dab1y believed did not • the infonna1ion directly or indirectly from COMP ANY, or 
(d) ia indepeu4eotly develo · by those oCConsultsnt'1 employees, agents o.r conttacton; who 
do not bavi, access to dle Co dential Information. 
Article 12. 
flteco.-da; Aecen t• Work. Consultant agiees that COMPANY 
reientativu shall have access to and the right to ·CltlllDine any 
crs·and accountingreconfs of Consultant which pertain to 
cnt during the pend ency of this A8fecment and for a period of 
of this Agreement. COMP ANY'1 rqm:sentative shall at n1l times 
sos ofizi:,pccria3 nmc and d1:tcrmining ihat tlK\ SCIViccs IU'C 
with tho terms of this Agreement. 
a: Durillg tho · ofpcrfonn.nce of tho Scmccs, ·CollSUllant shall maintain th~-
following insunince coveras at no additional cost to COMPANY, and Conswtant will pay the 
dt.dnctibles amder such CO\' ge: 
Workmen's mpensuion lnsumice as rcquiml by law. 
Aulomoblle J.. llity .Insui'alM:e COV'erlng claims for Injuries to or deat.11 of 
. one or 1U01'C and damage tO property cauaed by motor vehicles, 
owned oi hire. , with aggresare limits of not less dwl $50,000. 
b. Collsultant sh 
will be h\ etf~ during the t 
:gj~ thirty (30) daya prior 
:pc>\icies evidenced by.such 
Article 13. 
a. 'Ii. 
thi, t\gre1:nicnt for COMP 
C0ll.8Ultant ism default: 
l .furnish certificates showing tliat the above insurance coverages 
of this Agreement. amUpec:ifying ihat COMPANY must be 
• ell notice of c:an"Jlation, cermination. or aheratioa ot' thcs 
·acates. · 
. : COMPANY·mayupoa writtennoticeterniinate 
a c;onycni~ with or 'Without ~IK', and ·regardless ofwhcthcL 
r . . COMPANY may terminate this ~t ·~anytime, 
ltant specifying ~ e1recrive date ot'tennination. ·if 
(4) 
267 of 636
\ 
'· 
e. 
{l) Consultan shall become insolvent. or mako a gCl'leral assignment fonhe 
benefit of creditors, or any p , ceeding is brought by or again.sf Consultant seeking ally 
rmrganization. arrangement, mposition. readjustment, liquidation. dissolution, orsimilarreJlef 
under the present or any futur federal bankruptcy acts or under any other applicable federal or 
stl.ttt: law or n:gul11tiun, c.ir an ~ing is brought scck.ing I.he appoinlincnl of a reocjvc, or 
simitar officer <>f court with f pect to Colllllltant's busincs~ 
(2} Con.sultan tepeatedly muses of f&ik to supply enough propi:dy skilled 
workmen or equipmant or. · s of1he proper qwillty or quantity to perform the Saviees; 
disrcgan:1$ laws, ordinances. go~ent rules orregulatfocs, or 
of COMP ANY's repraectadve which ar• conair.tent with 1his · 
is guilty of a material breiwh or violation of e.ny pro;ision of this 
such bteai;b Ol"'Yltmdton within fumy (30) days ai\er ia;eipt of 
I 
(1) All Siu · or unfioiahcd dow111Cnts, data, fflldics, tun.cy1y drawing:i, 
maps, models, photographs reports or other materials prepared or (wl,ject however to 
Consultanf• nonexclusive ri to usc·the same as !let forth in Article 7) equipment purchased 
by Consultant under this . . ent shall become the propei:ty of COMP ANY; attd . 
(l) Con$Ultan aJJaQ be endded to iecetve just and equitable compensation for any 
satisfactory work i:ornpleted such dowme:nts and other materials. 
Article 14. . Ameai.dmeaa. 
panie., c:ovoring -1hc subject 
UDdnandinga. eltl\ef oral« 
mauer~£ ·No moditi,;; • 
and signed by the parties. 
• instrument· constmites tht entire Agreement between the 
er and. $UIMlfSCdes an.y and an omer prior agreanems Md 
writing. between tbe J)IJDC5hcrcto with rapcct to the subject 
. or amendments to this Agreement shall bo valid unless. in writing 
Artielc 15. Nodca. J\s.t.y . ·ce to be given hereunder by either party to the other may be 
effected ei!her liy personal de cry in writing, or by cenified mail, return r=pt requested, 
postage prepaid, eO:ective wh Reeived or on the fifth day following the date mailed, whichever 
ia soones. The ud~ for. · · aball be tho&& set forth OIi thtifitst page·oftm$ Agteemont, · 
.unless .such addresses are c · by wrltte:ri notice given in compliance with this Article 15. 
Artitlo Iii, Liens. 
iRANSl'ER.DOC 8/:IIIIOII . 
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a:. ConS1,1ltant sha promptly pay all bills incurred by Consultant in performance of 
the Services hereunder, includ ng, without limitalion, bills for labor, seivlces, equipment and 
materials. · 
b. Consultant s 
or other licni to be filed or o 
Ccmaultant or any of its empt 
and if Consultant does no& ca 
in lieu thereof. COMP ANY· 
diirdmrge and d.!,dµ,;t nll lUJIO 
not voluntarily pcnnit any laborer's, materiidmcm's, mc:chamc',, 
· sc impos~ on 11ny of COMPANY's property on the behalf of 
ees. agents, or sulx:ontndors. If my such lien or claim is filed 
such lien ~ be relwed and discharged forthwith.. or file a. bond 
l have the right to pay all sow necessary to obtain release and 
ts so paid ~m the paymCIUS i:luo than or thc:reafta hereunder. 
Artlcle 17. GavemiqLa . By &eteclionofthepanies, this Agnemet,tasulall questions 
·1:0nceming the c,x-,tiou, vali • y or invalidity, oapacity of the parties and th~ perfonnance or· 
this Ag[eement, shall be inte ted in accordance with the laws of~ State of California 
applicable to agrer.menb ed and to be wholly perfonned in sucll state. 
Article 11, Attorney•'·.Fe . If'any action at law or in equity is bJ'OU8bt 1o anfurca or 
· inteipm the provisions ofthi ent, the prevailing puty sbuJl be aitit1ed to reasonable 
attorneys' f"s in addition to y oilier Rlief,o -which it may be entitled. 
1N WITNESS WHEREOF, 
their ~ve awnes u of 
parties hereto ha\10 caused this Agreement to be duly executed in 
and year tint abov, written. 
(6) 
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San Jos~ Com Rica 
~l~~ncs:,.1,."Q.~r 
Tel: l06-20J-2 I 33 
Fax: S06-20J.2l67 
PROFESS! 1 NAL SERVICES AGREEMENT EXIllBIT "A?' 
Property size: a . . ro:dmately 5,000 acres. (C & M) October 3, 2003 
SERVICES 
1: Powers will be resp<1 ible fur the planting and maintenance of all trees on C & M's 
properties as well as the • tenance of the. existing natural forest surrouncling the plantations. 
This also includes all • ctures on roads, bridges and fe11ces. 
J 
ible for all employees and their compensation as :well as their 
and vac;i.tion pay. 
ible fur loss of any new plantings as a result ofhurricane, fire, 
in'lestments are IeSpOnsible at his expense to replant any loss of 
give C &M coverage of 100%1.ofthe planted area.. 
· . report a ctivities pataining to the progress of the plantations as well as 
. ords, bud ts and projections as descnl>ed further in Article 3 of this doc. · 
investments e also responsible for the acquisition of new properties both 
rerorested and for refu • on fur C & M. Powezs js also responsible to see that all related 
property leases whether lated to government forest restrictions or otherwise are cancelled 
or cleaned. Pow:ers is responsible to report and present all documents relating to closing to 
tbe offices ofMunoz and.1 ·as. . 
COMPENSATION 
Powers investment will receive . r compensation two do~n for every new tree planted: From this 
compensation Powers investmen will be .responsible to e&ry out all the functions as described above. 
The planting cost :fur the first y will be approxirnately S2 per tree. · This includes preparation of the 
property (cleaning, etc.). Certifi teak seedlings from nursery and transportation to site. Forest 
. ensineer who sets lines. distan and spaces and-monitors trees throughout the year. Holes prepared 
.:fbt ~ilizing,(fhcre will.be. stages ofwtilizing in the~ and ~nd year.) arid planting. 
·.Mailitcllal!Ce of surrounding fen and.boarders. Fire lines.ace made in Dc:ccmbet ~d revlsed . 
· · • · are included in this maintenance schedule. It will 
or its"maintenazicc; . 
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.. . 
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November IO, :ZOOJ . l. . 
Pag1t2 
Teak Tree maiJtenance schedule first 2 years 
One 
Two 
Three, 
Four 
Five 
Seven 
Eight 
Total Cost oflnvest. 
Cost perb Trees per acre 
l Based on 4mtJC4mt 
sli.oo 243 
: 1.00 
.5.0 
; ·.so 
.50 
.25 
.25 
.2~ 
243 
e 
Cost per Acre 
$485 
243 
121 
121 
121 
60 
60 
60 
·6 
$ 1,331 
of the costs expect to have from..10-20 years. 
Ten-Twenty 1'22 Sl2peracre 
In the tenth year if a 50% g _is.done then we will have a return on the ini~ial investment as 
.described in the chart below: 
Ten 121 . 122 I $ 30.00 · $ 3,630 4,000 $14,520,000 
· Toe above figures are based current wholesale logs of 10 inch diameter, .approx. 10-U year old 
tree. The total value figuere . all 4,000 acres of teak would be IO years old at the same time and 
assumes a 50% thinning. C &, 's properties have trees_varying in age from new saplings to 12 years · 
of age. The cUttent goal fur c: M is to preserve as much as the timber as po$Sib1e and still maintain 
ideal growth rate. Future · g would be done ~ughout the next 10 years·until the trees reach 20 
years of age. ClUTent wholesa price of a 20 inch diameter teak log in Costa Rica is approx. $150. 
Additional tbinnings to compe e fur maintenance will be at the discretion of C & M's executives, 
Gary Michaelson and Neil ~bell. · 
. (T{.:e.dut,it.,.:I,we.,fv,.Hf · "J l'WU~cms wfrl.Mff.tl«-in t~ 1t,.,11-tAti(m.ui(_r'4-t 
c.nuf}t~S.fw/,.M,!tJ~. 
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6 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 
and not a party to the within action. My business address is Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 777 South 
Figueroa Street, Suite 3700, Los Angeles, California 90017. 
On November 17, 200.8 I served the foregoing document described as: 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
on the interested parties as follows: 
7 ~ 
8 
BY U.S. MAIL: By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with 
postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States at Los Angeles, California addressed as 
set forth below. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22f·' 
.-:l:t 
2i: 
~-J:> 
24;! 
2l!~ 
:f~:~ 
26 
27 
28 
Michael L. Cypers, Esq. 
Evan M. Wooten, Esq. 
Mayer Brown LLP 
350 South Grand Averiue, 251h Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1503 
[2J [State] I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California 
that the above is true and correct. 
Executed November 17, 2008 at Los Angeles, Califi 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
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'· SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DATE: 0 2 / 0 4 / l 0 DEPT. 41 
HONORABLE RONALD M. SOHIGIAN JUDGE H. ESTRADA DEPUTY CLERK 
HONORABLE 
2 
V. KRBOYAN, CRT ASST 
JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR 
DeputySheriff A. PARADELA, CSR #9659 Reporter 
8:30 am BC378888 Plaintiff 
Counsel 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS 
SHAUN PAISLEY 
LLP 
( X) 
LUKE L. DAUCHOT ( X) C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD 
vs 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS ET AL 
Defendant 
Counsel 
DAVID R. FLYER 
TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE 
170. 6 (deft) 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT CAMPBELL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD; 
Motion comes on for hearing and is argued. 
Plaintiff informs the court of the motion for Summary 
Adjudication as to cause of action #4 have three 
elements: prevailing fiduciary relations, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damage. 
Defense counsel states all elements have not been 
established as to content and failure to disclose. 
The Court's ruling of Summary Adjudication Motion as 
to claim #4: 
The Court finds binding consession on the part of 
counsel. The claim of defendant, Campbell and 
defendant, Powers cheated plaintiff, C&M, out of 
millions of dollars in purchase. The court uses 
C.C.P. 437(c) and reviews allegation and pleading 
and analyzed record and rules Plaintiff's motion 
for summary adjudication of the fouth cause of 
action for constructive fraud is granted. 
The Court futher makes the following ruling as to 
defense's objection regarding Shaun Paisley 
declaration: 
Overruled as to items: #1 through #5 and #10 
Sustained as to items: #6 through #9 
Page 1 of 2 DEPT. 41 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DATE: 02/04/10 DEPT. 41 
HONORABLE RONALD M. SOHIGIAN JUDGE H . ES TRAD A DEPUTY CLERK 
HONORABLE 
2 
JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR 
V. KRBOYAN, CRT ASST Deputy Sheriff A . P ARAD.E LA, CSR # 9 6 5 9 Reporter 
8:30 am BC378888 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD 
vs 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS ET AL 
170.6 (deft) 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Plainiff to give notice. 
Page 2 of 
Plaintiff KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
Counsel SHAUN PAISLEY ( X) 
LUKE L. DAUCHOT (X) 
Defendant DAVID R. FLYER 
Counsel TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE 
2 DEPT. 41 
MINUTES ENTERED 
02/04/10 
COUNTY CLERK 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 
DATE: 11/ 02/10 DEPT. 41 
HONORABLE RONALD M. SOHIGIAN JUDGE E . GARCIA DEPUTY CLERK 
HONORABLE 
#2 
V. KRBOYAN, CRT ASST 
JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR 
Deputy Sheriff A . P ARADELA, CSR # 9 6 5 9 Reporter 
8:30 am BC378888 Plaintiff SHAUN PAISLEY (X) 
Counsel LUKE L. DAUCHOT (X) 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD 
vs Defendant 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS ET AL Counsel A. ERIC BJORGUM (X) 
FOR THIRD PARTY 
CHAMPLAIN 
170.6 (deft) 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
1) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT OF PHILIP RICHARD 
POWERS AND NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL; 
2) MOTION OF PLAINTIFFS, C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. 
AND KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO COMPEL 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM NON-PARTY HARVEY 
CHAMPLIN; 
3) THIRD PARTY aARVEY CHAMPLAIN'S EX PARTE APPLICATION 
TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AS UNTIMELY 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORDER PLAINTIFFS TO SHOW 
CAUSE WHY THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL SHOULD NOT BE 
STRICKEN AS UNTIMELY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, CONTINUE 
THE HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL; 
As to items 2 and 3, the Court orders Mr. Champlain to 
produce the Privilige log by no later than 11/30/10. 
As to item number one, the Court declines to hold 
either citee in contempt of court, however, the Court 
imposes a terminating sanctions in the form of 
striking both Powers and Campbell's pleadings and 
GRANTING default as to both Power's and Campbell 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 2030.030 
subsections 1 and 4. 
The matter is continued to 12/17/10 to verify if the 
said privilige log has been turned over by Mr. 
Champlain. 
Notice by plaintiff's counsel. 
Page 1 of 1 DEPT. 41 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DATE: 11/01/11 DEPT. 41 
HONORABLE RONALD M. SOHIGIAN JUDGE E. GARCIA DEPUTY CLERK 
HONORABLE 
#1 
V. KRBOYAN, CRT ASST 
JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR 
DeputyShcriff A. PARADELA, CSR #9659 Reporter 
8:30 am BC378888 Plaintiff 
counsel SHAUN PAISLEY ( X) 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD 
vs 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS ET AL 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Defendant 
Counsel NO APPEARANCES 
MOTION OF PLAINTIFF TO COMPEL DEFENDANT CAMPBELL'S 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION; 
MOTION OF ABOVE PARTY TO COMPEL DEFENDANT NEIL DAVID 
CAMPBELL TO ATTEND DEPOSITION; 
MOTION OF ABOVE PARTY TO MODIFY PROVISIONS OF SEPEMBER 
22, 2009 ORDER RE SEARCH OF IMAGES OF COMPUTER HARD 
DRIVES; 
Matter is called for hearing. 
The Court having read and considered the moving papers 
now rules as follows: 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Campbells Responses to 
their Fourth Set of Special Interrogatories and 
Request for Production is GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED 
in the amount sought of $1470.00. Campbell to answer 
by 11/18/11, and produce documents on 11/30/11, by 
9:30 a.m., at the offices of Plaintiff's Counsel. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant Nei+ David 
Campbell to Attend Deposition is GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED 
IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF $4,000.00 (from $4,714.00). 
Deposition to take place on 11/15/11. 
Page 1 of 2 DEPT. 41 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DATE: 11/01/11 DEPT. 41 
HONORABLE RONALD M. SOHIGIAN JUDGE E . GARCIA DEPUTY CLERK 
HONORABLE 
#1 
V. KRBOYAN, CRT ASST 
· JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR 
Deputy Sheriff A. PARADELA, CSR #9659 Reporter 
8:30 am BC378888 Plaintiff 
Counsel SHAUN PAISLEY (X) 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP LTD 
vs 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS ET AL 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Defendant 
Counsel NO APPEARANCES 
Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Provisions of September 22 
2009 Order re Search of Images of Computer Hard Drives 
is GRANTED. 
Moving party to give notice of all orders. 
Page 2 of 2 DEPT. 41 
MINUTES ENTERED 
11/01/11 
COUNTY CLERK 
284 of 636
N.RHODES 
285 of 636
'\ 
EXHIBITF 
286 of 636
. 
~ ' .. , 
. ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
·23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
,,.:J 
1·~ 31 ·i.. 
'" :~ 32 ... ~~ 
, .. 
·~ 
'f( 
REC'D 
DEC 0.620ft 
FILING WINDOW. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
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Philip Richard Powers, individually; Neil David 
Campbell, individually; Powers Investments and 
Management, Inc., S.A. , a corporation; Guanana 
Gris, S.A., a corporation; Protecci6n Forestal de 
Teca, S.A., a corporation; and DOES l through 
50 inclusive, · 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership (together. 
"Plaintiffs") previously moved for, and obtained, summary adjudication against Defendant Neil 
Campbell ("Campbell"). Based on th~ evidence then available to Plaintiffs, the Court found that 
Campbell, while a co-owner ofC&M, received kickbacks of at least $1.545 million from his co-
defendant, Philip Richard Powers ("Powers"), C&M's on-site manager, in conne~tion with C&M's 
. acquisition of teak farms in Costa Rica. Because Campbell never disclosed these payments to 
Plaintiffs, in vi~lation of his fiduciary duties, the Court concluded that Campbell was liable for 
constructive fraud. 
Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment as to all of the remaining causes of action they 
assert against Campbell in the December 17, 20 l O Third Amended Complaint: ( l) Violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962 (Civil RICO); (2) Fraud (including conspiracy to defraud); (3) Fraudulent 
Inducement; (4) Aiding and Abetting Fraud; (5) Violation of California Business & Professions 
Code§ 17200, et seq.; and (6) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations. For the reasons 
stated below, this Court grants Plaintiffs' motion. 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
PlaintiffC&M first filed this actionfo October 2007, alleging tharPowers and his corporate 
entities (together, the "Powers Defendants") cheated C&M out of millions of dollars by 
misrepresenting the purchas~ price of teak properties purchased for Plaintiff C&M, and asserting 
claims for, inrer a/ia, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and breach of contract. See Oct. 10, 2007 
Comp!. ln late-2008, while jurisdictional motions filed by the Powers Defendants were pending 
(those motions were later denied), C&M di~covered that Campbell had been receiving secret 
payments from Powers. On November 17, 2008, C&M and Karlin Holdings filed a First Amended 
Complaint, including Campbell as a defendant. See First Am. Compl. Upon obtaining more 
information from third party discovery, Plaintiffs again amended their complaint in July 2009 to 
include additional details concerning the fraud, as well a claim against Powers and Campbell for 
violations of civil RICO: See July 29, 2009 Second Am. Comp!. 
In November 2009, Plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication on their constructive fraud 
claim against Campbell. See Nov. 20, 2009 Pis.' Mot. for Summary Adj. On February 4, 2010, the 
Court-granted Plaintiffs' motion, concluding that Campbell had breached fiduciary duties to 
Plaintiffs, and finding Camp~ell liable in the amount of$1.545 million-the amount of secret profits 
that Plaintiffs were at that time able to prove. See Feb. 4, 2010 Summary Adj. Order. 
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When Plaintiffs continued to seek discovery as to their remaining causes of action, Campbell 
improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Even when this 
Court ruled that Campbell had waived the Fifth Amendment as to several areas of inquiry; Campbell 
continued to refuse to provide further discovery responses. See June I 8,2010 Order Compelling · 
Further Discovery Responses; Aug. 26, 20 IO Order to Show Cause. Eventually, the Court imposed 
terminating sanctions for these discovery abuses, struck_Campbell's answer, and entered default 
again~t him. See Nov. 2, 20 IO Order Imposing Terminating Sanctions Against Campbell. But when 
Plaintiffs then amended their Second Amended Complaint in preparation for proving up their default 
judgment, Campbell filed an answer to the Third Amended Complaint. See Jan. 13, 2011 
Campbell's Answer to TAC. Campbell has continued to abuse the discovery process following the 
filing of his Answer to the TAC. On November I, ~O 11, this Court imposed sanctions for 
Campbell's failure to attend a deposition and to respond to Plaintiffs' written discovery related to 
Campbell's financial condition. See Nov. I, 2011 Minute Order. 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on September 2, 2011 as to all of their remaining 
causes of action against ~ampbell, and the motion came on for hearing on November 29, 2011. 
Campbell filed·no opposition. 
B. Factual Background 
I. How the C&M venture was supposed to work. 
In the Summer of 1999, Campbell first urged Dr. Michelson, a surgeon, inventor and 
philanthropist whom Campbell had recently befriended to join him in investing in teak wood fanns 
located in Costa Rica. Campbell also recommended that Dr. Michelson entrust the acquisition and 
operation of the farms to Powers, a friend of Campbell dating back to the 1980s, when they worked 
in a car de~lership together. See June 2, 2008 Deel. of Philip Richard Powers in Support of Motion 
to Quash Service of Summons ,i 4 (Powers declaring that he met Campbell when they worked 
together at Vasek Porsche in Los Angeles and that "he and I became fast friends:'). Although Dr. 
Michelson initially declined this offer, in the Summer of 2000, he agreed to Campbell's overtures 
and caused Karlin Holdings (a partnership controlled by Dr. Michelson's living trust) to join with 
Campbell in investing in teak properties. Powers fonned C&M, a Costa Rican limited liability 
company, to take title to the properties. Campbell r~presented that he had sent an initial payment to 
Powers of about $105,000 towards the initial property that C&M purchased, and received an initial 
15% equity stake in C&M on that basis; Karlin Holdings owned the remaining shares. See Sept. 2, 
2011 Declaration of Shaun Paisley ("Paisley·Decl."), Exs. C & D (C&M Owners' Agreement). 
2 
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Powers was engaged to acquire and manage the properties in which C&M invested. 
From 2000 through 2006, Powers was responsible for acquiring and maintaining teak tree 
properties on behalf of C&M. Powers, on behalf of C&M, would purportedly locate properties ideal 
for teak, and negotiate the best possible purchase prices for the properties. Powers then asked Dr. 
Michelson to wire the funds needed to acquire such properties, purportedly at the price that Powers 
was able to negotiate for C&M (plus no more than a total 6% commission on the purchase price for 
each property), and Karlin Holdings, on behalf ofC&M, wired the money as requested. See, e.g., 
Sept. 2, 2011 Declaration of Scott Cooper ("Cooper Deel."), Ex. 4 (Jan. 6, 2003 fax from Powers to 
Michelson). Powers also regularly requested funds from Dr. Michelson that Powers represented he 
needed to maintain the properties, and Karlin Holdings would wire those funds as well. Id 
Campbell, someone whom Dr. Michelson then considered a best friend and co-owner of C&M, 
served as Dr. Michelson's "eyes and ears" in Costa Rica. See Paisley Deel., Ex. A at 16:16-20 
(Campbell Oct. 22, 2008 Interview). He regularly travelled to Costa Rica, purportedly to inspect 
properties that Powers was contemplating acquiring on behalf of C&M, participate in negotiations 
for those properties, and generally observe the activities of Powers and his contractors in the 
maintenance of the properties. Campbell reported regularly to Dr. Michelson about Powers and the 
properties. In so doing, he confirmed the representations of Powers, offered positive reports about 
the performance of Powers, and encouraged Dr. Michelson to continue having Powers acquire and 
manage properties on be~alf of C&M. 
From 2000 through 2006, Michelson wired on behalf ofC&M over $32 million for property 
acquisition and maintenance in reliance on Powers and Campbell's representations. During this 
period, Powers submitted to Plaintiffs accounting and property reports purportedly showing Powers' 
expenditures and acquisitions on behalf of C&M. 
2. Campbell and Powers' fraudulent scheme. 
The record reflects that the C&M venture was, from the very beginning, a vehicle for Powers 
and Campbell to systematically steal millions of dollars. Powers was in fact grossly overstating the 
prices that he had negotiated :with the sellers for the properties on behalf of C&M, and keeping the 
difference between the actual and stated purchase price for himself and his co-conspirators. While 
Campbell was supposed to be looking out for the interests of C&M and Karlin Holdings, including 
verifying the accuracy of representations regarding the quality of land purchased, he was in fact 
secretly in a conspiracy wit~ Powers, receiving-a substantial cut of the fraudulent proceeds, and 
encouraging Dr. Michelson not only to continue, but expand on, the relationship with Powers. 
3 
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During the course of the conspiracy, Powers sent to Dr. Michelson numerous faxes in which 
he claimed that he, along with his associate, Walter Suarez, arrived at the represented purchase price 
of the property through tough negotiations with the property owners that led to the best possible deal 
for C&M. See, e.g., Cooper Deel., Ex. 5 (June 3, 2005 fax from Powers to Michelson) (noling that 
"the seller has reached his bottom line for the farm, SS,200~000"). The faxed information was false. 
The record con~nns that the prices quoted to C&M in fact included massive mark-ups. In a 
February 2006 em~.il exchange between Campbell and Powers, for example, Powers noted in 
relation to one property transaction ~at, "I do know we raised the price to Gary about 35% over 
what we paid[.]" Id, Ex. 6 (Feb. 16, 2006 email exchange between Powers and Campbell). 
Campbell was involved in deciding by how much to defraud his friend and business partner, 
conferring with Powers about what price they should claim to have negotiated. The process 
appeared to involve Campbell and Powers picking the highest possible number that they thought 
would not arouse suspicion from Plaintiffs. In one email, Powers asked Campbel), "Can we offer 
this [property) to Gary at $SM?'' while noting that "[w]e are pretty sure they will sell at $6M but 
would be nice to get it at $5M." See id, Ex. 7 (Apr. 14, 2005 email from Powers to Campbell). 
Campbell responded that "8 million to Gary is probably on the high side, probably around 7 .5 would 
be more like.it .... " Id.; see also id, Ex. 8 (June 6, 2003 e-mail from Powers to Campbell) 
(attaching redlined document replacing $250,000 price with $350,000). 
Campbell was also involvec,i in deciding how best to communicate the fraudulent requests for 
maintenance costs to Plaintiffs. See, e.g., id, Ex. 9 (Dec. 30," 2005 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) 
(in response to e-mail from Powers asking him to review request for maintenance costs, Campbell 
responding with several edits). Many of the "maintenance" costs were invented, or at least wildly 
inflated, and the money that Plaintiffs sent would often find its way directly into Campbell's pocket. 
See id, Ex. 42 (Jan. 17, 2006 e-mail from Powers to Campbell) (Powers explaining to Campbell that 
he was inflating maintenance expenses for the month by a smaller amount-$14,000-to try to keep 
them closer than usual to actual expenses, but that he "might be able to still pull out I OO(o a month for 
you as well. Any more is going to be risky."); id., Ex. 43 (Feb. 8, 2006 e~mail from Powers to 
Campbell) ("I found a way to do it. Here is the request from Walter. I added the $20K to his 
budget. Hopefully this will fly."). 
Overall, Powers and Campbell estimated that together they had pocketed approximately 25% 
(or about $8 million) of the money that C&M had sent to Powers to purchase and maintain 
properties. See id., Ex. l I (July 28, 2006 e•mail string between Powers and Campbell) (Campbell 
4 
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remarking to Powers that "Gary [Michelson] feels you took approx. 25% of all he invested in C&M 
from commissions to marking up the cost of seeds and planting," and Powers responding that 
"Gary's figured that out very closely," and that "25% sounds about right"). Another e-mail 
exchange confirms the fraud and the $8 million figure. There, Campbell complains to Powers that 
his "worst nightmare" was coming true because he was receiying the proceeds of his fraud too 
slowly. Powers responded by reminding Campbell of the hard work Powers had put into their years' 
long conspiracy: 
. . 
Neil: NO, the worst nightmare would be Gary finding out you been receiving more 
than half of everything I made for all of the propeny deals he did with me. Your 
worst nightmare was Gary getting into my bank accounts and finding out that I have 
already wired you almost $3M over the last 6 years in various forms and finding out 
that he paid over $8M in commissions between you, me, Walter and other brokers. I 
stopped that nightmare from becoming a reality. Have you ever considered what a 
nightmare its been for me, my family. Hearing from you almost on a daily basis for 
the last 10 months how Gary's coming after me, his accountants are on me, his 
lawyers are going to sue me in Federal Coun, how he's going to sue me for every 
penny I have if it cost him $20M to do it. Try living with that fact day after day. Try 
spending the last IO months with accountants and lawyers 10 hours a day going over 
and over the concept of how we can make this pan out. Then having their attorneys 
and accountants pestering me daily for that information. The last 7 years I have been 
bu~ting my ass, on those farms, working every day to find another deal for us to put 
together while your biggest job in this entire operation has been to go water skiing 
and snow skiing with the Dr. Yes, I know it wasn't easy but it wasn't real work, at 
least not as far as I know work to be. And it made you MILLIONS. The real work 
has been this past year and it was only up to me, my accountants and lawyers to 
figure out how we could all get through this without a lawsuit and the pending 
properties transferred to C &M and to hope that with some real luck I could convince 
Gary to purchase some of the remaining properties that was committed by him. We 
succeeded in doing all of the above with the exception of two properties, the San 
Roque and Rio Seco piece, value of approx. $I.SM together. In Feb. of this year we 
had I think $6M worth of funds pending on committed properties that you told me in 
so many words that Gary will Never pay for. I told you not to worry and I would 
work on him and Cohen. We stalled, ~e confused the numbers, we changed 
accountants, the lawyers we did everything we could to keep the issue going until I 
·could clean the properties to present them for the balance of funds owed us. I had 
farmers threatening to take thei-r farms back unless I paid them immediately, even 
though Munoz's office was not accepting them at the time. I could go on and on 
about the shit I had to do to SA VE all our asses but I won't go into that because it 
would take me months or years to write the book and I don't think you been really 
reading all my letters anyway, because if you had you would have seen all this effort 
that I had put into this entire project. First to create and then to save it. 
Cooper Deel., Ex. 3. 
3. Campbell keeps at least $4.5 million of the fraudulent proceeds. 
As ~ewers described the division of labor between him and Campbell, he did all the work. 
According to Powers, Campbell's "biggest job in this entire operation has been to go water skiing 
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and snow skiing with the Dr." Id, Ex. 3 (Dec. 5; 2006 e-mail from Powers to Campbell). Campbell, 
however, wa~ integral to the conspiracy. See, e.g., id., Ex. 41 (Campbell describing the Powers-
Campbell fraud as a "team_ effort") .. Campbell's role was to travel to Costa Rica, purportedly to 
monitor Powers' activities and then to report back to Dr. Michelson as a trusted friend and advisor. 
See Paisley Deel., Ex. F (Further Resp. to lnterrog. No. 4) (stating that he travelled lo Costa Rica 
approximately 18 times between 1999 and 2009). But while supposedly playing the role of C&M's 
"eyes and ears" (see id, Ex. A at 16:16-20), he was doing the opposite-he was Powers' eyes and 
ears, going "water skiing and snow skiing" with Dr. Michelson in order to report back to Powers 
with any concerns about the venture that Dr. Michelson expressed. See Cooper Deel., Ex. 12 (Apr. 
26, 2006 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) ("Gary wants all the faxes from you dating from the very 
first ... I would only send him requests pertaining to the property requests."); id., Ex. 13 (July 27, 
2006 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) (explaining to Powers that "I hope you understand that I am 
only trying to pass on information as it is presented to me"). Campbell advised Powers to conceal 
information from Dr. Michelson, and sought to·placate Dr. Michelson when he expressed concerns 
about Powers' perfonnance.- See, e.g., id, Ex. 44 (Dec. 30, 2005 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) 
(Campbell advising Powers: "Don't call Gary a_nd tell him that, you have to make Gary believe he is 
getting the upper hand on you and [you're] out of the commission all together."); Ex. 45 (Jan. 3, 
2006 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) ("Gary told me that I was the only person that didn't think 
Richard ~as taking advantage of him ... I went over all the arguments that I could come up with, 
value of the property, the personal acquisitions that I had been involved in, so on and so on .... 
Again I don't know where this is going when it comes to all the options we already have."); Ex. 14 
(June 5, 2006 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) (Campbell stating to Powers that "I don't know if 
this last call from Gary was a test to see if I was giving you information. G~ had said recently why 
I was always taking your side and standing up.for you."). 
In exchange for introducing Dr. Michelson to Powers, and for encouraging Dr. Michelson to 
continue sending money, Campbell received a share of the fraudulent proceeds. In a June 2004 
memo, for example, Powers lists for Campbell several properties C&M is purchasing through 
Powers, listing the actual· price in one column, and the inflated price quoted to C&M in another. See 
Cooper Deel., Ex. 46 (June 29, 2004 memo from Powers to Campbell). Powers makes clear that a 
portion of that difference will be going_towards payi.ng "commissions" to Campbell. See id ("Gary 
. has advanced the funds shown in Red in the total amount of $244,000 or a total of $731,500 which 
commissions to you are due from this latter amount at time of closing."). Part of the excess proceeds 
6 
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Powers obtained from misrepresentations of maintenance costs was similarly allocated to Campbell. 
id, Ex. IO (Dec. 28, 2005 e-mail exchange between Powers and Campbell) (Powers noting that 
Campbell would "receive only $15,000 this month for ~he maintenance"). 
Powers kept balance sheets of how much Campbell had been paid, and how much he was 
still owed, for his role in t~e fraud See, e.g., Cooper Deel., Ex. 16 (N.D.C. accounts); id., Ex. 17 
(Dec. I, 2005 Memo to Campbell) (noting a balance of more than $2. l million owed to Campbell). 
When Campbell needed money, he would draw upon his reserve of kickbacks, contacting Powers to 
tell him to send a wire to one of Campbell's various bank accounts. See, e.g., id., Ex. 18 (Jan. 6, 
2006 email from Campbell to Powers) ("Rich· when you get an opportunity wire $25,000 to each 
acct. for a total of $50,000"); see also id., Ex. 19 (May 7, 2007 email from Campbell to Powers) 
("Rich, are you in a position to wire between 138k and 21 Ok today into an account in Tulsa, OK. 
Please let me know as soon as possible"). In addition to receiving millions of dollars in cash and 
checks over the course of the more than six years of the C&M venture, Campbell asked Powers to 
make purchases on his behalf from this running account. For example, the kickbacks were used to 
fund the following purchases or investments, via wires sent by Powers: 
• A Ford GT, a limited edition car, for $217,000. See id., Ex. 20 (Payments to Neil); 
Paisley Deel., Ex. H (North County Ford records). 
• A "Roadster" for $75,025. See Cooper Deel., Ex. 47 (Feb. 23, 2006 email from 
Campbell to Powers) (requesting funds to be wired for 356 Roadster); id, Ex. 20 
(Payments to Neil). 
• A vintage Corvette for $65,200. See id; Paisley Deel., Ex. I (Ed Lepelis.records). 
• An Agusta motorcycle for $32,612.43. Cooper Deel., Ex. 48 (June 22, 2006 email from 
Campbell to Powers) (Campbell requesting funds to be wired for Agusta and noting that 
he "hope[s] you have received funds from Gary"). · 
• Payments into investment accounts of about $150,000. See, e.g., id., Ex. 21 (June 26, 
2006 email from Campbell to Powers) (Campbell asking Powers to wire him $42,220 
into an investment account with lbrix); id, Ex. 20 (Payments to Neil) (chart reflecting 
total of nearly $150,000 wired to account with lbrix); Paisley Deel., Ex·. J (lbrix records). 
• An engagement ring for around $14,000. See Cooper Deel., Ex. 20 (Payments To Neil); 
id, Ex. 22 (Apr. 8, 2007 e-mails between Powers and Campbell) ("Rich I need $13,750 
wired to the following .... Please let me know when it is wired .... Juli's ring .... "). 
• A watch for $7,75Q. See id, Ex. 20 (Payments To Neil). 
• Nearly $50,000 to furnish a condo in Costa Rica. See id. (showing payments to Kreiss); 
id., Ex. ·23 (June 5, 2006 email from Campbell to Powers) (requesting "a few wires this 
week for the purchase of furniture for the condo"). 
• A sculpture for $21,278.50. Id., Ex. 49 (June 9, 2006 email from Campbell to Powers) 
·(requesting funds for Richard MacDonald sculpture). 
According to Powers, by 2006, he had \Yired Campbell more than $2.45 million and had paid 
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him-in a combination of wire transfers, cash, checks, and in-kind payments-in excess of$3.6 
million in total. See Cooper Deel., Ex. 20 (Payments To Neil). That amount did not include a 
luxury condominium that Powers purchased for CampbeU in Costa Rica, which Powers valued at 
$950,000. See Cooper Deel., Ex. 26 (Oct. 23, 2006 email from Campbell to Los Suenos Resort) 
(Campbell stating that he owns a condo purchased for him by Richard Powers); id, Ex. 27 (Sept. 18, 
2006 Accounting). Powers, acting through one of the defendant corporate entitles, Guanana Gris, 
S.A., also paid the homeowners' association dues owed on the condo. See id, Ex. 28 (Homeowners 
Association Dues). 
4. Campbell and Powers proceed to "stalll)" and "confuse[) the numbers" to 
conceal their fraud. 
In late-2005, Powers and Campbell's fraud started to unravel. Plaintiffs' accountants and 
investment managers found issues with accounting information previously provided by Powers and 
requested additional documentation of how Powers had spent the money sent to him by Plaintiffs 
(documentation that Powers was under a contractual obligation to keep). Up until that point, Powers 
had.managed to hide evidence of the fraud; recounting to Campbell that "[w]e stalled, we confused 
the numbers, we changed accountants, the lawyers we did everything we could to keep the issue 
going .... " Cooper Deel., Ex. 3 (Dec. 5, 2006 email from _Powers to Campbell). But Powers 
understood that he could not provide the detailed documentation of the transactions that Plaintiffs' 
accountants were now requesting without revealing that he and Campbell had been stealing money. 
As Powers wrote to Campbell: "The request David [Cohen, Plaintiffs' investment manager] is 
asking me ... is a request that I will never be able to provide them without compromising our total 
operation and its profit structure." Id, Ex. 29 (Dec. 29, 2005 email from Powers to Campbell). 
Because of the increased scrutiny on their business practices, Powers first proposed reducing 
the amount of money that he and Campbell were stealing: "Also the commissions Neil are going to 
change this next month on the maintenance. I will be adding a much smaller percentage to the 
overall maintenance program which I will still be able to pull you out 10%[.]" Id, Ex. 10 (Dec. 28, 
2005 e-mail exchange between Powers and Campbell). As a result of Powers' proposed cutbacks, 
Campbell would "receive only $15,000 this month for the maintenance." Id. 
Powers and Campbell then scrambled to cover up their fraud. They conspired to destroy 
documents, create false financial reports, forge checks, and otherwise Ii~ to Plaintiffs about how 
C&M's money was spent. Powers, for ·example, tolcl Campbell in February 2006 that he planned to 
destroy contracts with the property sellers, rath~r than provide them to Plaintiffs. See id., Ex. 50 
8 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT CAMPBELL 
295 of 636
-.~ 
t_~ 
... 
._.:, 
,jl, 
·, 
t~ , .. 
~s 
, .. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
(Feb. 3, 2006 e-mail from Powers to Campbell) ("What is not included in any of these files are our 
original option contracts, which we are destroying."). 
Powers also told Campbell that "[a]nother problem I am encountering is that Cohen 
continues to request copies of the cancelled checks for each one of my purchases to prove I actually 
paid what I said for _the property." Id., Ex. 31 (June 5, 2006 email from Powers to Campbell). 
Unable to provide those cancelled checks (because Powers had paid far less for the properties than 
he said), Powers resorted to fabricating them: "For this reason I need some cash available to make 
out checks to the sellers in which they deposit the check and then write me one back. I have been 
giving them a percentage for doing this for me." Id.; see also id., Ex. 32 (Mar. 12, 2006 e-mail from 
Powers to Campbell) ("of course it all went well with the guy who we cut the check to so it will 
show up as reported on my bank statements."). Powers expressed to these property sellers the 
"importance of them not divulging the price we paid them for the properties." Id., Ex. 31. 
Powers also provided a report to Plaintiffs b~ed on some of those fabricated checks, 
purporting to show "th~ check# the amount written for and to whom it was written[.]" Id., Ex. 29 
(Dec. 29, 2005 e-mail from Powers to Campbell). As Powers acknowledged, the report was both 
incomplete and false: "These amounts should come within 15% or less of the amount actually paid 
by Gary, showing an average commission of around I 0%. Of course it is incomplete and will 
remain so." Id 
After Plaintiffs' accountants expressed dissatisfaction with the incomplete documentation, 
and with Powers' varied and often contradictory explanations as to why he could not provide 
Plaintiffs with more evidence showing how he had spent t~eir money, Powers provided Plaintiffs 
with additional accounting reports. On March 15, 2006, for example, Powers sent Plaintiffs a report 
stating property-by-property how much he had actuaBy paid to acquire properties and how much he 
had taken in commissions, claiming that for 2005 he took an average commission of just 5.56% on 
property purchases. See id., Ex. 34 (Mar. 15, 2006 report). But as Powers later acknowledged to 
Campbell, Powers and Campbell in fact took at least 25% of what was sent to them. See Cooper 
Deel., Ex. 11. An additional accounting report followed in 2006, which included initials of certain 
individuals to whom Powers had supposedly paid closing costs, commissions, or other property-
related expenses. See id., Ex. 35 (June 2006 Accounting Report). This report, too, was false: most 
of the expenditures detailed in the report as expenses related to the purchase of properties were either 
kickbacks to Campbell or payments for. exotic cars., Compare, e.g., id (renecting wire transfer.of 
$217,000 in June 2005 to unnamed recipient purportedly for "closing" costs on property in Samaria) 
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wi1h Paisley Deel., Ex. H (North County Ford records) (reflecting wire transfer of $216,892.26 on 
same date to North County ford for purchase of Ford GT for Neil Campbell). Campbell grew 
increasingly fr:ustrated with Powers' inability to balance even the fraudulent numbers, noting that 
"do you not see that by taking this long to balance the accounting that it only shows that you have 
something to hide[?]" Cooper Deel., Ex. 51 (July I 0, 2006 e-mail from Campbell to Powers). 
Around the Spring ()f2006, Plaintiffs decided to stop investing in teak properties through 
Powers, but their efforts to obtain full transparency into their transactions with Powers continued. 
As Plaintiffs sought additional ~ocumentation from Powers, Campbell continued to try to placate Dr. 
Michelson, advising Powers that although Campbell had "Gary _calmed down for the moment ... 
this could end tomorrow and [you should] put your ducks in a row with plenty put away for a rainy 
day, it is raining now." Id., Ex. 36 (Apr. 8, 2006 e-mail exchange between Campbell and Powers). 
Campbell's ultimate concern, though, was self-preservation: "l don't care what you tell Gary or 
Davi~ but be 100% straight with me, "'.e have been friends to[o] long and I have trusted you with 
everything I own[.]" Id Powers reassured Campbell that "I had been trying my ~est with David and 
Gary to keep this all confidential as possible and will continue to do so to the end." Id 
With Powers detennined not to reveal his and Campbell's fraud, and unable to appease 
Plaintiffs by "stalling" and "confusjng the numbers" as before, the parties were at an impasse. In a 
June 2006 e-mail to Campbell, Powers balked at "giv[ing] ~Plaintiffs] every detail of our work up to 
date which would include every cent spent, and.to whom in our process of obtaining title." Id., Ex_. 
37 (June 20, 2006 e-mail from Powers to Campbell). Powers told Campbell that "[t]here is no way I 
will be sending any more info to Gary or David that will incriminate myself." Id., Ex. 38 (June 26, 
2006 e-mail from Powers to Campbell). 
While C&M stopped purchasing properties through Powers in 2006, Powers' payments to 
Campbell continued. Campbell still had a reserve of kickbacks to draw upon, and continued 
receiving direct wire transfers and in-~ind payments through at least October 2008. See. e.g., id, Ex. 
39 (Oct. 13, 2008 e-mail from Powers to Campbell) (confirming Powers' payment of Campbell's 
HOA fees on his condo); id, Ex. 40 (Oct. 13, 2007 e-mail from Campbell to Powers) (confinning 
receipt of wire transfer of $30,000 to Washington Mutual account). 
Powers and Campbell's attempts to cover up their fraud have continued into this litigation. 
For example, after Plaintiffs discovered Campbell's role in the conspiracy, Campbell initially denied 
receiving any money from Powers. See Paisley De~I., Ex A at 54:8-25. Then, confronted with his 
own bank records, which showed that Powers had in fact sent him millions of dollars, Campbell 
10 
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labeled the amounts he received from Powers-which Powers himself considered "gratuit[ies]" (id., 
Ex. G (Power~' Supp. Resp. 10 lnterrog. No. 14)}-as "loan[sJ." Id., Ex. F (Campbell Resp. t~ 
lnterrog. No. 8); see also Cooper Deel., Ex. 15 (Aug. 9, 2006 e-mail from Powers to S. Gibbons) 
(Powers noting that he will owe Campbell money once he receives it from Plaintiffs: "Gary still 
owes me $2.5M of the $3.5M worth of property they owed me which l owe $550K to have it all paid 
off. I will owe Neil $1 M from this so that should leave me$] M if I can put this together."). 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
"Any party may move for summary judgment in any action (?r proceeding if it is contended .. 
. that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 437c(a). To show that 
there is no defense to the action, Plaintiffs must "proveO each element of the cause of action 
entitling [them] to judgment on that cause of action." Id. § 437c(p)(I). Once Plaintiffs do so, the 
burden then "shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more 
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." Id A summary judgment 
motion "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.§ 437c(c). 
"The policy behind motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication is to 'promote and 
protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."' 
Lilienthal & Fowler v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1854 (1993) (quoting Wiler v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625 ( 1979)). 
The Court finds based on the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to Plaintiffs' 
fraud-based causes of action, their civil RICO cause of action, their claim for tortious interference 
with contractual relations, and their UCL claim. Summary judgment should therefore be granted. 
A. Campbell Is Liable For Fraud. 
Plaintiffs have asserted several fraud-based ·claims against Campbell in this lawsuit, 
including fraud (TAC 1160-65), fraudulent inducement (id. ~, 76-83), and aiding and abetting fraud 
(id 11 102-06). Plaintiffs have also alleged that Campbell engaged in a civil conspiracy with 
Powers to defraud Plaintiffs. Id. ,, 55-59. 
Here, Campbell is liable for fraud under two independent_ theories. First, Campbell 
intentionally concealed from Plaintiffs the kickbacks he was receiving from Powers at C&M's 
expense, in violation of the fiduciary duty he owed to Plaintiffs to disclose those payments. And 
second, Campbell is liable as a co-conspirator for the fraudulent representat/ons made by Powers 
pursuant to the conspiracy. 
11 
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1. Campbell is liable for fraud for conceal_ing his receipt of kickbacks. 
To prove a cl~im for fraud or deceit, a plaintiff must show: (I) a misrepresentation (false 
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter') and an intent 
to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damage to 
the plaintiff. Engalla v. Permanenle Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 974 (1997). "Active 
concealment or suppression of facts is the equivalent of a false representation." Vega v. Jones. Day, 
Reavis & Pogue, t'21 Cal. App. 4th 282,294 (2004). Where a plaintiff seeks to prove fraud by way 
of concealment or non-disclosure, he must prove one element in addition to the four stated above-
the existence of a fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. Weiner v. Fleischman, 54 
Cal. 3d 476,483 (1991). 
Having already obtaine~ swnmary adjudication against Campbell on their constructive fraud 
claim (on February 4, 2010), Plaintiffs have already gone a long way to proving that Campbell is 
also liable for actual fraud. They have established that Campbell concealed from Plaintiffs his 
receipt of kickbacks from Powers, that Campbell owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, that he 
breached that duty by concealing the payments, and that Plaintiffs were injured as a result. See Feb. 
4, 2010 Summary Adj. Order. To prove actual fraud, Plaintiffs need only now prove in addition: (a) 
scienter and an intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; and (b) justifiable reliance by Plaintiffs. 
See Enga/la, 15 Cal. 4th at 974. 
The record here shows that Campbell acted intentionally and for the purpose of inducing 
Plaintiffs to wire additional.fu~ds to Powers. Aware that disclosing the kickbacks would have put a 
stop to C&M doing business through Powers, Campbell, along with Powers, repeatedly tried to keep 
these secret "commissions" from Plaintiffs. Sept. 2, 2011 Plaintiffs' Separate Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ("SSUMF") 1 36. Indeed, Campbell continued to deny his receipt of 
kickbacks through the filing of this lawsuit. See id. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs, in continuing to send money to Powers. relied on Campbell's failure to 
disclose the kickbacks. Reliance occurs when a misrepresentation or nondisclosure is "an immediate 
cause of[a plaintiffs] conduct, which alter[sl his or her legal relations, and when without such 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure he or she would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered 
into the contract or other transaction." Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1239 
( 1995). Wherever a misrepresentation or omission is material-meaning that "a reasonable man 
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining ~is choice of action in th~ 
transaction in question"-a presumption of reliance-arises. Enga//a, 15 Cal. 4th at 977. Campbell 
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was supposed to be Plaintiffs' "eyes and ears" in Costa Rica, tasked with reporting back on Powers' 
performance in purchasing and maintaining Plaintiffs' teak properties. SSUMF ~,i 21-25. 
Campbell, however, concealed from Plaintiffs that more than $4.5 million of the money Pl11intiffs 
sent to Powers-which Powers told them was being used to acquire and maintain property-was in 
fact going into Campbell's pocket. Id. ,i,i 32-33, 36, 38. Plaintiffs would not have sent more than 
$32 million to Powers had they known that it would be used to fund Campbell's personal 
expenditures, including the purchase of a house, cars, a motorcycle, art, and an engagement ring. Id. 
,i 31; see a/so.Enga/la, 1 S Cal. 4th at 977. 
Campbell is thus liable for frau.d. When Plaintiffs moved for summary adj~dication on their 
constructive fraud claim against Campbell, they were able to prove that Campbell was liable for 
$1.545 million based on his receipt of kickbacks, but the evidence now makes clear that Campbell is 
liable for more. Campbell received $3.6 million in checks, wire transfers, and in-kind kickbacks, as. 
well as a condo valued at $950,000. See SSUMF ,i 38. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment 
on their fraud claims against Campbell. 
2. Campbell is liable for fraud as Powers' co-conspirator. 
Because Campbell and Powers were engaged in a conspiracy, Campbell is not only liable for 
his own fraudule"nt misrepresentations or.non-disclosures; rather, he is "directly liable for all 
misrepresentations made pursuant to such conspiracy." People v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 61 Cal. App. 
3d 879, 918 (1976). Similarly, "[o]ne who knowingly aids and abets a fiduciary to make secret 
profits may be held liable jointly with the fiduciary for such secret profits." Fink v. Weisman, 129. 
Cal. App. 305, 317 (1933). A defendant is liable for aiding and abetting an intentional tort if he 
substantially assists or encourages another party to act, aware that the other party's conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty. Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat'/ Ass 'n, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1144 (2005). 
Thus, because Campbell participated in the conspiracy with Powers, and aided and abetted Powers in 
defrauding Plaintiffs, acts committed by Powers may be ascribed to Campbell, and both may be held 
jointly and severally liable for the full measure of the fraud. 
There is no genuine issue for ujal that Powers' conduct, in concert with Campbell, satisfies 
each of the four elements required to prove fraud: (I) a misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity 
and an intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (3)justifiable reliance; and (4) resulting damage. 
Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 974. First, Powers, with Campbell's knowledge and cooperation, sent 
Plaintiffs numerous faxes stating, fal~ely, that Powers had negotiated a certain price for a property 
on behalf of C&M. See SSUMF ,ii 26-30. The prices quoted to C&M were in fact vastly inflated 
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from what Powers had negotiated, with the amount of the mark-up decided by Powers and 
Campbell. Id. Powers also sent faxes falsely overstating the costs of maintaining the properties. Id 
Second, Powers, in conspiracy with Campbell, made these false statements with the intent to 
induce Plaintiffs to send Powers the inflated swns, so that they could then divide the fraudulent 
proceeds among themselves. See id. ,r,r 29-30. 
Third, Plaintiffs relied on these false representations, sending the requested swns to Powers 
or his corporate entities in direct response to Powers' faxes. See id. ~ 31. In total, Plaintiffs sent 
Powers more than $32 million for both property purchases and maintenance costs, in reliance upon 
the representations. See id. That reliance was reasonable, given that Campbell, Plaintiffs' "eyes and 
e~s" in Costa Rica, not only did not alert Plaintiffs to any problems, but actually encouraged further 
investment. See id. ,r, 21-25, 36. 
And fourth, Plaintiffs were injured as a result. More than $8 million of the money they sent, 
which Powers had led them to believe would be used to purchase and maintain property in Costa 
Rica, was in fact pocketed by Powers and Campbell, who used it to buy exotic cars, motorcycles, 
condos, and art. See id. ,r 3 7. 
Campbell is liable for the full measure of the fraud-$8 million-by virtue of his 
participation in this conspiracy. 
B. Plaintiffs Are .Entitled To Summary Judgment On Their RICO Claim. 
"RICO is to be read broadly [and] to 'be lib~rally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.' The statute's 'remedial purposes' are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a 
private action for those injured by racketeering activity." Sedima, S.P.R.l. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 
479, 497-98 (1985). To prove a civil RICO cause of action, the plaintiff must establish the conduct 
of an enterprise, through a pattern of racketeering activity, causing injury to plaintiffs' business or 
property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817,825 (9th Cir. 2001). A person may 
also be liable under civil RICO for conspiring to violate RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 
Each of the elements of a RICO violation is satisfied here. First, an enterprise "includes any 
· individual, partnership, c~rporation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Here, C&M itself or, in the 
alternative, the association-in-fact between Campbell and the Powers Defendants, constitutes an 
"enterprise." C&M was the conduit through which Campbell and Powers defrauded Plaintiffs. 
Powers formed and then managed the affairs of C&M, and even exercised powers of attorney on 
14 
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behalf ofC&M to purchase properties on C&M's behalf. See SSUMF ~~ 1-2 1~ Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993) ("An enterprise also might be 'operated' or 'managed' by others 
'associated with' the enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by bribery"). 
And Powers and Campbell together also constitute an enterprise as an "association-in-fact". 
An association-in-fact is "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging 
in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkelle, 452 U.S. 576,583 (1981). The group need not 
have any particular organizational structure. See Gervase v. Super. Cr., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1235 
(1995); Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009) (the "structure" needed for an 
association-in-fact enterprise amounts only to "a purpose, relationships among those associated with 
the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's 
purpose"). Here, Campbell and the Powers Defendants associated together for the purpose of 
perpetrating a pattern of racketeering activity on Plaintiffs. See SSUMF 1, 8-12, 14-17. 
Second, as to the "pattern of racketeering" requirement, a "pattern" under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity" that are related and amount to or pose a threat of 
continued activity. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,239 (1989). The relatedness of the 
predicate acts is established through proof of "same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission." Id. at 240. Continuity may be proved by showing that the 
activity is part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Id. at 242. 
The wire fraud committed by Powers and Campbell spanned many years, was committed on 
multiple occasions, and followed the same pattern. Powers, with Campbell's knowledge and 
cooperation, made inflated requests for money for purported property acquisition and maintenance 
expenses by sending faxes from Costa Rica to Plaintiffs' representatives in California. SSUMF ,i,i 
8-12. Campbell then e-mailed requests to Powers for him to wire or otherwise transfer kickbacks to 
him, in exchange for Campbell's participation in the conspiracy. Id ,i 14. And Powers in tum wired 
to Campbell (or to a third party, on CampbeWs behalf) the requested kickbacks. Id ,i 15. Each of 
these multiple uses of the wires over the coQrse of six-plus years constitutes an actionable instance of 
wire fraud, and the requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is satisfied. See, e.g., Gervase, 
3 J Cal. App. 4th 1218; Charles J. Vacanti, MD., Inc. v. Stale Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 
826~27 (2001) (numerous acts of mail and wire fraud sufficient to establish pattem·under RICO 
statute); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palterovich, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1317-18 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding 
1 The Court grants Plaintiffs' September 2, 2011 Request for Judicial Notice. 
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that plaintiffs stated claim for pattern of racketeering where "Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants. 
committed mail fraud thousands of times over the course of their four-year scheme"). 
Tl,ird, as to injury, "RJCO does not require some sort of special 'racketeering injury'; rather, 
it is sufficient that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden 
under RICO and the activities injured the plaintiff in his business or property." Gervase, 31 Cal. 
App. 4th at 1233. As demonstrated above. Campbell in combination with the Powers Defendants 
caused injury to Plaintiffs' business or property in the amount of$8 million by fraudulently 
overstating property prices and maintenance costs, and then pocketing Plaintiffs' money as 
kickbacks. SSUMF n 13, 19-20. Cotµ1s have held that similar fraudulent schemes violate RICO, 
and that the secret diversion of plaintiffs' money to fund kickbacks constitutes RICO injury. See 
Rehab. Inst. of Chi. v. Hicks, 1991 WL 1 I 1212, at •s (N.D. Ill. June 14, 199l)("RJC was injured 
. because it paid for goo~s that it did not receive, and paid higher prices than necessary for the goods 
that it did receive, financing the kickbacks which Hicks received from Geist."); Bunker Ramo Corp. 
v. Utd. Bus. Forms. Inc .• 713 F.2d 1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted) (finding 
that "[Plaintiff] was directly injured [under RICO] if, as alleged, it paid for services it never 
received, the proceeds of which were used to pay off [its] employees and to bribe union officials"); 
see also Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Mahoney, 1984 WL 3997, at* 1-*·2, *4 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 
1984) (finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged RICO injury where defendant, who was supposed to · 
be acting on plaintiffs' behalf, raised sales prices in conspiracy with co-defendants and took cut of 
excess proceeds). 
Campbell is thus liable for violating RICO in the amount of $8 million, and Plaintiffs are 
entitled to treble damages and attorneys' fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
C. Campbell Is Liable For Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations. 
The elements of an action for tonious interference with contractual relations are: (1) a valid 
contract between plaintiff and a third pany; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) 
. . . 
defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; 
(4) actual breach or disruption of the c~mtractual relationship; and (S) resulting damage. Que/imane 
Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.; 19 Cal. 4th 26, 55 ( 1998). 
Here, Campbell was aware that C&~ and Powers had an agreement whereby Powers was 
limited to a commission on propeny purchases not to exceed 6% of the sales price. See SSUMF ,, 
95-96. By conspiring with Powers to charge in.flated prices for land, so that he could receive some 
of C&M's money by way of kickbacks, Campbell intentionally interfered with that coqtractual 
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relationship. SSUMF ~197-101. And as a result, Plaintiffs paid these inflated sums, more than $4.5 
milli<~n of which ended up in Campbell's pocket, rather than being used for its intended purposes. 
Id. ,i~ I 02-04, 108-09. 
Plaintiffs are also entitled to summary judgment on their tortious interference theory. 
D. Plaintiffs Are Entitled To Summary Judgment On Their UCL Claim. 
Finally, Plaintiffs 8!e entitled to summaryjudgment against Campbell on their claim under 
California Business & Professions Code Section 17200. As demonstrated above, Campbell's 
conduct, in concert with Powers, was fraudulent and, by virtue of his violations of RICO, unlawful. 
See Charles J. Vacanti, MD., 24 Cal. 4th at 828 n.9 (noting that conducting an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity constitutes an unlawful business·practice). Moreover, as discussed · 
above, Plaintiffs suffered "injury" and "lost money" as a result of Campbell and Powers' fraud. See 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled, pursuant to Section 17203, to 
restitution of the kickbacks Campbell received under this theory as well. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Because Campbell can demonstrate no genuine issue for trial on any of Plaintiffs' remaining 
claims, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment against Campbell. Plaintiffs have shown that 
they have been damaged in ~he amount of $8 million, which must be trebled under RICO, entitling 
Plaintiffs to $24 million in damages. In addition, Plaintiffs may recover reasonable attorneys' fees 
under RICO. 
DATED: December 02011 
·~"' ......... ~. D & 
333 South Hope eet 
Los Angeles, California 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
shaun.paisley@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M investment Group, Ltd. and 
Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am employed i~ the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 
and not a.party to the within action. My business address isKirkland & Ellis LLP, 333 South Hope 
Street, 29th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071. 
On December 6, 2011, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 
(PROPOSED) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
I PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 437c(g)I 
on the interested parties as follows: 
[BY U.S. MAILI By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with 
postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California 
addressed as set forth below. · 
Neil David Campbell 
7071 Warner A venue, Suite 34 7 
Huntington Beach, CA 92647 
I 
[8j (ST ATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California 
that the above is true and correct. 
Executed December 6, 2011 at ~OS Angeles, California. 
PROOF OF SER VICE 
305 of 636
SHERRI it CARTER. Executive Officer/Clerk of 
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REC'D 
DEC 0'6 2011 
FILING WINDOW 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
C&M Investment Group, Ltd., and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
. Philip Richard Powers, individually; Neil David 
Campbell, individually; Powers Investments and 
Management, Inc., S.A. , a corporation; Guanana 
Gris, S.A., a corporation; Protecci6n Foresta! de 
Teca, S.A., a corporation; and DOES I through 
50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No. BC378888 
f PRQPQSial JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
Judge: Hon. Ronald M. Sohigian 
Dept.: 41 
Third Am. Comp!. Filed: Dec. 17, 2010 
ORIGINAL 
[PROPOSED} JUDGMENT AGAINST NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
/i 
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On February 4, 2010, this Court granted Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group Ltd. and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership ("Plaintiffs") summary adjudicat~on on their claim for constructive 
fraud against Defendant Neil David Campbell ("Campbell"). On September 2, 2011, Plaintiffs then 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") as to all remaining claims against Campbell 
contained in the December 17, 20IO Third Amended Complaint: (I) Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 
(Civil RICO); (2) Fraud (including conspiracy to defraud); (3) Fraudulent Inducemen_t; (4) Aiding 
and Abetting Fraud; (5) Violation of California Business & ~rofessions Code § 17200, er seq.; and 
(6) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations. Campbell filed no opposition to the Motion. 
The Motion came on for hearing on November 29, 2011 before this Court, and the Court 
granted Plaintiffs' Motion pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c on the 
grounds that there was no triable issue of material fact and that Campbell had no defense to 
Plaintiffs' claims. The Court specified some of the reasons for its ruling in an oral order recorded by 
the court reporter, and also requested from Plaintiffs a·written proposed order pursuant to California 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(g). Plaintiffs lodged that proposed order on December 6, 
2011, and the Court has signed that order concurrently with this Judgment. 
The Court now directs that Judgment be entered against Campbell in accordance with its 
decision as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, with respect to the Third 
Amended Complaint filed in this action, Plaintiffs shall recover from Campbell the following 
amounts: 
1. $24,000,000 in damages ($8,000,000 in actual damages trebled pursuant to 18 U .S.C. 
§ 1964(c)); 
2. $483,270 in reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (calculated 
pursuant to L.A. Super. Ct. Rule 3.214(a) for contested actions); 
3. $5,470 in sanctions, awarded by this Court in a November I, 2011 Order, for 
discovery abuses by Campbell; and 
4. Recoverable costs, in an amount to be determined in accordance with California Rule 
of Court 3.1700. 
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Plaintiffs are entitled to recover this amount from Campbell, totaling $24,488,740 plus costs, 
along with interest accruing from the date of entry of this Judgment until paid. 
This Judgment is entered against Defendant Campbell only. Default has been entered against 
the remaining Defendants, Philip Richard Powers, Powers Investments & Management, Inc., 
Guanana Gris, S.A., and Protecci6n Foresta! de Teca, S.A., and a default prove-up hearing against 
those Defendants is scheduled for January 17. 2012 .. 
DATED: December /j_. 201 I 
Submitted by: · 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. and 
Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 
and not a party lo the within action. My business address is Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 333 South Hope 
Street, 29th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071. 
On December 6, 2011, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 
JPROPOSEDJ JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
on the interested parties as follows: 
JBY U.S. MAIL] By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with 
postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California 
addressed as set forth below. 
Neil David Campbell 
7071 Warner Avenue, Suite 347 
Huntington Beach, CA 9264 7 
~ !STATE) I declare under penalty o. perjury under the ·1aws of the State of California 
that the above is true and correct. 
Executed December 6, 2011 at Los Angeles, California. 
r 
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Chapter 615-the Anti-Mo11ey Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial 
Institutions) Ordinance, Part 3, § 20 
Obtained from: 
h!lp://wwv\1 • le!!islation .gov .hk/bl is []df.n§1.i'61).!_2J __ (>J_D~_FEE3F A94825 7 5 5 E003 3E5 
3?/A6CADFCCD49E764F482578C600539E74/$F1LE/CAP 615 e b5.pclf 
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(6) Nothing in this section prevents a financial institution from canying out a customer due diligence measure 
by its agent but such a financial institution remains liable under this Ordinance for a failure to carry out that 
customer due diligence measure. 
(7) In this sectiow-
cert(tied public acco1111ta11t (Y~~fgjfi) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Professional Accountants 
Ordinance (Cap 50). 
(Amended E.R. 2 of2014) 
19. Financial institutions to establish procedures 
(1) /\ financial institution must establish and maintain effective procedures for determining whether a customer 
or a beneficial owner of a customer is a politically exposed person. 
(2) A financial institution that carries out wire transfers must establish and maintain effective procedures for 
identifying and handling wire transfers in relation to which section I 2(5) of this Schedule has not been 
complied with. 
(3) A financial institution must, in respect of each kind of customer, business relationship, product and 
transaction, establish and maintain effective procedures not inconsistent with this Ordinance for the purpose 
of carrying out its duties under sections 3, 4, 5, 9, IO and 15 of this Schedule. 
Part3 
Record-keeping Requirements 
20. Duty to keep records 
(I) A financial institution must· 
(a) in relation to each transaction it carries out, keep the original or a copy of the documents, and a record 
of the data and information, obtained in connection with the transaction in accordance with Part 2 of 
this Schedule; and 
(b) in relation to each of its customers, keep-·-
(i) the original or a copy of the documents, and a record of the data and information, obtained in the 
course of identifying and verifying the identity of the customer or any beneficial owner of the 
customer in accordance with Part 2 of this Schedule; and 
(ii) the original or a copy of the files relating to the customer ' s account and business 
correspondence with the customer and any beneficial owner of the customer. 
(2) Records required to be kept under subsection ( I )(a) must be kept for a period of 6 years beginning on the 
date on which the transaction is completed, regardless of whether the business relationship ends during that 
period. 
(3) Records required to be kept under subsection ( 1 )(b) must be kept throughout the continuance of the 
business relationship with the customer and for a period of 6 years beginning on the date on which the 
business relationship ends. 
(4) A relevant authority may, by notice in writing to a financial institution, require the financial institution to 
keep the records relating to a specified transaction or customer for a period specified by the relevant 
authority that is longer than that referred to in subsection (2) or (3), as the case requires, if-
(a) the relevant authority is satisfied that the records are relevant to an ongoing criminal or other 
investigation carried out by it; or 
(b) the records are relevant to any other purposes as specified by the relevant authority in the notice. 
(5) A financial institution to whom a notice is given under subsection (4) must keep the relevant records for the 
period specified in the notice. 
21. Manner in which records are to be kept 
Records required to be kept under section 20 of this Schedule must be kept in the following manner-
C '"P (,/ S. A11ll-Mmtcy /.<11111clcrmg cmd Cmmtcl'-1'el'nm,t Fmctm:mg (/.'im111.-ic1/ /mlll11tum.1) OrclmC/nt"c 49 
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§ 1010.430 Nature of records and retention period., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.430 
Code ufFedernl Regn1ations 
Title :-1 t. Mm1(>y and Financ{·: Trc.1smy 
Sulililk ll. Rcguliltirins !~elating lo Money and Finance 
Clrnpl!:r X. Financia1 Crimes Enfon:en'tent N.etwork, Depmtment nfilic Trvawry (JZefr; & Annos) 
Pai L JOJO. U1,nerni l'rnYisiom; (Re[<; & An nos) 
Subpart n. Records R1•.qui1w1 tn be IV1aintaiued 
31 C.F.R. § 1010,430 
§ 1010-430 Nature of records and retention period. 
Effective: March 1, 2011 
C'nrre!ll 1ws;,; 
(a) Wherever it is required that there be retained either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of a check, 
draft, monetary instrument, investment security, or other similar instrument, there shall be retained a copy of both front and 
back of each such instrument or document, except that no copy need be retained of the back of any instrument or document 
which is entirely blank or which contains only standardized printed information, a copy of which is on file. 
(b) Records required by this chapter to be retained by financial institutions may be those made in the ordinary course of business 
by a financial institution. Jfno record is made in the ordinary course of business of any transaction with respect to which records 
arc required to be retained by this chapter, then such a record shall be prepared in writing by the financial institution. 
(c) The rules and regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service under '.U, l 1.S.C. 6109 determine what constitutes a taxpayer 
identification number and whose number shall be obtained in the case of an account maintained by one or more persons. 
(d) All records that are required to be retained by this chapter shall be retained for a period of five years. Records or reports 
required to be kept pursuant to an order issued under* IO l 0.370 of this chapter shall be retained for the period of time specified 
in such order, not to exceed five years. All such records shall be filed or stored in such a way as to be accessible within a 
reasonable period of time, taking into consideration the nature of the record, and the amount of time expired since the record 
was made. 
SOURCE: 75 FR 65812, Oct. 26, 2010; 80 I R -1506-1, July 29, 2015; 81 l R 18493, March 3 I, 2016, unless otherwise noted. 
AUTHORITY: 12 ll.~.C. 182% and 1951-1959; 31 U.51.C.5311-5314, 5316-531:!; title 111, sec. 314 Puh.l.. 107 56, 115 
Stat. 307. 
Current through April 15, 2016; 81 FR 22196. 
End of Document C 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 1020.410 Records to be made and retained by banks., 31 C.F.R. § 1020.410 
Cork of Federal Regulations · 
Tille ;~1. Morwy and Finance: Trea.'>nry 
Suh!ille B. Regulalions Relating to Mo1wy ,111d Fiiwncc 
Chapter X. Financial Crimes EnfrJrcenwnt Ne! wo1-lc, Deparlrnrllt of tlw TreaSlll':,' (Refs & Annps) 
l'ari 1020. Rule for Bm1ks (Refs & Am100) 
Snbpnrl ll. Records !{rquired to he l\.1nintc1i11:•d by Bmiks 
31 C.F.R. § 1020-410 
§ 1020-410 Records to be made and retained by banks. 
Effective: March 1, 2011 
C'1 nn•11\ ness 
(a) Each agent, agency, branch, or office located within the United States of a bank is subject to the requirements of this 
paragraph (a) with respect to a funds transfer in the amount of $3,000 or more, and is required to retain either the original or 
a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following: 
(I) Recordkeeping requirements. 
(i) Por each payment order that it accepts as an originator's bank, a bank shall obtain and retain either the original or a 
microfilm, other copy, or electronic record of the following information relating to the payment order: 
(A) The name and address of the originator; 
(B) The amount of the payment order; 
(C) The execution date of the payment order; 
(D) Any payment instructions received from the originator with the payment order; 
(E) The identity of the beneficia1y's bank; and 
(F) As many of the following items as are received with the payment order: 1 
(1) The name and address of the beneficiary; 
(2) The account number of the beneficiary; and 
(3) Any other specific identifier of the beneficiary. 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Gover~orks. 
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(ii) Por each payment order that it accepts as an intermediary bank, a bank shall retain either the original or a microfilm, 
other copy, or electronic record of the payment order. 
(iii) For each payment order that it accepts as a beneficiary's bank, n bank shall retain either the original or a microfilm, 
other copy, or electronic record of the payment order. 
(2) Originators other than established customers. 1 n the case of a payment order from an originator that is not an established 
customer, in addition to obtaining and retaining the information required in paragraph (a)(I )(i) of this section: 
(i) If the payment order is mmle in person, prior to acceptance the originator's bank shall verify the identity of the person 
placing the payment order. If it accepts the payment order, the originator's bank shall obtain and retain a record of the 
name and address, the type of identificntio11 reviewed, the number of the identification document (e.g., driver's license}, 
as well as a record of the person's taxpayer identification number (e.g., social security or employer identification number) 
or, if none, alien identification number or passport number and country of issuance, or a notation in the record of the 
lack thereof. Jf the originato1,s bank has knowledge that the person placing the payment order is not the originator, the 
originato1's bank shall obtain and retain a record of the originator's taxpayer identification number (e.g., social security or 
employer identification number) or, if none, alien identification number or passport number and counll)' of issuance, if 
known by the person placing the order, or a notation in the record of the lack thereof. 
(ii) If the payment order accepted by the originator's bank is not made in person, the originator's bank shall obtain and 
retain a record of name and address of the person placing the payment order, as well as the person's taxpayer identification 
number (e.g., social security or employer identification number} or, ifnone, alien identification number or passport number 
and country of issuance, or a notation in the record of the lack thereof, and a copy or record of the method of payment 
(e.g., check or credit card transaction) for the funds transfer. Jfthe originator's bank has knowledge that the person placing 
the payment order is not the originator, the originator's bank shall obtain and retain a record of the originator's taxpayer 
identification number (e.g., social security or employer identification number) or, if none, alien identification number or 
passport number and country of issuance, if known by the person placing the order, or a notation in the record of the 
lack thereof. 
(3) Beneficiaries other than established customers. For each payment order that it accepts as a beneficiary's bank for a 
beneficiary that is not an established customer, in addition to obtaining and retaining the information required in paragraph 
(a)(l)(iii) of this section: 
(i) If the proceeds are delivered in person to the beneficiary or its representative or agent, the beneficiary's bank shall 
verify the identity of the person receiving the proceeds and shall obtain and retain a record of the name and address, the 
type of identification reviewed, and the number of the identification document (e.g., driver's license), as well as a record 
of the person's taxpayer identification number (e.g., social security or employer identification number} or, if none, alien 
identification number or passport number and country of issuance, or a notation in the record of the lack thereof. If the 
beneficiary's bank has knowledge that the person receiving the proceeds is not the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank shall 
obtain and retain a record of the beneficiary's name and address, as well as the beneficiary's taxpayer identification number 
(e.g., social security or employer identification number) or, if none, alien identification number or passport number and 
country of issuance, if known by the person receiving the proceeds, or a notation in the record of the lack thereof. 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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(ii) Jf the proceeds are delivered other than in person, the beneficiary's bank shall retain a copy of the check or other 
instrument used to effect payment, or the information contained thereon, as well as the name and address of the person 
to which it was sent. 
( 4) Relrievability. The information that an originator's bank must retain under paragraphs (a)(I )(i) and (a)(2) of this section 
shall be retrievable by the originator's bank by reference to the name of the originator. If the originator is an established 
customer of the originator's bank and has an account used for funds transfers, then the information also shall be retrievable 
by account number. The information that a bencficimy's bank must retain under paragraphs (a)(l)(iii) and (a)(3) of this 
section shall be retrievable by !he beneficiary's bank by reference to the name of the beneficiary. lfthe beneficiary is an 
established customer of the beneficiary's bank and has an account used for funds transfers, then the information also shall 
be retrievable by account number. This information need not be retained in any particular manner, so long as the bank is 
able to retrieve the infonnation required by this paragraph, either by accessing fonds transfer records directly or through 
reference to some other record maintained by the bank. 
(5) Verification. Where verification is required under paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section, a bank shall verify a 
person's identity by examination of a document ( other than a bank signature card), preferably one that contains the person's 
name, address, and photograph, that is normally acceptable by financial institutions as a means of identification when 
cashing checks for persons other than established customers. Verification of the identity of an individual who indicates 
that he or she is an alien or is not a resident of the United States may be made by passport, alien identification card, or other 
official document evidencing nationality or residence (e.g., a foreign driver's license with indication of home address). 
( 6) Exceptions. The following funds transfers are not subject to the requirements of this section: 
(i) Funds transfers where the originator and beneficiary are any of the following: 
(A) A bank; 
(B) A wholly owned domestic subsidiary ofa bank chartered in the United States; 
{C) A broker or dealer in securities; 
{D) A wholly owned domestic subsidiary of a broker or dealer in securities; 
(E) A futures commission merchant or an introducing broker in commodities; 
(F) A wholly owned domestic subsidiary ofa futures commission merchant or an introducing broker in commodities; 
(G) The United States; 
(H) A state or local government; 
WEST LAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
321 of 636
§ 1020.410 Records to be made and retained by banks., 31 C.F.R. § 1020.410 
(I) A Federal, S1ate or local government agency or instrumentality; or 
(J) A mutual fund; and 
(ii) Funds transfers where both the originator and the beneficiary are the sa111e person and the originator's bank and the 
beneficiary'~ bank are the sa111e bank. 
(b )( 1) With respect to each certificate of deposit sold or redeemed after May 3 1, 1978, and before October I, 2003, or each 
deposit or share account opened with a bank after June 30, 1972, and before October I, 2003, a bank shall, within 30 days from 
the date such a transaction occurs or an account is opened, secure and maintain a record of the taxpayer identification number 
of the customer involved; or where the account or certificate is in the names of two or more persons, the bank shall secure the 
taxpayer identification nu111ber of a person having a financial interest in the certificate or account. 1 n the event that a bank has 
been unable to secure, within the 30 day period specified, the required identification, it shall nevertheless not be deemed to 
be in violation of this section if it has made a reasonable effort lo secure such identification, and it maintains a list containing 
the names, addresses, and account numbers of those persons from whom it has been unable lo secure such identification, and 
makes the names, addresses, and account numbers of those persons available lo the Secretary as directed by him. A bank acting 
as an agent for another person in the purchase or redemption of a certificate of deposit issued by another bank is responsible 
for obtaining and recording the required taxpayer identification, as well as for maintaining the records referred to in paragraphs 
(c)( 11) and ( 12) of this section. The issuing bank can satisfy the recordkeeping requirement by recording the name and address 
of the agent together with a description of the instrument and the date of the transaction. Where a person is a non-resident 
alien, the bank shall also record the person's passport number or a description of some other government document used to 
verify his identity. 
(2) The 30--day period provided for in paragraph (b)(I} of this section shall be extended where the person opening the 
account has applied for a taxpayer identification or social security number on Form SS-4 or SS, 5, until such time as the 
person maintaining the account has had a reasonable opportunity to secure such number and furnish it to the bank. 
(3) A taxpayer identification number required under paragraph (b )(I) of this section need not be secured for accounts or 
transactions with the following: 
(i) Agencies and instrumentalities of Federal, State, local or foreign governments; 
(ii) Judges, public officials, or clerks of courts of record as custodians of funds in controversy or under the control of 
the court; 
(iii) Aliens who are ambassadors, ministers, career diplomatic or consular officers, or naval, military or other attach Es of 
foreign embassies and legations, and for the members of their immediate families; 
(iv) Aliens who are accredited representatives of international organizations which are entitled to enjoy privileges, 
exemptions and immunities as an international organization under the International Organization Immunities Act of 
December 29, 1945 (22 ll.S.C'. 28S), and the members of their immediate families; 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
322 of 636
' .
§ 1020.410 Records to be made and retained by banks., 31 C.F.R. § 1020.410 
(v) Aliens temporarily residing in the United States for a period not to exceed 180 days; 
(vi) Aliens not engaged in a trade or business in the United States who are attending a recognized college or 11niversity or 
any training program, supervised or cond11cted by any agency of the Federal Government; 
(vii) Unincorporated subordinate units ofa tax exempt central organization which are covered by a group exemption letter, 
(viii) A person under 18 years of age with respect lo an account opened as a part of a school thrift savings program, 
provided the annual interest is less than $ JO; 
(ix) A person opening a Christmas club, vacation club and similar instnllment savings programs, provided the anmml 
interest is less than $1 O; and 
(x} Non-resident aliens who are not engaged in a trade or business in the United States. 
(4) In instances described in paragraphs (b}(3)(viii) and (ix) of this section, the bank shall, within 15 days following the 
end of any calendar year in which the interest accrued in that year is $10 or more use its best cffo1i to secure and maintain 
the appropriate taxpayer identification number or application form therefor. 
(5) The rules and regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service under section 6109 of the lntcmnl Re\ cnuc Code of 
I 95°! shall determine what constitutes a taxpayer identification number and whose number shall be obtained in the case 
of an account maintained by one or more perso11s. 
(c) Each bank shall, in addition, retain either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following: 
(I) Each document granting signature authority over each deposit or share account, including any notations, if such are 
normally made, of specific identifying information verifying the identity of the signer (such as a driver's license number 
or credit card number); 
(2) Each statement, ledger card or other record on each deposit or share account, showing each transaction in, or with 
respect to, that account; 
(3) Each check, clean draft, or money order drawn on the bank or issued and payable by it, except those drawn for $100 
or less or those drawn on accounts which can be expected to have drawn on them an average of at least I 00 checks per 
month over the calendar year or on each occasion on which such checks are issued, and which are: 
(i) Dividend checks, 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
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(ii) Payroll checks, 
(iii) Employee benefit checks, 
(iv) Insurance claim checks, 
(v) Medical benefit checks, 
(vi) Checks drawn on government agency accounts, 
(vii) Checks drawn by brokers or dealers in securities, 
(viii) Checks drawn on fiduciary accounts, 
(ix) Checks drawn on other financial institutions, or 
{x) Pension or annuity checks; 
(4) Each item in excess of $100 (other than bank charges or periodic charges made pursuant to agreement with the 
customer), comprising a debit to a customer's deposit or share account, not required to be kept, and not specifically 
exempted, under paragraph (c)(3) of this section; 
(5) Each item, including checks, drafts, or transfers of credit, of more than $ I 0,000 remitted or transferred to a person, 
account or place outside the United States; 
(6) A record of each remittance or transfer of funds, or of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, investment 
securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a person, account or place outside the United States; 
(7) Each check or draft in an amount in excess of$10,000 drawn on or issued by a foreign bank which the domestic bank 
has paid or presented to a nonbank drawee for payment; 
(8) Each item, including checks, drafts or transfers of credit, of more than $ I 0,000 received directly and not through a 
domestic financial institution, by letter, cable or any other means, from a bank, broker or dealer in foreign exchange outside 
the United States; 
(9) A record of each receipt of currency, other monetary instruments, investment securities or checks, and of each transfer 
of funds or credit, of more than $10,000 received on any one occasion directly and not through a domestic financial 
institution, from a bank, broker or dealer in foreign exchange outside the United States; and 
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(IO) Records prepared or received by a bank in the ordinary course of business, which would be needed to reconstruct 
a transaction account and to trace a check in excess of $100 deposited in such account through its domestic processing 
system or to supply a description of a deposited check in excess of $100. This subparagraph shall be applicable only with 
respect to demand deposits. 
(II) A record containing the name, address, and taxpayer identification number as determined under ,1cction <i 1oc; nf the 
l11krrnd Rc1Tm1e (\ldc· o/' l'Jr:(), if available, of the purchaser of each certificate of deposit, as well as a description of the 
instrument, a notation of the method of payment, and the date of the transaction. 
( 12) A record containing the name, address and taxpayer identification number as determined under c.t:ct ion (ii 09 nf the 
Internal Rev.::1rn;c Code ,)I" I ')8(,, if available, of any person presenting a ce11ificate of deposit for payment, as well as a 
description of the instrument and the date of the transaction. 
( 13) Each deposit slip or credit ticket reflecting a transaction in excess of$ I 00 or the equivalent record for direct deposit 
or other wire transfer deposit transactions. The slip or ticket shall record the amount of any currency involved. 
SOURCE: 75 Fl{ (158 l 2. (,5842, Oct. 26, 20 IO; 7'> l'R (,581 '.'., Oct. 26,201 O; 76 FR I 051 (,, Feb. 25, 2011, unless otherwise noted. 
AUTHORITY: 12 U.S.C. 182% and I 951-1059; , I U.S.C. 5311-5, 14 and 531 (1-5J32; title Ill, sec. 314, l't1h.l . I 07 56. 115 
Stat. 307. 
Current through April 15, 2016; 81 FR 22196. 
Footnotes 
For funds transl"ers effected through the Federal Rescrvc's Fcd\\'ire funds transfer system, only one of the items is required to be 
retained, if received with the payment order, until such time as the bank that sends the order to the Federal Reserve Bank completes 
its conversion to the cxpanclccl Feclwirc message format. 
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§ 6148. Contracts for services in cases not coming within ... , CA BUS & PROF§ 6148 
\Vest's Amiolatcd California Corks 
.J;usinrcss and l'rofos:-,ions Code (Rd's & A1mos) 
U]l'ision :.\. Prufossio11s and Voentions Geiwntll>· (H(.fs & J\nnus) 
Clinpter 4. ,\ttorrie~'S (Refs & Amws) 
i\r!ick f\.5. Fcc1\greemcnts (JZcfr; & An nos) 
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code§ 6148 
§ 6148. Contracts for services in cases not coming within § 
6147; bills rendered by attorney; contents; failme to comply 
Effective: January 1, 2000 
Currentness 
(a) In any case not coming within Sc·.:licrn 614 7 in which it is reasonably foreseeable that total expense to a client, including 
attorney fees, will exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), the contract for services in the case shall be in writing. At the time the 
contract is entered into, the attorney shall provide a duplicate copy of the contract signed by both the attorney and the client, 
or the client's guardian or representative, to the client or to the client's guardian or representative. The written contract shall 
contain all of the following: 
(I) Any basis of compensation including, but not limited to, hourly rates, statutory fees or flat fees, and other standard rates, 
fees, and charges applicable to the case. 
(2) The general nature of the legal services to be provided to the client. 
(3) The respective responsibilities of the attorney and the client as to the performance of the contract. 
(b) All bills rendered by an attorney to a client shall clearly state the basis thereof. Bills for the fee portion of the bill shall 
include the amount, rate, basis for calculation, or other method of determination of the attorney's fees and costs. Bills for the cost 
and expense portion of the bill shall clearly identify the costs and expenses incurred and the amount of the costs and expenses. 
Upon request by the client, the attorney shall provide a bill to the client no later than 10 clays following the request unless the 
attorney has provided a bill to the client within 31 days prior to the request, in which case the attorney may provide a bill to the 
client no later than 31 days following the date the most recent bill was provided. The client is entitled to make similar requests 
at intervals ofno less than 30 days following the initial request. In providing responses to client requests for billing information, 
the attorney may use billing data that is currently effective on the date of the request, or, if any fees or costs to that date cannot 
be accurately determined, they shall be described and estimated. 
(c) Failure to comply with any provision of this section renders the agreement voidable at the option of the client, and the 
attorney shall, upon the agreement being voided, be entitled to collect a reasonable fee. 
(d) This section shall not apply to any of the following: 
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(I) Services rendered in an emergency to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights or interests of the client or where a writing 
is otherwise impractical. 
(2) An mrnngement as to the fee implied by the fact that the attorney's services are of the same general kind as previously 
rendered to and paid for by the client. 
(3) If the client knowingly states in writing, after full disclosure of this section, that a writing concerning fees is not required. 
(4) lfthe client is a corporation. 
(e) This section applies prospectively only lo fee agreements following its operative date. 
(f) This section shall become operative on January I, 2000. 
Credits 
(Added by Stats. I 993. c. 9f;:> (S.B.ci4.'i), ~ (1, opcra1ive Jun. I. I 997. Amended by Stai=...199-l. c. 479 ( i\.lU2 l 9), ~ .'i. upc1.1tiH· 
Jan. l. 1997; Slats.1996. c. 1104 (A.B.2787), § 11, llp1:rn1ivc Jan. I. :!0!10.) 
Notes of Decision<; ( U) 
\Vest's Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6148, CA BUS & PROF§ 6148 
Current with urgency legislation through Ch. 8 of2016 Reg.Sess. and Ch. 3 of2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess. 
-----------·------·----------------------------------
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Rule 3-700. Termination of Employment, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
---------------
'\V('.sl's A!molatt•d Caiifornia Codes 
Rules oftlie Stal1, Bar of Ca1ifornia (Rds &. Annos) 
Ca1ifomin Ruks of 1'rofossinnal Conduct (Refs & An nos) 
Chap!cr :3. Professional Relationship \dth Clients 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3-700 
Rule 3-700. Termination of Employment 
Currcnl ncss 
(A) In General. 
(I) If permission for termination of employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a member shnll not withdraw from 
employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission. 
(2) A member shall not withdraw fro111 employment until the 111embcr has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable 
prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 
complying with rule 3-700(0), and complying with applicable laws and rules. 
(B) Mandatory Withdrawal. 
A member representing a client before a tribunal shall withdraw from e111ployment with the permission of the tribunal, ifrequired 
by its rules, and a member representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if: 
(I) The member knows or should know that the client is bringing an action, conducting a defense, asserting a position in 
litigation, or taking an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or 
(2) The member knows or should know that continued employment will result in violation of these rules or of the State Bar 
Act; or 
(3) The member's mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult to carry out the employment effectively. 
(C) Permissive Withdrawal. 
If rnle 3-700(8) is not applicable, a member may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and 
may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because: 
(I) The client 
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(a) in~ists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or 
(b) seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct, or 
(c) insists that the member pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under these rules or the State Bar 
Act, or 
(d) by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the member to carry out the employment effectively, or 
(e) insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the member engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and 
advice of the member but not prohibited under these rules or the State Bar Act, or 
(f) breaches an agreement or obligation to the member as to expenses or fees. 
(2) The continued employment is likely to result in a violation of these rules or of the State Bar Act; or 
(3) The inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the client likely will be served by withdrawal; or 
(4) The member's mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the member to carry out the employment effectively; or 
(5) The client knowingly and freely assents to termination of the employment; or 
(6) The member believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of 
other good cause for withdrawal. 
(D} Papers, Property, and Fees. 
A member whose employment has terminated shall: 
(l) Subject to any protective order or non-disclosure agreement, promptly release to the client, at the request of the client, all the 
client papers and property. "Client papers and properly" includes correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, exhibits, 
physical evidence, expert's reports, and other items reasonably necessary to the client's representation, whether the client has 
paid for them or not; and 
(2) Promptly refund any part ofa fee paid in advance that has not been earned. This provision is not applicable to a true retainer 
fee which is paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the member for the matter. 
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DISCUSSJON 
Subparagraph (A)(2) provides that "a member shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken 
reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the clients." What such steps would include, 
of course, will vary according lo the circumstances. Absent special circumstances, "reasonable steps" do not include 
providing additional services lo the client once the successor counsel has been employed and rule 3-700(0) has been 
satisfied. 
Paragraph (D) makes clear the member's duties in the recurring situation in which new counsel seeks to obtain client 
files from a member discharged by the client. It codifies existing case law. (See .!rndemr u/Cu/{li>miu 0;1romclri.,rs 
"· Su;>c·rio1 < '011rr I 1975) 51 t'.il.App.lcl 999 I 12tl Cal.Rpt1. c,c,Xj; II ei.11 1· . . \!t11-.·111 ( 1975) 5 I Cal.t\pp .. 1d 590 I 12-l 
Cal.Rplr. 2971.) Paragraph (D) also requires that the member "promptly" return unearned foes paid in advance. If a 
client disputes the amount to be returned, the member shall comply with rule 4-1 OO(A )(2). 
Paragraph (D) is not intended to prohibit a member from making, al the member's own expense, and retaining copies 
of papers released to the client, nor to prohibit a claim for the recovery of the member's expense in any subsequent 
legal proceeding. 
Credits 
(Adopted Nov. 28, I 988, eff. May 27, 1989.) 
Nutes or Decision, (5-l) 
Prof. Conduct, Ruic 3-700, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
California Rules of Cmui, California Rules of Professional Conduct, and California Code of Judicial Ethics are current with 
amendments received through October I, 20 I 5. California Supreme Corni, California Courts of Appeal, Guidelines for the 
Commission of Judicial Appointments, Commission on Judicial Performance, and all other Rules of the State Bar of California 
are current with amendments received through October l, 2015. 
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Rule 4-1.4. Communication, FL ST BAR Rule 4-1.4 
West':.; J'llorida Stii,lutes Annotated 
Rules Regnlaling iii<' Floridn Bm· (H.efs I\' 1\m10s) 
Chapter ,J. Rult·s of Professional Cnnd11d (l{(,fs & J\nnos) 
4-J. ClienL-Lawyr-r Relation.ship 
\,Vest's F.S.A. I3ar Rule 4-1.4 
Rule 4-1.4. Communication 
C111Tent1w.ss 
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall: 
(l) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined 
in terminology, is required by these rules; 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
(b) Duty to Explain Matte1·s to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Credits 
Amended July 23, 1992, effective Jan. l, 1993 (605 So.2cl 252); March 23, 2006, effective May 22, 2006 (911 So.2d 417). 
Editors' Notes 
COMMENT 
Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessal)' for the client to effectively participate in 
the representation. 
Communicating with client 
If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, subdivision (a)(I) 
requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior 
discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who 
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receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal 
case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will 
be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See rule 4-1.2(a). 
Subdivision (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish 
the client's objectives. ln some situations--depending on both the importance of the action under consideration 
and the feasibility of consulting with the client--this duty will require consultation prior to 1aking action. In other 
circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may 
require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. Jn such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to 
inform the client of actions the lawyer has tnken on the client's belrnlf. A dditionnlly, subdivision (n)(3) requires that the 
lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting 
the timing or the substance of the representation. 
A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request 
information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, 
subdivision (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or ifa prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, 
or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may 
be expected. 
Lawyers have particular responsibilities in communicating with clients regarding changes in firm composition. See 
Rule 4-5.8. 
Explaining matters 
The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. 
Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when 
there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the 
client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects 
of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to 
injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation 
strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information 
consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests and the client's overall requirements as to the character of 
representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected 
by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in terminology. 
Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible 
adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the 
client is a child or suffers from mental disability. See rule 4-1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is 
often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer 
should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See rule 4-1.13. Where many routine 
matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. 
Withholding information 
In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be 
likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of 
a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold 
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information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or lhc interests or convenience of another person. Rules 
or courl orders go\'erning liligation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the 
client. Ruic 4-3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders. 
!\Jolt.:, off kci,ion~ ( % ) 
\Vest's F. S. A. l3ar Rule 4-1.4, FL ST BAR Rule 4-1.4 
Florida Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Administration, Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure for Involuntary 
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, Worker's Compensation, Probate, Traffic Court, Small Claims, Juvenile Procedure, 
Appellate Procedure, Ce11ificd and Court-Appointed ]Vlediators, Court Appointed Arbitrators, Family Law, Certification and 
Regulation of Court Reporters, Certification of Spoken Language Interpreters, and Qualified and Court-Appointing Parenting 
Coordinators arc current with amendments received through 03/0 I/ I 6. A II other State Court Rules are current with amendments 
received through 03/0 I /1 G. 
End of llocumcnt rt> 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim lo original U.S. Govcmmcnl Works 
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~~ O..Dlelifct 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT .. OouttB!alri8eo,mtv. Idaho 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
ENLARGE TIME TO ASSERT 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND TO 
DISMISS CONTEMPT CHARGES 
On July 18, 2016, Defendant Neil Campbell's Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert 
Affirmative Defenses and his Motion to Dismiss Contempt Charges came on regularly for 
hearing. Plaintiffs were represented by Erin Clark and the Defendant was represented by Lee 
Ritzau. After considering the briefs, evidence and argument of counsel, the Court rules as 
follows: 
1. The Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert Affirmative Defenses is DENIED as to the 
three defenses asserted by Defendant on or about June 20, 2016. 
2. Plaintiffs withdrew their objection to the March 10, 2016 Notice of Affirmative 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO ENLARGE TIME 
AND DISMISS CONTEMPT CHARGES - 1 11259-001 
. .._...,. 
337 of 636
Defenses and, therefore, those two affirmative defenses may be asserted by 
Defendant. 
3. The Motion to Dismiss the Contempt Charges is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED THIS)( day of July 2016. 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO ENLARGE TIME 
AND DISMISS CONTEMPT CHARGES - 2 
Robert J. Elgee:=trfct Court Judge 
11259-001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 111 , 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicat~low, and addressed to each of the following: 
Erin F. Clark, Esq. 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Luke L. Dauchot, Esq. 
Lauren Schweitzer, Esq. 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO ENLARGE TIME 
AND DISMISS CONTEMPT CHARGES - 3 
_/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy - (208) 725-0076 
/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy -(213) 680-8500 
/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
11259-001 
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EXHIBIT /WITNESS LIST 
Date:7/26/16-7/27/16 JVL 2.J 2016 
Hearing Type: Court Trial (Civil/Criminal Contempt) 
Case Number: CV2012-407 C&M Investments vs. Neil. D. Campbell 
Before Judge: Robert J. Elgee Clerk: Crystal Rigby Reporter: Susan Israel 
Attorney: Erin Clark Attorney : Lee Ritzau 
Plaintiff's Witnesses Date Defendant's Witnesses Date 
1 -Neil D. Campbell 7/26/16 1 
2 2 
EXH. No. Description Obj. Date Admitted 
501 Limited Power of Attorney-David Fiver X 7/27/16 X 
502 Limited Power of Attorney-Michael Taiteman X 7/27/16 X 
503 Limited Power of Attorney-Robert Turffs X 7/27/16 X 
504 Limited Power of Attorney-Jonathan Michaels X 7/27/16 X 
505 Limited Power of Attorney-Steve Thompson X 7/27/16 X 
506 Limited Power of Attorney-Dyke Huish X 7/27/16 X 
507 Limited Power of Attorney-Susan Roy X 7/27/16 X 
508 Limited Power of Attorney-HSBC Bank X 7/27/16 X 
509 Limited Power of Attorney-Bank of America X 7/27/16 X 
510 Limited Power of Attorney-Bank of American X 7/27/16 X 
511 Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination 
filed 3-23-15 
512 Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's 
Examination filed 4-1-15 
513 Second Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment 
Debtors Examination filed 8-3-15 
514 Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of Motion for Order 
Findinq Neil David Campbell in Contempt dated 11-3-15 
515 Plaintiffs Trial Brief filed on 5-18-16 
EXH. No. Description Obj. Date Admitted 
1 Transcript from 8/24/15 Debtor Examination of Campbell X 7/26/16 X 
2 Transcript from 2/20/15 Debtor's Examination of Campbell X 7/26/16 X 
in CA 
3 Campbell's 5/28/15 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
letter and produced documents) EXCLUDING 3-3 to 3-8 
4 Campbell's 4/25/16 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
email from Campbell) 
4-1.1 Front Page Campbell's 4/25/16 Document Production X 7/27/16 X 
(includinq cover email from Campbell) 
5 Campbell's 4/25/16 Letter to Clark re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
6 Campbell's 4/26/16 Document Production X 7/26/16 X 
7 1 7/10/15 Faxed Letter from Campbell to Clark X 7/26/16 X 
8 Campbell's Sworn Opposition to Motion for Contempt X 7/26/16 X 
10. Transcript from 10/29/10 Deposition of Campbell in CA X 7/26/16 X 
11 Campbell's 11 /25/14 Responses to Plf's 1 si Set of X 7/26/16 X 
lnterroqatories in CA action 
12 6/21/12 Order of Domestication 7/26/16 X 
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13 4/1 /15 Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment 7/26/16 X 
Debtor's Examination 
15 4/23/15 Letter from Campbell to Clark re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
16 4/30/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
17 5/19/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
18 6/19/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
32 Campbell's 4/27/16 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
email) 
33 May 2016 Emails between Campbell and Clark re Informal 7/26/16 
Interview 
34 Campbell's Siqned Affidavit of Compliance X 7/26/16 X 
36 11/3/15 Affidavit of Clark with Exh. A 7/26/16 X 
T k" J d" . IN f a mg u 1c1a o ice: 
EXH. No. Description Obj. Date 
19 10/10/07 Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, X 7/26/16 
Ltd. V. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. A of 
Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
20 11 /17 /08 Amended Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M X 7/26/16 
Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership V. 
Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. 8 of Pit's 
Request for Judicial Notice) 
21 Los Angeles Superior Court's 2/4/10 Order Granting Pit's Motion for X 7/26/16 
Summary Judgment Adjudication Against Def. Campbell for 
Constructive Fraud (Exh. C to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
22 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11/2/10 Minute Order Imposing X 7/26/16 
Terminating Sanctions and Entering Default as to Defendants in the 
case captioned C&M Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. 
BC378888) (Exh. D to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
23 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11/1/11 Minute Order Imposing Monetary X 7/26/16 
Sanctions Against Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M 
Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. 
Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh.E to Pit's 
Request for Judicial Notice) 
24 Los Angeles Superior Court's 12/13/11 Order Granting Pit's Motion for X 7/26/16 
Summary Judgment Against Defendant Neil David Campbell in the 
case captioned C&M Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. 
BC378888) (Exh. F to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
25 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11 /13/11 Judgment Against Defendant X 7/26/16 
Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, 
Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers 
etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. G to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
26 Chapter 615-the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist X 7/26/16 
Financing (Financial Institutions) Ordinance, Part 3, Sec. 20 (Exh. H to 
Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) 
27 31 C.F.R. Sec. 1010.430 (Exh. I to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
28 31 C.F.R. Sec. 1020.410 (Exh. J to Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
29 CA Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 6148 (Exh. K to Pit's Request for Judicial X 7/26/16 
341 of 636
EXHIBIT /WITNESS LIST 
Notice) 
30 CA Prof. Conduct Rule 3-700 (Exh. L of Pit's Request for Judicial X 7/26/16 
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31 FL St. Bar Rule 4-1.4 (Exh. M of Pit's Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
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Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") hereby respectfully submit the following proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On November 3, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for an order holding Defendant Neil 
Campbell ("Campbell") in contempt. 
2. On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit, setting forth ten 
counts of civil contempt ( Counts 1-10) and twenty-four counts of criminal contempt ( Counts 
11-34). The Charging Affidavit alleged the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt and 
set forth each instance of alleged contempt separately. It also alleged that Campbell was served 
with a copy of the April 1, 2015 Amended Order ("the Amended Order") underlying the civil 
contempt counts, and alleged facts indicating that Campbell had actual knowledge of that order. 
3. On February 22, 2016, the Court held a hearing at which Campbell denied each 
count of contempt charged against him. During this hearing, the Court informed Campbell: of 
the charges of contempt against him, the possible sanctions for the contempt; that Campbell was 
not required to make a statement and that any statement made may be used against him; that 
Campbell had a right to a trial; that Campbell had a right to confront the witnesses against him, 
including watching the witnesses testify in court and questioning them; and that Campbell had 
the right to be represented by an attorney and that if Campbell desired an attorney and could not 
afford one, an attorney would be appointed at public expense. After being informed of these 
rights, Campbell denied each charge of contempt against him. 
4. On June 18, 2016, the Court denied Campbell's request to file three untimely 
supplemental affirmative defenses based on sufficiency of service, ruling that Campbell may 
only assert the two (also untimely) affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs stipulated that Campbell 
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could file: past inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the criminal counts) and present 
inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the civil counts). 
5. The above-entitled case and cause came before the Court for trial, sitting without 
a jury on the 26th and 2ih day of July 2016. Erin Clark of Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
and Lauren Schweitzer of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiffs. Lee 
Ritzau of Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. appeared for and on behalf of Defendant 
Neil Campbell ("Campbell"). 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT: CASE BACKGROUND 
6. This case stems from Plaintiffs' efforts to collect on a judgment entered in a 
California case for fraud and related claims. In October 2007, Plaintiffs sued Philip Richard 
Powers ("Powers") and his corporate entities in Los Angeles Superior Court (the "California 
suit") alleging that Powers cheated Plaintiffs out of millions of dollars in connection with a Costa 
Rican teak farming business. RJN Ex. A. Though Campbell was involved with this business, 
Plaintiffs did not name him as a defendant in their initial complaint. Id. 
7. In late 2008, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add Campbell as a defendant. 
RJN Ex. B. Plaintiffs alleged that Campbell had secretly received millions of dollars in improper 
kickbacks from Powers. Id. ,r,r 21-23, 81-99. 
8. On February 4, 2010, the California court entered partial summary judgment 
against Campbell for over $1.5 million-the amount of secret profits Plaintiffs were able to 
prove at that time. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex. F at 2. 
9. Because of Campbell's ongoing discovery abuses in the California suit, on 
November 2, 2010, the California court imposed terminating sanctions against Campbell, 
striking his answer, and entering a default against him. RJN. Ex. D; RJN Ex. F. at 3. Plaintiffs 
thereafter filed a third amended complaint, which Campbell answered. RJN Ex. F at 3. 
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10. On November 1, 2011, the California court granted Plaintiffs' motions to (1) 
compel Campbell to respond to interrogatories and requests for production and (2) to attend his 
deposition. The Court imposed monetary sanctions against Campbell in connection with both of 
these motions. RJN Ex. E. 
11. On December 13, 2011, the California court granted summary judgment in 
Plaintiffs' favor, finding Campbell liable for fraud and related claims. RJN Ex. F. The Court 
entered judgment against Campbell for over $24 million. RJN. Ex. G. 
12. On June 21, 2012, after filing the California Judgment in Idaho, Plaintiffs 
obtained an order from this Court domesticating the Judgment. Ex. 12. 
13. On March 23, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment Debtor's 
Examination. Ex. 511. The Court amended this order twice, first on April 1, 2015, and again on 
August 3, 2015, to change the date for the debtor's examination. Exs. 13; 512; 513. 
III. CIVIL CONTEMPT FINDINGS OF FACT 
14. The April 1, 2015 Amended Order (the "Amended Order") compelling Campbell 
to appear for his debtor's examination also required Campbell to produce documents, including 
in part, documents "evidencing any payments made by Defendant to any legal counsel over the 
period of 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make 
those payments," and "all records relating to financial accounts (savings accounts, checking 
accounts, or otherwise) maintained in Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for 
the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to the present date." Ex. 13-2 & 13-3. 
15. The Amended Order required Campbell to produce the responsive documents no 
later than 30 days prior to the scheduled May 11, 2015 debtor's examination. Ex. 13-2. 
16. As of April 13, 2015-Campbell's deadline to produce documents-Campbell 
had produced no documents whatsoever to Plaintiffs. See Ex. 15. 
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1 7. Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt against Campbell on April 21, 2015 alleging 
Campbell had failed to comply with the Court's April 1, 2015 Amended Order. 
18. On the following day, April 22, 2015, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with a 
handwritten statement asserting that (1) the documents evidencing his payment of his legal fees 
were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) he had only one bank account with Zions 
Bank and he did not have to produce the documents because it was used for the direct deposit of 
his social security funds, which he asserted was exempt from Plaintiffs' judgment. Ex. 15. At 
this time, Campbell produced no documents to Plaintiffs in response to the April 1, 2015 
Amended Order. Id. 
19. Despite Campbell's assertion in his April 22, 2015 statement that he had only one 
bank account, he actually had accounts with three banks during the relevant time period: Zions 
Bank, Bank of America, and HSBC in Hong Kong. Exs. 3-9 to 3-198; 11-4. 
20. On April 30, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent Campbell a letter addressing 
Campbell's claim that he did not have, or was not required to produce, any documents in 
response to the April 1, 2015 Amended Order. Ex. 16. This letter provided detailed, easy-to-
understand information as to what Campbell needed to produce to comply with the Amended 
Order. Id. 
21. On May 19, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent another letter to Campbell confirming 
the discussion they had had the previous day regarding Campbell's obligation to produce the 
responsive documents. Ex. 17. 
22. Campbell ultimately produced some documents to Plaintiffs. He produced 
documents on May 28, 2015; April 25, 2016; April 26, 2016; and April 27, 2016. Exs. 3, 4, 6, 
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32. There is no evidence that Campbell ever produced to Plaintiffs any documents other than 
those produced on these four dates. 
23. As discussed below, the documents produced on these four dates omitted certain 
responsive documents that the Amended Order required him to produce. 
24. On May 28, 2015, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with a handwritten statement and 
a portion of the documents responsive to the Amended Order. Ex. 3. In this production, 
Campbell provided a portion of his Bank of America checking account records from June 2012 
through February 2013 (Ex. 3-9 to 3-40) and his Zions Bank checking account records from 
November 2011 through May 2015 (Ex. 3-41 to 3-198). Campbell provided no documents 
evidencing his payments to his lawyers, the cancelled checks from his Bank of America account, 
his Bank of America account records for the time prior to June 2012, or any documents relating 
to his HSBC account. See generally Ex. 3. 
25. In his May 28, 2015 written statement, Campbell identified five lawyers that he 
had engaged during the time period set forth in the Amended Order: Michael Taitelman, David 
Flyer, Jonathan Michaels, Dyke Huish and Robert Turffs. Ex. 3-1. In his written statement, 
Campbell claimed that each of these lawyers "have been contacted and refuse to produce 
documents, stating two reasons, attorney work product and that I am no longer there [sic] client." 
Ex. 3-1. 
26. Campbell later identified two additional lawyers that he engaged during the 
relevant time period: Susan Roy and Steve Thompson. Exs. 1-74; 8-5. 
27. On June 19, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent Campbell another letter setting forth the 
deficiencies in his production of documents. Ex. 18. In this letter, Plaintiffs' counsel asked 
Campbell to produce the remaining responsive documents no later than July 10, 2015. Id. 
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Campbell did not produce any additional documents to Plaintiffs on or before to July 1 oth. See 
supra ,r 22. 
28. On July 10, 2015, Campbell provided to Plaintiffs' counsel a signed statement 
claiming that he could not obtain the remaining unproduced documents from his "prior banks." 
Ex. 7-1. He also now claimed that "[s]ome of the lawyers were paid a flat fee and did not send 
monthly statements, and they don't have documents showing payments to them. Other of the 
lawyers are refusing to give the documents to me because they are privileged and wont [sic] give 
them to me." Ex. 7-1. 
29. On November 20, 2015, Campbell filed his sworn Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
motion for contempt. Ex. 8. In his Opposition, Campbell claimed that Huish and Michaels were 
each paid a flat fee and thus never prepared or sent any bills. Ex. 8-5 & 8-6. Campbell also 
claimed that Flyer, Taiteman [sic], Turffs, and Thompson refused to provide Campbell with 
copies of bills because "the documents are their work product." Ex. 8-6. In the next paragraph, 
Campbell inconsistently stated that "as to Michael Taiteman [sic], I have made several attempts 
to contact him to get the information for Ms. Clark, but I cannot get him to return my calls." Id. 
30. On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit in Support of their 
Motion for Order Finding Campbell in Contempt. A hearing was held on February 22, 2016, 
during which time Campbell denied all of the civil contempt charges. During this hearing, the 
court set the trial on Plaintiffs' Contempt Motion for May 4, 2016. Trial Tr. at 192:24-193:10. 
31. From May 28, 2015 through April 25, 2016, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with no 
additional documents or information in response to the Amended Order. 
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32. On April 25, 26, and 27, 2016-approximately one week prior to the scheduled 
trial date-Campbell produced additional documents and information to Plaintiffs in response to 
the Court's Amended Order. Exs. 4, 6, 32. 
33. Notwithstanding his earlier claims that his lawyers refused to give him records of 
his fee payments, in his April 2016 productions, Campbell produced documents reflecting his 
payments to Michaels, Huish, Turffs, Thompson, Roy, and Taitelman. Exs. 4-4 to 4-6; 4-23 to 
4-24;4-95 to 4-96; 4-97 to 4-100; 4-102 to 4-104; 4-156 to 4-162; 4-163 to 4-167; 32-2. 
Campbell also produced payment records from Michael France. Ex. 4-153 to 4-155. Campbell 
did not produce any records related to his payments to Flyer. 
34. In the wake of this supplemental production, Plaintiffs agreed to continue the trial 
date to May 25, 2016. The trial date was continued again to July 26-27, 2016. 
35. During the trial of the civil contempt charges, Campbell testified that he has now, 
to his belief, produced all documents responsive to Counts 2-7 set forth in the Charging 
Affidavit. Trial Tr. at 195 :2-8. Also, in the affidavit of compliance that Campbell signed and 
delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel, which was admitted as Trial Exhibit 34, Campbell certified that 
he has produced all documents relating to his Bank of America account from June 2012 through 
present. Ex. 34-2. Based on these representation, Plaintiffs dismissed without prejudice these 
eight counts and proceed only on Counts 1 and 8 of the civil contempt charges. 
A. Findings of Fact Specific to Count 1 
36. Count 1 of the Charging Affidavit charges Campbell with civil contempt for his 
failure to produce the documents evidencing the payments he made to David Flyer ("Flyer"). 
Charging Affidavit at 3. 
37. Flyer is a California lawyer who represented Campbell in connection with the 
civil action filed against him by Plaintiffs in November 2008. Ex. 1 at 24:16-24; RJN Ex. B. 
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38. Campbell employed Flyer at some time between 2009 and the present-i.e., 
during the time period covered by the Amended Order. Exs. 7; 8-5. Campbell made payments 
to Flyer for legal fees. Ex. 2 at 14:13-19. 
39. Under the Amended Order, Campbell was required to produce documents 
evidencing his payments to Flyer. See Ex. 13-2. 
40. To date, Campbell has produced no documents evidencing his payments to Flyer. 
Trial Tr. at 193:17-194:2. 
41. There is no evidence that Campbell is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order requiring him to produce any and all documents evidencing his payments to 
Flyer. 
42. The Court does not find credible Campbell's statements that Flyer refuses to 
provide records. Campbell first claimed that Campbell himself refused to provide these records 
because of attorney-client privilege, then claimed that the lawyers refused to provide these 
records because they are attorney work product and Campbell is no longer a client, and finally 
claimed that some attorneys didn't have payment records while others (including Flyer) refused 
to provide them because these documents were those attorneys' work product. It defies credulity 
that these attorneys would each independently misconstrue the attorney work product rule in the 
same fashion, which conveniently aligns with Campbell's own improper attempt to invoke the 
attorney-client privilege. Moreover, Campbell's shifting story about these records calls into 
question his veracity. Finally, notwithstanding his earlier pleas that his attorneys would not 
provide the documents ( or that none existed), on the eve of the formerly scheduled trial date, 
Campbell successfully produced payment records from his seven other attorneys. 
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43. There is no evidence that documents reflecting Campbell's payments to Flyer do 
not exist. In fact, Campbell does not deny that these records exist. See, e.g., Exs. 3-1, 7; 8-5. 
44. The fact that Campbell was able to produce documents evidencing his payments 
to the other seven attorneys he engaged during the relevant time period shows that he is capable 
of obtaining such records. Ex. 4-4 to 4-6; 4-95 to 4-104; and 4-153 to 4-167. 
45. As an attorney in California, Flyer is required to provide bills to a client who 
requests them. RJN Ex. K at 1. Moreover, after an engagement has terminated, Flyer is required 
to "promptly" release all client papers and property upon the client's request-including all 
correspondence, and thus bills. RJN Ex L at 2. This evidence is unrefuted. 
46. Flyer no longer represents Campbell. See Ex. 3-1 
47. Because Campbell employed Flyer and paid him for legal fees, Flyer must 
provide Campbell with bills upon Campbell's request. Moreover, because Campbell is his 
former client, Flyer must provide Campbell with correspondence, including that related to 
Campbell's payment of fees to Flyer. See RJN Ex.Kat 1; RJN Ex.Lat 2. 
48. Campbell has the present ability to comply with the Amended Order insofar as it 
relates to Count One. 
49. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence ten documents purporting to confer 
on Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney purportedly allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to 
obtain records from David Flyer. Ex. 501. 
50. Contrary to Campbell's assertion and for the reasons discussed infra in the 
Court's conclusions of law, providing Plaintiffs with this limited power of attorney does not 
constitute compliance with the Court's Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count One. The 
Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the attorney payment records at issue. 
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B. Findings of Fact Specific to Count 8 
51. Count 8 of the Charging Affidavit charges Campbell with civil contempt for his 
failure to produce all records relating to his HSBC bank account in Hong Kong. Charging 
Affidavit at 4. 
52. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce records for all 
financial accounts for the time period commencing January 1, 2012. Ex. 13-3. 
53. In "early 2010," Campbell opened a bank account with HSBC Hong Kong (the 
"Hong Kong Account"). Ex. 11-4. The account holder was a Hong Kong company that 
Campbell owned, and Campbell was the account's beneficiary. Ex. 2 at 22:20-24:18; 11-4. At 
or around the time he opened the account, Campbell made an initial deposit of $300,000 into the 
Hong Kong Account. Ex. 2 at 27: 15-17. 
54. Campbell testified that he transferred the $300,000 out of the Hong Kong 
Account at some point after his arrest. Ex. 2 at 29:8-21. Campbell was arrested in June 2013. 
Ex. 2 at 16:24-17:14. 
55. Thus, the Hong Kong account was open and active between January 1, 2012 and 
the present-i.e., the time period covered by the Amended Order. 
56. The Amended Order therefore required Campbell to produce records related to 
the Hong Kong Account. 
57. None of Campbell's productions in evidence contains any records related to the 
HSBC Hong Kong Account. See generally Exs. 3, 4, 6, 32. To date, Campbell has produced no 
bank records from the Hong Kong Account. 
58. There is no evidence that Campbell is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order requiring him to produce the Hong Kong account records. 
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59. Under Hong Kong's record keeping ordinance, a financial institution such as 
HSBC Hong Kong must keep records of each transaction for 6 years from the transaction's date. 
RJN Ex.Hat 2. Hong Kong's financial institutions must also keep the customer's account file, 
copies of documents obtained while verifying the identity of the customer or any beneficial 
owner of the customer, and business correspondence with the customer and the customer's 
beneficial owner for 6 years after the business relationship ends. Id. 
60. Thus, for example, HSBC is required to keep records of the wire transfer of 
$300,000 out of the Hong Kong Account-which occurred sometime after June 2013-until at 
least June 2019. See id. 
61. Similarly, given that the Hong Kong Account was open at least as of June 2013, 
HSBC must keep copies of documents used to verify the identities of Mosaic Orange (the 
account holder) and Campbell (its beneficial owner) until at least June 2019. See id. 
62. During his debtor's examination, Campbell testified that he did not remember the 
name of the company in whose name he opened the Hong Kong Account. Ex. 1 at 41: 15-19. 
63. Campbell admits that, as of April 25, 2016, he now knows the name of the 
company in whose name the account was opened: Mosaic Orange. Ex. 5-2. There is no 
evidence that Campbell made any effort to obtain records related to the Hong Kong Account 
since learning the name of the company in whose name he opened the account. 
64. There is no evidence that Campbell has asked HSBC to search for records related 
to the Hong Kong Account by using his own identifying information. Instead, Campbell testified 
that he did not remember whether he gave HSBC his name and social security number and asked 
them to search for records. Ex. 1 at 44:25-45:2. 
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65. Thus, records for the Hong Kong Account that are responsive to the Amended 
Order exist. Yet Campbell has not produced any records for this account. He has also failed to 
take basic steps that could lead to the production of these records. 
66. Campbell has the present ability to comply with the Amended Order insofar as it 
relates to Count Eight. 
67. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence a document purporting to confer on 
Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney purportedly allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to obtain 
"[a]ll records relating to Neil Campbell's HSBC bank account," and "[a]ll records relating to 
Mosaic Orange's HSBC bank account which Mr. Neil Campbell may have access to[.]" Ex. 508. 
Of note, this limited power of attorney does not state that Campbell is authorized to grant such 
powers of attorney on Mosaic Orange's behalf. See id. 
68. Contrary to Campbell's assertion and for the reasons discussed infra in the 
Court's conclusions oflaw, providing Plaintiffs with this limited power of attorney does not 
constitute compliance with the Court's Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count Eight. The 
Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the bank records at issue. 
IV. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FINDINGS OF FACT 
69. The following findings of fact are based solely on the documentary evidence 
admitted or judicially noticed during trial. They are not based in any way on Campbell's 
testimony during trial (which related only to the civil contempt counts). 
70. On August 24, 2015, Campbell appeared before this Court in response to the 
Court's Second Amended Order setting his debtor's examination for that date. Ex. 1-4. The 
Court put Campbell under oath prior to the debtor's examination. Ex. 1-3. 
71. During the August 24, 2015 examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell a 
series of basic questions about his finances and living situation. To nearly every one of these 
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questions, Campbell responded with "I don't know" or "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 33:22-34:7, 
34:17-25, 35:1-7, 35:12-15, 35:25-37:22, 38:18-24, 41:15-22, 49:10-15, 49:24-50:16, 52:8-
54:5, 54:24-55:25, 56:21-57:3, 57:17-58:10, 58:12-59:8, 60:2-61 :17, 62:5-9, 65:9-14, 71 :14-
20,71 :23-72:12, 72:16-74:6. 
72. The sheer volume of basic facts that Campbell claimed he did not remember 
during his August 2015 debtor's examination shows that this testimony is not credible. Instead, 
these answers were part of Campbell's ongoing effort to evade Plaintiffs judgment collection 
efforts. 
73. From the fraudulent scheme perpetrated against Plaintiffs, through the related 
California litigation and subsequent judgment enforcement efforts, Campbell has followed a 
pattern of lying to Plaintiffs about his finances. 
74. Campbell was found guilty of defrauding Plaintiffs of millions of dollars, 
including concealing millions of dollars in improper kickbacks. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex.Fat 11-18. 
75. On November 25, 2014, during Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts, Campbell 
gave sworn, false answers to interrogatories about his finances. Ex. 11-3, 11-4. Specifically, the 
interrogatories asked Campbell to "state how much your monthly income is, broken down by 
source (e.g. employment, Social Security payments, interest, etc.)." Campbell responded that he 
had no income. Ex. 11-3. Campbell also averred that he did not maintain any bank accounts. 
Ex. 11-4. In contrast, Campbell's bank records show that (1) he received Social Security 
payments in November 2014, Ex. 3-177; and (2) he had a bank account at Zions bank during 
November 2014, id. 
76. Additionally, during his February 20, 2015 debtor's exam in the California 
proceeding, Campbell testified that he was "basically penniless" as of that date. Ex. 2 at 59:9-
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11. However, Campbell's bank records show that (1) less than 10 days before his examination, 
Campbell wrote checks to Robert Duringer (who was supposedly then regularly covering 
Campbell's expenses) for $17,000, Ex. 3-189; and (2) even after these checks were processed, 
Campbell still had over $13,000 in his Zions Bank account in February 2015, Ex. 3-187. 
77. Thus, Campbell has shown a pattern oflying to these Plaintiffs about the 
particular subject of his finances in the particular context of this litigation. In sum, Campbell 
has shown a pattern and corresponding intent to lie to Plaintiffs about his finances to keep them 
from obtaining the money of which Campbell defrauded them. 
A. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Source of Funds Used to Open 
his Bank of America Account, His Car, and Where He Lived (Counts 11-17) 
78. In late May 2012, Campbell opened a bank account with Bank of America. The 
earliest bank statement in evidence from this account covers the period of June 8, 2012 to July 9, 
2012. Ex. 3-37. The starting balance of the account for this time period was $24,715. Ex. 3-38. 
Notably, during this one month time period, Campbell wrote checks and took cash out of the 
account in an amount exceeding $22,000. Ex. 3-39. It is unclear why Campbell apparently 
opened a new bank account and immediately drained almost all of the funds initially deposited 
into it. 
79. At the time Campbell opened this account, Campbell's sole source of income was 
supposedly his $1,600 per-month Social Security payment. Ex. 1 at 35:8-11. Campbell also 
admitted that during this time his monthly expenses each month exceeded his monthly income. 
Id. at 51: 14-19. Campbell also testified that when he moved in late 2011, he had not brought 
any asset with him from Florida worth more than $10,000. Id. at 36:5-7. Moreover, he opened 
this account within six months of depositing over $30,000 in cash into his Zions bank account. 
Ex. 3-49, 3-55, 3-61, 3-67. 
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80. During the debtor's examination, Campbell was asked where he obtained the 
money to open this Bank of America account. He responded that he had "no idea." Ex. 1 at 
34:3-4. Campbell was then asked to identify the possible sources of the $24,000, to which he 
responded "I don't know." Id. at 34:20-25. He was asked ifhe owned a car, to which he 
responded "I don't remember." Id. at 35:4-5. He was asked where he was living, to which he 
responded "I don't remember." Id. at 35:12-15. These are questions that any reasonable person 
would have known the answer to, especially since Campbell claimed that he had brought no asset 
with him from Florida that was worth more than $10,000. Id. at 36:5-7. 
81. Campbell's statement that he did not remember where he was living in 2012 
exemplifies the evasive and false nature of this testimony. Immediately before Campbell gave 
this testimony, Plaintiffs' counsel showed Campbell his Bank of America statement from the 
period starting June 8, 2012. This statement showed the addressee as "Neil D Campbell" with a 
listed address of2804 Summit Dr., Sun Valley, ID 83353. Exs. 1 at 33:19-24; 3-37. The 
questions about where Campbell lived were made during the course of asking questions about 
this June 2012 statement. Ex. 1 at 33:19-35:15. There is no indication in the transcript that 
counsel removed from Campbell's sight the June 2012 statement with Campbell's address before 
asking him where he lived in June 2012. See id. He thus looked at the June 2012 statement 
listing his address and still had that statement in front of him when he testified that he did not 
remember where he was living at that time. This testimony is not credible and shows that 
Campbell's memory loss was feigned. 
82. Months after giving this testimony and on the eve of the previously scheduled 
May 4, 2016 trial date, Campbell produced to Plaintiffs a handwritten statement and documents 
showing that his August 2015 testimony was false. On April 25, 2016, Campbell sent to 
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Plaintiffs' counsel a handwritten statement admitting that he "owned a car a 2006 Corvette it was 
sold either in 2011 or 2012, it was the last car I owned." Ex. 5-1. Campbell signed this 
statement, averring that the contents were true and correct to the best of his ability. Ex. 5-2. 
83. On April 26, 2016, Campbell produced copies of the cancelled checks and deposit 
slip from his Bank of America bank account. Ex. 6. These records establish that Campbell 
received a check for $27,900 from Larry H. Miller Toyota dealership on March 28, 2012, 
presumably as payment for the Corvette he sold. Ex. 6-5. Campbell did not deposit this check 
into his existing Zions bank account. Instead, Campbell held onto this check and used it to open 
his new Bank of America account on May 23, 2012. Ex. 6-3. 
84. Campbell did not testify truthfully when he testified as set forth below in 
paragraphs 86 through 98 because there is no way he did not remember moving to Idaho from 
Florida with a Corvette, selling that Corvette, and using the check he received from the Toyota 
dealership to open the Bank of America account. Indeed, Campbell must have either driven the 
Corvette across the county himself, or paid to have it shipped. It is further inconceivable that 
someone purportedly living off of social security would not remember receiving nearly $28,000 
for the sale of a car. 
85. Moreover, it is simply not credible that Campbell would have no idea of the 
source from which he obtained almost $25,000-particularly when his sole income was $1,600 
per month, his monthly expenses exceeded his income, and he supposedly had come to Idaho 
less than a year earlier with no asset worth more than $10,000. 
86. Count Eleven of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 
2012 opening balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
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Q. So this is the statement from June gth' 2012, through July 9t\ 2012; 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June gt\ 2012, as 
being $24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea at this point. 
Ex. 1 at 33 :22-34:4. 
87. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Eleven. 
88. Count Twelve of the contempt charges states Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000 into it. Did 
it come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 34:5-7. 
89. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twelve. 
90. Count Thirteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
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Q. What possibly- where possibly could this money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the 
possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
91. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirteen. 
92. Count Fourteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own any assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. 
93. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Fourteen. 
94. Count Fifteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
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95. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Fifteen. 
96. Count Sixteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
97. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Sixteen. 
98. Count Seventeen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of 
America account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
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Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000 and you were 
living solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for 
you to be able to put $24,000 into a bank account in June of 2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
* * * 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are 
here under penalty of perjury. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when 
you're saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social 
Security, it just does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
99. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Seventeen. 
B. Campbell's False Testimony About the Source of a Large Cash Deposit to 
His Bank of America Account (Count 18) 
100. On November 30, 2012, Campbell deposited nearly $3,500 into his Bank of 
America account. Ex. 3-18. Campbell made this deposit within a year of depositing over 
$30,000 in cash into his Zions Bank account (Ex. 3-49, 3-55, 3-61, 3-67), and within six months 
of depositing over $25,000 into the Bank of America account (Exs. 3-38; 6-3). 
101. During his sworn Debtor's exam, Campbell testified that he did not know where 
he obtained nearly $3,500 in cash that he deposited in November 2012. Ex. 1 at 38:18-24. 
102. Campbell did not testify truthfully when he testified as set forth below in 
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paragraph 104 because there is no way he forgot where he received nearly $3,500, which he then 
deposited into his Bank of America account. Campbell claimed that his sole source of income at 
this time was his monthly social security payment ofroughly $1,600. Ex. 1 at 35:8-11. Anyone 
living off $1,600 per month would know where he received a check that exceeded more than 
twice his monthly income. Moreover, he only made two deposits into this account after it was 
opened: $500 on November 2, 2012 and $3,410 on November 30, 2012. Ex. 3-39, 33, 30, 26, 22, 
18, 13, 9. Given the infrequent nature of the deposits, he had to have known where a relatively 
large amount of money came from. 
103. Moreover, the documents that Campbell produced in April 2016 now show that 
this deposit was a federal tax refund and that when he made this deposit he took $1,500 in cash 
and deposited the remainder. Ex. 6-31 & 6-33. A tax refund is a remarkable event, given that it 
typically occurs only once per year. Additionally, the fact that Campbell simultaneously 
obtained $1,500 in cash-roughly equivalent to his total monthly income-would have made 
this event memorable. It is thus not credible that Campbell forgot how he obtained the money. 
104. Count Eighteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. And that on November 30th, 2012, you deposited $3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Where could it have come from? 
A. I don't know. 
Ex. 1 at 38:18-24 
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105. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Eighteen. 
C. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Company in Whose Name 
Campbell Opened the Hong Kong Account (Count 19) 
106. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Campbell was also asked about the 
account he opened with HSBC in Hong Kong. In "early 2010," Campbell opened this offshore 
account and deposited into it $300,000. Exs. 2 at 22:20-24: 18, 27: 15-17; 11-4. This was at or 
around the time of the California court's February 4, 2010 Order finding Campbell liable for 
constructive fraud and awarding to Plaintiffs over $1.5 million. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex. F at 2. 
107. Though Campbell claimed that this account was set up for the purpose of doing 
business in Hong Kong, he admits that he never used this account to conduct any business. Ex. 2 
at 24:12-25:10; 26:5-24. 
108. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell 
for the name of the company in whose name the Hong Kong Account was opened. Campbell 
claimed that he did not remember the name of the company-even though he deposited 
$300,000 into a bank account in its name. Ex. 1 at 41 :15-22. During his August 2015 
examination, Campbell did not testify that he could obtain this name from his attorney or 
records; nor did he ask for an opportunity to search and respond to Plaintiffs at a later date. 
Instead, he simply said he did not remember. 
109. This testimony is not credible. One does not forget the name of a company for 
which he opened a bank account and deposited $300,000. Furthermore, Campbell testified that 
he had given the name of the company to HSBC when he contacted it about getting the account 
records. Ex. 1 at 41 :6-9. If Campbell had known the name of the company when he asked for 
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the bank records after receiving the Amended Order in April 2015, he would have known the 
name of the company four months later during his August 2015 debtor's examination. 
110. On April 25, 2016, Campbell provided Plaintiffs' counsel with a handwritten 
document stating, in relevant part, "Count 19 [the Count related to the HSBC Hong Kong 
Account owner]-Mosaic Orange." Ex. 5-2. Thus, on the eve of the previously scheduled May 
4 trial date, Campbell was able to remember the company's name: Mosaic Orange. Id. It is 
simply not credible that Campbell would have remembered the name when he supposedly called 
HSBC in the Spring of 2015, forgotten it in August of 2015, and then suddenly remembered it 
again in April 2016 (nearly 1 year later). 
111. Count Nineteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with 
HSBC? 
A. What was the name of the company? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank 
account and put $300,000 into it? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Ex. 1 at 41:15-22. 
112. For the aforementioned reasons, Campbell made false statements under oath when 
he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Nineteen. 
D. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Source of Large Cash Deposits to 
Campbell's Zions Bank Account (Counts 20-30) 
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113. Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell numerous questions about his Zions bank 
account records. The Zions bank account records cover the time from November 2011 to April 
2015. Ex. 3. 
114. From November 2011 through March 2012, Campbell made twelve different cash 
deposits into his account. These deposits include the following: 
a. $4,000 on November 21, 2011 (Ex. 3-41) 
b. $2,000 on November 30, 2011 (Ex. 3-41) 
c. $5,000 on December 20, 2011 (Ex. 3-45) 
d. $2,500 on December 28, 2011 (Ex. 3-45) 
e. $700 on January 12, 2012 (Ex. 3-45) 
f. $1,500 on January 18, 2012 (Ex. 3-45) 
g. $1,000 on January 27, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
h. $2,000 on January 30, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
1. $2,500 on February 17, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
J. $1,500 on February 22, 2012 (Ex. 3-57) 
k. $2,600 on February 27, 2012 (Ex. 3-57) 
1. $4,000 on March 20, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
m. $1,600 on March 25, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
n. $3,000 on March 30, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
115. Thus, Campbell made $30,200 in cash deposits into his Zions bank account over a 
four month period. 
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116. Significantly, Campbell made these cash deposits despite the fact that he also 
testified that, in 2012, his sole source of income was his Social Security payment of roughly 
$1,600permonth. Ex.1 at35:8-11, 51:8-10. 
117. Also at this time, Campbell was renting a condominium for $1500 per month and 
had other large monthly expenses, such as Idaho Power, Cox Communications, Blue Cross, and 
other bills. Exs. 1 at 51:11-19; 3 at 41, 50, 55, 56, 67. As Campbell admitted, his monthly 
expenses each month exceeded his monthly income. Ex. 1 at 51:14-19. 
118. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked 
Campbell multiple questions about the source of the cash that he used to make these twelve 
deposits over the four month period. See generally Ex. 1 at 49-62. Campbell's testimony was 
evasive and contradictory on this issue. 
119. Campbell's response to each of the questions about the source of the large amount 
of cash that he deposited in his Zions account between November 2011 and March 2012 was "I 
don't remember." Ex. 1 at 49:7-15, 57:2-13, 58:23-59:1, 62:5-9. 
120. This testimony is not credible. Campbell moved to Idaho from Florida sometime 
prior to November 2011. Ex. 1 at 35:19-24. He testified that he brought no assets with him from 
Florida to Idaho worth more than $10,000, other than certain items that were put into storage and 
subsequently seized by Plaintiffs. Ex. 1 at 36:5-16. He further testified that, although he had 
liquidated items while living in Florida, he did not come to Idaho with cash. Ex. 1 at 50:2-13; 
see also Ex. 1 at 49:16-19. It is not credible that anyone would forget where he received tens of 
thousands of dollars of cash, especially someone with a very limited income and purportedly no 
assets. 
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121. Although Campbell testified that he must have sold an asset to be able to make 
the cash deposits, he said he could not remember what asset that would have been. Ex. 1 at 
49:20-23, 59:5-8. Furthermore, this testimony is in direct conflict with his testimony that he 
brought no asset worth more than $10,000 with him from Florida to Idaho. Ex. 1 at 36:5-7. 
122. Campbell did identify one asset-stock in a venture capital group-that he 
claimed may have been the source of the cash deposits. Ex. 1 at 52:12-19, 59:15-20. Notably, 
Campbell admits that he sold this stock prior to the issuance of the December 13, 2011 Judgment 
against him. Ex. 25 & Ex. 1 at 56:1-6. Moreover, in October 2010 Campbell testified that his 
venture capital stock was worthless. Ex. 10 at 86:20-87:17. It is thus unlikely that the stock 
went from being worthless in October 2010 to yielding a substantial amount of cash when sold 
sometime prior to December 13, 2011. 
123. Regardless of the stock's worth, this testimony still does not explain the multiple 
cash deposits. Campbell testified that he was paid by check for the stock sale, yet he made 
multiple cash deposits into his account. Ex. 1 at 55: 17-23. Had Campbell sold the stock in the 
venture capital company and maintained the proceeds in cash, he would have had access to a pile 
of cash. Yet, when asked if he cashed the check and kept tens of thousands of dollars in cash in 
his condo, he answered, "Did I hold money? No." Id. at 56:24-57:1. Immediately after making 
this statement, Campbell suddenly retreated from his stock sale response and claimed that he did 
not know if the money came from the stock sale. Id. at 57:17-58:1. When pressed on whether 
he liquidated items in Florida and came to Idaho with a "wad of cash," Campbell responded "I 
don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up with these deposits at this 
particular time." Id. at 58:5-10. 
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124. Thereafter, Campbell was asked further questions about the source of the cash. 
He was asked whether he would deposit all of the cash he had in his possession each time he 
made a deposit. Campbell responded that he did not remember. Ex. 1 at 60:12-20. 
125. On April 25, 2016-nine days before the previously scheduled May 4 trial date, 
Campbell sent to Plaintiffs' counsel a handwritten statement admitting that when he moved to 
Idaho, he had a moving company deliver boxes of his family's belongings, within which was 
some unspecified amount of cash "less than 1 OOK." Ex. 5-2. Campbell signed this statement, 
averring that the contents were true and correct to the best of his ability. Id. 
126. As the foregoing illustrates, Campbell's testimony during his August 2015 
debtor's exam regarding the source of his cash deposits was designed to obfuscate, not 
illuminate. 
127. Campbell did not testify truthfully when he testified as set forth below in 
paragraphs 128-48 because he knew at that time that the cash he was depositing into his Zions 
bank account came from the box of cash he claims to have been keeping in a storage facility. It 
is simply inconceivable that anyone would forget putting approximately $1 OOK in cash into a 
box, hiring a moving company to transport it across the country, and then depositing large sums 
of cash taken from these boxes into a bank account. It is even less conceivable that someone 
would not remember these events in August 2015, but suddenly remember them in April 2016 
(conveniently on the eve of the previously scheduled trial date). Furthermore, it is not credible 
that Campbell does not remember exactly what asset he liquidated to enable him to put 
approximately $100,000 of cash into a box. Campbell knew the answers to the questions but 
chose to claim ignorance instead of providing truthful responses. 
128. Count Twenty of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
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contempt when he testified untruthfully regarding cash deposits he made in his Zions bank 
account as follows: 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. Where could this have 
come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did somebody give you $10,000 in cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was back in 2011. 
Ex. 1 at 49:10-15. 
129. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty. 
130. Count Twenty-One of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was 
worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage units; 
correct? 
A. Well, I- to answer your question, I don't- I didn't bring anything 
with me that I would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
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Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 49:24-50:16. 
131. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-One. 
132. Count Twenty-Two of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe 
some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part 
of a venture capital group that we were involved with. 
* * * 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by 
my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000- end of 2011 what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
133. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Two. 
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134. Count Twenty-Three of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating 
to enable you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month; correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
A. I believe this was part- I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, 
but I think this was part of that stock settlement. 
* * * 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far - that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
13 5. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Three. 
136. Count Twenty-Four of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock 
- why were you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in 
cash in your condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits; right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
Id. at 56:21-57:3 
13 7. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four. 
138. Count Twenty-Five of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in 
one month. And if you're telling me that that money came from a 
stock sale, that would mean that you were having that cash from the 
stock sale somewhere within your reach; isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would you have gotten it if the money weren't in your 
reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I 
don't remember if it did or not. 
Q. So where - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash 
have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
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Q. Okay. And then - you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of 
cash that you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up 
with these deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
139. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five. 
140. Count Twenty-Six of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated 
February 21 s\ 2012; right? 
* * * 
Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 
deposit, a $2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous 
month of $10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the 
cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
141. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Six. 
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142. Count Twenty-Seven of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
143. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Seven. 
144. Count Twenty-Eight of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of 2012; 
right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you- so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made 
deposits of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in 
cash at the beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in 
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your possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the 
cash you had in your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
145. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Eight. 
146. Count Twenty-Nine of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would have obtained additional cash if not somebody providing it 
to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives 
you one piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of cash; right? Because you liquidated everything when you 
were in Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 
while you were in Florida and before you moved to Idaho other than 
what was in your storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any 
assets worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage 
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unit; right? 
A. Nothing that was worth more than $10,000 to my recollection, yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at60:21-61:17. 
147. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Nine. 
148. Count Thirty of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're- on February 22nd there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 
2?1h a $2,600 deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
149. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty. 
E. Campbell's False Testimony About How He Paid his Rent (Counts 31-34) 
150. Beginning in April 2012, Campbell's Zions Bank records establish that the only 
deposits into his account were his monthly social security payments. Ex. 3-69, 73, 79, 83, 87, 
91, 95. That is, at that time, Campbell stopped making cash deposits into his Zions account. The 
records further establish that, although Campbell had always paid his $1,500-per-month rent with 
a check from his Zions account prior to April 2012, after that date, there is no cancelled check 
evidencing the payment of his rent. Ex. 3-71, 77, 81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 103. When asked how he 
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paid his rent if there was no cancelled check establishing its payment after April, Campbell again 
repeatedly claimed that he could not remember. Ex. 1 at 65:6-23. 
151. It is not credible that a person who had been consistently paying his monthly rent 
with a check would forget why he stopped paying it in this manner, or how he had proceeded to 
pay his rent. 
152. When asked about the possible ways in which his rent was being paid, Campbell 
testified that he may have paid with a money order obtained from Atkinson's. Ex. 72:21-73:5. 
Campbell claimed he could not remember why he would have paid with a money order instead 
of a check. Ex. 74:3-6. Campbell did not identify as a possibility that he had prepaid several 
months' worth ofrent at a time. Nevertheless, the bank records that Campbell produced in 
August 2016 show that Campbell wrote a check to his landlord from his Bank of America 
account for $9,000. Ex. 6-10. It thus appears that Campbell prepaid his rent for at least part of 
2012. It defies credulity that someone would forget suddenly switching from monthly payments 
to prepaying six months at one time-particularly someone with purportedly limited income and 
assets. In sum, Campbell's testimony about how he paid his rent was not truthful. 
153. Count Thirty-One of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
A. I assume so. 
Q. Who was paying your rent? 
A. I don't know - I was, I assume. 
Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Ex. 1 at 65:9-14. 
154. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-One. 
155. Count Thirty-Two of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid your rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from 
the two bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of 
money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71:14-20. 
156. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-Two. 
157. Count Thirty-Three of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten - what source of funds could you have 
possibly used to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't 
remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you 
could have paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
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Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and 
your expenses, and we 're talking about $1,500 every month that 
you're saying that you didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with 
checks from the two bank accounts that you're telling us are the only 
bank accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at 
that time. 
Id. at 71:23-72:12. 
158. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-Three. 
159. Count Thirty-Four of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another 
bank account out there; right? Those are my only options that I can 
think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A. Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is 
there any other possible way. That's the only other possible way I can 
understand that it was being done. 
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Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you gone to Atkinson's 
with cash to obtain a money order? 
A. I have. 
* * * 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to 
pay for it, that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at 
that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either -
that stock that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into 
your Zions account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of -
A. I don't remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
160. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-Four. 
F. Affirmative Defenses Asserted as to the Criminal Counts 
161. Campbell asserts as to Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts the affirmative 
defense of past inability to comply with the court's order. It is not readily apparent how this 
affirmative defense relates to the criminal contempt counts, each of which is premised on giving 
false testimony. Regardless, Campbell has presented no evidence of a past inability to comply 
with any relevant court order. 
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V. CIVIL CONTEMPT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Elements and Burden of Proof 
162. It is a contempt of court to disobey a court order. Idaho Code§ 7-601(5). 
163. A civil contempt claim must be proven to a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho 
R. Civ. Proc. 75(j)(l). 
164. The failure to comply with a court order need not be intentional or willful to 
impose a civil contempt sanction. Chavez v. Canyon Cty., 152 Idaho 297, 304 (2012). 
165. "When the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act which is yet in the 
power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned until he has performed it[.]" Idaho Code 
§ 7-611. 
166. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(j)(l), the court must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence "that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the 
order violated[.]" 
167. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(h) establishes that present inability to comply is 
an affirmative defense, which the alleged contemnor must prove to a preponderance of the 
evidence. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(h). 
168. Courts applying similar laws put the burden regarding ability or inability to 
comply on the defendant. Thus, in Lamb v. Eads, the Iowa Supreme Court found that "the 
general rule holds that an applicant for a contempt citation establishes a prima facie case by 
proving the duty which is on the contemner and the contemner's [sic] failure to perform the duty. 
The contenmer then has the burden of showing he could not perform the duty, if he relies on that 
ground." 346 N.W. 2d 830, 832 (1984); see also Foust v. Denato, 175 N.W.2d 403,405 (Iowa 
1970) ("[W]hen the evidence clearly shows the order of court has been disobeyed, a party who 
seeks to purge himself of contempt by showing his inability to comply with the order of court 
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has the burden to prove it"). 1 Similarly, Spabile v. Hunt held that, while a court must find that a 
contemnor has the present ability to comply before imposing sanctions, it is the contemnor who 
bears the burden of proving his inability to comply. 360 A.2d 51 (Vt. 1976). 
169. This Court therefore finds that Campbell, the alleged contemnor, bears the burden 
of proving his present inability to comply with the orders allegedly violated. 
170. To satisfy his burden, an alleged contemnor must prove his defense of present 
inability to comply with admissible evidence. He cannot avoid his burden by claiming a Fifth 
Amendment privilege. U.S. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761 (1983). 
171. On June 18, 2016, this Court held that Campbell may assert only two affirmative 
defenses: (1) present inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the civil counts), and (2) 
past inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the criminal counts). Campbell waived all 
other affirmative defenses. 
B. Effect of Powers of Attorney 
1 72. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence ten documents purporting to confer 
on Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney to seek records from each lawyer and bank 
named in Plaintiffs' ten civil contempt counts (including those that Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss 
without prejudice). Exs. 501-10. 
173. Campbell asserts that these limited powers of attorney constitute compliance with 
the Court's Amended Order. 
174. The Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the bank records and 
See also 17 C.J.S. Contempt§ 141 (2015) ("When the moving party in a contempt action 
has shown that the alleged contemnor has failed to comply with the judgment or order, the 
burden shifts to the alleged conternnor to show why he or she should not be held in contempt. ... 
If the alleged contemnor makes a sufficient showing, the burden of proof shifts back to the party 
seeking a finding of contempt, who ultimately bears the burden of showing an ability to comply 
with the order.") 
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attorney payment records currently at issue. 
175. In the analogous context of discovery, it is well established that a party does not 
adequately respond to a request for production by telling the requesting party that it may go get 
the documents itself. Instead, "even where a requesting party already has documents in its 
possession, or could otherwise access those documents, the disclosing party may not withhold 
those documents." Beach Mart, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 396,410 (E.D.N.C. 2014); 
accord Rivers v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 5:08CV61/RS/EMT, 2008 WL 5111300, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2008); SSL, L.L.C. v. Garcia-Chicoine Enters., Inc., No. 04-1017-JTM, 2005 
WL 6793646, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2005); Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281,284 
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Fort Wash. Res., Inc. v. Tannen, 153 F.R.D. 78, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
176. If a party cannot satisfy a request for production by informing the requesting party 
that he already possesses the relevant documents, then a fortiori, a party cannot satisfy a court 
order directing production by merely authorizing the requesting party to obtain the documents 
from a third-party source. 
177. Additionally, there is no evidence that Campbell's limited powers of attorney 
would be effective to allow Plaintiffs to obtain the records in question. 
178. Campbell's failure to cite any evidence or law supporting the efficacy of these 
limited powers of attorney is particularly problematic as to the records related to the Hong Kong 
account. It is dubious that limited powers of attorney granted in the United States and under U.S. 
law would be effective to obtain records related to a bank account at a Hong Kong bank in the 
name ofa Hong Kong company. 
179. Moreover, as discussed supra with respect to the limited power of attorney related 
to the Hong Kong Account, the document does not state on its face that Campbell is authorized 
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by Mosaic Orange to confer such a power. 
180. Campbell thus has not offered sufficient evidence to show that his limited powers 
of attorney (Exhibits 501-10) are relevant. 
181. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell did not comply 
with the Court's Amended Order by providing Plaintiffs with the original copies of the limited 
powers of attorney admitted as Exhibits 501-10. 
C. Conclusions of Law Specific to Count 1 
182. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce to Plaintiffs all 
documents evidencing payments made by Campbell to Flyer over the period of 2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
183. To date, Campbell has not produced a single document evidencing any payment 
that he made to Flyer over the period of 2009 to present. 
184. Thus, to date, Campbell has not complied with the Court's Amended Order 
insofar as it relates to Count 1. 
185. For the reasons discussed in paragraphs 41-48, supra, the Court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Campbell has the present ability to Comply with the Court's 
Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count One. 
186. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds Campbell in contempt under 
Count One of the Charging Affidavit. 
D. Conclusions of Law Specific to Count 8 
187. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce to Plaintiffs all 
records relating to the Hong Kong Account for the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to 
the present date. 
188. To date, Campbell has not produced a single record relating to the Hong Kong 
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Account. 
189. Thus, to date, Campbell has not complied with the Court's Amended Order 
insofar as it relates to Count 8. 
190. For the reasons discussed in paragraphs 58-66, supra, the Court finds by a 
preponderance that Campbell has the present ability to Comply with the Court's Amended Order 
insofar as it relates to Count Eight. 
191. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds Campbell in contempt under 
Count Eight of the Charging Affidavit. 
VI. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
192. None of the foregoing conclusions oflaw is based in any way on Campbell's 
testimony during trial. 
A. Elements 
193. A party's "[d]eceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court" is 
punishable as a contempt. Idaho Code§ 7-601. 
194. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 750), criminal contempt must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 750). Reasonable doubt "is not mere possible 
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt." Idaho Crim. Jury Instr. 1707. Instead, "it is the state of the 
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of 
the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral 
certainty, of the truth of the charge." Id. 
19 5. Plaintiffs' criminal contempt charges arise from Campbell's false testimony given 
under oath during his August 24, 2015 debtor's examination. 
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B. Lies During the Debtor's Exam and in the Context of this Case Are Relevant 
to Plaintiffs' Criminal Contempt Counts 
196. During closing argument, Campbell argued that this Court should essentially 
consider the testimony underlying each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts in a vacuum-
without considering the transcript of Campbell's August 2015 debtor's exam as a whole. He also 
argued that Campbell's other lies to Plaintiffs in the context of this litigation and the underlying 
facts are irrelevant to Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts. Campbell's arguments are both 
wrong. 
197. It is proper for this Court to consider the testimony underlying each criminal 
contempt count in light of the August 2015 debtor's examination as a whole. The context of 
Campbell's overall testimony during the August 2015 debtor's examination is relevant and 
important to shed light on the testimony's meaning. 
198. Moreover, the totality of basic facts that Campbell claimed to forget during this 
examination, considered alongside his shifting and inconsistent answers, shows that each of 
Campbell's claims of memory loss is feigned. See In re Sowers, 229 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1998) (considering uncharged omissions while addressing whether debtors' failure to 
disclose certain facts related to their finances was intentional and stating "even if this Court were 
to believe that the foregoing mentioned omissions were merely the result of some sort of 
oversight or ignorance on the part of the Defendants, this notion becomes preposterous when 
combined with the many other omissions of the Defendants"). As with In re Sowers, considering 
each of Campbell's claims of memory loss in light of the many other things he claimed not to 
remember during the August 2015 debtor's examination shows that each claim of memory loss 
underlying Plaintiffs' contempt charges is preposterous. 
199. Additionally, the numerous other misstatements and omissions that Campbell 
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made to these Plaintiffs in the course of this litigation and underlying events for the same 
purpose of preventing Plaintiffs from learning information about Campbell's finances are 
relevant to Campbell's intent to again prevent Plaintiffs from learning about his finances during 
the August 2015 debtor's examination. See United States v. Mebust, 857 F. Supp. 609, 618-19 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (defendant's uncharged prior procurement of firearm owner identification cards 
by false statements relevant to his intent to knowingly make false statements in the case at bar); 
Estes v. Anglin, No. 2:14-CV-994-SLB, 2015 WL 1279746, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2015) ("A 
pattern of omissions on the part of the debtor is often sufficient to find fraudulent intent[.]"); 
Abdo v. Com., 64 Va. App. 468,474 (Ct. App. 2015) (alleged contemnor's prior uncharged 
instances of tardiness relevant to showing intent on the charged occasion). 
200. Moreover, given its relevance to intent, this evidence is also relevant to show 
Campbell's willfulness in giving the alleged false testimony underlying Plaintiffs' criminal 
contempt charges. 
C. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Affirmative Defense of Past 
Inability to Comply 
201. Campbell asserts as to Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts the affirmative 
defense of past inability to comply with the Court's order. 
202. Given that Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts are premised not on violation of a 
court order, but on giving false testimony, Campbell's asserted affirmative defense is irrelevant 
to the criminal contempt counts at bar. 
203. Nevertheless, even if this affirmative defense were relevant, there is no evidence 
that Campbell was unable to comply with any relevant court order at the time of his August 2015 
debtor's examination. 
204. Therefore, as to each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts, the Court finds that 
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Campbell failed to meet his burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Thus, as to each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts, the Court rejects Campbell's 
affirmative defense of past inability to comply with the Court's order. 
D. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's False Testimony Related to the 
Source of Funds Used to Open his Bank of America Account, His Car, and 
Where he Lived (Counts 11-17) 
205. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
examination when he was asked "[ w ]here did that money come from?" and answered "I have no 
idea at this point." Ex. 1 at 34:3-4. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Eleven was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Eleven. 
206. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
examination when he was asked whether the nearly $25,000 used to open the Bank of America 
account came from his Zion's Account and he said "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 34:5-7. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twelve was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twelve. 
207. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
examination when he responded to questions about the possible source of money used to open 
the Bank of America account with "I don't remember" and "I don't know." Ex. 1 at 34:17-25. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
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testimony underlying Count Thirteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirteen. 
208. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked whether he owned any assets that he sold around the 
time he opened the Bank of America account and said "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 35:1-3. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Fourteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Fourteen. 
209. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked twice whether he owned a car in 2012 and twice 
answered that he did not remember. Ex. 1 at 35:4-7. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Fifteen was 
willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Fifteen. 
210. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked where he lived in June 2012 and answered "I don't 
remember." Ex. 1 at 35:12-15. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Sixteen was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Sixteen. 
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211. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he repeatedly testified that he did not remember the source form 
which he obtained the tens of thousands of dollars used to open his Bank of America Account. 
Ex. 1 at 35:25-37:22. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's 
giving of the false testimony underlying Count Seventeen was willful. The Court therefore finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Seventeen. 
E. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's False Testimony About the 
Source of a Large Cash Deposit to His Bank of America Account (Count 18) 
212. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he answered questions about the source of a $3,410 deposit by saying 
"I have no idea" and "I don't know." Ex. 1 at 38:18-24. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Eighteen was 
willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Eighteen. 
F. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's False Testimony Related to the 
Company in Whose Name Campbell Opened the Hong Kong Account (Count 
19) 
213. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he repeatedly testified that he did not remember the name of the 
company in whose name he set up the Hong Kong Account into which he deposited $300,000. 
Ex. 1 at 41 :15-22. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving 
of the false testimony underlying Count Nineteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond 
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a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Nineteen. 
G. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's False Testimony About the 
Source of Large Cash Deposits to Campbell's Zions Bank Account (Counts 
20-30) 
214. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he testified that he did not remember where the $10,000 of cash that 
he deposited in one month could have come from or whether somebody gave him $10,000 in 
cash. Ex. 1 at 49:10-15. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's 
giving of the false testimony underlying Count Twenty was willful. The Court therefore finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty. 
215. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Two related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 49:24-50:16. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-One was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-One. 
216. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Two related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 52:8-54:5. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Two was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Two. 
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source of large amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Three was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Three. 
218. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 56:21-57:3. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Four. 
219. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five related to the 
source of large amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 57: 17-58: IO. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Five. 
220. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
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debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Six related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 58:12-59:1. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Six was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Six. 
221. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Seven related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 59:2-8. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Seven was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Seven. 
222. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Eight related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 60:2-20. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Eight was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Eight. 
223. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Nine related to the 
source of large amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 60:21-61: 17. 
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Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twenty-Nine was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Nine. 
224. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Thirty related to the source 
of large amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 62: 5-9. Moreover, 
the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony 
underlying Count Thirty was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty. 
H. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's False Testimony About How He 
Paid his Rent (Counts 31-34) 
225. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he testified that he did not remember who or how his rent was paid 
during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced indicated that he 
had ceased paying his rent by check. Ex. 1 at 65:9-14. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Thirty-One was 
willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Thirty-One. 
226. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he testified that he did not remember sources of money from which 
his rent was paid during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced 
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indicated that he had ceased paying his rent by check. Ex. 1 at 71: 14-20. Moreover, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count 
Thirty-Two was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is 
guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty-Two. 
227. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he answered a variety of questions about how his rent was paid 
during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced indicated that he 
had ceased paying his rent by check by saying that he did not remember. Ex. 1 at 71 :23-72: 12. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Thirty-Three was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty-Three. 
228. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Thirty-Four regarding how 
his rent paid during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced 
indicated that he had ceased paying his rent by check. Ex. 1 at 72:16-74:6. Moreover, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count 
Thirty-Four was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is 
guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty-Four. 
VII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
229. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Campbell is guilty of civil contempt Counts One and Eight. 
230. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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Campbell is guilty of criminal contempt Counts Eleven thru Thirty-Four. 
231. The Court orders the parties to appear for a hearing regarding Campbell's 
sentencing on the __ day of , 2016. 
-------------
232. Campbell shall file any brief regarding sentencing no later than 14 days before the 
sentencing hearing. 
233. Plaintiffs shall file their response, if any, no later than 7 days before the 
sentencing hearing. 
DATED: August \C\, 2016 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August __B, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of 
the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
V Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
~~, 
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Lee P. Ritzau 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
460 Sun Valley Road, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Tel: 208/726-8219 
Fax: 208/726-3750 
ISB No. 5239 
Attorneys for Defendant Neil David Campbell 
AUG 19 20i6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Case No. CV-2012-407 
I 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD., and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NEIL CAMPBELL'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
v. 
) 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, ) 
individually; NEIL DA YID ) 
CAMPBELL, individually; ) 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, ) 
S.A., a corporation; PROTECCION ) 
FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., a ) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through ) 
50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
This case was tried on July 261h and 271\ 2016, in the above-entitled Court, the Honorable 
Robert Elgee presiding. Plaintiffs/Petitioner, C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., (hereinafter 
"C&M") and KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (hereinafter "Karlin"), and 
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together ("Petitioners") were represented by Erin Clark of Lawson, Laski, Clark and Pogue, 
PLLC, and Defendant/Respondent, Neil Campbell (hereinafter "Neil"), was represented by Lee 
Ritzau ofLuboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. Evidence, both oral and documentary, 
was introduced by the parties. The Court, having considered the evidence, and being fully 
advised, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that: 
A. CASE HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION 
1. The California civil case leading to the commencement of the present case in 
Idaho started on October 10, 2007 (Exhibit 19). Neil was added to the California civil case on 
November 17, 2008 (Exhibit 20). The California civil case first resulted in a judgment against 
Neil on February 4, 2010 in the amount of$1,545,000.00 (Exhibit 24: page 2: line 31). As a 
result of the $1,545,000.00 judgment in the California civil case, Neil was deposed in Florida on 
October 29, 2010. (Exhibit 10). The California case was still active in October of2010 when 
Neil was deposed in Florida. On December 11, 2013 the California civil case revisited the 
judgment against Neil and issued a subsequent judgment against Neil of $24,488,740 plus costs. 
(Exhibit 25). 
A. Neil was involved in the California civil case for almost 8 years before 
Mr. Ritzau was appointed to represent him in the current litigation. There were collection efforts 
in the California civil case for 6 years before Mr. Ritzau was appointed to represent Neil. 
2. On June 1, 2012 Petitioners filed their Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment in 
with this Court. On June 19, 2012 Petitioners' filed their Motion for Issuance of Order of 
Domestication. On June 21, 2012 the Court issued an Order of Domestication. This was 
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obviously done because Petitioners knew Neil was residing in Idaho. 
3. Mr. Campbell is a 68 year old man who was born on (Exhibit 8: 
page 1 and Neil's testimony). Petitioners' owner, Gary Michelson, urged the Los Angeles 
District Attorney to charge Neil with 140 felony counts in a Los Angeles criminal case. (Exhibit 
8: page 2). Bail in the Los Angeles criminal case was set at $10,000,000.00 and since Neil could 
not post bail, he spent between 17 months and 18 months in jail awaiting his criminal trial. 
(Exhibit 8: page 2 & Exhibit 1: page 35: lines 19-24). The Los Angeles criminal case was 
eventually tried in about October of 2014. (Exhibit 8: page 3). Subtracting a about a year and a 
half from October, 2014 means Neil was in Los Angeles in jail between the spring of 2013 and 
the fall of 2014. At the conclusion of the Los Angeles criminal trial, Neil was found not guilty of 
139 of the felony counts pursued by the Los Angeles District Attorney, and guilty of one felony 
count pursued by the Los Angeles District Attorney. (Exhibit 8: page 3). 
4. Neil's time in jail obviously accounts for the lack of activity in the present case 
between June 1, 2012 when this case was started and the fall of 2014 when Neil was released 
from jail. 
5. On March 23, 2015 the Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's 
Examination was issued by the Court. 
6. On April 1, 2015 an Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's 
Examination was issued by the Court. 
7. On August 3, 2015 a Second Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment 
Debtor's Examination was issued by the Court. 
i. Pursuant to the Second Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment 
Debtor's Examination, on August 24, 2015 Neil's examination was taken by counsel for the 
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Petitioners. 
8. On February 1, 2016 the Charging Affidavit of Erin F. Clark in Support of 
Motion for Order Finding Neil David Campbell in Contempt (hereinafter "the Charging 
Affidavit") was filed with the Court. The Charging Affidavit sought to adjudicate 1 O counts of 
contempt of court seeking a civil sanction and 24 counts of contempt of court seeking a criminal 
sanction. 
9. On June 1, 2016 the Order Regarding Appointment was entered by the Court 
which appointed Lee Ritzau as the attorney for Neil Campbell, the Respondent. Prior to June 1, 
2016 Neil represented himself. Mr. Ritzau had just under two months to prepare for trial. 
10. On July 26 and 27, 2016 trial was held in this case. Petitioners pursued the 
10 counts of contempt of court seeking a civil sanction and 24 counts of contempt of court 
seeking a criminal sanction which are set forth in the Charging Affidavit. The parties and court 
frequently referred to the 10 counts of contempt seeking a civil sanction as civil contempt of 
court and the 24 counts of contempt of court seeking a criminal sanction as criminal contempt of 
court. 
B. CIVIL CONTEMPT CHARGES 
1. The Charging Affidavit sets forth ten counts of alleged civil contempt. Eight 
counts, Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 were dismissed by the Petitioners during their closing 
argument given on July 27, 2016. The two alleged remaining civil contempt charges are as 
follows: 
A. Count One alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to 
produce documents evidencing payments he made to David Flyer over the period of 2009 to the 
present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
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Neil's Responses to Count 1: 
I. Respondent's Exhibit 501 was Neil's Limited Power of Attorney 
for David Flyer, the original of which was provided to Petitioners on July 27, 2016 so Petitioners 
could obtain the records which form the subject matter of the civil contempt charges set forth in 
count one. 
a In Re Houshang Dardashti v. Jeffry Golden, 2008 WL 
8444 787 (Ninth Circuit 2008), the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California entered 
a Turnover Order which required Mr. Dardashti, the debtor, to execute and return to Mr. Golden, 
the trustee, a power of attorney form prepared by Mr. Golden as well as perform certain other 
tasks. Mr. Dardashti refused to execute the power of attorney prepared by Mr. Golden. Since 
Mr. Dardashti refused to execute the power of attorney, Mr. Golden sought an order to show 
cause requiring Mr. Dardashti to appear and show why he should not be held in contempt of 
court. The bankruptcy judge found Mr. Dardashti in contempt of court for his refusal to execute 
the power of attorney prepared by Mr. Golden. The Ninth Circuit upheld both the Turnover 
Order entered by the bankruptcy judge as well as the Contempt Order entered by the bankruptcy 
judge. The Contempt Order required that Mr. Dardashti be incarcerated until he executed the 
power of attorned, fined daily until he complied with the element of the Turnover Order requiring 
he execute a power of attorney, and ordered him to pay certain expenses and attorney fees; 
b. In Eckard v. Eckard, 333 MD. 531 (App. Maryland 
1994) the Eckard Court upheld the lower court's ruling which found Mrs. Eckard in contempt of 
court due to her refusal to sign a power of attorney authorizing Mr. Eckard to sell land located in 
Florida owned by both Mrs. Eckard and Mr. Eckard; 
c. Given the court's ability to require Mr. Dardashti and 
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Mrs. Eckard sign powers of attorney so that certain matters could be accomplished in those cases, 
the fact that Neil provided limited powers of attorney to the Petitioners so they can obtain the 
documents at issue is compliance with the Court's Order and equivalent to Neil providing the 
documents himself 
B. Count Eight alleges Mr. Campbell is in civil contempt for his failure to 
produce all records relating to his HSBC bank account, including documents that identify any 
deposits made into and any disbursements of founds from that account. 
Neil's Responses to Count 8: 
I. Respondent's Exhibit 508 was Neil's Limited Power of Attorney 
for HSBC bank, the original of which was provided to Petitioners on July 27, 2016 so Petitioners 
could obtain the records which form the subject matter of the civil contempt charges set forth in 
count eight. 
2. In Respondent's Exhibits 501 through 510, Mr. Campbell provided Petitioners 
a Limited Power of Attorney to obtain the records which form the subject matter of the civil 
contempt charges set forth in counts one through ten. Only Exhibits 501 and 508 are relevant 
given Petitioners' dismissal of counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10. 
3. Given that Mr. Campbell has provided Petitioners with a Limited Power of 
Attorney to obtain the records which form the subject matter of the civil contempt charges set 
forth in counts one and eight, he has done what the court previously ordered him to due, and thus 
a civil sanction is not warranted in this case. 
C. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES 
1. The Charging Affidavit sets forth twenty four counts of alleged criminal 
contempt. Of the twenty four alleged counts of criminal contempt, all twenty four are as a result 
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of Mr. Campbell answering he didn't know the answer or he does not remember the information 
sought by the answer. Additionally, all twenty four counts of alleged criminal contempt of court 
involve situations more than three years old at the time his August 24, 2015 deposition was 
taken. Neil's responses to the criminal contempt charges are set forth below each count of 
contempt of court seeking a criminal sanction. The alleged criminal contempt charges are as 
follows: 
COUNT ELEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 2012 
opening balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
Q. So this is the statement from June g1\ 2012, through July 91\ 2012: 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June gt\ 2012, as being 
$24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea at this point. 
Id. at 33:22-34:4. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 11: 
I. Q. So you have no explanation for how $10,000 was deposited into your 
account? 
A. I must have sold off some type of assets, but I don't remember what it 
was or how it was done. 
Exhibit 1: page 49: lines 20-23 
II. Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated at this time. 
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Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. Iwas. 
Exhibit 1: page 50: lines 5-10. 
III. Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So how did you make up that difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe 
some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part of a 
venture capital group that we were involved with? 
Exhibit 1: page 52: lines 8-15 
IV. Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating 
to enable you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month; correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January of 2012. 
A. I believe this was part - - I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, 
but I think this was part of that stock settlement. 
Q. And then the stock settlement was enabling you to live with expenses 
far exceeding your social security payment? 
A. Correct 
Exhibit 1: page 54: line 24 through Page 55: line 10 
V. A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I 
don't remember if it did or not. 
Q. So where - - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would the case 
have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Exhibit 1: page 57: line 25 through page 58: line 10 
VI. Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
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A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Exhibit 1: page 59: lines 5-8. 
VII. Q. And yet you still say that you didn't have a box somewhere filled with 
cash from liquidation of the items in Florida? 
A. I don't remember the - - where this money was coming from directly, if 
it was from that stock sale. I don't remember. This is back in 2012. 
Exhibit 1: page 59: lines 18 - 20. 
VIII. In the summer of2008 Dr. Michaelson paid $500,000 for Neil's interest in 
C&M. 
Petitioner's Revised Trial Brief: page 4. 
COUNT TWELVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000.00 into it. Did it 
come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. At 34:5-7. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 12: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT THIRTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. What possibly- where possibly could this money have come from? 
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A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 13: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT FOURTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own an assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 14: 
I. The question in Count 14 is vague as to time. "That time" could be 
somewhere between June 8, 2012 and July 9, 2012 (Exhibit 1: page 33: 
lines 22 and 23), all of 2012 (Exhibit 1: page 34: lines 11 and 12) or some 
other time frame. For these reasons Petitioners have failed to prove Neil 
lied beyond a reasonable doubt. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Fourteen was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle). Whether or not Neil 
remembered selling assets at some undetermined time was not going to 
provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination 
which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. A reading of 
almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination lead to the 
conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court charges, not 
gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in this case. 
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A. "Criminal contempt is the commission of a disrespectful act 
directed at the court itself which obstructs justice. A criminal 
contempt proceeding is maintained solely and simply to vindicate 
the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct 
offensive to the public in violation of an order of the court." Camp 
v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850,862 (2002). 
B. In the Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 
747, case cited by Petitioners, the Ohio Department of Taxation 
Court states, "in order to sustain a conviction for contempt for 
giving false testimony, it must be shown that the false testimony 
had an obstructive effect, that the court had judicial knowledge of 
the falsity of the testimony, and that the questions were pertinent to 
the issues in the case." Ohio Department of Taxation at 753. 
C. Regarding Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkel, Petitioners cite 
the case as standing for the proposition "debtor was held in 
contempt for evasive and false answers regarding his assets." 
Plaintiff's Trial Brief at page 8. This case actually has no 
relevance to answers like "I don't know" or "I don't remember." 
The holding in Ohio Department of Taxation stated, "a review of 
the record and proceedings below reveals that at the debtor's 
examination of July 19, 2004, appellant blatantly lied about his 
interest in real property ... " Ohio Department of Taxation v. 
Kunkle at 753 and 754. 
D. There is no holding in Ohio Department of Taxation that answers 
similar to "I don't know" or "I don't remember'' are sufficient to 
establish criminal contempt of court. To the contrary, the Ohio 
Department of Taxation Court stated, "a well-founded belief of the 
testimony's untruthfulness is not sufficient." Ohio Department of 
Taxation at 753. 
E. " ... contempt is an extraordinary proceeding and should be 
approached with caution. This Court has recognized contempt is 
an extraordinary proceeding. Phillips 95 Idaho at 405, 509 P.2d at 
1326. This inherent power must be exercised with great caution ... 
. The contempt power is readily susceptible of abuse and fraught 
with danger not only to personal liberties but to the respect and 
confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a 
power is universally recognized as essential to an orderly and 
effective administration and execution of justice, it should be 
exercised with utmost caution .... Since a contempt citation is a 
'potent weapon, .... courts rightly impose it with caution .... 
Imposing a willful standard ensures that courts cannot abuse their 
inherent contempt power. It also ensures that courts only impose 
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such an extraordinary remedy when the alleged contemnor has 
wrongfully disobeyed a court order." In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick 
and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 
(2005). 
COUNT FIFTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 15: 
I. Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he did not know ifhe owned a car in 2012. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Fifteen was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle). Whether or not Neil owned a 
car in 2012 was not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 
2015 Debtor's Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting 
their judgment. A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at 
his examination lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create 
contempt of court charges, not gather information to collect the huge 
judgment at issue in this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East 
Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation 
v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule 
Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) which is 
set forth in Neil's Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, 
the quotations from those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT SIXTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
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A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 16: 
I. On June 1, 2012 Petitioners filed their Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment. 
On June 19, 2012 Petitioners' filed their Motion for Issuance of Order of 
Domestication. On June 21, 2012 the Court issued an Order of 
Domestication. This was obviously done because Petitioners knew Neil 
was residing in Idaho; 
II. Q. So in 2011 you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't know. I don't remember, but it's in - - I'm trying to backdate. I 
lived in Idaho for almost two years before I was arrested, and I was in jail 
for almost 17 months, and I've been out since November, so you just 
backtrack from there. 
Exhibit 1: page 35: lines 19-24. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Sixteen was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Where Neil lived in 2012 was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT SEVENTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of America 
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account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000.00 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
*** 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000.00 and you were living 
solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for you to be able to 
put $24,000 into a bank account in June of 2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
*** 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are here under 
penalty of perjury. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when you're 
saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social Security, it just 
does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 17: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of 2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
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COUNT EIGHTEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. An that on November 30, 2012, you deposited $3,410; right? 
A. That's what it states, yes. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Where could it have come from? 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 38:18-24. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 18: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT NINETEEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with HSBC? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank account and 
put $300,000 into it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 41:15-22. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 19: 
I. Q. Let me ask you about offshore bank accounts. Specialty Interrogatory 
No. 8, we asked if you've ever had an account with a bank or financial 
NEIL CAMPBELL'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -15 
417 of 636
institution in a country other than the United States and, if so, to state what 
the name and address of that bank or financial institution is and the dates 
of which that account was opened. 
And your response to Special Interrogatory No. 8 is that you have 
never had an account with a bank of financial institution in a county other 
than the United States. But then you state that you were the beneficiary of 
an account at HSBC at P.O. Box 27677, Kowloon Central Post Office, 
Hong Kong, which was open in early 2010. Can you just explain to me 
the circumstances under which you became the beneficiary of an account 
in Hong Kong? 
A. Do you want to explain that? 
Mr. Michaels: You have to answer it. 
A. Oh. It's just the way this was particularly set up is that I was just an 
officer of that particular corporation. 
Q. Okay. What corporation are you talking about? 
A. I don't remember the name of it offhand. 
Exhibit 2: page 22: line 20 through page 23: line 20. 
II. On April 25, 2016 Neil emailed Erin Clark various bank records. The 
name of the corporation at issue is Mosaic Orange Limited as provided in 
the bank statement from Jonathan Michaels contained in Exhibit 4: page 
95. Apparently Neil's memory of the corporate name was refreshed when 
he received the bank statement from Michaels Law Group APLC depicted 
in Exhibit 4: page 95. 
COUNT TWENTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully regarding cash deposits he made in his Zion's bank account as 
follows: 
Q. Well, it's almost $10,000 in cash in one month. Where could this have come 
from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did someone give you $10,000in cash? 
A. I don't remember how this was set up. This was back in 2011. 
Id. at 49:10-15. 
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NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 20: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT TWENTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was worth more 
than $10,000 other than what was I the storage units, correct? 
A. Well, I - to answer your question, I don't - I didn't bring anything with me that I 
would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 49:24-50: 16. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 21: 
I. Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he did not know if he had liquidated everything before he 
moved to Idaho. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-One was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
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Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Whether or not Neil 
remembered ifhe had liquidated all his Florida assets prior to moving to 
Idaho was not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 
Debtor's Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their 
judgment. A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his 
examination lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of 
court charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue 
in this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct: 
A. Correct. 
Q. so, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe some of it 
came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part of a venture capital 
group that we were involved with. 
*** 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000 - end of 2011 what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 22: 
I. Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he did not remember what assets he might have still been 
liquidating in 2011. 
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II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Two was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Whether or not Neil 
remembered what assets he may have still been liquidating in 2011 was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating to enable 
you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month, correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
A. I believe this was part - I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, but I think 
this was part of that stock settlement. 
*** 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far - that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
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NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 23: 
I. Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he did not remember how much prior to January of 2012 he 
would have deposited a check for funds generated from a stock sale. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Three was not 
a disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle). Whether or not Neil 
remembered what assets he may have still been liquidating in 2011 was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock - why were 
you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in cash in your 
condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits, right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
Id. at 56:21-57:3. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 24: 
I. Neil truthfully testified that he made cash deposits in his examination so 
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there is no lie which would be the basis for contempt of court in Count 24. 
IL Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he testified he made cash deposits. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Four was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East F ark Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he made cash 
deposits and the fact that he made cash deposits in the past was not going 
to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination 
which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. A reading of 
almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination lead to the 
conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court charges, not 
gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in this case. 
Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 
850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 
747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and 
Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's Response 
to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from those 
three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-FIVE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in one month. 
And if you're telling me that that money came from a stock sale, that would mean 
that you were having that cash from the stock sale somewhere within your reach; 
isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would have gotten it if the money weren't in your reach? 
A. Well, you're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I don't 
remember if it did or not. 
Q. So were - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then - you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of cash that 
you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up with these 
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deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 25: 
I. Neil testified it came from the sale of stock or the liquidation of assets. 
His testimony it was from either of these two possibilities and that he did 
not remember which was truthful. 
II. Petitioners have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered he testified he how he came into possession of the cash 
deposits he made in the 2011/2012 time frame. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Five was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he made cash 
deposits and the fact that he does not remember where the cash came from 
was not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-SIX: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated February 
2l8\ 2012; right. 
*** 
Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 deposit, a 
$2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous month of 
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$10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 26: 
I. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 27: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-
Seven. He testified that he didn't remember unless it was cash he received 
from selling items in this 2011/2012 time frame. 
IL Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Seven was not 
a disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he received cash 
from the sale of assets in the 2011/2012 time frame and the fact that he 
does not remember wether anyone else provided him cash during this 
2011/2012 time frame was not going to provide information at Neil's 
August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination which would assist Petitioners in 
collecting their judgment. A reading of almost all of the questions 
directed to Neil at his examination lead to the conclusion it was an attempt 
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to create contempt of court charges, not gather information to collect the 
huge judgment at issue in this case. Please see the language in Camp v. 
East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of 
Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John 
Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick 
and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) 
which is set forth in Neil's Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of 
brevity, the quotations from those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of 2012; right? 
A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you - so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made deposits 
of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in cash at the 
beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in your 
possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the cash you had in 
your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 28: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-
Eight. He testified that he didn't remember whether he depleted all of the 
cash he had when he deposited cash in the 2011/2012 time frame. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Eight was not 
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a disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember whether or not he depleted all his cash in 2011/2012 time frame 
when he made cash deposits and the fact that he does not remember 
wether or not he depleted all of his cash in the 2011/2012 time frame was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT TWENTY-NINE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would have obtained additional cash if not somebody providing it to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives you one 
piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of cash; right? Because you liquidate everything when you were in 
Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 while you 
were in Florida and before you moved to Idaho other than what was in your 
storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any assets worth 
more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage unit, right? 
A. Nothing that was wroth more than $10,000 to my recollection yeah. 
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Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:21-61 :17. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 29: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-
Nine. He testified that he didn't remember whether he owned anything in 
Florida when he moved to Idaho. 
11. In Exhibit 2, Neil's February 20, 2015 Debtor's Examination in California, 
Neil testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. And is there anything that would refresh you on whether 
you might have accounts you have access to? You said not to your 
knowledge. 
A. Let me put it this way. There's no accounts open that I have 
knowledge of that would be over $1,000.00. Is that - - that's pretty 
much with reference to everything out there. But there might be 
accounts open in Florida or here that might have $20.00 or $30.00 
in it that might still be open. I just don't know. But nothing more 
than $1,000.00. 
Exhibit 2: page 35: lines 3 through 12. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Nine was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember whether or not he owned anything in Florida when he moved to 
Idaho. It has already been established that Petitioners collected 
approximately $2,000.000.00 from foreclosing on a house Neil had 
purchase in Florida. (Exhibit 8: page 4). Whether Neil remembered 
owning any assets in Florida when he moved to Idaho was not going to 
provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination 
which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. A reading of 
almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination lead to the 
conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court charges, not 
gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in this case. 
Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 
850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 
747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and 
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Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's Response 
to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from those 
three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT THIRTY: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're - on February 22nct there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 27th a $2,600 
deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 30: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty. He 
testified that he didn't remember where several cash deposits came from in 
February of 2012. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Thirty was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructedjustice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember where the money for two cash deposits in February of 2012 had 
come from. Whether Neil remembered the source of two cash deposits in 
February of 2012 was not going to provide information at Neil's August 
24, 2015 Debtor's Examination which would assist Petitioners in 
collecting their judgment. A reading of almost all of the questions 
directed to Neil at his examination lead to the conclusion it was an attempt 
to create contempt of court charges, not gather information to collect the 
huge judgment at issue in this case. Please see the language in Camp v. 
East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of 
Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John 
Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick 
and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) 
which is set forth in Neil's Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of 
brevity, the quotations from those three cases will not be repeated. 
III. Please see Neil's response to Count 11, subparagraphs I through VIII. The 
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details will not be set forth in full to avoid duplicating information 
however Neil testified in other places of his Debtor's Examination that he 
sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, that he 
liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer 
of2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. The 
specific exchange of questions and answers is set forth in Count 11. 
COUNT THIRTY-ONE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully about why his bank records no longer showed him paying his 
rent with a check as he had done for the previous five months. Specifically, 
Campbell testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
A. I assume so. 
Q. Who was paying your rent? 
A. I don't know - I was, I assume. 
Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 65:9-14. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 31: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-One. 
He testified that he didn't remember how he was paying his rent in 2012. 
It is unclear whether Petitioners are referring to cash or check which would 
be the context from the questions and answers immediately proceeding the 
language of Count Thirty-One. 
II. Additionally, Count Thirty-One ignores Neil's answer stating he might 
have paid it by money order. 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have 
another bank account out there; right? Those are my only options 
that I can think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Exhibit 1: page 72: lines 16 -22. 
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III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-One was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember how his rent was being paid. Whether Neil remembered 
whether his rent was being paid by cash or check or cashier's check was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT THIRTY-TWO: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid you rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from the two 
bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71: 17-20. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 32: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-Two. 
He testified that he didn't remember how he was paying his rent in 2012. 
II. Additionally, Count Thirty-Two ignores Neil's answer stating he might 
have paid it by money order. 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have 
another bank account out there; right? Those are my only options 
that I can think of. Can you thin of any other? 
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A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Exhibit 1: page 72: lines 16 -22. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-Two was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember how his rent was being paid. Whether Neil remembered 
whether his rent was being paid by cash or check or cashier's check was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT THIRTY-THREE: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he 
testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten - what source of funds could you have possibly used 
to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you could have 
paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and your 
expenses, and we're talking about $1,500 every month that you're saying that you 
didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with checks from the two bank accounts that 
you're telling us are the only bank accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at that time. 
Id. at 71 :23-72:4. 
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NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 33: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-
Three. He testified that he didn't remember how he was paying his rent in 
2012. 
IL Additionally, Count Thirty-Three ignores Neil's answer stating he might 
have paid it by money order. 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have 
another bank account out there; right? Those are my only options 
that I can think of. Can you thin of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Exhibit 1: page 72: lines 16 -22. 
III. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-Three was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructedjustice (see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember how his rent was being paid. Whether Neil remembered 
whether his rent was being paid by cash or check or cashier's check was 
not going to provide information at Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's 
Examination which would assist Petitioners in collecting their judgment. 
A reading of almost all of the questions directed to Neil at his examination 
lead to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt of court 
charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in 
this case. Please see the language in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio 
App. 3d 747, and In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's 
Response to Count 14 above. For purposes of brevity, the quotations from 
those three cases will not be repeated. 
COUNT THIRTY-FOUR: Campbell committed criminal contempt when he testified 
untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for month you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody was paying it 
for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another bank account out there; 
right? Those are my only options that I can think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
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Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A. Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is there any 
other possible ways. That's the only other possible way I can understand that it 
was being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you one to Atkinson's with cash to 
obtain a money order? 
A. I have. 
*** 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to pay for it, 
that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either - that stock 
that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into your Zion's 
account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of -
A. I don't' remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
NEIL'S RESPONSE TO COUNT 34: 
I. Petitioners have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Neil lied when 
he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-Four. 
He testified that he didn't remember why he potentially did not put the 
money from the stock sale into his Zion's bank account. 
II. Neil's answer which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-Four was not a 
disrespectful act which obstructed justice ( see Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd.), or had an obstructive effect and the question was pertinent (see 
Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle). Neil testified he didn't 
remember why (if in fact this was the case) that he may not have put the 
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money from his stock sale in his Zion's bank account. Whether Neil 
remembered why (if this is true) he did not put the money from his stock 
sale into his Zion's bank account was not going to provide information at 
Neil's August 24, 2015 Debtor's Examination which would assist 
Petitioners in collecting their judgment. A reading of almost all of the 
questions directed to Neil at his examination lead to the conclusion it was 
an attempt to create contempt of court charges, not gather information to 
collect the huge judgment at issue in this case. Please see the language in 
Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850 (2002), Ohio 
Department a/Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d 747, and In the 
Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson 
v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 
275,279 (2005) which is set forth in Neil's Response to Count 14 above. 
For purposes of brevity, the quotations from those three cases will not be 
repeated. 
2. "I don't know" or "I don't remember" is not "deceit ... of the court by a 
party to an action or special proceeding" as required by LC. § 7-601(4) which would lead to a 
conviction for criminal contempt of court. This is especially true for events that happened more 
than three years prior to his debtors examination. 
3. Petitioners asked the same questions repeatedly in their Debtor's Examination 
of Neil. Neil's response of "I don't know" or "I don't remember" to these repetitive questions do 
not create an independent and separate cause of action for Contempt of Court seeking a Criminal 
Sanction. Neil pointed this out when he testified as follows: 
Q. Was this money that you had in cash and then you put it into a 
checking- -
A. You know, you're asking the same question over and over again. I told 
you I don't remember. I don't know. You can ask it 15 different ways, I don't know. 
Exhibit 1: page 37: line 9-19. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court makes its Conclusions Of Law: 
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A. C&M AND KARLIN DID NOT FULFILL THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING 
THEIR CIVIL CONTEMPT CHARGES. 
1. IRCP 75(a)(5) defines "Nonsummary Proceeding" and states, "(5) 
Nonsummary Proceeding. A nonsummary proceeding is one in which the contemnor is given 
prior notice of the contempt charge and an opportunity for a hearing." IRCP 75(a)(5). This case 
involved a nonsummary proceeding, and in the nonsummary proceeding the Petitioners originally 
sought 10 counts of Contempt of Court seeking a Civil Sanction and 24 counts of Contempt of 
Court seeking a Criminal Sanction. 
2. IRCP 75(j) provides the burden ofproofrequired to impose a Civil Sanction 
and states, "Nonsummary Proceedings; Burden of Proof. (1) Civil Sanction. In order to impose 
a civil sanction, the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all of the elements 
of contempt have been proven and that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the 
order violated, or with that portion of it required by the sanction." IRCP 75(j)(l). The plain 
language of IRCP 7 5(j)( 1) makes it the Petitioners' burden to prove Neil has the present ability to 
comply with the Court's Order. This language requires Petitioners to prove Neil has the present 
ability to comply while IRCP 75(h) appears to place the burden of proving a contemnor does not 
have the present ability to comply on the contemnor. 
i. Petitioners claim Neil committed Contempt of Court requiring the 
imposition of a Civil Sanction through his violation ofldaho Code§ 7-601(5) which states, "5. 
disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court." LC. § 7-601(5). Pursuant to 
IRCP 75(j)(l) Petitioners must prove Neil has the present ability to comply with the order. 
ii. "[T]o jail one for contempt for comitting an act he is powerless to 
perform would ... make the proceeding purely punitive." Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 
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(1948). 
iii. To impose a civil contempt sanction, the judge must find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the contemnor failed to do what he or she had been ordered 
to do and that he or she has the present ability to comply, at least to the extent required by 
the contempt sanction. Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297, 304 (2012). 
1v. "The district court has the authority to impose sanctions for failure to 
timely comply with a court order, but it also has the discretion to not impose sanctions once the 
order has been complied with." Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297. 
v. "This Court has held that§ 7-711 (which addresses permissible 
sanctions to compel compliance) 'does not preclude alternative civil sanctions under the common 
law or LC. § 1-1603' ... Therefore, a court does not abuse its discretion by merely imposing 
reasonable sanctions that are not specifically articulated in Title 7, Chapter 6. This does not give 
courts unfettered authority to impose unreasonable and inappropriate sanctions; however, the 
focus of civil contempt is to ensure that orders are complied with and an injunction imposed for 
this purpose should be upheld." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240,247 (2007). 
vi. "Father could not be legally committed to jail for contempt arising out 
of his failure to pay stated amounts for support of his children as ordered in previous divorce 
decree, in absence of a specific finding, supported by evidence, that he had the ability to perform 
when he failed to pay and at the time of the hearing." Kinner v. Steg, 74 Idaho 382. 
vii. The court could impose a civil contempt sanction only if the 
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contemnor had the present ability to comply with the order violated. Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 865 (2002). 
3. Petitioners have not proven that Neil has the present ability to comply with the 
two remaining counts of Contempt of Court seeking a Civil Sanction. Petitioners have not 
shown that Neil has the present ability to comply with the Court's Order requiring he provide 
records relating to David Flyer or HSBC Bank. Given Petitioners' failure of proof on this issue, 
the Court does not find Neil committed Contempt of Court which would warrant the imposition 
of a Civil Sanction. 
4. "(k) Nonsummary proceedings; Findings of fact. If the contempt allegation is 
tried to the court without a jury, the court must make specific findings of fact. In order to impose 
either a civil sanction or a conditional ( civil) provision as part of a criminal sanction, the findings 
must include the facts upon which the court bases its determination that the contemnor has the 
present ability to comply with the order violated, or with that portion of it required by the 
sanction." IRCP 75(k). 
5. "(3) Written Order. The court must issue a written order reciting the conduct 
upon which the contempt conviction rests; adjudging that the contemnor is guilty of contempt; 
and setting forth the sanction for that contempt. If the sanction is civil or includes a condition 
provision, the order must specify precisely what the contemnor must do in order to avoid that 
sanction or have it cease." IRCP 75(/)(3). 
6. IRCP 75(a)(6)defines "civil sanction" and states, "Civil Sanction. A civil 
sanction is one that is conditional. The contemnor can avoid the sanction entirely or have it case 
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by doing what the contemnor had previously been ordered by the court to do. A civil sanction 
can only be imposed if the contempt consist of failing to do what the contemnor had previously 
been ordered by the court to do" IRCP 75(a)(6). 
i. A conditional civil contempt sanction must cease if the contemnor no 
longer has the present ability to purge the contempt by complying with the order violated. 
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) 
ii. The court must exercise the least possible power adequate to the end 
proposed and consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by the continued 
refusal to perform the act and the probable effectiveness of the sanction in bringing about the 
desired result. Marks v. Vehlow, l 05 Idaho 560 (1983). 
B. C&M AND KARLIN DID NOT FULFILL THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING 
THEIR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES. 
1. IRCP 75(a)(5) defines "Nonsummary Proceeding" and states, "(5) 
Nonsummary Proceeding. A nonsummary proceeding is one in which the contemnor is given 
prior notice of the contempt charge and an opportunity for a hearing." IRCP 75(a)(5). This case 
involved a nonsummary proceeding, and in the nonsummary proceeding the Petitioners originally 
sought 10 Contempt of Court counts seeking a Civil Sanction and 24 Contempt of Court counts 
seeking a Criminal Sanction. Given the definition contained in IRCP 75(a)(5) the type of case 
involved in this case was a Nonsummary Proceeding. This case did not involve either a Criminal 
Proceeding or a Civil Proceeding. 
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i. Idaho Code § 19-103 states, "Criminal action defined. The 
proceedings by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and 
punishment is known as a criminal action." J.C.§ 19-103. Idaho Code§ 19-104 states, "Parties 
to criminal actions. A criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the state of Idaho, as a party 
against the person charged with the offense." J.C.§ 19-104. Idaho Code§ 19-108 in relevant 
part states, "Self-incriminating evidence - Restraint of person. No person can be compelled in 
a criminal action to be a witness against himself, ... " J.C.§ 19-108. Given these statutes this 
case was not a criminal action or a criminal proceeding. 
ii. "The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the 
forms of all such action and suits are hereby prohibited; and there shall be in this state but one for 
of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, 
which shall be denominated a civil action: and every action prosecuted by the people of the state 
as a party, against a person charged with a public offense for the punishment of the same, shall be 
termed a criminal action." Idaho Constitution, Article V, § 1. Contempt of Court is not a Civil 
Action as it does not address "protection of private rights or redress of private wrongs" but rather 
addresses the following: 
a " ... a disrespectful act directed at the court itself which 
obstructs justice. A criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and simply to vindicate 
the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in violation 
of an order of the court." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 862 (2002); or 
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b. "Although such a power is universally recognized as essential to 
an orderly and effective administration and execution of justice, it should be exercised with 
utmost caution .... Since a contempt citation is a 'potent weapon', .... courts rightly impose it 
with caution .... Imposing a willful standard ensures that courts cannot abuse their inherent 
contempt power. It also ensures that courts only impose such an extraordinary remedy when the 
alleged contemnor has wrongfully disobeyed a court order." In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005). 
2. IRCP 75(j)(2) provides the burden of proof required for the court to impose a 
criminal sanction and states, "IRCP 75(j) Nonsummary Proceedings; ... Burden of Proof. (2) 
Criminal Sanction. In order to impose a criminal sanction, the trier of fact, must find that all of 
the elements of contempt were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." IRCP 75(j)(2). 
i. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 103 states, "ICJI 103. 
REASONABLE DOUBT. A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This 
presumption places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no 
evidence against the defendant. If, after considering all the evidence and my instructions on the 
law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not 
guilty. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because everything 
relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or 
NEIL CAMPBELL'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-39 
441 of 636
imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration 
of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel 
an abiding conviction, or a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." !CJ! 103. 
3. Petitioners claim Neil committed Contempt of Court through his violation of 
Idaho Code§ 7-601(4) which states, "4. Deceit or abuse of process or proceedings of the court 
by a party to an action or special proceeding." IC. § 7-601 (4). Petitioners have repeatedly 
represented that their pursuit of Contempt of Court seeking the imposition of a Criminal Sanction 
for the alleged 24 counts is based upon Neil lying when he provided answers of"I don't know" 
or "I don't remember". Petitioners must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when Neil 
answered "I don't know" or "I don't remember" he lied. Petitioners also represent that "Neil 
knew the answers at the time of his examination and lied." Of course, Petitioners can not prove 
those assertions beyond a reasonable doubt as their next argument is common sense shows Neil 
lied and most people would know the answers to the questions. This common sense argument is 
contrary to the language of the Ohio Department of Taxation Court stating, "a well-founded 
belief of the testimony's untruthfulness is not sufficient." Ohio Department of Taxation at 753. 
The Court concludes that Petitioners have not fulfilled their burden of proof and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Neil is guilty of Contempt of Court justifying the imposition of a Criminal 
Sanction. 
4. "Criminal contempt is the commission of a disrespectful act directed at the 
court itself which obstructs justice. A criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and 
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simply to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the 
public in violation of an order of the court." Camp at 862. If the Court uses the Camp Court's 
definition of criminal contempt ( a disrespectful act directed at the court itself which obstructs 
justice ) it appears there is no plausible circumstance in this case which would lead to the 
Petitioners proving beyond a reasonable doubt Neil is guilty of Contempt of Court seeking a 
Criminal Sanction. 
5. " ... contempt is an extraordinary proceeding and should be approached with 
caution. This Court has recognized contempt is an extraordinary proceeding. Phillips 95 Idaho 
at 405, 509 P.2d at 1326. This inherent power must be exercised with great caution .... The 
contempt power is readily susceptible of abuse and fraught with danger not only to personal 
liberties but to the respect and confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a 
power is universally recognized as essential to an orderly and effective administration and 
execution of justice, it should be exercised with utmost caution .... Since a contempt citation is a 
'potent weapon, .... courts rightly impose it with caution .... Imposing a willful standard 
ensures that courts cannot abuse their inherent contempt power. It also ensures that courts only 
impose such an extraordinary remedy when the alleged contemnor has wrongfully disobeyed a 
court order." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. 
John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,279 (2005). The 
Court concludes this is especially true where private parties are the parties involved in 
Nonsummary Proceedings. 
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6. Willful means, '"an indifferent disregard of duty' or 'a remissness and failure 
in performance of a duty' but not a 'deliberately and maliciously planned dereliction of 
duty'-applies to contempt proceedings under LC. § 7-601(5)" In the Matter of John Weick 
Contempt Appeal Rocky Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, 142 Idaho 275,281 (2005). Neil did not act willfully when he answered "I 
don't know" or "I don't remember." 
7. The holding in Ohio Department of Taxation stated, "a review of the record 
and proceedings below reveals that at the debtor's examination of July 19, 2004, appellant 
blatantly lied about his interest in real property ... " Ohio Department of Taxation at 753 and 
754. There is no holding in Ohio Department of Taxation that answers similar to "I don't know" 
or "I don't remember" are sufficient to establish criminal contempt of court. To the contrary, the 
Ohio Department of Taxation Court stated, "a well-founded belief of the testimony's 
untruthfulness is not sufficient." Ohio Department of Taxation at 753. The Court concludes Neil 
did not lie, let alone blatantly lie, when he answered "I don't know" or I don't remember" at his 
Debtor's Examination. 
8. "The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important because of 
the federal constitutional rights that the United States Supreme Court has held applicable in 
nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings. Those rights include notice that a criminal 
contempt sanction is being sought in the contempt proceedings, ... ; the right to a public trial, .. 
. ; the right to compulsory process, ... ; the right to the presumption of innocence, ... ; the 
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privilege against self-incrimination, ... ; the requirement that contempt be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, ... ; the right to be represented by counsel, ... ; the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, ... ; the right to call witnesses to testify both in complete exculpation or in extenuation 
of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed, ... ; the right to testify in one's own 
behalf, ... ; the right to the protection of the exclusionary rule, ... ; the protection of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, ... ; and the right to speak on one's own behalf, similar to the right to 
allocution, in order to present matters in mitigation or otherwise attempt to make amends with 
the court, ... ; As stated by the United States Supreme Court ... 'Criminal contempt is a crime in 
the ordinary sense,' . . . and 'criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not 
been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings."' 
Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850,860 & 861 (2002). It appears as if this case 
was the precursor to much ofIRCP 75. 
9 IRCP 75(i)(2) sets forth the rights required to impose a Criminal Sanction and 
states, "(i) Nonsummary Proceedings; Trial ... (2) Trial Rights Required to Impose a 
Criminal Sanction. The court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial unless the 
respondent was provided the following rights: (A) a public trial, (B) compulsory process, (C) the 
presumption of innocence, (D) the privilege against self-incrimination, (E) the right to call and 
cross-examine witnesses, (F) the right to testify in his or her own behalf, (G) the right to exclude 
evidence that was obtained in violation of the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, (H) the 
right to counsel, if applicable, and (I) the right to a unanimous verdict if there was a jury trial. 
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i. In U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) the 
United States Supreme Court stated, "if the defendants were thus accorded all the rights and 
privileges owing to defendants in criminal contempt cases, they are put in no better position to 
complain because their trial included a proceeding in civil contempt and was carried on in the 
main equity suit. Common sense would recognize that conduct can amount to both civil and 
criminal contempt. The same acts may justify a court in resorting to coercive and to punitive 
measures. . . . Even if it be better practice to try criminal contempt alone and so avoid obscuring 
the defendant's privileges in any manner, a mingling of civil and criminal contempt proceedings 
must nevertheless be shown to result in substantial prejudice before a reversal will be required ... 
. In so far as the criminal nature of the double proceedings dominates and in so far as the 
defendants' rights in the criminal trial are not diluted by the mixing of civil and criminal 
contempt, to that extent prejudice is avoided. Here, as we have indicated, all rights and privilges 
of the defendants were fully respected, and there has been no showing of substantial prejudice 
flowing from the formal peculiarities of defendants' trial." (Emphasis Added). U.S. v. United 
Mine Workers of America at 298 and 299. 
ii. "Rylander argues that the district court improperly combined his trial 
on the civil and criminal contempt charges. Jointly trying civil and criminal contempt charges is 
not a ground for reversal unless it is 'shown to result in substantial prejudice" ... Rylander has 
failed to demonstrate such prejudice. None of the safeguards to which he was entitled as a 
criminal defendant was compromised. We therefore do not reverse on this ground. Although 
combining the civil and criminal trials in this case was not reversible error, such joint trials entail 
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problems and hazards that lead us to think it would usually be wiser to try the civil and criminal 
charges separately. There are many safeguards applicable in a criminal contempt proceeding, 
such as the right to a jury trial in some cases, the right to counsel, the right not to take the witness 
stand, and the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' burden of proof, which do not apply in a civil 
contempt proceeding. These differences create unforeseen problems when civil and criminal 
contempt charges are tried jointly. Thus, although it was no reversible error here, we do not 
endorse the practice of trying civil and criminal contempt charges jointly." (Emphasis Added). 
U.S. v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1003 and 1004 (Ninth Circuit, 1983). 
iii. Pursuant to IRCP 75(i)(2)(D) the Court cannot impose a Criminal 
Sanction as Mr. Campbell was not provided his privilege against self-incrimination. He was 
required to take the witness stand and assert his Fifth Amendment right. The language in both 
U.S. v. Unites States Mine Workers, "if the defendants were thus accorded all the rights and 
privileges owing to defendants in criminal contempt cases" and U.S. v. Rylander, ''the right not to 
take the witness stand" confirms that in this case the Court cannot impose a Criminal Sanction as 
Neil was required to take the witness stand in violation of the rights provided him by IRCP 
75(i)(2)(D). 
iv. The mandatory use of "cannot" in IRCP 75(i)(2)(D) prohibits the 
Court from exercising its discretion and imposing a criminal sanction against Neil given that 
Neil's privilege against self-incrimination was not honored in this case. In Gubler v. Boe, 120 
Idaho 294 (1990) the Idaho Supreme Court provided, "in addressing the effect of noncompliance 
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with procedural statutes and rules the Court in Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121 ... (1952) 
said 'The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote the 
administration of justice. Those statutes and rules which fix this time within which procedural 
rights are to be asserted are intended to expedite the disposition of causes to the end that justice 
will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But except as to those which are 
mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations should not be so applied as to defeat their 
primary purpose ... " Gubler at 300. 
v. The Court concludes that pursuant to IRCP 75(i)(2)(D), U.S. v. 
Rylander, U.S. v. United States Mine Workers, and Gubler v. Boe, the Court cannot impose a 
Criminal Sanction as Neil's privilege against self incrimination/his right to not take the witness 
stand was not honored. The Court made Neil take the stand and answer questions posed by 
Petitioners' counsel. Once Neil was forced to take the stand the Court cannot impose a Criminal 
Sanction. 
10. A serious fine cannot be imposed as a criminal contempt sanction unless the 
contemnor was given a jury trial. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,837 & 838 (1994). A fine becomes serious somewhere between $10,000 
and $52,000,000.00. Id. at 838 n.5. 
11. "(l) Nonsummaryproceedings; Imposition of sanctions. If the respondent ... 
is found in contempt following a trial, the court may impose sanctions as permitted by law, under 
the following conditions: ... (2) Right to call witnesses and speak regarding the sanction. The 
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court cannot impose a criminal sanction without first giving the contemnor the right to call 
witnesses in mitigation of the sanction and the right to be heard in order to present matters in 
mitigation or otherwise attempt to make amends with the court." IRCP 75(1)(2). 
i. "The determination of whether a sanction or penalty should be imposed 
is within the discretion of the trial court." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 
Idaho 275, 278 (2005). 
C. NEIL PROVED HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO BOTH THE CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES. 
1. Mr. Campbell's Civil Contempt of Court Affirmative Defenses are as follows: 
A. Mr. Campbell lacks the present ability to comply with the court order, 
however by asserting this affirmative defense, Mr. Campbell is not conceding that it is an 
affirmative defense rather than an element or item which needs to be proven by the Petitioners 
pursuant to IRCP 75G)(l) and/or ICRP 75(k). 
2. Mr. Campbell's Criminal Contempt of Court Affirmative Defenses are as 
follows: 
A. Mr. Campbell was unable to comply with the court order at the time of 
the alleged violation. 
3. "(2) Burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses. In order to prevent a 
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civil sanction from being imposed, the respondent must prove the affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence ... " IRCP 75(h)(2). 
4. "(2) Burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses .... In order to prevent a 
criminal sanction from being imposed, there need only be a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
respondent is guilty of the contempt." IRCP 75(h)(2). 
D. ISSUES UPON WHICH THE COURT REQUESTED BRIEFING 
The court requested briefing on two issues. 
The first was whether providing a means to obtain documents excuse civil contempt or 
satisfy a parties obligation to provide documents. Neil provided his discussion of this issue 
above in the portion of this document dealing with Contempt o Court seeking a Civil Sanction. 
It will not be readdressed here. 
The second was whether truthfulness on prior occasions is relevant given Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404 which renders as inadmissible prior bad acts. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a) in relevant part states, "(a) Character evidence 
generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of the accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offer by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; (2) Character of victim . .. (3) Character 
of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,608 and 609." IRE 
404(a). 
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Subparagraph (1) ofIRE 404(a) does not apply as Petitioner's are trying to offer this 
evidence, it is not offered by Neil and it is not offered to rebut a pertinent trait of character 
offered by Neil. Petitioners called Neil to the witness stand of his objection upon the grounds of 
the Fifth Amendment and IRCP 75(i)(2)(D). The Court overruled those objections and permitted 
Petitioners to call Neil, but the fact that Neil called no witnesses clearly indicates he did not put a 
pertinent trait of his character in issue under IRE 404(a)(l). 
Subparagraph (2) ofIRE 404(a) does not apply since Petitioners offer in this case does 
not involved the character of a victim. 
Finally subparagraph (3) ofIRE 404(a) does not apply as IRE 607 permits the 
impeachment, however Petitioners did not attempt to impeach Neil while he was on the stand 
over his previously identified objections. IRE 608(a) is inapplicable because no opinion or 
reputation evidence was offered. IRE 608(b) states, "(b) Specific instances of conduct. 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning 
(1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) ... " IRE 608(b). IRE 
608(b) specifically prohibits specific instances of the conduct of a witness to be proven by 
extrinsic evidence. Additionally, the truthfulness or untruthfulness of Neil was not covered by 
the Petitioners in their cross-examination of Neil. For these reasons IRE 608 would not permit 
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character evidence of Neil to be admitted or used in the case. IRE 609 does not permit the 
character evidence of Neil to be used as they neither there was no hearing held in this case to 
determine if the probative value of any felony conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. Since 
none of the exceptions in subparagraph 1 through 3 ofIRE 404(a) apply in this case the general 
rule ofIRE 404(a) applies which states Neil's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) in relevant part states, "(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall 
file ans serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at 
trial." IRE 404(b). Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is not applicable in this case as Petitioners did 
not file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial of the general nature of the evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
For these reasons the Court should disregard any attempts by the Petitioners to argue that 
any alleged prior lies of Neil may serve as evidence to show he lied in the nonsummary 
proceedings currently before the Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds in favor of Neil and declines to find him 
in Contempt of Court where a Criminal Sanction would be imposed. Under the plain language of 
IRCP75(i)2)(D) since the Court did not provide Neil his privilege against self-incrimination the 
Court can no longer impose a Civil Sanction. 
Additionally the Court finds in favor of the two remaining counts of Contempt of Court 
where Petitioners' sought the imposition of a Civil Sanction. Neil provided a Limited Power of 
Attorney which would permit the Petitioners' to obtain the documents they seek. Additionally, 
Petitioners have not established that Neil has the present ability to comply with the order violated 
as required by IRCP 75(k). 
The Court awards Neil is the prevailing party and may thus award Neil his costs and 
attorney fees ifhe pursues them as required by IRCP 75(m) and IRCP 54. and awards the custody 
of IMH as set forth above. 
+~ 
DATED this __fl:!. day of August, 2016. 
Lee P. Ritzau, Attorney 
Defendant/Responde ', 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ICJ f-',, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _£L day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon: 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax: 208-725-0076 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
By transmitting copies of the same to said attorney by facsimile machine process. 
+ By hand delivering the same to said attorney. 
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_,. 
Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
'lilGINAL 
Luke L. Dauchot, CA Bar No. 229829, OH Bar No. 0039935, IL Bar No. 6193611 
Lauren Schweitzer, CA Bar No. 301654 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") hereby respectfully object to Defendant Neil Campbell's ("Campbell") 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As discussed in more detail below, 
Campbell's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are factually and legally 
incorrect and ignore key pieces of evidence. Plaintiffs therefore respectfully ask the Court to 
reject Campbell's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to adopt entirely those 
proposed by Plaintiffs. 
I. OBJECTIONS TO CAMBPELL'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT1 
A. Campbell's Proposed Case History Findings Include Irrelevant and 
Unsupported Assertions of Fact 
Paragraph A.I.A: The fact that this case was ongoing for years before Campbell's 
current counsel began representing him is not relevant to any issue presented by this contempt 
proceeding. 
Paragraph A.3: Campbell states that Dr. Gary Michelson "urged" the Los Angeles 
District Attorney to charge Campbell with criminal counts. Campbell bases this assertion on 
statements that he made in his sworn Opposition. Campbell's out-of-court statements regarding 
Dr. Michelson are hearsay when offered self-servingly by Campbell and lack foundation because 
there is no evidence that they were based on Campbell's personal knowledge. Moreover, this 
assertion is irrelevant to the contempt trial. 
Paragraph A.9: The fact that Mr. Ritzau had "just under two months to prepare for trial" 
is irrelevant and-to the extent that it suggests that Mr. Ritzau had inadequate time to prepare--
is misleading. If Mr. Ritzau felt he needed more time to prepare, he could have moved for a 
continuance. He did not do so. 
Plaintiffs object that many of Campbell's proposed findings of fact are better 
characterized as conclusions of law or argument. 
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B. Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact Regarding the Civil Contempt Counts 
Are Based on Inapposite Authority and Ignore Relevant Evidence 
Paragraph B.1: Plaintiffs wish to clarify that the dismissed civil contempt counts were 
each dismissed without prejudice. 
Paragraph B.1.A2 & B.3: Campbell does not deny that he failed to produce a single 
record of a single payment to Flyer, nor does he deny that such records exist. Moreover, 
Campbell does not cite any facts indicating that he is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order directing him to produce these records. Nor does he address Plaintiffs' evidence 
establishing each of these facts. See Trial Tr. at 193:17-194:2; Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 43-48. 
Instead, Campbell argues solely that "the fact that Neil provided limited powers of 
attorney to the Petitioners so they can obtain the documents at issue is compliance with the 
Court's Order and equivalent to Neil providing the documents himself." Paragraph B.1.A.I.c. 
Campbell bases this claim entirely on two inapposite cases, both of which address the failure to 
comply with a court order requiring the party to execute a power of attorney. See In Re 
Houshang Dardashti v. Jeffry Golden, 2008 WL 8444787, at *1, *7-10 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(affirming contempt conviction for failing to comply with court order to "execute and return to 
the Trustee a power of attorney form"); Eckard v. Eckard, 333 Md. 531, 533, 546 (Md. App. 
1994) (affirming contempt conviction for failing to comply with court order to sign a power of 
attorney). Here, the Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce documents, not to 
execute a power of attorney. Moreover, neither of these cases addresses whether a party 
complies with a discovery obligation or court order requiring production of documents by 
2 Plaintiffs here respond to Paragraphs B. l .A, B. l .A.I, and B. l .A.I.a- B. l .A.I.c. 
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executing a power of attorney purportedly authorizing the requesting party to obtain those 
documents. 
As set forth in Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Conclusions, it is well established in the 
context of discovery requests that "even where a requesting party already has documents in its 
possession, or could otherwise access those documents, the disclosing party may not withhold 
those documents." Beach Mart, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 396,410 (E.D.N.C. 2014); 
accord Rivers v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 5:08CV61/RS/EMT, 2008 WL 5111300, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2008); SSL, L.L.C. v. Garcia-Chicoine Enters., Inc., No. 04-1017-JTM, 2005 
WL 6793646, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2005); Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281, 284 
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Fort Wash. Res., Inc. v. Tannen, 153 F.R.D. 78, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1994). If a party 
cannot satisfy a discovery request by informing the requesting party that he already possesses the 
relevant documents, then a fortiori, a party cannot satisfy a court order directing production by 
merely authorizing the requesting party to obtain the documents from a third-party source. 
Additionally, Campbell gives no reason why Plaintiffs should be forced to spend 
additional time and resources to obtain documents within Campbell's control. Campbell is in the 
best position to find and obtain his own records, and this Court ordered Campbell to produce 
them. He cannot shirk his burden by authorizing Plaintiffs to get the records themselves. 
For the aforementioned reasons, Campbell did not comply with this Court's Amended 
Order by providing to Plaintiffs a limited power of attorney purporting to authorize them to 
obtain the subject records. 
Paragraph B.1.B.I & B.3: Campbell's Responses to Count Eight suffer from the same 
deficiencies as his Responses to Count One. Again, he does not deny that he failed to produce 
any records from the HSBC Hong Kong Account or that such records exist. Moreover, 
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Campbell does not cite any facts indicating that he is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order directing him to produce these records. Nor does he address Plaintiffs' evidence 
establishing each of these facts. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
,r,r 52-66. 
Again, Campbell's sole argument is that he complied with the Amended Order by 
providing Plaintiffs with a limited power of attorney purportedly authorizing them to obtain 
records related to the HSBC Hong Kong Account. This argument fails for the same reasons 
discussed above. Additionally, as to Count Eight, this argument suffers from the added defect 
that Campbell provides no evidence that a power of attorney executed by a U.S. citizen, in the 
United States, under U.S. law would be effective to authorize Plaintiffs to obtain records related 
to an account in a Hong Kong company's name at a Hong Kong bank. Thus, Campbell's 
argument that he has "done what the court previously ordered him to due [sic], and thus a civil 
sanction is not warranted" is wrong. 
Paragraph B.2: Plaintiffs object that Exhibits 501 and 508 are not relevant. For the 
reasons discussed above, Campbell did not comply with the Court's Amended Order by 
providing to plaintiffs these limited powers of attorney. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Exhibit 508 (the power of attorney related to the HSBC Hong Kong Account) would be 
effective. 
C. Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact Regarding the Criminal Contempt 
Counts Are Incorrect and Ignore Relevant Evidence 
1. Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact Do Not Propose Factual 
Findings and Ignore Plaintiffs' Evidence 
The theme running through Campbell's responses to each of the contempt counts is that 
"I don't know" and "I don't remember" answers do not constitute contempt. Campbell is wrong. 
If those answers are given falsely, then they are punishable as contempts. 
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Moreover, in his proposed findings of fact, Campbell generally does not propose any 
factual findings. Instead, he structures his proposed findings as argumentative "response[s]" to 
Plaintiffs' contempt counts. These responses typically excise additional portions of the August 
2015 debtor's exam transcript and argue that these later answers somehow show that Campbell's 
claims of ignorance or memory loss do not constitute contempt. However, none of the cited 
testimony shows that any of the statements underlying Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts was 
true. Moreover, Campbell's arguments miss the point: Campbell's entire exam was full of 
inconsistent answers designed to evade and obfuscate rather than illuminate. Thus, the fact that 
Campbell can point to vague testimony related to facts that Campbell earlier claimed to not 
remember at all only strengthens the conclusion that Campbell is guilty on each count of 
criminal contempt. 
Campbell also does not address any of the evidence that Plaintiffs offered showing 
beyond any reasonable doubt that Campbell lied when he made the statements underlying each 
of Plaintiffs' contempt counts. For example, Campbell fails to address evidence that he owned 
and sold a Corvette in 2012 for roughly $28,000, that he sent himself "less than lOOK" in cash in 
his moving boxes when he moved to Idaho, and that he claimed he didn't remember where he 
lived in 2012 while he had a document listing his address at that time in front of him. See Exs. 1 
at 33:19-24; 3-37; 5; 6-3; 6-5. He also fails to explain how Campbell-a person of supposedly 
limited means-could forget so many basic facts about his finances and living situation; or how 
he could miraculously remember some of these facts nearly a year later on the eve of the 
previously scheduled contempt trial. Finally, as to each contempt count, Campbell fails to point 
to any evidence raising a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. 
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2. Campbell's Incorrectly Claims that His Testimony Was Not 
Contumacious Because It Either Would Not Have Helped Plaintiffs or 
Because Plaintiffs' Exam Was Designed to Build A Contempt Case 
As to nearly every one of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts, Campbell proposes a 
finding that the answer underlying the relevant contempt count were "not a disrespectful act 
which obstructed justice ... or had an obstructive effect and the questions was pertinent." For 
each of these counts, he simultaneously proposes a finding that the information sought would not 
have "assist[ ed] Petitioners in collecting their judgment. A reading of almost all of the questions 
directed to Neil at his examination lead[s] to the conclusion it was an attempt to create contempt 
of court charges, not gather information to collect the huge judgment at issue in this case."3 
Contrary to Campbell's argument, feigning ignorance or forgetfulness constitutes deceit. 
And any false testimony given under oath is inherently a disrespectful act which violates the 
solemnity of court proceedings and obstructs justice by obscuring the truth. See Sauls v. State, 
354 So. 2d 435,436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("[T]he giving of perjured testimony obstructs the 
proper administration of justice and, thus, is subject to a criminal contempt proceeding."). 
Giving false testimony is the height of disrespect and constitutes a willful attempt to obstruct 
Plaintiffs' efforts to seek the truth. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that supports Campbell's argument that the information 
sought in the testimony underlying Plaintiffs' contempt counts would not have helped Plaintiffs 
enforce their judgment. The purpose of the debtor's exam was to trace Campbell's assets, 
income, and expenditures to obtain financial information. Plaintiffs need this information to find 
assets against which to enforce their judgment. Thus, any information establishing the timeline 
of Campbell's assets, income, and expenditures would help Plaintiffs' judgment collection 
3 Campbell proposes this finding as to Counts Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, Twenty-One to 
Twenty-Five, and Twenty-Seven to Thirty-Four. 
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efforts. Therefore each of the questions underlying the relevant criminal contempt counts-all of 
which sought information related to Campbell's assets, income, and expenditures-sought 
information that would have been helpful to Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts. 
Moreover, whether the information would have been useful is irrelevant. The issue is 
whether the testimony was deceitful, not whether the information sought by the question would 
have been helpful. See Idaho Code§ 7-601 (party's deceit constitutes contempt). Campbell 
bases his argument to the contrary on a statement in Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 179 
Ohio App. 3d 747 (Ct. App. 2008).4 In Kunkle, the Court stated that "to sustain a conviction for 
contempt for giving false testimony, it must be shown that the false testimony had an obstructive 
effect ... and that the questions were pertinent to the issues in the case." Id. at 753. The 
portion that Campbell cites in support of his argument is inapposite because the Court was 
interpreting Ohio law. Notably, unlike Idaho, Ohio's definition of contempt does not include 
deceit. Compare Ohio. Rev. Code. § 2705.02 (not including deceit as a contempt) with Idaho 
Code§ 7-601(defining a party's deceit as contempt). Regardless, even if this were the law in 
Idaho, each instance of false testimony related to Campbell's finances was pertinent to and 
obstructed Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts. The purpose of the debtor's exam was to trace 
Campbell's assets, income, and expenditures to divine their ultimate whereabouts and find assets 
against which to enforce Plaintiffs' judgment. Campbell's feigned ignorance of these facts 
impeded Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts. 
For similar reasons, Campbell's argument that the examination was conducted solely to 
"create contempt of court charges, not gather information to collect" the judgment is specious, 
unsupported by evidence, and irrelevant. It is also belied by the transcript of the August 2015 
4 In their trial brief, Plaintiffs cited Kunkel for a different proposition-that blatantly false 
and evasive answers constitute contempt. Pls.' Tr. Brief at 8. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO CAMPBELL'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 7 
462 of 636
debtor's examination, which is comprised largely of questions about Campbell's assets, income, 
expenses, and other cashflows. 
CAMPBELL'S FALSE TESTIMONY RELATED TO THE SOURCE OF FUNDS USED 
TO OPEN HIS BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT, HIS CAR, AND WHERE HE LIVED 
(COUNTS 11-17) 
3. Campbell's Response to Counts Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen 
Counts Eleven through Thirteen relate to Campbell's testimony regarding where he 
obtained approximately $25,000 that he used to open his Bank of America account in May 2012. 
Campbell provides essentially the same response to each. 
Campbell's only proposed facts related to these Counts are (1) that he testified elsewhere 
during his August 2015 debtor's examination that "he sold off an asset, that he was liquidating 
things in Florida, [ and] that he liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group," and (2) that in 
the summer of 2008 Campbell received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M. 5 
The testimony that Campbell cites regarding his asset and stock sales comes from his 
responses to questions about topics other than the source of the funds with which he opened his 
Bank of America account. The fact that Campbell elsewhere acknowledged selling stock and 
unspecified assets when discussing other topics has no bearing on whether his claims of 
ignorance about the money he used to open his Bank of America account were truthful. If 
anything, these statements suggest the opposite. The fact that Dr. Michelson paid Campbell 
$500,000 in 2008 is similarly unavailing. 
Moreover, the testimony that Campbell cites in paragraph VII about whether Campbell 
had a box of cash somewhere is demonstrably false. Campbell admitted that he put "less than 
Campbell does not actually recite most of these facts with respect to Count 11, but 
instead reproduces the following testimony: Ex. 1 at 49:20-23, 50:5-10, 52:8-15, 54:24-55:10, 
57:25-58:10, 59:5-8, 59:18-20. Plaintiffs treat Campbell's proposed findings for Count 11 
(paragraphs I thru VII) as though they ask the Court to find the same facts recited with respect to 
Counts Twelve and Thirteen. 
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1 OOK" of cash in the boxes that his movers transported to Idaho. Ex. 5-2. It is unfathomable that 
he forgot this fact. 
Finally, nowhere in his responses to Counts Eleven, Twelve, or Thirteen does Campbell 
address any of Plaintiffs' evidence showing that the testimony underlying these counts is false. 
See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 'il'il 78-85. It is particularly striking 
that Campbell does not acknowledge the evidence showing that he owned a car, sold it in March 
2012 for roughly $28,000, and used the check from that sale to open the Bank of America 
account. See Exs. 5-1; 6-3; 6-5. 
4. Campbell's Response to Count Fourteen 
Paragraph I: Campbell for the first time objects that the question underlying Count 
Fourteen is vague as to time. This objection is waived because it was not asserted during the 
examination. Regardless, Campbell's argument that Plaintiffs failed to prove has lies beyond a 
reasonable doubt because the question was supposedly vague misses the point: Plaintiffs were 
asking Campbell a question about where he obtained the source of funds used to open his Bank 
of America account. The evidence now shows that he obtained these funds by selling his car for 
roughly $28,000. See Exs. 5-1; 6-3; 6-5. Because it is inconceivable that anyone would forget 
these facts, Plaintiffs have established that Campbell lied when he said he did not remember-
regardless of whether Plaintiffs pinpointed the exact date covered by their question. 
Paragraphs II, ILA, and /LB: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
Paragraph /LC & ILD: Campbell argues that Ohio Department of Taxation v. Kunkle, 
179 Ohio App. 3d 747 (Ct. App. 2008), does not establish that "I don't know" or "I don't 
remember" answers are sufficient to establish criminal contempt and has no relevance to 
contempt charges related to such answers. Campbell's arguments fail. The testimony at issue in 
Kunkle involved multiple "I don't know" or "I can't remember" answers. See id. at 750-51. 
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Moreover, Kunkle 's statement that "a well-founded belief of the testimony's untruthfulness is not 
sufficient," id. at 753, does not establish that "I don't know" or "I can't remember" answers do 
not constitute contempt where, as here, there is evidence proving that those answers are false. 
5. Campbell's Response to Count Fifteen 
Paragraph I: Campbell argues that Plaintiffs have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when he said he did not remember if owned a car in 2012. Campbell does not 
cite any evidence in support of this argument. He also fails to address his own admission and 
bank records which show that he owned a car in 2012 and sold it for roughly $28,000. See Exs. 
5-1; 6-3;, 6-5. It is inconceivable that someone of purportedly limited means would forget 
owning and selling a car for that much money. 
Paragraph II: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
6. Campbell's Response to Count Sixteen 
Paragraph I: The fact that Plaintiffs knew in 2012 that Campbell lived in Idaho is 
irrelevant to whether Campbell lied when he said he did not remember where he lived in June of 
2012. 
Parargraph II: Without explanation, Campbell recites his testimony that "I lived in 
Idaho for almost two years before I was arrested, and I was in jail for almost 17 months, and I've 
been out since November, so you just backtrack from there." Ex. 1 at 35:19-24. The fact that 
Campbell gave this testimony does not show that he testified truthfully when he said he did not 
remember where he lived in June of 2012. If anything, it shows that his memory loss was 
feigned. Moreover, this testimony is beside the point: Immediately before Campbell claimed not 
to remember where he lived in 2012, Plaintiffs' counsel showed Campbell his Bank of America 
statement from the period starting June 8, 2012. This statement showed the addressee as "Neil D 
Campbell" with a listed address of 2804 Summit Dr., Sun Valley, ID 83353. Exs. 1 at 33:19-24; 
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3-37. Campbell, therefore, knew where he was living at the time but chose to evade the 
question. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
7. Campbell's Response to Count Seventeen 
Campbell relies on the same argument he set forth in his response to Count Eleven. For 
the same reasons that his response fails for Count Eleven, his response to Count Seventeen fails. 
CAMPBELL'S FALSE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE SOURCE OF A LARGE CASH 
DEPOSIT TO HIS BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT (COUNT 18) 
8. Campbell's Response to Count Eighteen 
Campbell relies on the same argument he set forth in his response to Count Eleven. For 
the same reasons that his response fails for Count Eleven, his response to Count Eighteen fails. 
CAMPBELL'S FALSE TESTIMONY RELATED TO THE COMPANY IN WHOSE 
NAME CAMPBELL OPENED THE HONG KONG ACCOUNT (COUNT 19) 
9. Campbell's Response to Count Nineteen 
Paragraph I: Campbell cites testimony from his February 2015 debtor's examination in 
which he states that he does not remember the name of the corporation in whose name he opened 
the HSBC Hong Kong Account. This testimony does not show that Campbell's August 2015 
testimony to the same effect was truthful. In both exams, Campbell feigned memory loss to 
avoid giving Plaintiffs information. If anything, the fact that Campbell was asked this question 
during the February examination shows that he was on notice that Plaintiffs sought this 
information and should have investigated the name of his company in Hong Kong. 
Paragraph II: Campbell admits that he has now provided the name of his Hong Kong 
company to Plaintiffs. He claims that his memory was refreshed when he obtained a bank 
statement from his lawyer, Jonathan Michaels ("Michaels"). In support of this argument, 
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Campbell cites a wire transfer record showing transfers from Mosaic Orange Limited to 
Michaels. However, Campbell cites to no evidence establishing when Campbell received the 
documents at issue. There is thus no evidence that Campbell's memory was refreshed. It is also 
noteworthy that Campbell was asked about the name of this company during two 
examinations-one of which was conducted in Michaels' presence-and never suggested that 
Michaels would have this information. See Exs. 1 at 41: 15-22; 2 at 22:20-23 :20. Finally, 
Campbell ignores Plaintiffs' evidence establishing that he in fact knew this name when he falsely 
claimed he did not. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ,r,r 106-112. 
CAMPBELL'S FALSE TESTIMONY RELATED TO THE SOURCE OF LARGE CASH 
DEPOSITS TO CAMPBELL'S ZIONS BANK ACCOUNT (COUNTS 20-30) 
10. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty 
Campbell responds to Count Twenty is the same as his response to Count 11: That he 
"testified in other places of his Debtor's exam that he sold off an asset, that he was liquidating 
things in Florida, that he liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the 
summer of 2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M." This argument fails for 
the same reasons discussed with respect to Count Eleven. Moreover, Campbell misses the point: 
Campbell's entire exam was full of inconsistent answers designed to evade and obfuscate rather 
than illuminate. Campbell's hazy testimony during other parts of his August 2015 debtor's exam 
about unspecified assets and unidentified stock only strengthens this conclusion. Moreover, 
Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including Campbell's admission that he sent 
himself"less than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that proves Campbell's testimony about 
the source of large cash deposits to his Zions Account was false. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127. 
11. Campbell's Response to Counts Twenty-One to Twenty-Three 
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Counts Twenty-One to Twenty-Three are each based on Campbell's false testimony 
regarding the source of large cash deposits to his Zions bank account. As to each of these 
Counts, Campbell argues: (1) that Plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell lied when he gave the subject testimony, and (2) that the information sought would not 
have been helpful to Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts and that the August 2015 examination 
was designed to build a contempt case. 
Campbell cites no evidence raising a reasonable doubt regarding whether he lied when he 
gave the testimony underlying these contempt counts. Moreover, he ignores all of Plaintiffs' 
evidence to the contrary-not the least of which being his admission that he sent himself "less 
than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 'il'il 113-27; Ex. 5-2. 
His second argument fails for the reasons stated in Part I.C.2, supra. 
12. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Four 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that he "testified truthfully that he made cash deposits in 
his examination so there is no lie which would be the basis for contempt of court[.]" This 
argument is inapposite. Count Twenty-Four asserts that Campbell lied about the source from 
which he obtained the cash that he deposited, not about the fact that he deposited cash. 
Paragraph II: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied "when he answered he testified he made cash deposits." This argument fails 
for the same reason as Paragraph I. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
13. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Five 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that he "testified it came from the sale of stock or the 
liquidation of assets. His testimony it was either of these two possibilities and that he did not 
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remember which was truthful." Campbell cites no evidence in support of this argument and fails 
to address Plaintiffs' substantial evidence to the contrary-including Campbell's admission that 
he shipped himself"less than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes. See Pls.' Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127; Ex. 5-2. He also misses the point: This testimony, 
like Campbell's entire exam, consists of inconsistent answers designed to evade and obfuscate 
rather than illuminate. 
Paragraph II: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell "lied when he answered he testified he how he came into possession of the cash 
deposits he made in the 2011/2012 time frame." This argument fails for the same reasons as 
Paragraph I. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
14. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Six 
Campbell's response to Count Twenty-Six is the same as his response to Count 11: That 
he "testified in other places of his Debtor's exam that he sold off an asset, that he was liquidating 
things in Florida, that he liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the 
summer of 2008 he received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M." This argument fails for 
the same reasons discussed with respect to Count Eleven. Moreover, Campbell misses the point: 
Campbell's entire exam was full of inconsistent answers designed to evade and obfuscate rather 
than illuminate. Campbell's hazy testimony during other parts of his August 2015 debtor's exam 
about unspecified assets and unidentified stock only strengthens this conclusion. Moreover, 
Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including Campbell's admission that he sent 
himself"less than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that proves Campbell's testimony about 
the source of large cash deposits to his Zions Account was false. See Pis.' Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127. 
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15. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Seven 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he "lied when he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-Seven. 
He testified that he didn't remember unless it was cash he received from selling items in this 
2011/2012 timeframe." Campbell does not cite any evidence in support of his argument that his 
testimony was truthful. Moreover, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including 
Campbell's admission that he sent himself"less than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that 
proves Campbell's testimony about the source of large cash deposits to his Zions Account was 
false. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127. 
Paragraph II: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
16. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Eight 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when he "answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Twenty-
Eight. He testified that he didn't remember whether he depleted all of the cash he had when he 
deposited cash in the 2011/2012 time frame." Campbell does not cite any evidence showing that 
his testimony was truthful. Moreover, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including 
Campbell's admission that he sent himself"less than lOOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that 
proves Campbell's testimony about the source oflarge cash deposits to his Zions Account was 
false. See Pis.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127. 
Paragraph II: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
17. Campbell's Response to Count Twenty-Nine 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when "he answered the question that is the subject matter of Count Twenty-
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Nine. He testified that he didn't remember whether he owned anything in Florida when he 
moved to Idaho." Campbell does not cite any evidence showing that his testimony was truthful. 
Additionally, this argument only addresses part of the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Nine. 
Finally, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including Campbell's admission that he 
sent himself "less than 1 OOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that proves Campbell's testimony 
about the source of large cash deposits to his Zions Account was false. See Pls.' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 113-127. 
Paragraph II: Campbell recites testimony from his February 2015 debtor's examination 
in which he states that he might have accounts open in Florida or California with some money, 
but nothing more than $1,000. This does not prove the truth of Campbell's August 2015 
testimony that he didn't remember whether he liquidated all of his assets in Florida worth more 
than $10,000 or whether he still owned anything in Florida when he moved to Idaho. If 
anything, Campbell's February 2015 testimony that he might still have open accounts in Florida 
tends to prove that his August 2015 claim that he could not remember whether he owned 
anything in Florida was false. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
18. Campbell's Response to Count Thirty 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when "he answered the question that is the subject matter of Count Thirty. 
He testified that he didn't remember where several cash deposits came from in February of 
2012." Campbell does not cite any evidence showing that his testimony was truthful. Moreover, 
the "several" cash deposits described in the testimony underlying Count Thirty totaled $4, 100-
significantly more than Campbell's sole monthly income of his $1,600 social security payment. 
See Ex. 1 at 3 5 :8-11. It is highly unlikely that Campbell would have forgotten the source of 
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these funds. Finally, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence-including Campbell's 
admission that he sent himself "less than 1 OOK" in cash in his moving boxes-that proves 
Campbell's testimony about the source oflarge cash deposits to his Zions Account was false. 
See Pls.' Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw,r,r 113-127. 
Paragraph II: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
Paragraph III: Campbell incorporates his response to Count 11 that he "testified in other 
places of his Debtor's exam that he sold off an asset, that he was liquidating things in Florida, 
that he liquidated stock he held in a venture capital group, and that in the summer of 2008 he 
received $500,000 for selling his interest in C&M." This argument fails for the same reasons 
discussed with respect to Count Eleven. Moreover, Campbell misses the point: Campbell's 
entire exam was full of inconsistent answers designed to evade and obfuscate rather than 
illuminate. Campbell's hazy testimony during other parts of his August 2015 debtor's exam 
about unspecified assets and unidentified stock only strengthens this conclusion and shows that 
his testimony that he did not know where the large cash deposits came from was false. 
Moreover, as states above regarding Paragraph I, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence. 
CAMPBELL'S FALSE TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW HE PAID HIS RENT (COUNTS 31-
M} 
19. Campbell's Response to Count Thirty-One 
Paragraph I: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when "he answered the question which is the subject matter of Count Thirty-
One. He testified that he didn't remember how he was paying his rent in 2012. It is unclear 
whether Petitioners are referring to cash or check which would be the context from the questions 
and answers immediately proceeding [sic] the language of Count Thirty-One." First, Campbell 
does not cite any evidence showing that his testimony was truthful. 
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Moreover, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence that proves Campbell's testimony 
that he did not remember how he paid his rent was false. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 150-152. The evidence suggests that approximately one week after 
Plaintiffs' $24 million judgment against Campbell was domesticated in Idaho, Campbell paid his 
landlord a check equivalent to six months' worth ofrent. See Exs. 6-10; 1 at 51:11-13. There is 
no way Campbell forgot prepaying six months' rent under these circumstances. 
Finally, Campbell's statement that it is unclear whether Plaintiffs are referring to cash or 
check makes no sense. Plaintiffs did not specifically ask about only cash or checks because they 
were broadly asking Campbell to identify the method by which he paid his rent-it was up to 
him to supply that information. Instead, Campbell falsely claimed he did not remember. 
Paragraph II: Campbell argues that Count Thirty-One ignores his later answer that he 
might have paid his rent by money order. Campbell's argument is inapposite. Campbell's 
testimony that he might have paid his rent by money order (but didn't remember) does not show 
that he testified truthfully when he said he didn't remember how he was paying his rent. 
Moreover, the testimony that Campbell cites is the subject of Count 34-which asserts that this 
testimony is also false. Finally, Campbell misses the point: His entire exam was full of 
inconsistent answers designed to obfuscate and evade rather than illuminate. When compared to 
the testimony underlying Count Thirty-One, Campbell's testimony that he might have paid his 
rent by money order (but doesn't remember) only emphasizes this conclusion. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
20. Campbell's Response to Count Thirty-Two and Thirty-Three 
Campbell gives the same three responses to Counts Thirty-Two and Thirty-Three. 
Paragraph I: Campbell argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when he gave the subject testimony. Campbell does not cite any evidence 
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showing that his testimony underlying these Counts was truthful. Moreover, Campbell ignores 
all of Plaintiffs evidence that proves Campbell's testimony that he did not remember how he paid 
his rent was false. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,i,i 150-152. 
The evidence suggests that approximately one week after Plaintiffs' $24 million judgment 
against Campbell was domesticated in Idaho, Campbell paid his landlord a check equivalent to 
six months' worth of rent. See Exs. 6-1 O; 1 at 51: 11-13. There is no way Campbell forgot 
prepaying six months' rent under these circumstances. 
Paragraph II: Campbell argues that these Counts ignore his other answer that he might 
have paid his rent by money order. Campbell's argument is inapposite. Campbell's testimony 
that he might have paid his rent by money order (but didn't remember) does not show that he 
testified truthfully when he said he didn't remember how he was paying or could have paid his 
rent. Moreover, the testimony that Campbell cites is the subject of Count 34--which asserts that 
this testimony is also false. Finally, Campbell misses the point: His entire exam was full of 
inconsistent answers designed to obfuscate and evade rather than illuminate. When compared to 
the testimony underlying Counts Thirty-Two and Thirty-Three, Campbell's testimony that he 
might have paid his rent by money order (but doesn't remember) only emphasizes this 
conclusion. 
Paragraph III: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
21. Campbell's Response to Thirty-Four 
Paragraph I: Campbell argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell lied when he gave the testimony underlying Count Thirty-Four and states that he 
"testified that he didn't remember why he potentially did not put the money from the stock sale 
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into his Zion's bank account." Campbell does not cite any evidence showing that his testimony 
underlying these Counts was truthful. Moreover, Campbell ignores all of Plaintiffs evidence that 
proves Campbell's testimony that he did not remember how he paid his rent was false. See Pls.' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 150-152. The evidence suggests that 
approximately one week after Plaintiffs' $24 million judgment against Campbell was 
domesticated in Idaho, Campbell paid his landlord a check equivalent to six months' worth of 
rent. See Exs. 6-1 O; 1 at 51: 11-13. There is no way Campbell forgot prepaying six months' rent 
under these circumstances. 
Paragraph II: See Part I.C.2, supra. 
22. "I Don't Know" or "I Don't Remember" Answers are Contumacious 
When Given Falsely 
Paragraph LC.2: Campbell argues that "I don't know" or "I don't remember" answers 
are not deceitful within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 7-601(4). He further argues that this is 
"especially true for events that happened more than three years prior to his debtors examination." 
Campbell argument is wrong and unsupported by any authority. First, "I don't know" or "I don't 
remember" answers are deceitful if they are false-i.e. the declarant knows or remembers the 
information at the time he claims not to. See In re Gitkin, 164 F. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1908) (finding 
debtor committed perjury by pretending not to know the answers to questions about facts that 
any normal person would have known). 
Second, there is no reason why feigned ignorance or memory loss is less deceitful 
because the testimony pertains to events occurring more than three years prior. Lies are lies. 
Additionally, three years is not a long period of time to remember basic facts about how a person 
paid his bills or noteworthy events such as car sales and large cash deposits. 
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Paragraph L C.3: Campbell argues that Plaintiffs repeatedly asked the same questions 
and that Campbell's responses to these "repetitive questions do not create an independent and 
separate cause of action" for contempt. Contrary to Campbell's assertion, Plaintiffs did not 
repeatedly ask the same questions. Instead, Plaintiffs asked different questioned related to the 
same topics. Moreover, Campbell cites no authority for the proposition that giving discrete 
answers to "repetitive questions" does not create an independent and separate cause of action. 
II. OBJECTIONS TO CAMPBELL'S PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The Civil Contempt Charges 
Paragraphs 2, 2.i-iii: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that 
Campbell has a present ability to comply with the Court's Amended Order. Under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 75(h), present inability to comply is an affirmative defense, which the alleged 
contemnor must prove to a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(h); see also 
US. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983). 
Other courts have also put the burden regarding ability or inability to comply on the 
alleged contemnor. Thus, in Lamb v. Eads, the Iowa Supreme Court found that "the general rule 
holds that an applicant for a contempt citation establishes a prima facie case by proving the duty 
which is on the contemner and the contemner's [sic] failure to perform the duty. The contenmer 
then has the burden of showing he could not perform the duty, if he relies on that ground." 346 
N.W. 2d 830, 832 (1984). Similarly, Spabile v. Hunt held that, while a court must find that a 
contemnor has the present ability to comply before imposing sanctions, it is the contemnor who 
bears the burden of proving his inability to comply. 360 A.2d 51 (Vt. 1976). To satisfy his 
burden, an alleged contemnor must prove his defense of present inability to comply with 
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admissible evidence. He cannot avoid his burden by claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Rylander, 460 U.S. at 761. 
Paragraph 2. vi: Plaintiffs object that this quote comes from the headnotes and 
misrepresents the meaning of Kinner v. Steg, 74 Idaho 382 (1953). The related portion of the 
opinion states that it is required that the "court have made a finding, which must have been 
supported by the evidence, that plaintiffls] yet had" the present ability to comply. Id. at 385. 
Steg thus mirrors Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i), which requires only that the Court find a 
present ability to comply. Neither Steg nor Rule 75 requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant's 
present ability to comply with the court's order. 
Paragraph 3: Campbell asserts that Plaintiffs did not prove that Campbell has the present 
ability to comply with the Amended Order as set forth in Counts One and Eight. First, as 
discussed above, Campbell-not Plaintiffs-bears the burden of proof with respect to ability to 
comply. Regardless, Campbell ignores Plaintiffs' substantial evidence proving that Campbell 
has the present ability to comply with the Amended Order insofar as it relates to both Counts 
One and Eight. This evidence includes: 
• Notwithstanding his earlier claims of impossibility, Campbell was able to produce 
documents evidencing his payments to all of the relevant attorneys other than 
Flyer. Ex. 4-4 to 4-6, 4-95 to 4-104, and 4-153 to 4-167. 
• As an attorney in California, Flyer is required to provide bills to a client who 
requests them. RJN Ex. K at 1. Moreover, after an engagement has terminated, 
Flyer is required to "promptly" release all client papers and property upon the 
client's request-including all correspondence, and thus bills. RJN Ex Lat 2. 
• Because Campbell employed Flyer and paid him for legal fees, Flyer must 
provide Campbell with bills upon Campbell's request. Moreover, because 
Campbell is his former client, Flyer must provide Campbell with correspondence, 
including that related to Campbell's payment of fees to Flyer. See RJN Ex.Kat 
1; RJN Ex.Lat 2. 
• Under Hong Kong's record keeping ordinance, a financial institution such as 
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HSBC Hong Kong must keep records of each transaction for 6 years from the 
transaction's date. RJN Ex.Hat 2. Hong Kong's financial institutions must also 
keep the customer's account file, copies of documents obtained while verifying 
the identity of the customer or any beneficial owner of the customer, and business 
correspondence with the customer and the customer's beneficial owner for 6 years 
after the business relationship ends. Id. 
• Given that the Hong Kong Account was open and Campbell wired money out of 
this account sometime after June 2013 (Ex. 2 at 16:24-17:14, 29:8-21), HSBC 
must keep records related to this account until at least June 2019. 
Campbell also failed to present any evidence showing that he is presently unable to 
comply with the Amended Order insofar as it relates to Counts One or Eight. 
B. The Criminal Contempt Charges 
Paragraph 1: Plaintiffs object to the statement "[t]his case did not involve either a 
Criminal Proceeding or a Civil Proceeding." It is not clear what this statement means or why it 
is relevant. 
Paragraph J.i.: Campbell cites the definition of a criminal action, definition of parties to 
criminal actions, and a statute related to the right against self-incrimination in a criminal action. 
As Campbell acknowledges in this paragraph, it is undisputed that the instant action is not a 
criminal action within the meaning of these statutes. This proposed conclusion is thus irrelevant. 
Paragraph 1.ii: Plaintiffs object to this proposed conclusion as irrelevant. Campbell 
cites the Idaho Constitution's prohibition of distinctions between actions at law and equity and 
its definition of a criminal action. As Campbell again recognizes, the instant action is not a 
criminal action within the meaning of the Idaho Constitution. Moreover, there is no dispute 
regarding a distinction between actions at law and equity. 
Paragraph 3: Plaintiffs object to this paragraph insofar as Campbell contends that 
Plaintiffs cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he lied when he claimed he did not know 
or remember the answers to questions during his August 2015 debtor's exam. He asks the Court 
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to jettison common sense because a "well-founded belief of the testimony's untruthfulness is not 
sufficient." Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d at 753. This argument is meritless. 
First, Kunkle is properly understood to mean that there must be something more than a 
subjective (albeit well-founded) belief that testimony is false-i.e. there must be at least some 
evidence. As discussed with respect to Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact and as set forth in 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs have presented ample evidence (in addition to 
common sense) showing that Campbell's testimony is false. 
Second, Kunkle affirmed the lower court's finding, inter alia, that the defendant was 
guilty of contempt because it was "inconceivable" that he could "mortgage his property over the 
course of a period, has the deeds recorded in his name, . . . goes to the bank and takes the steps 
of mortgaging the property and establishing a line of credit, drawing down the line of credit" and 
yet doesn't recognize that he has an interest in the property. Id. at 752-53. Thus, common sense 
suffices where the facts and evidence as a whole show that it is inconceivable that the defendant 
was ignorant of the facts he claimed not to know or remember. 
If Campbell's testimony is so nonsensical that the trier of fact has an abiding conviction 
that Campbell lied, Plaintiffs' burden of proof is satisfied. While Campbell is entitled to the 
protection afforded by the reasonable doubt standard, a trier of fact is not required to leave his 
common sense at the door and rely solely on direct "smoking gun" evidence of a lie. To require 
such a standard of proof would lead every witness being asked sensitive questions to "forget" the 
answer. Allowing witnesses to answer unwanted questions with feigned ignorance would 
destroy the meaning of oaths in our legal system. Courts would lose their power to demand and 
expect truthful testimony, and the goal of truth finding would be irreparably impaired. 
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Third, as discussed above, Campbell ignores Plaintiffs' voluminous and compelling 
direct evidence against him, including his own admissions. For example, Campbell ignores his 
admission that he shipped "less than 1 OOK" of cash to himself in his moving boxes when he 
moved to Idaho and ignores evidence that he sold his Corvette in 2012 for roughly $28,000. See 
Exs. 5-2; 6-3, 6-5. Considered alongside the evidence of Campbell's large cash deposits in late 
2011 and early 2012, as well as his contemporaneous opening the Bank of America account, this 
evidence tells a convincing story: Campbell left Florida with boxes of cash and a Corvette. In 
the span of less than a year, Campbell sold his car, used the proceeds to open a new bank account 
(which he rapidly drained), and on numerous occasions took wads of cash from his boxes to the 
bank. The evidence also shows that Campbell paid his landlord six months' worth of rent one 
week after Plaintiffs' $24 million judgment against him was domesticated in Idaho. See Exs. 6-
1 O; 1 at 51: 11-13. It is inconceivable-beyond a moral certainty-that one could forget all of 
these events. It is even less conceivable that someone could forget these facts on one day and 
then conveniently remember them nearly a year later (when facing an imminent contempt trial). 
Moreover, this evidence goes well beyond a "well-founded belief." 
Plaintiffs' establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that Campbell lied when he answered 
"I don't remember" or "I don't know" during his August 2015 debtor's exam. He knew the 
truthful answers but did not want to disclose the information to Plaintiffs. 
Paragraph 4: Campbell again argues that he cannot be found guilty of criminal contempt 
because his lies do not constitute "a disrespectful act directed at the court itself which obstructs 
justice." As stated above, any false testimony meets this purported standard. See Sauls, 354 So. 
2d at 436 ("[T]he giving of perjured testimony obstructs the proper administration of justice and, 
thus, is subject to a criminal contempt proceeding."). Regardless, the debtor's examination was 
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conducted to gather information about Campbell's assets, income and expenses-information 
necessary for Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts. Campbell obstructed these efforts by 
claiming falsely that he did not know or remember the answers to Plaintiffs' questions. When 
the transcript is read as a whole and considered in light of Campbell's long history in connection 
with this litigation of deceiving these Plaintiffs about his finances, it is apparent that Campbell 
purposefully obstructed justice by giving evasive, false, and contradictory testimony. 
Paragraph 5: Plaintiffs object to Campbell's statement that it is "especially true" that the 
Court should exercise its contempt power with caution where "private parties are the parties 
involved in Nonsummary Proceedings." Campbell cites no authority for this proposition and 
does not explain why the Court should treat a contempt case differently based on whether the 
parties are private or whether the proceedings are adjudicated non-summarily. 
Paragraph 6: Campbell cites In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275 (2005), for the definition of 
willfulness. However, he includes only the first part of the Court's definition. He omits the 
Court's clarification that this definition of willfulness "implies simply a purpose or willingness 
to commit the act or make the omission ... no intent to violate the law or injure another, or to 
acquire any advantage is necessary." Id. at 281. 
Plaintiffs also object to Campbell's proposed conclusion that he did not act willfully. 
Plaintiffs proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Campbell deliberately stated that he did not 
know or did not remember facts that he actually knew or remembered. See Pls.' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 69-160. Plaintiffs thus proved that Campbell acted 
willfully. 
Paragraph 7: Campbell again incorrectly asserts that Kunkle does not establish that "I 
don't know" or "I don't remember" answers are sufficient to establish criminal contempt. As 
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discussed above, the testimony that Kunkle found false includes numerous "I don't know" and "I 
don't remember" answers. See Kunkle, 179 Ohio App. 3d at 750-51. Moreover, to the extent 
that Kunkle requires more than a "well-founded belief," it does not require the Court to abandon 
common sense. 
Plaintiffs also object to Campbell's proposed finding that he did not lie when he gave the 
testimony at issue in Plaintiffs' contempt counts. As discussed with respect to his proposed 
findings of fact, Campbell ignores Plaintiffs' substantial evidence (including his own 
admissions) showing that his August 2015 testimony was false. He also cites no evidence 
rebutting Plaintiffs' evidence of his lies. 
Paragraph 9.i-9. v: Campbell revives his argument that a criminal sanction cannot be 
imposed because he was purportedly not afforded his right not to take the witness stand. 
Specifically, Campbell claims that, because the civil and criminal counts were tried together in 
one trial, he should not have been forced to take the witness stand. And now, because he was, he 
claims the Court cannot impose a criminal sanction. During trial, this Court heard and rejected 
this argument twice. Trial Tr. at 132: 11-160:8; 233 :25-260: 1. The law on this matter is clear: 
Civil and criminal contempt charges may be tried in a single proceeding. US. v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258,298 (1947). In fact, "[d]isposing of both aspects of the contempt 
in a single proceeding would seem at least a convenient practice." Id. at 299. Thus, the mingling 
of civil and criminal counts is allowed unless it results in substantial prejudice to the defendant. 
Id. 
In this case, Campbell suffered no prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice, as a result of 
taking the stand and testifying in connection with the civil contempt counts. Importantly, as this 
Court previously found, the civil contempt charges and the criminal contempt charges do not 
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arise out of the same conduct and do not rely on the same evidence. The civil contempt charges 
are based solely on Campbell's failure to produce documents, whereas the criminal contempt 
charges are based on his untruthful testimony during his debtor's examination (which was not 
related to his document production). During trial, Campbell was questioned only about his 
knowledge of the Amended Order to produce the documents and his actions in response to that 
order. Campbell was asked no questions about his testimony at the debtor's examination. 
Moreover, the Court carefully respected Campbell's right against self-incrimination by allowing 
him to assert the privilege against individual questions. 
Finally, all of Plaintiffs' evidence regarding the criminal charges was introduced through 
documents admitted prior to Campbell's testimony regarding the civil contempt charges. As 
such, the Court has no need to consider anything that Campbell testified about in connection with 
the civil contempt charges when deciding the criminal contempt charges. Thus, Campbell 
cannot show any prejudice arising from the Court's decision to compel him to take the stand with 
regard to his production of documents. 
Furthermore, Campbell's reliance on United Mine Workers and US. v. Rylander is 
inapposite. Neither case forbids trying civil and criminal contempt counts in the same 
proceeding where those counts are based on separate conduct and evidence. As discussed above, 
United Mine Workers endorses trying civil and criminal contempt counts together. See United 
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 299. And Rylander recognizes that "[j]ointly trying civil and 
criminal contempt charges is not a ground for reversal unless it is 'shown to result in substantial 
prejudice."' United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) 
(citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 299-300). 
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Finally, Campbell cites no authority for the proposition that Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 75(i) forbids imposing criminal sanctions in this case. Rule 75(i) requires the Court to 
afford the defendant the privilege against self-incrimination. It does not specify that the 
defendant must have the right to refuse to take the stand. Additionally, Campbell cites no 
authority showing that compelling a defendant to take the stand as to civil counts violates his 
right against self-incrimination as to factually distinct criminal counts tried in the same 
proceeding. It is also worth noting that Campbell could have moved to bifurcate the trial, but did 
not do so. He thus cannot complain now ifhe regrets his own strategic decisions. 
In sum, Campbell's right against self-incrimination was properly respected throughout 
this contempt trial, and the Court can ( and should) impose criminal sanctions in this case. 
C. Campbell Failed to Prove his Affirmative Def ens es 
Paragraphs C.1-C.4: Campbell recites his affirmative defenses of past and present 
inability to comply and conclusorily asserts in a heading that he proved them. Campbell 
recognizes that he bears the burden of proving his affirmative defenses. He nevertheless fails to 
offer or cite any evidence supporting them. 
D. Campbell's Argument Regarding Character Evidence 
Campbell argues that the Court should "disregard any attempts by the Petitioners to argue 
that any alleged prior lies of Neil may serve as evidence to show he lied in the nonsummary 
proceedings currently before the Court." Def.' s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 50. Campbell's argument fails. 
As Campbell recognizes, Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows evidence of prior bad 
acts to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of 
mistake or accident." The numerous uncharged lies and omissions that Campbell made to these 
Plaintiffs in the course of this litigation and underlying events for the same purpose of 
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preventing Plaintiffs from obtaining information about Campbell's finances are relevant to 
Campbell's motive and intent to again prevent Plaintiffs from learning about his finances during 
the August 2015 debtor's examination. See United States v. Mebust, 857 F. Supp. 609, 618-19 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (defendant's uncharged prior procurement of firearm owner identification cards 
by false statements relevant to his intent to knowingly make false statements in the case at bar); 
Estes v. Anglin, No. 2:14-CV-994-SLB, 2015 WL 1279746, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2015) ("A 
pattern of omissions on the part of the debtor is often sufficient to find fraudulent intent[.]"); 
Abdo v. Com., 64 Va. App. 468,474 (Ct. App. 2015) (alleged contemnor's prior uncharged 
instances of tardiness relevant to showing intent on the charged occasion); see also Pls.' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r,r 196-200. Campbell's motive and intent 
relate to willfulness. 
Campbell's argument that Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is inapplicable because 
Plaintiffs did not file and serve notice of the general nature of any prior bad act evidence also 
fails. The notice requirement of Section 404(b) only applies to a prosecutor in a criminal case. 
Moreover, Campbell received all of Plaintiffs' evidence relevant to his prior lies in May 2016-
months before the July contempt trial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reject 
Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and adopt entirely those 
proposed by Plaintiffs. 
DATED: September 2, 2016 LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, 
PLLC 
Erin F. Clark V 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
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V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On November 3, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for an order holding Defendant Neil 
Campbell ("Campbell") in contempt. 
2. On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit, setting forth ten 
counts of civil contempt (Counts 1-10) and twenty-four counts of criminal contempt (Counts 
11-34). The Charging Affidavit alleged the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt and 
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set forth each instance of alleged contempt separately. It also alleged that Campbell was served 
with a copy of the April 1, 2015 Amended Order ("the Amended Order") underlying the civil 
contempt counts, and alleged facts indicating that Campbell had actual knowledge of that order. 
3. On February 22, 2016, the Court held a hearing at which Campbell denied each 
count of contempt charged against him. During this hearing, the Court informed Campbell: of 
the charges of contempt against him, the possible sanctions for the contempt; that Campbell was 
not required to make a statement and that any statement made may be used against him; that 
Campbell had a right to a trial; that Campbell had a right to confront the witnesses against him, 
and that Campbell had the right to be represented by an attorney and that if Campbell desired an 
attorney and could not afford one, an attorney would be appointed at public expense. After being 
informed of these rights, Campbell denied each charge of contempt against him. 
4. On June 18, 2016, the Court denied Campbell's request to file three untimely 
supplemental affirmative defenses based on sufficiency of service, ruling that Campbell may 
only assert the two (also untimely) affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs stipulated that Campbell 
could file: past inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the criminal counts) and present 
inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the civil counts). 
5. The above-entitled case and cause came before the Court for trial, sitting without 
a jury on the 26th and 2J1h day of July 2016. Erin Clark of Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
and Lauren Schweitzer of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiffs. Lee 
Ritzau of Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. appeared for and on behalf of Defendant 
Neil Campbell ("Campbell"), appointed in part at county expense due to the nature of the 
charges. Mr. Campbell was ordered to pay Mr. Ritzau's attorney fees himself until it appeared 
his financial ability to do so was exhausted. 
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6. Campbell was called for cross-examination by plaintiff at trial, and was the only 
witness presented by either side. Plaintiff's cross-examination was limited to questions related to 
the civil contempt charges. Mr. Campbell took the Fifth Amendment multiple times during this 
examination, and the Court indicated on the record it would or could draw negative inferences 
against Campbell ifhe did so. Plaintiffs counsel made no attempt to cross-examine Campbell 
on the criminal contempt charges. 1 Although the Court indicated on the record it could or would 
draw a negative inference from Campbell's taking the 5th Amendment on portions of the civil 
contempt case, the Court also indicated it did not know what negative inference it would draw in 
response to any particular question, nor is any particular negative inference appropriate based 
simply upon a refusal to answer a particular question on 5th Amendment grounds. Unless the 
Court indicates herein specifically that it did in fact draw a negative inference with regard to a 
particular question, and what that negative inference was, the Court did not need to draw any 
specific negative inference in response to any particular question, and did not do so in any 
overall general sense. Almost all of Plaintiffs case is contained in documents and exhibits. At 
the conclusion of trial Plaintiff dropped all civil contempt charges except Count 1 and Count 8. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT: CASE BACKGROUND 
7. This case stems from Plaintiffs' efforts to collect on a judgment entered in a 
California case for fraud and related claims. In October 2007, Plaintiffs sued Philip Richard 
Powers ("Powers") and his corporate entities in Los Angeles Superior Court (the "California 
suit") alleging that Powers cheated Plaintiffs out of millions of dollars in connection with a Costa 
Rican teak farming business. Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) Ex. A. Though Campbell was 
1 Campbell's counsel has objected to this process. Although Mr. Campbell's prior testimony at other times and on 
other occasions may have presented him with difficult choices as to whether to testify in his own defense of the 
criminal contempt charges, the criminal contempt charges were kept separate from the civil contempt charges 
throughout this trial. 
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involved with this business, Plaintiffs did not name him as a defendant in their initial complaint. 
Id 
8. In late 2008, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add Campbell as a defendant. 
RJN Ex. B. Plaintiffs alleged that Campbell had secretly received millions of dollars in improper 
kickbacks from Powers. Id ,r,r 21-23, 81-99. 
9. On February 4, 2010, the California court entered partial summary judgment 
against Campbell for over $1.5 million-the amount of profits Plaintiffs were able to prove at 
that time. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex. F at 2. 
10. On November 2, 2010, the California court imposed terminating sanctions against 
Campbell, striking his answer, and entering a default against him. RJN. Ex. D; RJN Ex. F. at 3. 
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a third amended complaint, which Campbell answered. RJN Ex. F at 3. 
11. On November 1, 2011, the California court granted Plaintiffs' motions to (1) 
compel Campbell to respond to interrogatories and requests for production and (2) to attend his 
deposition. The Court imposed monetary sanctions against Campbell in connection with both of 
these motions. RJN Ex. E. 
12. On December 13, 2011, the California court granted summary judgment in 
Plaintiffs' favor, finding Campbell liable for fraud and related claims. RJN Ex. F. The Court 
entered judgment against Campbell for over $24 million. RJN. Ex. G. 
13. On June 21, 2012, after filing the California Judgment in Idaho, Plaintiffs 
obtained an order from this Court domesticating the Judgment. Ex. 12. 
14. The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment Debtor's Examination, filed 
herein on March 23, 2015. The Court amended this order twice, the first filed on April 1, 2015, 
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and a Second Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's Examination filed on 
August 3, 2015,in order to change the dates for the debtor's examination. 
II. CIVIL CONTEMPT FINDINGS OF FACT 
15. The April 1, 2015 Amended Order (the "Amended Order") compelling Campbell 
to appear for his debtor's examination also required Campbell to produce documents, including 
in part, documents "evidencing any payments made by Defendant to any legal counsel over the 
period of 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make 
those payments," and "all records relating to financial accounts (savings accounts, checking 
accounts, or otherwise) maintained in Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for 
the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to the present date." Ex. 13-2 & 13-3. 
16. The Amended Order required Campbell to produce the responsive documents no 
later than 30 days prior to the scheduled May 11, 2015 debtor's examination. Ex. 13-2. 
17. As of April 13, 2015-Campbell' s deadline to produce documents-Campbell 
had produced no documents whatsoever to Plaintiffs. See Ex. 15. 
18. Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt against Campbell on April 21, 2015 alleging 
Campbell had failed to comply with the Court's April 1, 2015 Amended Order. 
19. On the following day, April 22, 2015, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with a 
handwritten statement asserting that (1) the documents evidencing his payment of his legal fees 
were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) he had only one bank account with Zions 
Bank and he did not have to produce the documents because it was used for the direct deposit of 
his social security funds, which he asserted was exempt from Plaintiffs' judgment. Ex. 15. At 
this time, Campbell produced no documents to Plaintiffs in response to the April 1, 2015 
Amended Order. Id. 
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20. Despite Campbell's assertion in his April 22, 2015 statement that he had only one 
bank account, he actually had accounts with three banks during the relevant time period: Zions 
Bank, Bank of America, and HSBC in Hong Kong. Exs. 3-9 to 3-198; 11-4. 
21. On April 30, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent Campbell a letter addressing 
Campbell's claim that he did not have, or was not required to produce, any documents in 
response to the April 1, 2015 Amended Order. Ex. 16. This letter provided fairly detailed and 
understandable information as to what Campbell needed to produce to comply with the Amended 
Order. Id. 
22. On May 19, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent another letter to Campbell confirming 
the discussion they had had the previous day regarding Campbell's obligation to produce the 
responsive documents. Ex. 1 7. 
23. Campbell ultimately produced some documents to Plaintiffs. He produced 
documents on May 28, 2015; April 25, 2016; April 26, 2016; and April 27, 2016. Exs. 3, 4, 6, 
32. There is no evidence that Campbell ever produced to Plaintiffs any documents other than 
those produced on these four dates. 
24. As discussed below, the documents produced on these four dates omitted certain 
responsive documents that the Amended Order required him to produce. 
25. On May 28, 2015, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with a handwritten statement and 
a portion of the documents responsive to the Amended Order. Ex. 3. In this production, 
Campbell provided a portion of his Bank of America checking account records from June 2012 
through February 5, 2013 (Ex. 3-9 to 3-40) and his Zions Bank checking account records from 
November 2011 through May 18, 2015 (Ex. 3-41 to 3-198). Campbell provided no documents 
evidencing his payments to his lawyers, the cancelled checks from his Bank of America account, 
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his Bank of America account records for the time prior to June 2012, or any documents relating 
to his HSBC account. See generally Ex. 3. 
26. In his May 28, 2015 written statement, Campbell identified five lawyers that he 
had engaged during the time period set forth in the Amended Order: Michael Taitelman, David 
Flyer, Jonathan Michaels, Dyke Huish and Robert Turffs. Ex. 3-1. In his written statement, 
Campbell claimed that each of these lawyers "have been contacted and refuse to produce 
documents, stating two reasons, attorney work products and that I am no longer there [sic] 
client." Ex. 3-1. 
27. Campbell later identified two additional lawyers that he engaged during the 
relevant time period: Susan Roy and Steve Thompson. Exs. 1-74; 8-5. 
28. On June 19, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel sent Campbell another letter setting forth the 
deficiencies in his production of documents. Ex. 18. In this letter, Plaintiffs' counsel asked 
Campbell to produce the remaining responsive documents no later than July 10, 2015. Id. 
Campbell did not produce any additional documents to Plaintiffs on or before to July 10th. See 
supra ,r 23. 
29. On July 10, 2015, Campbell provided to Plaintiffs' counsel a signed statement 
claiming that he could not obtain the remaining unproduced documents from his "prior banks." 
Ex. 7-1. He also now claimed that "[s]ome of the lawyers were paid a flat fee and did not send 
monthly statements, and they don't have documents showing payments to them. Other of the 
lawyers are refusing to give the documents to me because they are privileged and wont [sic] give 
them to me." Ex. 7-1. 
30. On November 20, 2015, Campbell filed his sworn Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
motion for contempt. Ex. 8. In his Opposition, Campbell claimed that Huish and Michaels were 
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each paid a flat fee and thus never prepared or sent any bills. Ex. 8-5 & 8-6. Campbell also 
claimed that Flyer, Taiteman [sic], Turffs, and Thompson refused to provide Campbell with 
copies of bills because "the documents are their work product." Ex. 8-6. In the next paragraph, 
Campbell inconsistently stated that "as to Michael Taiteman [sic], I have made several attempts 
to contact him to get the information for Ms. Clark, but I cannot get him to return my calls." Id. 
31. On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit in Support of their 
Motion for Order Finding Campbell in Contempt. A hearing was held on February 22, 2016, 
during which time Campbell denied all of the civil contempt charges. During this hearing, the 
court set the trial on Plaintiffs' Contempt Motion for May 4, 2016. Trial Tr. at 192:24-193:10. 
32. From May 28, 2015 through April 25, 2016, Campbell provided Plaintiffs with no 
additional documents or information in response to the Amended Order. 
33. On April 25, 26, and 27, 2016-approximately one week prior to the scheduled 
trial date-Campbell produced additional documents and information to Plaintiffs in response to 
the Court's Amended Order. Exs. 4, 6, 32. 
34. Notwithstanding his earlier claims that his lawyers refused to give him records of 
his fee payments, in his April 2016 productions, Campbell produced documents reflecting his 
payments to Michaels, Huish, Turffs, Thompson, Roy, and Taitelman. Exs. 4-4 to 4-6; 4-23 to 
4-24;4-95 to 4-96; 4-97 to 4-100; 4-102 to 4-104; 4-156 to 4-162; 4-163 to 4-167; 32-2. 
Campbell also produced payment records from Michael France. Ex. 4-153 to 4-155. Campbell 
did not produce any records related to his payments to Flyer. 
35. In the wake of this supplemental production, Plaintiffs agreed to continue the trial 
date to May 25, 2016. The trial date was continued again to July 26-27, 2016. 
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36. During the trial of the civil contempt charges, Campbell testified that he has now, 
to his belief, produced all documents responsive to Counts 2-7 set forth in the Charging 
Affidavit. Trial Tr. at 195:2-8. Also, in the affidavit of compliance that Campbell signed and 
delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel, which was admitted as Trial Exhibit 34, Campbell certified that 
he has produced all documents relating to his Bank of America account from June 2012 through 
present. Ex. 34-2. Based on these representations, Plaintiff dismissed without prejudice these 
eight counts and only proceeded at trial upon Counts 1 and 8 of the civil contempt charges. 
A. Findings of Fact Specific to Count 1 
37. Count 1 of the Charging Affidavit charges Campbell with civil contempt for his 
failure to produce the documents evidencing the payments he made to David Flyer ("Flyer"). 
Charging Affidavit at 3. 
38. Flyer is a California lawyer who represented Campbell in connection with the 
civil action filed against him by Plaintiffs in November 2008. Ex. 1 at 24:16-24; RJN Ex. C. 
39. Campbell employed Flyer at some time between 2009 and the present-i.e., 
during the time period covered by the Amended Order. Exs. 7; 8-5. Campbell made payments 
to Flyer for legal fees. Ex. 2 at 14: 13-19. 
40. Under the Amended Order, Campbell was required to produce documents 
evidencing his payments to Flyer. See Ex. 13-2. 
41. To date, Campbell has produced no documents evidencing his payments to Flyer. 
Trial Tr. at 193: 17-194:2. 
42. There is no evidence that Campbell is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order requiring him to produce any and all documents evidencing his payments to 
Flyer. 
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43. The Court does not find credible Campbell's statements that Flyer refuses to 
provide records. Campbell first claimed that Campbell himself refused to provide these records 
because of attorney-client privilege, then claimed that the lawyers refused to provide these 
records because they are attorney work product and Campbell is no longer a client, and finally 
claimed that some attorneys did not have payment records while others (including Flyer) refused 
to provide them because these documents were those attorneys' work product. It defies credulity 
that these attorneys would each independently misconstrue the attorney work product rule in the 
same fashion. In addition, it appears it is Campbell, not his attorneys, who is making his own 
improper attempt to invoke the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, Campbell's shifting story 
about these records calls into question his veracity. Finally, notwithstanding his earlier pleas that 
his attorneys would not provide the documents (or that none existed), on the eve of the formerly 
scheduled trial date, Campbell successfully produced payment records from his seven other 
attorneys. 
44. There is no evidence that documents reflecting Campbell's payments to Flyer do 
not exist. In fact, Campbell does not deny that these records exist. See, e.g., Exs. 3-1, 7; 8-5. 
45. The fact that Campbell was able to produce documents evidencing his payments 
to the other seven attorneys he engaged during the relevant time period shows that Campbell is 
capable of obtaining such records. Ex. 4-4 to 4-6; 4-95 to 4-104; and 4-153 to 4-167. Campbell's 
counsel suggests that the Court refrain here from making the finding above on the grounds that 
Mr. Flyer may in fact refuse to provide these records to Mr. Campbell so that Flyer will not be 
sued by Plaintiffs. While that may be true, there is no evidence to support Campbell's position, 
and it is Campbell's burden in a civil contempt proceeding to establish present inability to 
comply with the Court's order. See IRCP 75 (h)(l)(B). 
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46. As an attorney in California, Flyer is required to provide bills to a client who 
requests them. RJN Ex. K at 1. Moreover, after an engagement has terminated, Flyer is required 
to "promptly" release all client papers and property upon the client's request-including all 
correspondence, and thus bills. RJN Ex L at 2. This evidence is unrefuted. 
4 7. Flyer no longer represents Campbell. See Ex. 3-1 
48. Because Campbell employed Flyer and paid him for legal fees, Flyer must 
provide Campbell with bills upon Campbell's request. Moreover, because Campbell is his 
former client, Flyer must provide Campbell with correspondence, including that related to 
Campbell's payment of fees to Flyer. See RJN Ex.Kat 1; RJN Ex.Lat 2. 
49. Campbell has the present ability to comply with the Amended Order insofar as it 
relates to Count One. 
50. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence ten documents purporting to confer 
on Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney purportedly allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to 
obtain records from David Flyer. Ex. 501. 
51. Contrary to Campbell's assertion and for the reasons discussed infra in the 
Court's conclusions of law, providing Plaintiffs with this limited power of attorney does not 
constitute compliance with the Court's Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count One. The 
Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the attorney payment records at issue. 
B. Findings of Fact Specific to Count 8 
52. Count 8 of the Charging Affidavit charges Campbell with civil contempt for his 
failure to produce all records relating to his HSBC bank account in Hong Kong. Charging 
Affidavit at 4. 
53. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce records for all 
financial accounts for the time period commencing January 1, 2012. Ex. 13-3. 
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54. In "early 2010," Campbell opened a bank account with HSBC Hong Kong (the 
"Hong Kong Account"). Ex. 11-4. The account holder was a Hong Kong company that 
Campbell set up in order to open an account at a bank in Hong Kong, and Campbell was the 
account's beneficiary. Ex. 2 at 22:20-24: 18; 11-4. At or around the time he opened the account, 
Campbell made an initial deposit of$300,000 into the Hong Kong Account. Ex. 2 at 27:15-17. 
55. Campbell testified that he transferred the $300,000 out of the Hong Kong 
Account at some point after his arrest. Ex. 2 at 29:8-21. Campbell was arrested in June 2013. 
Ex. 2 at 16:24-17:14. 
56. Thus, the Hong Kong account was open and active between January 1, 2012 and 
thereafter-i.e., the time period covered by the Amended Order. 
57. The Amended Order therefore required Campbell to produce records related to 
the Hong Kong Account. 
5 8. None of Campbell's productions in evidence contains any records related to the 
HSBC Hong Kong Account. See generally Exs. 3, 4, 6, 32. To date, Campbell has produced no 
bank records from the Hong Kong Account. 
59. There is no evidence that Campbell is presently unable to comply with the Court's 
Amended Order requiring him to produce the Hong Kong account records. The burden of proof 
is on Campbell to show present inability to comply with an order in order to establish a defense 
to a charge of criminal contempt. 
60. Under Hong Kong's record keeping ordinance, a financial institution such as 
HSBC Hong Kong must keep records of each transaction for 6 years from the transaction's date. 
RJN Ex.Hat 2. Hong Kong's financial institutions must also keep the customer's account file, 
copies of documents obtained while verifying the identity of the customer or any beneficial 
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owner of the customer, and business correspondence with the customer and the customer's 
beneficial owner for 6 years after the business relationship ends. Id. 
61. Thus, for example, HSBC is required to keep records of the wire transfer of 
$300,000 out of the Hong Kong Account-which occurred sometime after June 2013-until at 
least June 2019. See id. 2 
62. Similarly, given that the Hong Kong Account was open at least as of June 2013, 
HSBC must keep copies of documents used to verify the identities of Mosaic Orange (the 
account holder) and Campbell (its beneficial owner) until at least June 2019. See id. 
63. During his debtor's examination, Campbell testified that he did not remember the 
name of the company in whose name he opened the Hong Kong Account. Ex. 1 at 41: 15-19, Ex. 
2-23. 
64. Campbell admits that, as of April 25, 2016, he now knows the name of the 
company in whose name the account was opened: Mosaic Orange. Ex. 5-2. There is no 
evidence that Campbell made any effort to obtain records related to the Hong Kong Account 
since learning the name of the company in whose name he opened the account. 
65. There is no evidence that Campbell has asked HSBC to search for records related 
to the Hong Kong Account by using his own identifying information. Instead, Campbell testified 
that he did not remember whether he gave HSBC his name and social security number and asked 
them to search for records. Ex. 1 at 44:25-45:2. 
66. Thus, records for the Hong Kong Account that are responsive to the Amended 
Order exist. Yet Campbell has not produced any records for this account. He has also failed to 
take basic steps that could lead to the production of these records. 
2 Although Mr. Ritzau points out that Exhibit 4-95 reflects transfers from this Mosaic Orange account to Campbell's 
attorney Mr. Flyer, these account records were never authenticated (Ritzau's own objection), nor are they responsive 
to the order requiring production of the bank account's records. 
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67. Campbell has the present ability to comply with the Amended Order insofar as it 
relates to Count Eight. 
68. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence a document purporting to confer on 
Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney purportedly allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to obtain 
"[a]ll records relating to Neil Campbell's HSBC bank account," and "[a]ll records relating to 
Mosaic Orange's HSBC bank account which Mr. Neil Campbell may have access to[.]" Ex. 508. 
Of note, this limited power of attorney does not state that Campbell is authorized to grant such 
powers of attorney on Mosaic Orange's behalf. See id. 
69. Contrary to Campbell's assertion and for the reasons discussed infra in the 
Court's conclusions oflaw, providing Plaintiffs with this limited power of attorney does not 
constitute compliance with the Court's Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count Eight. The 
Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the bank records at issue. 
III. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FINDINGS OF FACT 
70. The following findings of fact are based solely on the documentary evidence 
admitted or judicially noticed during trial. They are not based in any way on Campbell's 
testimony during trial (which related only to the civil contempt counts). Campbell's counsel has 
objected generally to trying Campbell together on civil and criminal contempt charges. The 
Court addressed this in finding #6. Although the Court indicated it could or would draw negative 
inferences when Mr. Campbell declined to answer any question at trial on 5th Amendment 
grounds, Mr. Campbell was not asked any questions at trial relating to the criminal contempt of 
court charges. Accordingly, Mr. Campbell did not take the 5th Amendment relative to any 
criminal contempt of court charges, nor, therefore did the Court draw any negative inferences 
from Mr. Campbell's testimony on these criminal contempt charges, or from his right to remain 
silent with respect to these criminal contempt of court charges. 
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71. On August 24, 2015, Campbell appeared before this Court in response to the 
Court's Second Amended Order setting his debtor's examination for that date. Ex. 1-4. The 
Court put Campbell under oath prior to the debtor's examination. Ex. 1-3. 
72. During the August 24, 2015 examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell a 
series of basic questions about his finances and living situation. To a great number of these 
questions, Campbell responded with "I don't know" or "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 33:22-34:7, 
34:17-25, 35:1-7, 35:12-15, 35:25-37:22, 38:18-24, 41:15-22, 49:10-15, 49:24-50:16, 52:8-
54:5, 54:24-55:25, 56:21-57:3, 57:17-58:10, 58:12-59:8, 60:2-61 :17, 62:5-9, 65:9-14, 71 :14-
20,71 :23-72:12, 72:16-74:6. 
73. The sheer volume of basic facts that Campbell claimed he did not remember 
during his August 2015 debtor's examination shows that this testimony is not credible. One in 
Campbell's position might not be expected to recall every detail of prior financial transactions, 
but should be able to recall some, or even most of them. Instead, interposing the same answer of 
"I don't recall" to such a volume of questions leads unerringly to the conclusion that in many 
specific instances, deception is at work rather than a faulty memory. The Court finds that these 
answers in general, and not in every particular, were part of Campbell's ongoing effort to evade, 
frustrate, and delay Plaintiffs judgment collection efforts and frustrate and obstruct the lawful 
processes of the court. 
74. Campbell has not been forthcoming nor entirely truthful with his answers about 
his finances on multiple occasions. For example, at one time Mr. Campbell stated under oath that 
he brought no assets with him when he moved from Florida to Idaho. At another time he stated 
under oath he did bring or ship less than $100,000 to Idaho in cash. Ex. 5-2 
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75. Campbell was found to have defrauded Plaintiffs of millions of dollars, including 
concealing millions of dollars in improper kickbacks. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex. F at 11-18. 
76. On November 25, 2014, during Plaintiffs' judgment collection efforts, Campbell 
gave sworn, false answers to interrogatories about his finances. Ex. 11-3, 11-4. Specifically, the 
interrogatories asked Campbell to "state how much your monthly income is, broken down by 
source (e.g. employment, Social Security payments, interest, etc.)." Campbell responded that he 
had no income. Ex. 11-3. Campbell also averred that he did not maintain any bank accounts. 
Ex. 11-4. In contrast, Campbell's bank records show that (1) he received Social Security 
payments in November 2014, Ex. 3-177; and (2) he had a bank account at Zions bank during 
November 2014, id 
77. Additionally, during his February 20, 2015 debtor's exam in the California 
proceeding, Campbell testified that he was "basically penniless" as of that date. Ex. 2 at 59:9-
11. However, Campbell's bank records show that (1) less than 10 days before his examination, 
Campbell wrote checks to Robert Duringer (who was supposedly then regularly covering 
Campbell's expenses) for $17,000, Ex. 3-189; and (2) even after these checks were processed, 
Campbell still had over $13,000 in his Zions Bank account in February 2015, Ex. 3-187. 
78. Thus, Campbell has shown a pattern of deception in his answers to these Plaintiffs 
about the particular subject of his finances in the particular context of this litigation in order to 
keep them from obtaining money which Campbell defrauded them of. 
A. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Source of Funds Used to Open 
his Bank of America Account, His Car, and Where He Lived (Counts 11-17) 
79. In late May 2012, Campbell opened a bank account with Bank of America. The 
earliest bank statement in evidence from this account covers the period of June 8, 2012 to July 9, 
2012. Ex. 3-37. The starting balance of the account for this time period was $24,715. Ex. 3-38. 
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Notably, during this one month time period, Campbell wrote checks and took cash out of the 
account in an amount exceeding $22,000. Ex. 3-39. It is unclear why Campbell apparently 
opened a new bank account and immediately drained almost all of the funds initially deposited 
into it. 
80. At the time Campbell opened this account, Campbell's sole source of income was 
supposedly his $1,600 per-month Social Security payment. Ex. 1 at 35:8-11. Campbell also 
admitted that during this time his monthly expenses each month exceeded his monthly income. 
Id. at 51 : 14-19. Campbell also testified that when he moved in late 2011, he had not brought 
any asset with him from Florida worth more than $10,000. Id. at 36:5-7. Moreover, he opened 
this account within six months of depositing over $30,000 in cash into his Zion's bank account. 
Ex. 3-49, 3-55, 3-61, 3-67. 
81. During the debtor's examination, Campbell was asked where he obtained the 
money to open this Bank of America account. He responded that he had "no idea." Ex. 1 at 
34:3--4. Campbell was then asked to identify the possible sources of the $24,000, to which he 
responded "I don't know." Id. at 34:20-25. He was asked ifhe owned a car, to which he 
responded "I don't remember." Id. at 35:4-5. He was asked where he was living, to which he 
responded "I don't remember." Id. at 35:12-15. These are questions that any reasonable person 
would have known the answer to, especially since Campbell claimed that he had brought no asset 
with him from Florida that was worth more than $10,000. Id. at 36:5-7. 
82. Campbell's statement that he did not remember where he was living in 2012 
exemplifies the evasive and false nature of this testimony. Immediately before Campbell gave 
this testimony, Plaintiffs' counsel showed Campbell his Bank of America statement from the 
period starting June 8, 2012. This statement showed the addressee as "Neil D Campbell" with a 
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listed address of2804 Summit Dr., Sun Valley, ID 83353. Exs. 1 at 33:19-24; 3-37. The 
questions about where Campbell lived were made during the course of asking questions about 
this June 2012 statement. Ex. 1 at 33:19-35:15. There is no indication in the transcript that 
counsel removed from Campbell's sight the June 2012 statement with Campbell's address before 
asking him where he lived in June 2012. See id. He could have asked for or looked at the June 
2012 statement listing his address when he testified that he did not remember where he was 
living at that time. Unless one moves frequently one should be able to remember or calculate 
where one was living three years before. There is no evidence Mr. Campbell was moving 
frequently, only that he moved from Florida to Idaho during relevant time periods, and Ex.5-1 
indicates he had only two Idaho addresses. This testimony is not credible. 
83. Months after giving this testimony and on the eve of the previously scheduled 
May 4, 2016 trial date, Campbell produced to Plaintiffs a handwritten statement and documents 
showing that his August 2015 testimony was false. On April 25, 2016, Campbell sent to 
Plaintiffs' counsel a handwritten statement admitting that he "owned a car a 2006 Corvette it was 
sold either in 2011 or 2012, it was the last car I owned." Ex. 5-1. Campbell signed this 
statement, averring that the contents were true and correct to the best of his ability. Ex. 5-2. 
84. On April 26, 2016, Campbell produced copies of the cancelled checks and deposit 
slip from his Bank of America bank account. Ex. 6. These records establish that Campbell 
received a check for $27,900 from a Larry H. Miller Toyota dealership on March 28, 2012, 
presumably as payment for the Corvette he sold. Ex. 6-5. Campbell did not deposit this check 
into his existing Zion's bank account. Instead, Campbell held onto this check and used it to open 
his new Bank of America account on May 23, 2012. Ex. 6-3. 
85. Campbell did not testify truthfully when he testified as set forth below in 
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paragraphs 86 through 98 because there is no way he did not remember moving to Idaho from 
Florida. At the time, he owned a Corvette. He either brought it with him to Idaho, had it shipped 
here, or sold it in the spring of 2012 in Colorado. He sold that Corvette, and used the check he 
received from the Toyota dealership to open the Bank of America account. It is inconceivable 
that someone purportedly living off of social security would not remember receiving nearly 
$28,000 for the sale of a car. 
86. Moreover, it is simply not credible that Campbell would have no idea of the 
source from which he obtained almost $25,000-particularly when his sole income was $1,600 
per month, his monthly expenses exceeded his income, and he supposedly had come to Idaho 
less than a year earlier with no asset worth more than $10,000. 3 
87. Count Eleven of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully in his debtor's examination about the source of the June 
2012 opening balance in his Bank of America account as follows: 
Q. So this is the statement from June 8th, 2012, through July 91\ 2012; 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in there they have the beginning balance on June 81\ 2012, as 
being $24,715.35; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where did that money come from? 
A. I have no idea at this point. 
3 Campbell's counsel suggests in his objections to Plaintiffs proposed findings that if Campbell made off with 
$4.5M these amounts would not necessarily be a memorable event for Mr. Campbell. While that may be true, these 
answers from which these findings are made are from Mr. Campbell's own testimony. He does not admit in his 
testimony having large cash sources, except in specific instances, such as the Hong Kong bank deposit or the $1 OK 
or less brought from Florida, which later became $1 OOK. 
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Ex. 1 at 33:22-34:4. 
88. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Eleven. 
89. Count Twelve of the contempt charges states Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you opened an account and you put nearly $25,000 into it. Did 
it come from your Zions account? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 34:5-7. 
90. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twelve. 
91. Count Thirteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What would the possibilities be for the origination of this money? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. What possibly-where possibly could this money have come from? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. I understand you don't remember. I want to know what the 
possibilities were. 
A. I don't know. 
Id. at 34:17-25. 
92. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirteen. 
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93. Count Fourteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own any assets at that time that you sold? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 35:1-3. There is no indication that Campbell did not know or understand 
the period of time referred to. 
94. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Fourteen. 
95. Count Fifteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Did you own a car at that time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if you owned a car in 2012? 
A. No, I don't. 
Id. at 35:4-7. 
96. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Fifteen. 
97. Count Sixteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where were you living? 
A. In 2012? 
Q. June of 2012. 
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A. I don't remember.4 
Id. at 35:12-15. 
98. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Sixteen. 
99. Count Seventeen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Clearly, you were living in Idaho when you opened up the Bank of 
America account; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had moved from Florida; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What assets of a more than $10,000 value did you bring with you from 
Florida? 
A. I didn't. 
* * * 
Q. So, again, if you had no assets worth more than $10,000 and you were 
living solely off of Social Security, what were the possible sources for 
you to be able to put $24,000 into a bank account in June of 2012? 
A. I don't remember where the funds came from. 
* * * 
Q. Well, Mr. Campbell, I'm just going to remind you again that you are 
here under penalty of perjury. 
4 If this answer was given in isolation it might not lend itself to a finding of guilt. However, the "I don't know" 
answer given in conjunction with other similar questions, and other evidence, leads the Court to find this answer is 
false. 
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A. Um-mm. 
Q. And to say that you don't remember where $24,000 came from when 
you're saying that you have no assets and no income other than Social 
Security, it just does not ring true. 
A. Well, I don't remember where the $24,000 came from. 
Id. at 35:25-37:22. 
100. The Court finds this is essentially the same answer Campbell gave to Count 
Eleven of the criminal contempt of court charge (para 87 above); it is the same question asked in 
a different form as to the source of the $24,000 .. The Court finds it inappropriate to charge or 
convict a defendant of criminal contempt for the same basic answer given to essentially the same 
question more than once. The Court acquits Campbell of criminal contempt of court in Count 
Seventeen. 
B. Campbell's False Testimony About the Source of a Large Cash Deposit to 
His Bank of America Account (Count 18) 
101. On November 30, 2012, Campbell deposited nearly $3,500 into his Bank of 
America account. Ex. 3-18. Campbell made this deposit within a year of depositing over 
$30,000 in cash into his Zions Bank account (Ex. 3-49, 3-55, 3-61, 3-67), and within six months 
of depositing over $25,000 into the Bank of America account (Exs. 3-38; 6-3). 
102. During his sworn Debtor's exam in August of 2015, Campbell testified that he did 
not know where he obtained nearly $3,500 in cash that he deposited in November 2012. Ex. 1 at 
38:18-24. 
103. The documents that Campbell produced in April 2016 now show that this deposit 
was a federal tax refund and that when he made this deposit he took $1,500 in cash and deposited 
the remainder. Ex. 6-31 & 6-33. 
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104. The Charging Affidavit of Erin Clark alleges that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt of court when he testified untruthfully that he did not recall the source of this money, 
or where it could have come from. 
105. The Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff proved Campbell 
would have remembered the source of this $3,500 deposit when questioned about it, and the 
Court cannot find that Campbell's testimony on this point was necessarily false, or designed to 
avoid or hamper Plaintiffs efforts during the course of the debtor's examination. The Court 
hereby acquits Campbell of criminal contempt for Count Eighteen. 
C. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Company in Whose Name 
Campbell Opened the Hong Kong Account (Count 19) 
106. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Campbell was also asked about the 
account he opened with HSBC in Hong Kong. In "early 2010," Campbell opened this offshore 
account and deposited into it $300,000. Exs. 2 at 22:20-24: 18, 27: 15-17; 11-4. This was at or 
around the time of the California court's February 4, 2010 Order finding Campbell liable for 
constructive fraud and awarding to Plaintiffs over $1.5 million. RJN Ex. C; RJN Ex. F at 2. 
107. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell 
for the name of the company in whose name the Hong Kong Account was opened. Campbell 
claimed that he did not remember the name of the company-even though he deposited 
$300,000 into a bank account in its name. Ex. 1 at 41: 15-22. During his August 2015 
examination, Campbell did not testify that he could obtain this name from his attorney or 
records; nor did he ask for an opportunity to search and respond to Plaintiffs at a later date. 
Instead, he simply said he did not remember. 
108. This testimony is not credible. One does not forget the name of a company for 
which he opened a bank account and deposited $300,000. Furthermore, Campbell testified that 
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he had given the name of the company to HSBC when he contacted it about getting the account 
records. Ex. 1 at 41:6-9. If Campbell had known the name of the company when he asked for 
the bank records after receiving the Amended Order in April 2015, he would have known the 
name of the company four months later during his August 2015 debtor's examination. 
109. On April 25, 2016, Campbell provided Plaintiffs' counsel with a handwritten 
document stating, in relevant part, "Count 19 [the Count related to the HSBC Hong Kong 
Account owner]-Mosaic Orange." Ex. 5-2. Thus, on the eve of the previously scheduled May 
4 trial date, Campbell was able to remember the company's name: Mosaic Orange. Id. It is 
simply not credible that Campbell would have remembered the name when he supposedly called 
HSBC in the Spring of 2015, forgotten it in August of 2015, and then suddenly remembered it 
again in April 2016 (nearly 1 year later). 
110. Count Nineteen of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. What was the name of the company that had the bank account with 
HSBC? 
A. What was the name of the company? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember the name of a company that you set up a bank 
account and put $300,000 into it? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Ex. 1 at 41:15-22. 
111. For the aforementioned reasons, Campbell made false statements under oath when 
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he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Nineteen. 
D. Campbell's False Testimony Related to the Source of Large Cash Deposits to 
Campbell's Zions Bank Account (Counts 20--30) 
112. Plaintiffs' counsel asked Campbell numerous questions about his Zions bank 
account records. The Zions bank account records cover the time from November 2011 to April 
2015. Ex. 3. 
113. From November 2011 through March 2012, Campbell made twelve different cash 
deposits into his account. These deposits include the following: 
a. $4,000 on November 21, 2011 (Ex. 3-41) 
b. $2,000 on November 30, 2011 (Ex. 3-41) 
C. $5,000 on December 20, 2011 (Ex. 3-45) 
d. $2,500 on December 28, 2011 (Ex. 3-45) 
e. $700 on January 12, 2012 (Ex. 3-45) 
f. $1,500 on January 18, 2012 (Ex. 3-45) 
g. $1,000 on January 27, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
h. $2,000 on January 30, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
1. $2,500 on February 17, 2012 (Ex. 3-51) 
J. $1,500 on February 22, 2012 (Ex. 3-57) 
k. $2,600 on February 27, 2012 (Ex. 3-57) 
1. $4,000 on March 20, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
m. $1,600 on March 25, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
n. $3,000 on March 30, 2012 (Ex. 3-63) 
114. Thus, Campbell made $30,200 in cash deposits into his Zions bank account over a 
four month period. 
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115. Significantly, Campbell made these cash deposits despite the fact that he also 
testified that, in 2012, his sole source of income was his Social Security payment ofroughly 
$1,600 per month. Ex. 1 at 35:8-11, 51 :8-10. 
116. Also at this time, Campbell was renting a condominium for $1500 per month and 
had other large monthly expenses, such as Idaho Power, Cox Communications, Blue Cross, and 
other bills. Exs. 1 at 51: 11-19; 3 at 41, 50, 5 5, 56, 67. As Campbell admitted, his monthly 
expenses each month exceeded his monthly income. Ex. 1 at 51: 14-19. 
11 7. During his August 2015 debtor's examination, Plaintiffs' counsel asked 
Campbell multiple questions about the source of the cash that he used to make these twelve 
deposits over the four month period. See generally Ex. 1 at 49--62. Campbell's testimony could 
be construed as evasive and contradictory on this issue. However, the Court cannot say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was not true or was designed to deceive. By December of 2011, the 
California courts had already found Mr. Campbell had received over $8M as a result of his 
conspiracy with Mr. Powers. Mr. Campbell asserts that he never received anywhere near that 
amount. However he had received significant amounts as a result of his defrauding of Plaintiff. 
The fact that Mr. Campbell did not remember the source of these specific deposits, none of 
which are extraordinarily large or significant, is not incredible, and the Court cannot find that 
Plaintiff proved this particular criminal contempt charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
118. The Court hereby acquits Mr. Campbell of the charge of criminal contempt of 
court for Count Twenty. 
119. Count Twenty-One of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, you already testified that you didn't have any asset that was 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 27 
513 of 636
worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage units; 
correct? 
A. Well, I- to answer your question, I don't- I didn't bring anything 
with me that I would liquidate unless it was liquidated in Florida. 
Q. Were things being liquidated in Florida at this time? 
A. I was living on things that were being liquidated in that time. 
Q. Who was liquidating items in Florida? 
A. I was. 
Q. So you were in Idaho but liquidating items in Florida? 
A. No, I was doing that in Florida. 
Q. So everything had been liquidated before you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 49:24-50: 16. 
120. Mr. Campbell remembers whether he had liquidated everything before he moved 
to Idaho. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-
One. 
121. Count Twenty-Two of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So, clearly, your expenses were exceeding your income; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, how did you make up the difference? 
A. I told you, I liquidated - I had liquidated assets that I had. I believe 
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some of it came from stock that I was holding in Florida that was part 
of a venture capital group that we were involved with. 
* * * 
Q. Did you sell it before or after the judgment was entered against you by 
my client? 
A. Before. 
Q. So, in 2000 - end of 2011 what assets were you still liquidating? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 52:8-54:5. 
122. The only part of this answer that the Court could construe as knowingly false 
would be the part where Campbell says he doesn't remember what assets he was still liquidating 
at the end of 2011. While the Court can find from other answers, etc. that Campbell knew 
whether he had liquidated everything before he moved to Idaho, there is not sufficient evidence 
for the Court to conclude Mr. Campbell must be testifying falsely when he says he doesn't 
remember what assets he was still liquidating at the end of 2011. 
123. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court acquits Campbell of the charge of 
criminal contempt in Count Twenty-Two. 
124. Count Twenty-Three of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you can't remember any asset that you would have been liquidating 
to enable you to make nearly $10,000 in deposits this month; correct? 
A. You say "this month"? 
Q. This month of January, 2012. 
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A. I believe this was part - I believe this was - and I don't know for sure, 
but I think this was part of that stock settlement. 
* * * 
Q. How was the stock sale money provided to you? 
A. I believe in the form of a check. I can't remember. 
Q. So why is there no record of the check being deposited? 
A. Well, that was far - that was earlier than this particular date. 
Q. How much prior to that date? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 54:24-55:25. 
125. The Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Three. 
Campbell is hereby acquitted of criminal contempt of court as charged in Count Twenty-Three. 
126. Count Twenty-Four of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Why would you have held this money from the liquidating your stock 
- why were you holding it in cash? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you just cash the check and keep tens of thousands of dollars in 
cash in your condo in Elkhorn? 
A. Did I hold money? No. 
Q. But you're making cash deposits; right? 
A. I made cash deposits, yes. 
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Id. at 56:21-57:3 
127. On April 25, 2016, --nine days before the previously scheduled May 4 trial date, 
Campbell sent to Plaintiffs counsel a handwritten statement, admitting that when he moved to 
Idaho, he had a moving company deliver boxes of his family's belongings within which was 
some specified amount of cash "less than $1 OOK." Ex. 5-2. Campbell signed this statement, 
averring that the contents were "true and correct to the best of his ability." 
128. Mr. Campbell was avoiding telling the truth about keeping tens of thousands of 
dollars in cash in his condo in Elkhorn. He was in fact doing so. His answers above are 
substantially false or designed to avoid disclosing his cash resource-they are deceitful. For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell guilty of contempt of court when he gave 
the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four. 
129. Count Twenty-Five of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. You know, you walked into a bank four times with cash to deposit in 
one month. And if you're telling me that that money came from a 
stock sale, that would mean that you were having that cash from the 
stock sale somewhere within your reach; isn't that right? 
A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. 
Q. How else would you have gotten it if the money weren't in your 
reach? 
A. Well, you 're asking me if that came directly from the stock sale. I 
don't remember if it did or not. 
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Q. So where - if it wasn't from the stock sale, where would that cash 
have come from? 
A. I had liquidated assets in Florida. 
Q. Okay. And then -you liquidated them, and then you just had a wad of 
cash that you came to Idaho with? 
A. I don't remember how that came about or how I ended up coming up 
with these deposits at this particular time. 
Id. at 57:17-58:10. 
130. These answers are substantially false. Mr. Campbell knew full well the source of 
these cash deposits. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five. 
131. Count Twenty-Six of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Then let's move to the next tab, and this is the Zions statement dated 
February 21 5\ 2012; right? 
* * * 
Q. And on this one it's showing deposits of three separate times; a $1,000 
deposit, a $2,000 deposit, and a $2,500 deposit. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, $5,500 in cash deposits in one month after the previous 
month of $10,000 in cash deposits, and you don't remember where the 
cash came from? 
A. No, I do not. 
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Id. at 58:12-59:1. 
132. Based on the Court's findings in paragraph 127 and 128, the Court finds that 
Campbell made false statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count 
Twenty-Six. 
133. Count Twenty-Seven of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Was somebody regularly providing you with cash each month? 
A. I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q. Did anybody ever provide you with cash at this time frame? 
A. Unless it was something I was selling at that time, I don't remember. 
Id. at 59:2-8. 
134. Immediately after providing these answers, at Ex.1 59:9-14, Campbell is asked if 
Mr. Duringer was providing him with cash. He answered no. ''No one else was providing you 
with cash?" "No." Campbell clarified his answer that he "didn't remember," and clearly 
indicated no one was providing him with cash at this point in time. There is no proof, certainly 
none that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt, that someone was providing Campbell with 
cash during this period. 
135. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby acquits Campbell of the 
criminal contempt charge contained in Count Twenty-Seven. 
136. Count Twenty-Eight of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So you had that much cash in your possession in February of 2012; 
right? 
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A. Obviously, I did. 
Q. And you had $10,000 in your possession in January; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So all you- so in January you had $15,000 at least in cash; right? 
A. I don't remember the exact amounts, but that's what it says that I made 
deposits of, yes. 
Q. So you had within your reach thousands and thousands of dollars all in 
cash at the beginning of 2012; right? 
A. Well, I had at least what I deposited, yes. 
Q. Did you make a deposit one month, deplete all the cash you had in 
your possession at that point, and then the next month deposit all the 
cash you had in your possession that month? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:2-20. 
137. This answer is clearly false. Campbell knew he had cash on hand in early 2012, 
he knows how much it was that came from Florida, and he knows whether all of it in his 
possession was deposited into an account at one time, and whether he came into possession of 
more cash, or whether he depleted his cash in any month at the start of 2012. For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false statements under oath when 
he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Twenty-Eight. 
138. Count Twenty-Nine of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. How would you have obtained additional cash if not somebody 
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providing it to you? 
A. Like I say, I had liquidated assets. 
Q. I understand that. And when you say you liquidated assets, that gives 
you one piece of cash. 
A. Um-mm. 
Q. One pile of cash; right? Because you liquidated everything when you 
were in Florida; correct? 
A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Did you liquidate all of your assets that were worth more than $10,000 
while you were in Florida and before you moved to Idaho other than 
what was in your storage unit? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, you've already testified that you didn't come to Idaho with any 
assets worth more than $10,000 other than what was in the storage 
unit; right? 
A. Nothing that was worth more than $10,000 to my recollection, yeah. 
Q. Did you own anything still in Florida once you moved to Idaho? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 60:21-61 :17. 
139. This is a difficult charge for the Court to analyze because the Court is unsure 
exactly which of the answers given was allegedly false, or how. It is possible, depending on 
where the cash amount of "less than $1 OOK" was stored in Florida, or if it was stored in Florida, 
or if it was in a storage unit, or if it is considered an "asset," that Campbell made no false 
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statement here. The question whether Campbell owned "anything" in Florida after he moved to 
Idaho is quite broad. It is quite conceivable Mr. Campbell could not recall, particularly given his 
testimony at the February 20, 2015 Debtor's Examination in California, which is set forth at 
Exhibit 2, 35:3-12 He testified then that there could be some accounts open in Florida with $20 
or $30 in them, he just didn't know. 
140. The Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell made a false 
statement as charged in Count Twenty-Nine, and the Court hereby acquits Campbell of any 
charge of criminal contempt of court for Count Twenty-Nine. 
141. Count Thirty of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed criminal 
contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. They're - on February 22"d there's a $1,500 deposit and on February 
2?1h a $2,600 deposit; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, again, no idea where that cash came from? 
A. No. 
Id. at 62:5-9. 
142. Although the Court could draw an inference here that Campbell knew the source 
of the cash for these deposits, the Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that he did in fact 
know or recall the source of cash for these particular deposits. For those reasons, the Court 
hereby acquits Campbell of the charge of criminal contempt of court as contained in Count 
Thirty. 
E. Campbell's False Testimony About How He Paid his Rent (Counts 31-34) 
143. Beginning in April 2012, Campbell's Zions Bank records establish that the only 
deposits into his account were his monthly social security payments. Ex. 3-69, 73, 79, 83, 87, 
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91, 95. That is, at that time, Campbell stopped making cash deposits into his Zions account. The 
records further establish that, although Campbell had always paid his $1,500-per-month rent with 
a check from his Zions account prior to April 2012, after that date, there is no cancelled check 
evidencing the payment of his rent. Ex. 3-71, 77, 81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 103. When asked how he 
paid his rent if there was no cancelled check establishing its payment after April, Campbell again 
repeatedly claimed that he could not remember. Ex. 1 at 65:6-23. 
144. It is not credible that a person who had been consistently paying his monthly rent 
with a check would forget why he stopped paying it in this manner, or how he had proceeded to 
pay his rent. 
145. When asked about the possible ways in which his rent was being paid, Campbell 
testified that he may have paid with a money order obtained from Atkinson's. Ex. 72:21-73:5. 
Campbell claimed he could not remember why he would have paid with a money order instead 
of a check. Ex. 74:3-6. Campbell did not identify as a possibility that he had prepaid several 
months' worth ofrent at a time. Nevertheless, the bank records that Campbell produced in 
August 2016 show that Campbell wrote a check to his landlord from his Bank of America 
account for $9,000 on June 28, 2012. Ex. 6-10. It thus appears that Campbell prepaid his rent 
for at least part of 2012. It defies credulity that someone would forget suddenly switching from 
monthly payments to prepaying six months at one time-particularly someone with purportedly 
limited income and assets. In sum, Campbell's testimony about how he paid his rent was not 
truthful. 
146. Count Thirty-One of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. So was your rent being paid at that time? 
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A. I assume so. 
Q. Who was paying your rent? 
A. I don't know- I was, I assume. 
Q. And how were you paying it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Ex. 1 at 65:9-14. 
14 7. In 2012, for the months after April, it is a reasonable inference from the evidence 
that Campbell still had money left from the "less than $100K" that came from Florida. Even ifhe 
did not, Campbell would have known the source of his rent payments after April 2012. For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false statements under oath when 
he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-One. 
148. Count Thirty-Two of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. But you testified that you had never paid your rent in cash. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you didn't pay it in cash and you didn't pay it through a check from 
the two bank accounts that you had. So what possible source of 
money paid your rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Id. at 71:14-20. 
149. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell made false 
statements under oath when he gave the sworn testimony underlying Count Thirty-Two. 
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150. Count Thirty-Three of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Where could you have gotten-what source of funds could you have 
possibly used to pay the rent? 
A. I don't remember how that was being paid at this time. I don't 
remember. 
Q. Did you have access to any other source of money with which you 
could have paid the rent? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, that's pretty important because this is all about your assets and 
your expenses, and we're talking about $1,500 every month that 
you're saying that you didn't pay in cash and you didn't pay with 
checks from the two bank accounts that you 're telling us are the only 
bank accounts that you have. 
A. Oh, it was being paid. I just don't remember how it was being paid at 
that time. 
Id. at 71:23-72:12. 
151. This is the same answer to the same basic question that Campbell was asked in 
Count Thirty-One-how were you paying your rent, and he gave the same answer. It is 
inappropriate for a Court to punish the same act of contempt twice, for to do so is double 
jeopardy. State v. Sellers, _Idaho_, 2016 WL4548086, Sept 1, 2016. The Court hereby 
acquits Campbell of the charge of criminal contempt of court alleged in Count Thirty-Three. 
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152. Count Thirty-Four of the contempt charges states that Campbell committed 
criminal contempt when he testified untruthfully as follows: 
Q. Well, for months you weren't paying your rent, so either somebody 
was paying it for you, you were paying it in cash or you have another 
bank account out there; right? Those are my only options that I can 
think of. Can you think of any other? 
A. It might have been a money order. I don't remember. 
Q. And how would you have obtained a money order? 
A. Through Atkinson's. 
Q. So you go in with cash to Atkinson's and purchase a money order? 
A. I don't remember if that's how this was done, but you're asking me is 
there any other possible way. That's the only other possible way I can 
understand that it was being done. 
Q. Okay. So have you done that before, have you gone to Atkinson's 
with cash to obtain a money order? 
A. I have. 
* * * 
Q. And, again, the cash with which you used to buy the money order to 
pay for it, that came from cash that was sitting around in your condo at 
that time? 
A. It was either that or a liquidation of - no, it was liquidation of either -
that stock that I referred to earlier. 
Q. So that's the only source, it could only be this stock? 
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A. As I remember, yes. 
Q. So why didn't you take the money from the stock sale and put it into 
your Zions account and then write a check to pay your rent instead of -
A. I don't remember why I did that. 
Id. at 72:16-74:6. 
153. The only answer to this set of questions that could possibly be construed as false, 
and therefore constituting contempt, is the answer to the last question: Why didn't you take the 
money from the stock sale and put it into your account and write a check to pay your rent? There 
are multiple reasons why Campbell might not have chosen to do that. The Court cannot conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is testifying falsely when he says he cannot remember 
years later why he chose one course of action over another. 
154. The Court hereby acquits Campbell of the charge of criminal contempt of court as 
alleged in Count Thirty-Four. 
F. Affirmative Defenses Asserted as to the Criminal Counts 
155. Campbell asserts as to Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts the affirmative 
defense of past inability to comply with the court's order. It is not readily apparent how this 
affirmative defense relates to the criminal contempt counts, each of which is premised on giving 
false testimony. Regardless, Campbell has presented no evidence of a past inability to comply 
with any relevant court order. 
IV. CIVIL CONTEMPT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Elements and Burden of Proof 
156. It is a contempt of court to disobey a court order. Idaho Code§ 7-601(5). 
157. A civil contempt claim must be proven to a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho 
R. Civ. Proc. 75(j)(l). 
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158. The failure to comply with a court order need not be intentional or willful to 
impose a civil contempt sanction. Chavez v. Canyon Cty., 152 Idaho 297,304 (2012). 
159. "When the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act which is yet in the 
power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned until he has performed it[.]" Idaho Code 
§ 7-611. 
160. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(l), the court must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence "that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the 
order violated[.]" 
161. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(h) establishes that present inability to comply is 
an affirmative defense, which the alleged contemnor must prove to a preponderance of the 
evidence. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(h). 
162. Courts applying similar laws put the burden regarding ability or inability to 
comply on the defendant. Thus, in Lamb v. Eads, the Iowa Supreme Court found that "the 
general rule holds that an applicant for a contempt citation establishes a prima facie case by 
proving the duty which is on the contemnor and the contemnor's [sic] failure to perform the 
duty. The contemnor then has the burden of showing he could not perform the duty, ifhe relies 
on that ground." 346 N.W. 2d 830, 832 (1984); see also Foust v. Denato, 175 N.W.2d 403,405 
(Iowa 1970) ("[W]hen the evidence clearly shows the order of court has been disobeyed, a party 
who seeks to purge himself of contempt by showing his inability to comply with the order of 
court has the burden to prove it"). 5 Similarly, Spabile v. Hunt held that, while a court must find 
See also 17 C.J.S. Contempt§ 141 (2015) ("When the moving party in a contempt action 
has shown that the alleged contemnor has failed to comply with the judgment or order, the 
burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to show why he or she should not be held in contempt. ... 
If the alleged contemnor makes a sufficient showing, the burden of proof shifts back to the party 
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that a contemnor has the present ability to comply before imposing sanctions, it is the contemnor 
who bears the burden of proving his inability to comply. 360 A.2d 51 (Vt. 1976). 
163. This Court therefore finds that Campbell, the alleged contemnor, bears the burden 
of proving his present inability to comply with the orders allegedly violated. 
164. To satisfy his burden, an alleged contemnor must prove his defense of present 
inability to comply with admissible evidence. He cannot avoid his burden by claiming a Fifth 
Amendment privilege. U.S. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761 (1983). 
165. On June 18, 2016, this Court held that Campbell may assert only two affirmative 
defenses: (1) present inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the civil counts), and (2) 
past inability to comply with the Court's order (as to the criminal counts). Campbell waived all 
other affirmative defenses. 
B. Effect of Powers of Attorney 
166. During trial, Campbell presented as evidence ten documents purporting to confer 
on Plaintiffs' counsel a limited power of attorney to seek records from each lawyer and bank 
named in Plaintiffs' ten civil contempt counts (including those that Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss 
without prejudice). Exs. 501-10. 
167. Campbell asserts that these limited powers of attorney constitute compliance with 
the Court's Amended Order. 
168. The Court's Amended Order directed Campbell to produce the bank records and 
attorney payment records currently at issue. 
169. In the analogous context of discovery, it is well established that a party does not 
adequately respond to a request for production by telling the requesting party that it may go get 
seeking a finding of contempt, who ultimately bears the burden of showing an ability to comply 
with the order.") 
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the documents itself. Instead, "even where a requesting party already has documents in its 
possession, or could otherwise access those documents, the disclosing party may not withhold 
those documents." Beach Mart, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 396,410 (E.D.N.C. 2014); 
accord Rivers v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 5:08CV61/RS/EMT, 2008 WL 5111300, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2008); SSL, L.L.C. v. Garcia-Chicoine Enters., Inc., No. 04-1017-JTM, 2005 
WL 6793646, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2005); Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281,284 
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Fort Wash. Res., Inc. v. Tannen, 153 F.R.D. 78, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
170. If a party cannot satisfy a request for production by informing the requesting party 
that he already possesses the relevant documents, then a fortiori, a party cannot satisfy a court 
order directing production by merely authorizing the requesting party to obtain the documents 
from a third-party source. 
171. Additionally, there is no evidence that Campbell's limited powers of attorney 
would be effective to allow Plaintiffs to obtain the records in question. 
172. Campbell's failure to cite any evidence or law supporting the efficacy of these 
limited powers of attorney is particularly problematic as to the records related to the Hong Kong 
account. It is not at all clear that limited powers of attorney granted in the United States and 
under U.S. law would be effective to obtain records related to a bank account at a Hong Kong 
bank in the name of a Hong Kong company. 
173. Moreover, as discussed supra with respect to the limited power of attorney related 
to the Hong Kong Account, the document does not state on its face that Campbell is authorized 
by Mosaic Orange to confer such a power. 
174. Campbell thus has not offered sufficient evidence to show that his limited powers 
of attorney (Exhibits 501-10) are relevant. Nor has Campbell provided the Court with any 
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authority supporting his position that providing a power of attorney in lieu of production of the 
actual production of documents suffices to excuse a charge of civil contempt. 
175. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Campbell did not comply 
with the Court's Amended Order by providing Plaintiffs with the original copies of the limited 
powers of attorney admitted as Exhibits 501-10. 
C. Conclusions of Law Specific to Count 1 
176. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce to Plaintiffs all 
documents evidencing payments made by Campbell to Flyer over the period of 2009 to present, 
including documents evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments. 
177. To date, Campbell has not produced a single document evidencing any payment 
that he made to Flyer over the period of 2009 to present. 
178. Thus, to date, Campbell has not complied with the Court's Amended Order 
insofar as it relates to Count 1. 
179. For the reasons discussed in paragraphs 42-49, supra, the Court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Campbell has the present ability to Comply with the Court's 
Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count One. 
180. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds Campbell in civil contempt under 
Count One of the Charging Affidavit. 
D. Conclusions of Law Specific to Count 8 
181. The Court's Amended Order required Campbell to produce to Plaintiffs all 
records relating to the Hong Kong Account for the time period commencing January 1, 2012 to 
the present date. 
182. To date, Campbell has not produced a single record relating to the Hong Kong 
Account. 
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183. Thus, to date, Campbell has not complied with the Court's Amended Order 
insofar as it relates to Count 8. 
184. For the reasons discussed in paragraphs 59--67, supra, the Court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Campbell has the present ability to Comply with the Court's 
Amended Order insofar as it relates to Count Eight. 
185. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds Campbell in civil contempt under 
Count Eight of the Charging Affidavit. 
V. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
186. None of the foregoing conclusions oflaw is based in any way on Campbell's 
testimony during trial. 
A. Elements 
187. A party's "[d]eceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court" is 
punishable as a contempt. Idaho Code § 7-601. This title is called the Criminal Code. Idaho 
Code§ 18-100(1). This code does not affect any power conferred by law upon any public body, 
tribunal, or officer, to impose or inflict punishment for contempt. Idaho Code §18-105. Thus 
commission of an act that may constitute perjury does not prevent the Court from punishing the 
same act as criminal contempt. 
188. The following cases are taken from 89 ALR 2d. 1258 entitled Perjury or False 
Swearing as Contempt, originally published 1963: 
In Clark v United States (/932, C48 Minn) 61 F2d 695, affirming a conviction of 
contempt for false swearing by a prospective juror, the court rejected the contention that 
defendant was charged with perjury but perjury was not proved. and declared that the 
essence of the alleged misconduct was contempt rather than perjury, and since 
fctlsification or evasion which mayfall short of technical perjwy may still constitute 
contemptuous conduct {( its tendency is to obstruct the administration l?fiustice. the 
allegation of the petition that defendant's answers constituted perjwy was an immaterial 
allegation, and she stood thereunder charged with the exact offense of which she was 
convicted. The court said that in Ex parte Hudgings (1919) 2-1-9 US 378. 63 L cd 656. 39 
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S () 33 7. l l A LR 333, it was held that technical pe1jury does not constitute criminal 
contempt unless it also amounts to an obstruction to the administration ofjustice. and 
impliedly it can be drawnfi·om that case that less than technical perjury may constitute 
criminal contempt (fit amounts to an obstruction lf the administration of'justice. even 
though certain elements l?{perjwy may be lacking. and that in Young 1' S'tafe (l 926) I 98 
Ind 629. 1.../ NE 4::8. it was said that.false swearing by a witness is such an obstruction of 
justice as to constitute a direct contempt (~f court, and that it is not necessary that the 
false testimony upon which the charge of contempt is based constitute perjury. Upon 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 289 US I. {, ed 993. 53 S Ct 465, the 
court, qffirming, said that concealment or misstatement by ajuror upon a voir dire 
examination is punishable as a contempt [fits tendency and design are to obstruct the 
processes l~fjustice. Concerning defendant's statements as to her.former employment 
(which did not mention her employment by the accused). the court said that whether this 
ivas pe1:jury or.false swearing there was no occasion to inquire, since it was a deliberate 
endeavor to thwart the process qf inquiry and to turn a trial into afutileform, and that 
added to this concealment there was a positive misstatement by the defendant when she 
testtfied that she was not biased or prejudiced The court said that defendant was not 
condemned/or concealment. although concealment had been proved, and that she was 
not condemned.for false swearing. although false swearing had been proved, but rather 
she was condemned because she made use ~/false swearing and concealment as the 
means ·whereby to accomplish her acceptance as a juror and under cover of that relation 
to obstruct the course ofjustice. The court said that pe1:jury by a witness has been 
thought to be not enough ·where the obstruction to judicial power is only that inherent in 
the wrong qf test(fj:ingfalsely, but that. on the other hand obstruction to judicial power 
ivill not lose the quality of contempt even though one of its aggravations is the 
commission ofpe1:jury. 
Where defendant gave obstructive, perjurious, evasive, and contumacious answers to the 
questions propounded to him ·while he was being examined be.f()re a grandjury, the 
court in Re Afrckley (1943. DC Pa) 50 F Supp 27.f., held that the defendant was thereby 
guilty of contempt (~fcourt. It was said that various conflicting and obviously false 
ans1vers of the defendant to the questions asked him lejt no doubt that defendant intended 
to and actua!Zv did prevent the grandjuryfi·om obtaining ilrformation which was desired, 
and that hisfi·equent repetition (?fthe phrase "I don't remember" with regard to matters 
about which he quite obviously could not have forgotten, his frequent reference to 
documents and memoranda not at hand without which he stated he could not test{/y and 
give the information requested, and his inability to supply the required information when 
these documents and memoranda were available to him. showed beyond a reasonable 
doubt the contumacy qf the witness and his desire to obstruct the examination by 
asserting the first excuse or answer which came to mind Affirming this judgment; the 
court in (CA3) 137 F2d 310, cert den 320 US 760. 88 L ed-153, 64 S' Ct 69, said that it 
had carefully examined the record in detail and thought the findings of the court below 
were abundant{v sustained by the testimony, and that the conclusion that the defendant 
was guilty<?{ contumacious conduct was well just[fied. 
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In a divorce proceeding wherein the l'Fife sought alimony payments and it appeared that 
during cross-examination of the husband he stated that he had no property or assets, 
whereupon the trial court adjudged him guilty of contempt of court, the appellate court 
in Crute v Crute (195]j 86 Ga App 96, 7() SE]d 727, affirmed the judgment beloiv. 
stating that there was no abuse c~f discretion on the part qf the trial court which would 
authorize setting aside its judgment. It was said that the husband's manner on the stand 
was observed by the trial judge, and whether or not the witness so conducted himse(f 
relative to questions concerning his financial worth and his records and books as to 
justifj: the court in adjudging him in contempt was all.for the trialjudge to determine, 
and that under the present record it was not an abuse ,fdiscretionfrJr thatjudge to make 
a.finding of contempt. It was also said that the trialjudge had power to punish for 
contempt, and while it was true that criminal contempt involves some disrespectful or 
contumacious conduct toward the court, a witness who 1-vas seeking to conceal the truth 
and to give evasive an.rn.1ers or to fals(/}' and mislead the court certainly is not acting 
respectfully to the court, and his conduct is reprehensible. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i), criminal contempt must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 75(i). Reasonable doubt "is not mere possible 
doubt, because everything relating to hwnan affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is 
open to some possible or imaginary doubt." Idaho Crim. Jury Instr. 1707. Instead, "it is 
the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction, to a moral ce1iainty, of the truth of the charge." Id 
189. Plaintiffs' criminal contempt charges arise from Campbell's false testimony given 
under oath during his August 24, 2015 debtor's examination. 
B. The Effect of One Answer Upon Another 
190. During closing argument, Campbell argued that this Court should essentially 
consider the testimony underlying each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts in a vacuum-
without considering the transcript of Campbell's August 2015 debtor's exam as a whole. It is 
proper for this Court to consider the testimony underlying each criminal contempt count in light 
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of the August 2015 debtor's examination as a whole. The context of Campbell's overall 
testimony during the August 2015 debtor's examination is relevant and important to shed light 
on the testimony's meaning. 
191. The totality of basic facts that Campbell claimed to forget during this 
examination, considered alongside other evasive, inconsistent, or outright false answers, tends to 
increase the probability, in this Court's view, that any particular claim of memory loss is feigned. 
See In re Sowers, 229 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998) (considering uncharged omissions 
while addressing whether debtors' failure to disclose certain facts related to their finances was 
intentional and stating "even if this Court were to believe that the foregoing mentioned omissions 
were merely the result of some sort of oversight or ignorance on the part of the Defendants, this 
notion becomes preposterous when combined with the many other omissions of the 
Defendants"). As with In re Sowers, considering each of Campbell's claims of memory loss in 
light of the many other things he claimed not to remember during the August 2015 debtor's 
examination increases the likelihood that any particular claim of memory loss made in other 
circumstances in the same debtor's examination is not well taken. 
192. Additionally, the numerous other misstatements and omissions that Campbell 
made to these Plaintiffs in the course of this litigation and underlying events for the same 
purpose of preventing Plaintiffs from learning information about Campbell's finances are 
relevant to Campbell's intent to again prevent Plaintiffs from learning about his finances during 
the August 2015 debtor's examination. See United States v. Mebust, 857 F. Supp. 609, 618-19 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (defendant's uncharged prior procurement of firearm owner identification cards 
by false statements relevant to his intent to knowingly make false statements in the case at bar); 
Estes v. Anglin, No. 2:14-CV-994-SLB, 2015 WL 1279746, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2015) ("A 
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pattern of omissions on the part of the debtor is often sufficient to find fraudulent intent[.]"); 
Abdo v. Com., 64 Va. App. 468,474 (Ct. App. 2015) (alleged contemnor's prior uncharged 
instances of tardiness relevant to showing intent on the charged occasion). 
193. Moreover, given its relevance to intent, this evidence is also relevant to show 
Campbell's willfulness in giving the alleged false testimony underlying Plaintiffs' criminal 
contempt charge, and it shows why his actions and testimony give rise to charges of contempt, 
independent of any examination as to whether Campbell committed perjury. 
C. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Affirmative Defense of Past 
Inability to Comply 
194. Campbell asserts as to Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts the affirmative 
defense of past inability to comply with the Court's order. 
195. Given that Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts are premised not on violation of a 
court order, but on giving false testimony, Campbell's asserted affirmative defense is irrelevant 
to the criminal contempt counts at bar. 
196. Nevertheless, even if this affirmative defense were relevant, there is no evidence 
that Campbell was unable to comply with any relevant court order at the time of his August 2015 
debtor's examination. 
197. Therefore, as to each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts for which Campbell 
has been found guilty, the Court finds that Campbell failed to meet any burden he might have 
had of proving his affirmative defenses. As to each of Plaintiffs' criminal contempt counts, the 
Court rejects Campbell's affirmative defense of past inability to comply with the Court's order. 
D. Conclusions of Law Related to the Source of Funds Used to Open his Bank of 
America Account, His Car, and Where he Lived (Counts 11-17) 
198. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
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examination when he was asked "[w]here did that money come from?" and answered "I have no 
idea at this point." Ex. 1 at 34:3-4. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Eleven was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Eleven. 
199. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
examination when he was asked whether the nearly $25,000 used to open the Bank of America 
account came from his Zion's Account and he said "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 34:5-7. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Twelve was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twelve. 
200. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely during his August 2015 debtor's 
examination when he responded to questions about the possible source of money used to open 
the Bank of America account with "I don't remember" and "I don't know." Ex. 1 at 34: 17-25. 
Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Thirteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirteen. 
201. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked whether he owned any assets that he sold around the 
time he opened the Bank of America account and said "I don't remember." Ex. 1 at 35:1-3. 
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Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false 
testimony underlying Count Fourteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Fourteen. 
202. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked twice whether he owned a car in 2012 and twice 
answered that he did not remember. Ex. 1 at 35:4-7. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Fifteen was 
willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Fifteen. 
203. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he was asked where he lived in June 2012 and answered "I don't 
remember." Ex. 1 at 3 5: 12-15. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Sixteen was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Sixteen. 
204. The Court finds the conduct charged in Count Seventeen is the same conduct for 
which Campbell has been found guilty in Count Eleven. Whether convictions on different counts 
implicate a double jeopardy violation turns on whether conduct amounts to separate, distinct, and 
independent criminal acts. State v. Sellers, _Idaho_, 2016 WL4548086, Sept 1, 2016. The 
Court here concludes Campbell's conduct in Count Eleven and the conduct alleged in Count 
Seventeen are not separate, distinct, and independent criminal acts. Count Seventeen is dismissed 
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as it constitutes a violation of double jeopardy protections found in the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
E. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Testimony About the Source of 
Cash Deposits to His Bank of America Account (Count 18) 
205. The Court cannot find that Plaintiff proved the allegations of Count Eighteen 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court finds Campbell not guilty of Count Eighteen. Count 
Eighteen is dismissed. 
F. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Testimony Related to the 
Company in Whose Name Campbell Opened the Hong Kong Account (Count 
19) 
206. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he repeatedly testified that he did not remember the name of the 
company in whose name he set up the Hong Kong Account into which he deposited $300,000. 
Ex. 1 at 41: 15-22. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving 
of the false testimony underlying Count Nineteen was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Nineteen. 
G. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Testimony About the Source of 
Large Cash Deposits to Campbell's Zions Bank Account (Counts 20-30) 
207. The Court cannot find that Plaintiff proved the allegations of Count Twenty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court finds Campbell not guilty of Count Twenty. Count 
Twenty is dismissed. 
208. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-One related to 
liquidating property in Florida. Ex. 1 at 49:24-50: 16. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Twenty-One 
was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Twenty-One. 
209. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not prove the allegations of Count Twenty-Two 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Campbell is not guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-
Two. 
210. The Court cannot find that Count Twenty-Three was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Court therefore finds that Campbell is not guilty of the contempt charged in Count 
Twenty-Three. 
211. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four related to 
whether he was keeping large amounts of cash in his condo in Elkhorn or whether he was then 
"holding money." Ex. 1 at 56:21-57:3. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Twenty-Four was willful. The 
Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged 
in Count Twenty-Four. 
212. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 57: 17-58: 10. 
Campbell knew he had a large amount of cash ("less than $1 OOK") that had been delivered, 
shipped, or brought from Florida. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Twenty-Five was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Twenty-Five. 
213. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Six related to the 
source oflarge amounts of cash that he deposited into his Zions account. Ex. 1 at 58:12-59:1. 
Campbell knew he had a large amount of cash ("less than $1 OOK") that had been delivered, 
shipped, or brought from Florida. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Twenty-Six was willful. The Court 
therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in 
Count Twenty-Six. 
214. As to Count Twenty-Seven, Campbell was asked if someone was providing him 
with cash during a particular time frame. Campbell answered something to the effect that unless 
it was corning from something he was selling at the time, he didn't remember. Ex. 1 at 59:2-8. 
Plaintiff contends this answer is false. However, immediately after this testimony, Campbell was 
asked again, very directly, whether anyone was providing him with cash, and during this time, 
and he answered no. Ex.I at 59:9-14. The Court cannot find that this answer was false or 
intended to mislead. The Court cannot find that Count Twenty-Seven was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Court finds Campbell not guilty of the contempt charged in Count 
Twenty-Seven. 
215. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
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debtor's examination when he gave the testimony underlying Count Twenty-Eight that indicated 
he could not remember whether he deposited all of his available cash in one month, and then 
deposited all the cash in his possession the next month. Ex. 1 at 60:2-20. Moreover, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count 
Twenty-Eight was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is 
guilty of the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Eight. 
216. The Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff proved Count 
Twenty-Nine beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore finds that Campbell is not guilty of 
the contempt charged in Count Twenty-Nine. 
21 7. The Court cannot find that Plaintiff proved the allegations of Count Thirty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The Court finds that Campbell is not guilty of the contempt charged in Count 
Thirty. 
H. Conclusions of Law Regarding Campbell's Testimony About How He Paid 
his Rent (Counts 31-34) 
218. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
debtor's examination when he testified that he did not remember who or how his rent was paid 
during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced indicated that he 
had ceased paying his rent by check. Ex. 1 at 65:9-14. Moreover, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count Thirty-One was 
willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is guilty of the 
contempt charged in Count Thirty-One. 
219. In light of the facts discussed in the Court's findings of fact, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell testified falsely under oath during his August 2015 
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debtor's examination when he testified that he did not remember sources of money from which 
his rent was paid during a period of time for which the bank records that he had then produced 
indicated that he had ceased paying his rent by check. Ex. I at 71:14-20. Moreover, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell's giving of the false testimony underlying Count 
Thirty-Two was willful. The Court therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell is 
guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty-Two. 
220. The Court finds the conduct charged in Count Thirty-Three is the same conduct 
for which Campbell has been found guilty in Count Thirty-One. Whether convictions on 
different counts implicate a double jeopardy violation turns on whether conduct amounts to 
separate, distinct, and independent criminal acts. State v. Sellers, _Idaho_, 2016 
WL4548086, Sept 1, 2016. The Court here concludes Campbell's conduct in Count Thirty-One 
and the conduct alleged in Count Thirty-Three are not separate, distinct, and independent 
criminal acts. Count Thirty-Three is dismissed as it constitutes a violation of double jeopardy 
protections found in the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions. 
221. The Court cannot find that Plaintiff has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell is guilty of the contempt charged in Count Thirty-Four. The Court finds that Campbell 
is not guilty of criminal contempt as alleged in Count Thirty-Four. 
VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
222. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Campbell is guilty of civil contempt in Counts One and Eight. 
223. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Campbell is guilty of criminal contempt as alleged in Counts Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, 
Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six, 
Thirty-One, and Thirty-Two. 
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224. The Court hereby finds Campbell not guilty of Counts Seventeen, Eighteen, 
Twenty, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Seven, Twenty-Eight, Twenty-Nine, Thirty, 
Thirty-Three, and Thirty-Four. 
225. The Court orders the parties to appear for a hearing before the Court for 
Campbell's sentencing on the -1.B__ day of __ _,_N--"-'oLal/J'-AR....,'.IYll..!-.1....,_b~uc."""-!c__ __ , 2016, at the hour 
226. Campbell shall file any briefregarding sentencing no later than 14 days before the 
sentencing hearing. 
227. Plaintiffs shall file their response, if any, no later than 7 days before the 
sentencing hearing. 
DATED: November 3, 2016. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
Lee P. Ritzau, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I represent Mr. Neil Campbell in the above entitled action; 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a Complaint filed by the 
Petitioners against MLG Automotive Law, which represented Neil Campbell in the California 
Criminal case associated with this matter and with the California Civil case creating this matter, 
and against Walter Urban who represented Mr. Philip Richard Powers in the California litigation; 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of my July 28, 2016 letter to 
Mr. David Flyer, the enclosures I reference in paragraph 2 of my July 28, 2016 letter to Mr. 
Flyer, and return receipt information associated with my July 28, 2016 letter to Mr. Flyer; 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of my November 4, 2016 email 
to David Flyer; 
5. To date, I have not received a response from David Flyer to either my July 28, 2016 
letter to him or my November 4 ,2016 email to him; 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of my July 28, 2016 letter to 
HSBC regarding account information for Mosaic Orange Limited, as well as the attachments to 
my July 28, 2016 letter; 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter dated October 18, 
2016 which HSBC sent to me. My office received this letter on November 4, 2016; and 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ( l~ay of November, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon: 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax:208-725-0076 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
By transmitting copies of the same to said attorney by facsimile machine process. 
~ By hand delivering the same to said attorney. 
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Luke L. Dauchot (S.B.N. 229829) 
Lauren J. Schweitzer (S.B.N. 301654) 
KIRKIAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 S. Hope Street, 29th Floor 
Los Angeles, California 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Email: luke.dauchot@kirkJand.com 
Email: lauren.schweitzer@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment 
FILED 
su~r Com O(Calllorula 
County Of LosAngelea 
JUL ·13 2016 
Sherri ~ic11t/Clerk 
BY. .Deputy 
111118 • 
Group, Ud. and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
~,~ Vvottt µ, Po..lot2ucic£· 
SUPERIOR couaT'lYoR THE ~TATE OF CALIFORNIA . 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
C&M Investment Group, Ud., and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MLG Automotive Law, A Professional Law 
Corporation; ~d Walter Urban, d/b/a Walter 
Urban Law Offices, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. BC6 24771 
COMPLAINT FOR: 
) 1. 
) 2. 
) 
) 
) ) 3. 
) 
CONVERSION 
l)NLA WFUL AND UNFAIR BUSINESS 
PRACTICES (CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 17200, et seq.) 
RECEIPT OF PROPERTY OBTAINED 
BY THEFT (CAL. PEN. CODE § 496(c)) 
) 
) 
) 
DEMAN_]) FOR JURY TRIAL 
) 
______________ ). 
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1. Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. ("C&M") and Karlin Holdings Limited 
Partnership ("Karlin Holdings") (together, "Plaintiffs") were the victims of a large-scale fraud 
perpetrated by Neil David Campbell ("Campbell") and Richard Philip Powers ("Powers") over the 
course of more than six years. In October 2007, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior 
Court and in December 2011 and January 2012, after years of litigation, obtained judgments against 
Campbell and Powers of approximately $24 million and $36 million, respectively. Since then, 
Plaintiffs have not been able to collect meaningfully on those judgments (recovering only a fraction 
of what Campbell stole, and recovering nothing from Powers), because both have claimed, under 
oath, to have no assets to their names. Yet, when the Los Angeles District Attorney's office initiated 
a criminal prosecution of Powers and Campbell for felony grand theft in 2013, both managed to 
retain-and pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to-private counsel to defend them against the 
criminal charges~ 
2. Plaintiffs now file this lawsuit against the lawyers hired by Powers and Campbell-
MLG Automotive Law (who represented both Campbell and Powers) and Walter Urban (who 
represented Powers)1-to recover the money Defendants were paid. As Defendants were aware, the 
money they receiv~d from Powers and Campbell was subject to a post-judgment lien in favor of 
Plaintiffs, and by applying it to cover their attorneys' fees, they improperly cmiverted it in violation 
of California law. In addition, because Defendants knew that the money that they were receiving to 
cover attorneys' fees represented the proceeds of the fraud Powers and Campbell perpetrated on 
Plaintiffs, Defendants are not only required to return it to Plaintiffs, but are liable for treble damages 
and attorneys' fees as well. 
. THE PARTIES 
3. Plaintiff C&M is a limited liability company established under the laws of Costa Rica 
with its registered domicile in San Jose, Costa Rica. C&M's sole shareholder is Plaintiff Karlin 
Holdings, a Limited Partnership established under, the laws of Nevada witp its principal place of 
business in the City and County of Los An~les. Karlin Holdings is owned almost entirely by the 
Campbell was also represented by Dyke Huish ("Huish"), who is not a party to this action. 
1 
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living trust of Dr. Gary K. Michelson ("Dr. Michelson"), of which Dr. Michelson is the sole trustee. 
4. Defendant MLG Automotive Law, A Professional Law Corporation, is a law firm 
domiciled in Orange Co1:1nty, California, which represented Campbell and Powers in criminal 
proceedings in Los Angeles brought by the Los Angeles District Attorney. 
5. Walter Urban is a lawyer and sole practitioner (d/b/a Walter Urban Law Offices), 
who is domiciled in Orange County, California, and who represented Powers in c;:riminal 
proceedings in Los Angeles brought by the Los Angeles District Attorney. 
6. The true.names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, 
of DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintif:(s, who therefore sue said Defendants by 
I 
such fictitious names and will ask leave to amend the Complaint to show their true names and 
capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege 
that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events 
and happenings therein referred to, and there is now due, owing, and unpaid from Defendants and 
each of them to Plaintiffs the sums alleged in this Complaint. 
.JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because each of them is 
domiciled in California, and because the transactions that are the subject of this Complaint took 
place in California. Venue is proper in this Court in that the transactions giving rise to this action 
occurred in substantial part in the City and County of Los Angeles, California. 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Campbell and Powers Perpetrate a Large-Scale Fraud On Plaintiffs, And 
Become Mui.ti-Millionaires At Plaintiffs' Expense. 
8. In the Summer of 199.9, Dr. Michelson met Powers in Los Angeles, California. They 
were introduced by Campbell, a mutual friend. Campbell and Powers met in the 1980s, and worked 
together as car salesmen before Powers left the United States to live and work in Costa Rica. 
Campbell urged Dr. Michelson, a surgeon, inventor and philanthropist whom Campbell had recently 
befriended to join him in investing in teak wood farms located in Costa Rica. Campbell also 
recommended that Dr. Michelson entrust the acquisition and operation of the farms to Powers. 
2 
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1 Although Dr. Michelson initially declined this offer, in the Summer of 2000, he agreed to 
2 Campbetrs overtures and caused Karlin Holdings (a partnership controlled by Dr. Michelson's 
3 living trust) to join with Campbell in investing in teak properties. 
4 9. Powers formed C&M, a Costa Rican limited liability company, to take title to the 
5 properties. Campbell represented that he had sent an initial payment to Powers of about $105,000 
6 towards the initial property that C&M purchased, and received an initial 15% equity stake in C&M 
7 on that basis; Karlin Holdings owned the remaining shares. Powers was engaged to acquire and 
8 manage the properties in which C&M invested. 
9 10. From 2000 through 2006, Powers was responsible for acquiring and maintaining teak 
10 tree properties on behalf of C&M. Powers, on behalf of C&M, would purportedly locate properties 
11 that he represented were ideal for teak, and negotiate what he claimed were the best possible · 
12 purchase prices for the properties. Powers then asked Dr. Michelson to wire the funds needed to 
13 acquire such properties, purportedly at the price that Powers was able to negotiate for C&M (plus no 
14 more than a total 6% commission on the purchase price for each property), and Karlin Holdings, on 
15 behalf of C&M, wired the money as requested. Powers also regularly requested funds from Dr. 
16 Michelson that Powers represented he needed to maintain the properties, and Karlin Holdings would 
17 wire those funds as well. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
11. Campbell, someone whom Dr. Michelson then considered a best friend and co-owner 
ofC&M, served as Dr. Michelson's "eyes and ears'; in Co'sta Rica. He regularly travelled to Costa 
Rica, purportedly to inspect properties that Powers was contemplating acquiring on behalf of C&M, 
participate in negotiations for those properties, and generally observe the activities of Powers and his 
contractors in the maintenance of the properties. Campbell reported regularly to Dr. Michelson 
about ~owers and the properties. In so doing, he confirmed the representations of Powe~s, offered 
positive reports about the performance of Powers, and encouraged Dr. Michelson to continue having 
Powers acquire and manage properties· on behalf of C&M. 
C.',) 26 12. From 2000 through 2006, Dr. Michelson wired on behalf of C&M over $32 million 
·~ 
for property acquisition and maintenance in reliance on Powers and Campbell's representations. 
During this period, Powers submitted to Plaintiffs accounting and property reports purportedly 
3 
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1 showing Powers' expenditures and acquisitions on behalf of C&M. 
2 13. The C&M venture was, however, from the very beginning, a vehicle for Powers and 
3 Campbell to systematically steal millions of dollars. Powers was in fact grossly overstating the 
4 prices that he liad negotiated with the sellers for the properties on behalf of C&M, and keeping the 
5 differ~nce between the actual and stated purchase price for himself. And while Campbell was 
6 supposed to be looking out for the interests of C&M and Karlin Holdings, including verifying the 
7 accuracy of representations regarding the quality ofland purchased, he was in fact secretly in ~ 
8 conspiracy with Powers, receiving a substantial cut of the fraudulent proceeds, and encouraging Dr. 
9 Michelson not only to continue, but expand on, the relationship with Powers. 
10 14. By perpetrating this fraud on Plaintiffs, Powers and Campbell became multi-
11 millionaires. In 1996, before he conspired with Powers to steal millions of dollars from Plaintiffs, 
12 Campbell had filed for personal bankruptcy. On-information and belief, Campbell stopped working 
13 in or about 2000, and from that point forward, his sole source of income (apart from, in the past few 
14 years, Social Security payments) came from defrauding Plaintiffs. Powers' principal source of 
15 income throughout the 2000s was also from defrauding Plaintiffs. By doing so, Powers had amassed 
16 an estimated net worth of more than $12 million by the end of 2008. 
17 
18 
19 
B. Plaintiffs Obtain Judgments Against Powers and Campbell Following A Civil 
Lawsuit, And Obtain Liens On Powers' and Campbell's Assets Through Service 
of Debtors' Examination Notices. 
15. In October 2007, C&M filed a lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior Court; entitled C&M 
20 Investment Group Ltd. & Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers & Neil 
21 Campbell, Case No. BC378888, alleging that Powers and his corporate entities cheated C&M out of 
22 millions of-dollars by falsely inflating the prices of teak properties in Costa Rica he purchased on 
23 behalf of C&M, and' keeping the excess proceeds, and asserting claims for fraud, frauduient 
24 inducement, and conversion, among other claims. At the time C&M filed the lawsuit in 2007, it 
~~ 25 believed that Powers had perpetrated the fraud a~one, and did not know that Campbell-who was a 
·-~~ . 
,..,, 26 co-owner ofC&M and the best friend and trusted advisor to C&M's other co-owner, Dr. 
·~ 
~~ 27 Michelson-was involved. But in late-2008, after obtaining access to Powers' bank records, C&M 
,..... • I 
c,, 28 discovered that Campbell had, unbeknownst to Dr. Michelson, been receiving wire transfers from 
4 
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1 Powers, totaling more than a million dollars. Upon discovering that Campbell had been receiving 
2 significant payments from Powers, Plaintiffs' counsel interviewed Campbell. During that interview, 
3 which was recorded and transcribed, Campbell falsely denied receiving any money from Powers for 
4 any purpose. 
5 16. On November 17, 2008, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include Campbell as a 
6 defendant. In June 2009, the complaint was further amended to include a count against both Powers 
7 and Campbell for violation of civil RICO. 
8 17. During the course of discovery, Campbell admitted that he had received money from 
9 Powers (contrary to his prior statement that he had received none), but claimed falsely under oath 
10 that the money was simply a "loan." When his new "loan" story began to unravel, Campbell 
11 proceeded to try to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to 
12 answer any more questions in discovery about the money he had received from Powers. Discovery 
13 obtained from Powers, third parties, and from Powers' computers, however, showed that Campbell 
14 had not received a "loan," but rather several million dollars of secret kickbacks from Powers over 
15 the course of the C&M venture, in the form of wire transfers, a condominium, expensive cars, a 
16 roadster, a motorcycle, furniture, artwork, jewelry, and more. 
17 18. On December 13, 2011, presented ~ith overwhelming evidence, including 
18 contemporaneous emails between Powers and Campbell, that Campbell had conspired with Powers 
19 to perpetrate a fraud on Plaintiffs, the Court granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and 
20 entered judgment against Campbell in the amount of more than $24 million. That amount 
21 represented the at least $8 million Campbell was responsible for stealing from Plaintiffs,.trebled 
22 under RICO. 
23 19. Powers, meanwhile, vigorously defended the lawsuit for more than two years, but 
24 engaged in repeated discovery abuses, defying court orders requiring him to turn over data from his 
~~ 25 computers. As a result, in November 2010, the Court issued a terminating sanction against Powers, 
'• 
t' ... 
i..,,i 26 resulting in entry of default. The reason for Powers' repeated refusals to comply with discovery 
.. 
r-.J 
~~ 27 orders to produce data from his computers became clear when Plaintiffs ultimately obtained the 
I" ... 
~I') 
28 computer data by way of a letter rogatory to Costa Rican authorities: the computers contained emails 
5 
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1 and other documents that confirmed beyond doubt that Powers had conspired with campbell to 
2 defraud Plaintiffs out of millions of dollars. Based in part on the data retrieved from the computers, 
3 Plaintiffs proved up damages to the satisfaction of the Court of more than $12 million, which was 
4 then trebled under RICO. On January 17, 2012, the Court entered judgment against Powers and his 
5 corporate entities in the amount of $36,680,676.46. 
6 20. Following entry of judgment against Campbell and Powers, Plaintiffs engaged in 
7 post..judgment discovery in an effo~t to recover the money they were owed. As part of that effort, 
8 Plaintiffs personaUy served debtor's examination notices on Campbell in August 2013, and again in 
9 August 2014, which by operation of law created liens on all of Campbell's assets for a period of one 
10 year from service. Plaintiffs also personally served Powers with a debtor's examination notice in 
11 August 2013, which created a lien on all of Powers' assets for one year, which lien was then 
12 extended by court order for a further year. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
C. Powers and Campbell Are Criminally Prosecuted And Use Their Ill-Gotten 
Gains To Hire Attorneys To Defend Them. 
21. In March 2013, the Los Angeles Dis_trict Attorney's Office brought criminal charges 
for felony grand theft against Campbell and Powers arising out of the same conduct that led to 
Plaintiffs' civil lawsuit. Powers-who was resident in Costa Rica at the time the charges were 
filed-was arrested after flying to Texas in May 2013. Campbell-who was resident in Idaho at the 
time the charges were filed-was arrested in Idaho in June 2013. Both were extradited to Los 
Angeles to stand trial. 
22. Both Campbell and Powers hired private counsel to represent them in the criminal 
~~ 25 
proceedings. On or about July 13, 2013, Campbell hired MLG Automotive Law and Dyke Huish to 
represent him. Jonathan Michaels ("Michaels"), MLG Automotive Law's sole owner, is a business 
litigator. During a third party examination conducted on March 25, 2016, Michaels explained that 
he brought Huish into the case because ofHuish's experience in criminal law. Michaels was the 
"person who understands business" and Huish was "there to help [him] with the criminal context." ·~ 
" ... 
,..., 26 
23. In August 2013, Plaintiffs notified Huish that all of Campbell's assets that might be 
used to pay attorneys' fees were subject to a post-judgment lien in favor of Plaintiffs. As co-counsel 
6 
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1 with Huish and the team member with civil litigation_ experien~, MLG Automotive Law was aware 
2 of the civil debtor's examination and the post-judgment lien Plaintiffs had on Campbell's assets. 
3 24. Powers, after originally being represented by a public defender, hired Walter Urban in 
4 or about January 2014. Shortly after Urban's retention, Plaintiffs notified him that all of Powers' 
5 assets that might be used to pay attorneys' fees were subject to a post-judgment lien in favor of 
6 · Plaintiffs. 
7 25. Shortly before trial, MLG Automotive Law also made an appearance in the criminal 
8 proceedings on behalf of Powers. On information -and belief, MLG Automotive Law was also aware 
9 of the debtor's examination proceedings against Powers and the resulting post~judgment lien. 
10 26. On information and belief, Powers and Campbell paid each of the Defendants for the 
11 legal services they provided. In a sworn affidavit filed in Idaho, Campbell admitted to paying MLG 
12 Automotive Law over $300,000 to represent him. Campbell, who was hiding $300,000 from 
13 Plaintiffs in an offshore account in Hong Kong, wired money from that account to MLG Automotive 
14 Law for purposes of covering those attorneys' fees. Roughly $300,000 was wired from the Hong 
15 Kong account to MLG Automotive Law in November 2013. MLG Automotive Law applied this 
16 $300,000 to cover its fees, when the money was subject to Plaintiffs' lien. 
17 27. On information and belief, Powers also agreed to pay Defendants MLG Automotive 
18 and Urban to represent him iri the criminal proceedings. Between June 2014 and present, MLG 
19 Automotive received at least $175,000 for representing Powers. On information and belief, 
20 Defendant Urban received for representing Powers sums that likely approximated what MLG 
21 Automotive received for similar work. On information and belief, this money was transferred to 
22 MLG Automotive Law and Urban, and MLG Automotive Law and Urban applied it to cover their 
23 fees, when the money was subject to Plaintiffs' lien. 
28. In addition, on information and belief, at the time Defendants accepted these funds 
and applied them to cover attorneys' fees, they were aware that the funds were the proceeds of fraud 
and had been wrongfully obtained from Plaintiffs. As to Campbell, no other conclusion could be 
drawn, given that Campbell's sole source of income for nearly fifteen years has been the proceeds of 
the fraud perpetrated on Plaintiffs (or, more recently, collecting Social Security), and he thus had no 
7 
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1 legitimate source of funds from which to pay hundred~ of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees. 
2 Similarly, the vast majority of Powers' wealth was derived from stealing money from Plaintiffs over 
3 the course of more than six years. 
4 29. The majority of the counts charged in the criminal complaint were ultimately 
5 dismissed by the court before trial on statute of limitations grounds and ·never adjudicated on the 
6 merits. In October 2014, the five remaining counts were tried to a jury in Los Angeles, and both 
7 Powers and Campbell were convicted of one count of felony grand theft. Campbell, who had served 
8 about 15 months in jail pending trial, was sentenced to time served and released. Powers was 
9 sentenced to supervised release, and was ordered to stay in California for a period of 888 days. 
10 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION 
11 (Against All Defendants) 
12 30. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 28 as 
13 if fully set forth herein. 
14 31. Plaintiffs have valid judgments against Powers and Campbell, and had post-judgment 
15 liens against all of Powers' and Campbell's assets at the time Powers and Campbell transferred 
16 money to Defendants to cover attorneys' fees. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' lien on those funds, 
17 Defendants nonetheless applied these funds to cover their attorneys' fees, and thereby wrongfully 
18 converted Plaintiffs'. money. Plaintiffs have therefore been injured, and seek to recover the money 
19 transferred by P~wers and Campbell to Defendants. 
20 32. The aforementioned conversion was committed through oppression, fraud, and malice 
21 with intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs and subject them· to cruel and unjust hardship as a result 
22 thereof. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages under 
23 California Code of Civil Procedure·§ 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
24 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 
~~ 25 UNDER CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE§ 17200. ET SEO . 
... 
:: 26 (Against All Defendants) 
. .,
~~ 27 · 33. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 31 as 
...... 
cri 28 if fully set forth herein. 
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1 34. Defendants' acts as set forth above constitute business practices that are unlawful in 
2 violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq., in that they violate California 
3 Penal Code § 496(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2315, among other applicable laws. 
4 35. Defendants' acts as set forth above also constitute business practices that are unfair in 
5 violation of California Qusiness & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. 
6 36. Defendants' unlawful and unfair conduct has deprived Plaintiffs of money to which 
7 Plaintiffs have a claim of right by wrongfully applying funds that had been stolen from Plaintiffs and 
8 that were subject to Plaintiffs' lien to cover Defendants' own fees, and Plaintiffs have thereby 
9 suffered injury in fact and lost money or property. 
10 37. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to restitution of all of the money Powers and Campbell 
11 paid to Defendants to cover their attorneys' fees. 
12 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RECEIPT OF FUNDS OBTAINED BY THEFT 
13 (Against All Defendants) 
14 38. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 36 as 
15 if fully set forth herein. 
16 39. Defendants received money from Powers and Campbell that had been stolen from 
17 Plaintiffs, with knowledge that the money had been stolen, in violation of California Penal Code § 
18 496(a). 
19 40. As a result of Defendants' violation of that subsection, Plaintiffs have been injured, 
20 and thus seek to recover three timei, the amount oftheir actual damages, costs of suit, and reasonable 
21 attorneys' fees pursuant to California Penal Code § 496(c). 
22 JURYDEMAND 
23 41. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial in this action to the extent the claims are so 
24 triable. 
,;p 25 
~.J PRAYER 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment against Defendants as follows: 
·~ 
r-.i 
c;:o 27 
.... 
42. As against Defendant MLG Automotive Law, awarding compensatory 
,;r, 28 damages/restitution in the amount of at least $475,000; 
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1 43. As against Defendant Urban, awarding compensatory damages/restitution in the 
2 amount of at least $175,000; 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
44. As against all Defendants: 
a. Awarding treble damages pursuant to California Penal Code§ 496(c); 
b. Awarding punitive damages pursuant to California Code of Civil Proced1,1re § 
3294, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
c. Awarding attorneys' fees as allowed by law; 
d. Awarding costs of suit as allowed by law; 
e. Awardi~g interest on damages allowed by law; and 
f. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems proper, fair, 
equitable, and just. 
13 DATED: July 13, 2016 Respectfully submitted, 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
By: L11Ke. L. D l.(11r:~,f I/I 
Luke L. Dauchot (S.B.N. 229829) 
Lauren J. Schweitzer (S.B.N. 301654) 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
Telephone: (213) 680·8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680.SSOO 
Email: luke.dauchot@kirkland.com 
Email: lauren.schweitzer@kirkland.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, Ltd. 
and Karlin Holdinas Limited Partnershio 
10 
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LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P .A 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 205 -THE STATION 
460 SUN VALLEY ROAD 
P.O. BOX 1172 
KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340-1172 
(208) 726-8219 
FAX (208) 726-3750 
www.lwfrlaw.com 
July 28, 2016 
Flyer & Flyer 
A Professional Law Corporation 
4120 Birch Street, Suite 101 
Newport Beach, CA 92660-2228 
Sent via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested 
Re: Neil David Campbell 
Dear Mr. Flyer: 
BARRY J. LUBOVlSKI of counsel 
JANET C. WYGLE of counsel 
ROBERT I. FALLOWFIELD 
rfallowfield@lwfrlaw.com 
LEEP. RITZAU 
lritzua@lwfrlaw.com 
I represent Neil Campbell in a lawsuit in Blaine County, Idaho involving criminal and civil 
counts of contempt of court. One of the civil contempt of court counts involves records from 
your past representation of Mr. Campbell. To assist me in representing Mr. Campbell in this 
case, I am requesting copies of all documents which evidence payment Mr. Campbell made to 
you or your finn between January 1, 2009 and the present.. 
I am attaching a copies of CA BUS & PROF § 6148 as well as CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 which 
were provided by the opposing party in the Blaine County, Idaho litigation. The opposing party 
supplied this information to support their argument that records must still exist. 
It would be of great assistance to Mr. Campbell if you or your fim1 could provide the documents 
I have requested to me at the address listed above. I am having Mr. Campbell sign this letter 
with me to confinn his approval and consent to the request for the records I have made above. 
Should you have any questions about this letter or require additional infonnation please contact 
either me or Mr. Campbell. I can be reached at either (208) 726-8219 which is my work number 
or (208) 720-1619 which is my cell phone number. My facsimile number and mailing address 
are set forth above. Mr. Campbell may be reached at (208) 309-3705. 
Please contact me should you have any questions. Mr. Campbell and I thank you very much for 
your assistance. 
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Flyer & Flyer 
July 28, 2016 
Page 2 
Sincerely, 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
~v 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Enclosures 
cc: Neil Campbell 
I, Neil Campbell have read these letter and authorize and pem1it David Flyer or Flyer & Flyer a 
Professional Law Corporation to send my lawyer, Lee Ritzau, the records requested above. 
563 of 636
§ 6148. Contracts for services in cases not coming within ... , CA BUS & PROF§ 614tS 
West's Annotated California Codes 
Business (tnd Professions Code (Refs & Annos) 
Division 3. Professions and Vocations Generally (Refs &Annos) 
Chapter 4. Attorners (Refs & Annos) 
Article 8.5. Fee Agreements (Refs & A1mos) 
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code§ 6148 
§ 6148. Contracts for services in cases not coming within § 
6147; bills rendered by attorney; contents; failure to comply 
Effective: January 1, 2000 
Currentness 
(a) In any case not coming within Section 61--17 in which it is reasonably foreseeable that total expense to a client, including 
attorney fees, will exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), the contract for services in the case shall be in writing. At the time the 
contract is entered into, the attorney shall provide a duplicate copy of the contract signed by both the attorney and the client, 
or the client's guardian or representative, to the client or to the client's guardian or representative. The written contract shall 
contain all of the following: 
( 1) Any basis of compensation including, but not limited to, hourly rates, statutory fees or flat fees, and other standard rates, 
fees, and charges applicable to the case. 
(2) The general nature of the legal services to be provided to the client. 
(3) The respective responsibilities of the attorney and the client as to the performance of the contract. 
(b) All bills rendered by an attorney to a client shall clearly state the basis thereof. Bills for the fee portion of the bill shall 
include the amount, rate, basis for calculation, or other method of determination of the attorney's fees and costs. Bills for the cost 
and expense portion of the bill shall clearly identify the costs and expenses incurred and the amount of the costs and expenses. 
Upon request by the client, the attorney shall provide a bill to the client no later than 10 days following the request unless the 
attorney has provided a bill to the client within 31 days prior to the request, in which case the attorney may provide a bill to the 
client no later than 31 days following the date the most recent bill was provided. The client is entitled to make similar requests 
at intervals ofno less than 30 days following the initial request. In providing responses to client requests for billing information, 
the attorney may use billing data that is currently effective on the date of the request, or, if any fees or costs to that date cannot 
be accurately determined, they shall be described and estimated. 
(c) Failure to comply with any provision of this section renders the agreement voidable at the option of the client, and the 
attorney shall, upon the agreement being voided, be entitled to collect a reasonable fee. 
(d) This section shall not apply to any of the following: 
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§ 6148. Contracts for services in cases not coming within ... , CA BUS & PROF§ 6148 
(1) Services rendered in an emergency to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights or interests of the client or where a writing 
is otherwise impractical. 
(2) An arrangement as to the fee implied by the fact that the attorney's services are of the same general kind as previously 
rendered to and paid for by the client. 
(3) If the client knowingly states in writing, after full disclosure of this section, that a writing concerning fees is not required. 
(4) If the client is a corporation. 
(e) This section applies prospectively only to fee agreements following its operative date. 
(f) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2000. 
Credits 
(Added by Stats. I 993, c. 982 ( S.B.6-(5), § 6, operative Jan. I, 1997. Amended by Stats. I 994. c. 4 79 (A.B.3219). § 5. operative 
Jrn1. I. 1997; Stats.1996, c. 1104 (A.B.2787), § 11. operative Jan. L 2000.) 
Notes of Decisions ( 13) 
West's Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6148, CA BUS & PROF§ 6148 
Current with urgency legislation through Ch. 8 of2016 Reg.Sess. and Ch. 3 of2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess. 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Rule 3-700. Termination of Employment, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
lVest's Annotated California Codes 
Rules of the State Bar of California (Refs &Annos) 
California Rules of Professior1al Conduct (Refs & Annas) 
Chapter 3. Profess_ional Relatioi1ship \\'1th Clients 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3-700 
Rule 3-700. Termination of Employment 
Cnrrent11ess 
(A) In General. 
(1) If permission for termination of employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a member shall not withdraw from 
employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission. 
(2) A member shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable 
prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 
complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules. 
(B) Mandatory Withdrawal. 
A member representing a client before a tribunal shall withdraw from employment with the permission of the tribunal, if required 
by its rules, and a member representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if: 
(1) The member knows or should know that the client is bringing an action, conducting a defense, asserting a position in 
litigation, or taking an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or 
(2) The member knows or should know that continued employment will result in violation of these rules or of the State Bar 
Act; or 
(3) The member's mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult to carry out the employment effectively. 
(C) Permissive Withdrawal. 
If rule 3-700(B) is not applicable, a member may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and 
may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because: 
(1) The client 
Exhibit 30-1 
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Rule 3-700. Termination of Employment, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
(a) insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be suppo1ted by good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or 
(b) seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct, or 
(c) insists that the member pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under these rules or the State Bar 
Act, or 
(d) by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the member to carry out the employment effectively, or 
( e) insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the member engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and 
advice of the member but not prohibited under these rules or the State Bar Act, or 
(f) breaches an agreement or obligation to the member as to expenses or fees. 
(2) The continued employment is likely to result in a violation of these rules or of the State Bar Act; or 
(3) The inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the client likely will be served by withdrawal; or 
(4) The member's mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the member to carry out the employment effectively; or 
(5) The client knowingly and freely assents to termination of the employment; or 
(6) The member believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of 
other good cause for withdrawal. 
(D) Papers, Property, and Fees. 
A member whose employment has terminated shall: 
(I) Subject to any protective order or non-disclosure agreement, promptly release to the client, at the request of the client, all the 
client papers and property. "Client papers and property" includes correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, exhibits, 
physical evidence, expert's reports, and other items reasonably necessary to the client's representation, whether the client has 
paid for them or not; and 
(2) Promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned. This provision is not applicable to a true retainer 
fee which is paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the member for the matter. 
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Rule 3-700. Termination of Employ111ent, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
DISCUSSION 
Subparagraph (A)(2) provides that "a member shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken 
reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the clients." What such steps would include, 
of course, will vary according to the circumstances. Absent special circumstances, "reasonable steps" do not include 
providing additional services to the client once the successor counsel has been employed and rule 3-700(D) has been 
satisfied. 
Paragraph (D) makes clear the member's duties in the recurring situation in which new counsel seeks to obtain client 
files from a member discharged by the client. It codifies existing case law. (See .·lrnd.!my o(Cuf[lrm1iu Oj1ro111etrisrs 
1·. S11pL'l'ior Co1//'f ( 1975) 51 Cal.AppJd 999 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 668); JJ'eiss r. :\Jarcus ( 1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590 [ 12-1 
Cal.Rptr. 297).) Paragraph (D) also requires that the member "promptly" return unearned fees paid in advance. If a 
client disputes the amount to be returned, the member shall comply with rule 4-1 OO(A)(2), 
Paragraph (D) is not intended to prohibit a member from making, at the member's own expense, and retaining copies 
of papers released to the client, nor to prohibit a claim for the recove1y of the member's expense in any subsequent 
legal proceeding. 
Credits 
(Adopted Nov. 28, 1988, eff. May 27, 1989.) 
Notes of Decisions { 54) 
Prof. Conduct, Rule 3-700, CA ST RPC Rule 3-700 
California Rules of Court, California Rules of Professional Conduct, and California Code of Judicial Ethics are current with 
amendments received through October 1, 2015. California Supreme Comi, California Courts of Appeal, Guidelines for the 
Commission of Judicial Appointments, Commission on Judicial Performance, and all other Rules of the State Bar of California 
are current with amendments received through October 1, 2015. 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reulers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Lee Ritzau 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Importance: 
Mr. Flyer, 
Lee Ritzau 
Friday, November 04, 2016 12:24 PM 
'davidflyer@flyerandflyer.com' 
'Neil Campbell' 
FW: CV2012-407 C&M vs. Powers 
Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re_ Civil and Criminal Contempt.pdf 
High 
I represent Neil Campbell. By a letter dated July 28, 2016, I requested that you send me all documents which 
evidence payments Mr. Campbell made to you or your firm between January 1, 2009 and July 28, 2016. You did not 
respond to my July 28, 2016 letter. 
I am forwarding Judge Robert Elgee's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law Re Civil and Criminal 
Contempt. Judge Elgee found Mr. Campbell in Civil Contempt for his inability to provide the documents discussed 
above. I am again requesting you provide the documents requested above which evidence payments made by Mr. 
Campbell to you or your firm between January 1, 2009 and July 28, 2016. Mr. Campbell faces potentially imprisonment 
until he provides these documents, and he is again requesting your assistance. 
While I am sure the suit that Dr. Michaelson filed against Jonathan Michaels is impacting your decision, I do not 
believe your concern on that topic outweighs your obligations under the California law I enclosed with my July 28, 2016 
letter to you. 
Thank you for your time and anticipated cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Lee Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Phone - 208-726-8219 
Fax - 208-726-3750 
From: Crystal Rigby [mailto:crigby@co.blaine.id.us] 
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 1:30 PM 
To: 'Erin Clark' (efc@lawsonlaski.com) <efc@lawsonlaski.com>; Lee Ritzau <lritzau@lwfrlaw.com> 
Subject: CV2012-407 C&M vs. Powers 
Importance: High 
Please find the attached decision. 
Thank you, 
Crystal Rigby 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
Blaine County Court 
201 2nd Avenue S., Ste. 106 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Phone: (208)788-5521 
Fax: (208)788-5527 
Email: crigby@co.blaine.id.us 
1 
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LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 205 - THE STATION 
460 SUN VALLEY ROAD 
P.O. BOX 1172 
KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340-1172 
(208) 726-8219 
FAX (208) 726-3750 
www.lwfrlaw.com 
July 28, 2016 
HSBC 
P.O. Box 27677 
Kowloon Central Post Office 
Hong Kong 
Re: Mosaic Orange Limited 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
BARRY J. LUBOV1SKI ofcounse1 
JANET C. WYGLE of counsel 
ROBERT I. FALLOWFIELD 
tfal1owfield@1wfrlaw.com 
LEE P. RITZAU 
hitzua@1wfrlaw.com 
I represent Neil Campbell in a lawsuit in Blaine County, Idaho of the United States of America. 
Mr. Campbell caused to be opened with you an account in the name of Mosaic Orange Limited in 
early 2010. To assist me in representing Mr. Campbell in this case, I am requesting all bank 
statements, copies of deposit slips, copies of checks, and any other documentation related to the 
HSBC account in the name of Mosaic Orange Limited between the date the Mosaic Orange 
Limited account was opened and the date the Mosaic Orange Limited account was closed. 
I am attaching a copy of the first page of a two page bank statement from Mr. Campbell's 
previous attorney, Jonathan Michaels of Michaels Law Group APLC, who received several wires 
from the Mosaic Orange Limited account. I am also attaching a copy of Mr. Campbell's United 
State of America Passport signed by him before a notary public. Finally, I am attaching a copy of 
Chapter 615 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Te1Torist Financing Ordinance which 
was provided by the opposing party in the Blaine County, Idaho litigation. The opposing party 
supplied this infonnation to support their argument that the Mosaic Orange Limited bank records 
must still exist. 
It would be of great assistance to Mr. Campbell if HSBC could provide the documents I have 
requested to me at the address listed above. I am having Mr. Campbell sign this letter with me to 
confinn his approval and consent to the request for bank records I have made above. 
Should you have any questions about this letter or require additional infonnation please contact 
either me or Mr. Campbell. I can be reached at either (208) 726-8219 which is my work number 
or (208) 720-1619 which is my cell phone number. My facsimile number and mailing address 
are set fo1th above. Mr. Campbell may be reached at (208) 309-3705. 
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HSBC. 
July 28, 2016 
Page2 
Please contact me should you have any questions. Mr. Campbell and I thank you very much for 
your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
\~/, 
-7 . 
. ~ 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Enclosures 
cc: Neil Campbell 
I, Neil Campbell have read these letter and authorize and pennit HSBC to send my lawyer, Lee 
Ritzau, the bank records requested above for Mosaic Orange Limited. 
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STATEMENT PERIOD MICHAELS LAW GROUP APLC 
2801 W, COAST HWY 
NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92663 
FROM 11/01/13 
THRU 11/30/13 
ENCLOSURES 0 
----------------- SIMPLIFIED BUSINESS CHECKING-----------------
ACCOUNT IiBR DD BEGINIUN'G BALANCE 
AVG BALANCE DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
MINIMUM BAL INTEREST PAID 
CHECKS/DEBITS 
D.li.TE 
11/04 
11/05 
11/12 
11/26 
SERVICE CHARGES 
ENDING BALANCE 
# DE~OSITS/CREDITS 
# CHECKS/DEBITS 
DEPOSITS AND CREDITS 
DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
DEPOSIT-WIRED FUNDS 45,000,00 
MOSAIC ORANGE LIMITED 
REVERSE - MAINTENANCE FEE 30.00 
10/31/13 
DEPOSIT-WIRED FUNDS 70,000.00 
MOSAIC ORAI'1GE LIMITED 
DEPOSIT-WIRED FUNDS 180,000.00 
MOS.b.IC ORANGE LIMITED 
TOTAL ITEMS 4 $295,030.00 
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Chapter 615-the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial 
Institutions) Ordinance, Part 3, § 20 
Obtained from: 
http://www.Jegislation.gov.hk/blis pdf.nsf/6799 l 65D2FEE3F A94825755E0033E5 
32/A6CADFCCD49E764F482578C600539E74/$FILE/CAP 615 e b5.pdf 
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, ) 
(6) Nothing in this section prevents a financial institution from carrying out a customer due diligence measure 
by its agent but such a financial institution remains liable under this Ordinance for a failure to cany out that 
customer due diligence measure. 
(7) In this section-
certified public acco1111ta11t (~!f§ffi) has the meaning given by section 2(1) of the Professional Accountants 
Ordinance (Cap 50). 
(Amended E.R. 2 of20I4) 
19. Financial institutions to establish procedures 
(1) A financial institution must establish and maintain effective procedures for dete1111ining whether a customer 
or a beneficial owner of a customer is a politically exposed person. 
(2) A financial institution that carries out wire transfers must establish and maintain effective procedures for 
identifying and handling wire transfers in relation to which section 12(5) of this Schedule has not been 
complied with. 
(3) A financial institution must, in respect of each kind of customer, business relationship, product and 
transaction, establish and maintain effective procedures not inconsistent with this Ordinance for the purpose 
of canying out its duties under sections 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 and 15 of this Schedule. 
Part 3 
Record-keeping Requirements 
20. Duty to keep records 
(1) A financial institution must-
(a) in relation to each transaction it carries out, keep the original or a copy of the documents, and a record 
of the data and information, obtained in connection with the transaction in accordance with Patt 2 of 
this Schedule; and 
(b) in relation to each of its customers, keep-
(i) the original or a copy of the documents, and a record of the data and information, obtained in the 
course of identifying and verifying the identity of the customer or any beneficial owner of the 
customer in accordance with Part 2 of this Schedule; and 
(ii) the original or a copy of the files relating to the customer ' s account and business 
correspondence with the customer and any beneficial owner of the customer. 
(2) Records required to be kept under subsection (1 )(a) must be kept for a period of 6 years beginning on the 
date on which the transaction is completed, regardless of whether the business relationship ends during that 
period. 
(3) Records required to be kept under subsection (l)(b) must be kept throughout the continuance of the 
business relationship with the customer and for a period of 6 years beginning on the date on which the 
business relationship ends. 
(4) A relevant authority may, by notice in writing to a financial institution, require the financial institution to 
keep the records relating to a specified transaction or customer for a period specified by the relevant 
authority that is longer than that referred to in subsection (2) or (3), as the case requires, if-
(a) the relevant authority is satisfied that the records are relevant to an ongoing criminal or other 
investigation carried out by it; or 
(b) the records are relevant to any other purposes as specified by the relevant authority in the notice. 
(5) A financial institution to whom a notice is given under subsection (4) must keep the relevant records for the 
period specified in the notice. 
21. Manner in which records are to be kept 
Records required to be kept under section 20 of this Schedule must be kept in the following manner-
Cc,p 615. Anti-Money J.c,1111dering c,nd Co11nter-Te,.,.orist Financing (Financic,/ Jnsli/11tions) On/inw,ce 49 
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' . _, HSBC ID ilffi 
Your Ref3(tliEJ~l/df: GWISSFSl6225020l07006SI02 
Private & Confidential 
MOSAIC ORANGE LIMITED 
SUITE 205-THE STATION 
460 SUN VALLEY ROAD 
P.OBOX 1172 
KETCHUM.IDAHO 83340-1172 
Dear Customer fJUfa'g$p 
REQUEST FOR ACCOUNT STATEMENT $~tf 
ACCOUNT NAME JSD4!ifli: MOSAIC ORANGE LIMITED 
ACCOUNT NUMBERpOl)ltli!§: 817-357791-838 
We refer to your above request and advise the following: 
2f\:f'H&~/fI:.ti1Jta'g$fflif • :Ml~~~D"f : 
( ) We enclose copy(ies) of the account document(s). l!:ll~~(1.t1f;ffl:xf1!=tl!:P2f\: • 
Date 811/118 Oct 2016 
( ) We enclose the account history report/ statement covering the period from to. lffi~llf1.tEl3 ____ :g ___ _ 
a'gx~~c.~?via.¥ • 
The normal statement for the data after will be mailed to you on. :(f _____ ~ Zfia'giafiij1iljf4 , ~~;(£ 
----~~ili· . 
( ) Please return us this letter and enclose a cheque payable to 'HSBC' for HKD on or before . m!~:.$:m&-•;fH~im 
'HSBC' • 1ti1Ji.i.1ti:f!l\!W a'gJt~:(£~3'{@1,$:fj • . . . . 
(X) Required documents are under preparation, please let us have a cheque/a bank draft for l:IKD2,500.00 payable to 'HSBC' 
being the handling charges for producing the said account record. Jifi1mJtf!j:r,';j:(f~~qi ; .affJ14...;.,..ffl1tl1Ji.i.1t~m 
___ .ft • 1m'1i 'HSBC'a'gJt~1vi~rr~~x~~*ff • j..J_Jt{sfff;;a,g.cj:.iJOt • . 
( ) We shall despatch your Audit Confirmation Request to your auditor directly upon receipt of the cheque for HKD. ~l&~fill 
%*~ml1.1!iWim a,gJt~ , *l'r*ll41f;mf!(~lilt'lilx-'ffa:a,gf!(t5{gffi • 
( ) Your cheque number is returned for your disposal. ;;f\:ffijl,ill@Jf{I:B")Jt~l]df~ ~/~~~ • 
( ) The service charges of HKD will be debited from the above account/account no. *llJtifim jc~~El3.tilll:J=i 
O/pO~~ 1Dil* • 
( ) According to our records, there is no transaction performed on your account between and . Therefore, no account statement 
has been produced. fl.U.lf2f\:rr~~ • /fI:a'gpD:(f :g Ml'lll • ~*1ff.EfaJ3'{~~~ • l&*ff 
~fl[~)D(. 
( ) Data shown on the history report is up to. Please update your passbook for transaction performed afterwards. x~~~_t 
a'gJiflP.J. .i.1t.!l:. • ffittJltBMZfk~l&1i::tJH''I • ~:flli~!fI:~ffi! • 
( ) The transaction documents/statements have been destroyed after the required retention period. Jtf!j:~•e.mll\!i~'i'M~N 
&11;z~H~ • 
( ) The remaining items of your request will be processed by other department/ our branch. f~P'};J!tft!!.a'g:ttii~ • ~El3~-l1!ir, 
/5:rffm~ • 
(X) Others ;l!t{i!\: The above account was opened on 07 Jul 2010 & closed on 
11 Sep 2014. 
If you have any questions, please contact us on (852) 22882176. 
~o~f.Efiil~r .. , , ~n11 c8s2> 2288 !M2f>:fflfW~. 
Thank you for choosing HSBC. 
~itiilifflilffift. 
(This advice requires no signature) 
CJ!t7'.Jm:RiM~!:P::X:f1f::- i.1H~~~l 
Account Services 
pOij!H~l'.fr, 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 
i!1ii..tiliiUHllfi'lsflllm aJ 
NSC Account Services : PO Box 72677, Kowloon Central Post Office, Kowloon, Hong Kong 
cp:!P--/lltJ!l!cp,(,,pDJIUffiflll : i!i';t!J:ttflacp:!P--!lilli[.l(Faj!ffllil;!(ffiffl 72677 ~ 
Tel fiit!i : (852) 2233 3000 Web tllhl : www.hsbc.com.hk 
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LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 205 -THE STATION 
460 SUN VALLEY ROAD 
P.O. BOX 1172 
KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340-1172 
(208) 726-8219 
FAX (208) 726-3750 
www.lwfrlaw.com 
November 8, 2016 
HSBC 
P.O. Box 72677 
Kowloon Central Post Office 
Hong Kong 
Re: Mosaic Orange Limited 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
I represent Neil Campbell. 
BARRY J. LUBOVISK.I of counsel 
JANET C. WYGLE of counsel 
ROBERT I. FALLOWFIELD 
rfallowfield@lwfrlaw.com 
LEEP. RITZAU 
lritzua@lwfrlaw.com 
On July 28, 2016 I sent HSBC a letter on behalf of Mr. Campbell requesting certain documents 
for an account in the name of Mosaic Orange Limited. On October 18, 2016 HSBC responded to 
my letter. I am attaching a copy ofHSBC's October 18, 2016 letter. I am also enclosing 
Mountain West Bank's Cashier's Check #814891 payable to HSBC in the amount of $327.00 in 
United States currency which is more than the HKD2,500.00 requested in HSBC's October 18, 
2016 letter. 
HSBC' s October 18, 2016 letter states that the 'required documents are under preparation." 
Thank you very much for your assistance. I look forward to receiving copies of the previously 
requested documents for the account in the name of Mosaic Orange Limited. Please provide 
these documents to me to the mailing address as follows: 
Lee Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. 
P .0. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Should you have any questions about this letter or require additional information please contact 
either me or Mr. Campbell. I can be reached at either (208) 726-8219 which is my work number 
or (208) 720-1619 which is my cell phone number. Mr. Campbell may be reached at (208) 309-
3705. 
Please contact me should you have any questions. Mr. Campbell and I thank you very much for 
582 of 636
-- ·' 1 • 
HSBC. 
November 8, 2016 
Page2 
your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
(
E.'?"LLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
'\ / Ll 
-,~- .. -··'" ...... -----
\ 
\ -
\.; "' 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Enclosures (HSBC's October 18, 2016 letter regarding Mosaic Orange Limited and Mountain 
West Bank's Cashier's Check #814891) 
cc: Neil Campbell via email 
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HSBC~Di~ m 
Your ReOl~:l!El~!JdE: GWISSFS 16225020107006SI02 
Private & Confidential 
MOSAIC ORANGE LIMITED 
SUITE 205-THE STATION 
460 SUN VALLEY ROAD 
P.O BOX 1172 
KETCHUM.IDAHO 83340-1172 
Dear Customer fJli:A3~F 
REQUEST FOR ACCOUNT STATEMENT $filiii 
ACCOUNT NAME JSD:Sfl!J: MOSAIC ORANGE LIMITED 
ACCOUNT NUMBER J=iD!df!i!: 8 l 7-357791-838 
We refer to your above request and advise the following: 
2fl:f'rtt:Utfl\U:~A3Ef3iR& , Mzmm~o"f : 
( ) We enclose copy(ies) of the account document(s). J!.illifullftt.1fBSX{4rlEIJ;;fl: • 
Date BWJ 18 Oct 2016 
( ) We enclose the account history report/ statement covering the period from to. J!.i!l?full(1..t.El3 ____ ~ 
A33'.i:~~cM:/~a¥ • . . ---
( ) The normal statement for the data after will be mailed to you on. tf ______ :ZfkA3&a•jffl , lr-f~ff 
( ) 
(X) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
----~m· . 
Please return us this letter and enclose a cheque payable to 'HSBC' for HKD on 'or before . i!li4:;f;.:ffi'.&-~EH€im 
'HSBC'• 1f2tJi~i=l!im l'f:l~~ff_wj,C:[E]:lt,:fr' . . . 
Required documents are under preparation, please let us have a cheque/a bank draft for ;HKl)2,SOO.OO payable to 'HSBC' 
being the handling charges for producing the said account record. ffi'?lax{!f:~Ul:11!.cJ:iJ illl4f-":3~1f2ffi~;f!i/it 
____ .7'c , t€elm 'HsscA3~J1vi~fT~fflx~~*rr , l!.t5lNimmA3-$.tlJt • . · · 
We shall despatch your Audit Confirmation Request to your auditor directly upon receipt of the cheque for HKD. ~t&~f~ 
~*~ffi.f./!Jiil/li l't:I~~ , 2f\:fi~lfiJ1JBm~ll:fi'{g&f?.•xrfml't:ltr<~W • . 
Your cheque number is returned for your disposal. ;;js:fjfJ!ill!filflr.it:JR~5dtnl!J · ~~f(LlP.f&ij! • 
The service charges of HKD will be debited from the above account/account no. .=ftllUl!!~ ___ nlF-f ~E!:Ll:~p 
onon ~- · 
According to our records, there is no transaction performed on your account between and , Therefore, no account statement 
has been produced. tl'Ull;;f;.:fi~if. • f(Lll'f:lpOff ¥: Wlrei • tt*fl°f.EfiiJ3c~~l/f. • ;!&*1"j 
ia¥~1D<:. 
Data shown on the history report is up to. Please update your passbook for transaction performed afterwards. Jl~~l/f...t 
l't:l~ttti. ~11:: • !l!Fl£JltBMZfJtl't:li&:~Jfil3 • ii1ili&tf!1.:l't:lff1\\f • 
The transaction documents/statements have been destroyed after the required retention period. :1({!f:~r.tf.BtIIlt!li~'ii'M~~ 
&}1,Unfll • 
( ) The remaining items of your request will be processed by other department/ our branch. {~pg;J,tftgl'f:lfejjf; • lF-f El3~-g~r, 
/7tfj~ij! • 
(X) Others ;lt:{tlt The above account was opened on 07 Jul 2010 & closed on 
II Sep 2014. 
If you have any questions, please contact us on (852) 22882176. 
~a1'if:Efcil~r.,, , ~~11t (852> 2288 W*m:!3. 
Thank you for choosing HSBC. 
~iflfillffl;lHl • 
(This advice requires no signature) 
(Jl:t7J~ij~M'iiEIJ>C/'l= -JlH~~~l 
Account Services 
pDR!H~ifr, 
The Uongl<Dng nm.I Shnnghni Banking Corporntion Limited 
1r~J:.lliiilll~fflrrfl°11tm'iiJ 
NSC Accounl Services: PO Box 72677, Kowloon Central Pos1 Oflicc, Kowloon, Hong Kong 
rf:19Hilil.!l!'l'•C.•f5DIIIHnfll\: i!iath.fttt9'9Hlillil&Faiflli&fatii 72677 \'1 
Tel 1115:!i : (8S2) 2233 3000 Web ~'!ll1l : www.hsbc.com.hk 
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92-7195/1231 
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_ _--=- West Bank 
~ ~ Division of Glacier Bank 
FDHI@ 
800-641-5401 I MOUNTAINWESTBANK.COM 
REMITIER LEEP RITZAU LUBOVISKI WYGLE FALLOWFIELD RITZAU PA 
PAY 
TO THE 
ORDER OF 
EXACTLY **327 AND 00/100 DOLLARS 
HSBC 
'' l'' .. IJ '·! 
Cashier's Check 
Date: 11/ 0 8 /16 814891 
-
3180 
Branch: 
$327.00 
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Lee P. Ritzau 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
460 Sun Valley Road, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Tel: 208/726-8219 
Fax: 208/726-3750 
ISB No. 5239 
Attorneys for Defendant Neil David Campbell 
FILEDA:M .. ~~)I 
NOV 1 4 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD., and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, ) 
individually; NEIL DAVID ) 
CAMPBELL, individually; ) 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, ) 
S.A., a corporation; PROTECCION ) 
FORESTALDE TECA, S.S., a ) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through ) 
50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-407 
POINTS OF LAW FOR SENTENCING HEARING 
Comes now the Defendant/Respondent, Neil Campbell (hereinafter "Neil"), by and 
through his attorney of record, Lee Ritzau of Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A. and 
provides the Court with his Points of Law for the Sentencing Hearing scheduled for November 
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28, 2016. 
I. POINTS OF LAW 
A. IRCP 75(j) provides the burden of proof required to impose a Civil Sanction and 
states, "Nonsummary Proceedings; Burden of Proof. (1) Civil Sanction. In order to impose a 
civil sanction, the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all of the elements of 
contempt have been proven and that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the 
order violated, or with that portion of it required by the sanction." JRCP 75(j)(l). 
i. "[T]o jail one for contempt for committing an act he is powerless to 
perform would ... make the proceeding purely punitive." Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 
(1948). 
ii. To impose a civil contempt sanction, the judge must find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the contemnor failed to do what he or she had been ordered 
to do and that he or she has the present ability to comply, at least to the extent required by 
the contempt sanction. Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297,304 (2012). 
iii. "The district court has the authority to impose sanctions for failure to 
timely comply with a court order, but it also has the discretion to not impose sanctions once the 
order has been complied with." Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297. 
iv. "This Court has held that§ 7-711 (which addresses permissible 
sanctions to compel compliance) 'does not preclude alternative civil sanctions under the common 
law or I.C. § 1-1603' ... Therefore, a court does not abuse its discretion by merely imposing 
reasonable sanctions that are not specifically articulated in Title 7, Chapter 6. This does not give 
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courts unfettered authority to impose unreasonable and inappropriate sanctions; however, the 
focus of civil contempt is to ensure that orders are complied with and an injunction imposed for 
this purpose should be upheld." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240,247 (2007). 
v. The court could impose a civil contempt sanction only if the contemnor 
had the present ability to comply with the order violated. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 13 7 
Idaho 850, 865 (2002). 
B. "(3) Written Order. The court must issue a written order reciting the conduct upon 
which the contempt conviction rests; adjudging that the contemnor is guilty of contempt; and 
setting forth the sanction for that contempt. If the sanction is civil or includes a conditional 
provision, the order must specify precisely what the contemnor must do in order to avoid that 
sanction or have it cease." IRCP 75(1)(3). 
C. IRCP 75(a)(6) defines "civil sanction" and states, "Civil Sanction. A civil sanction is 
one that is conditional. The contemnor can avoid the sanction entirely or have it case by doing 
what the contemnor had previously been ordered by the court to do. A civil sanction can only be 
imposed if the contempt consists of failing to do what the contemnor had previously been 
ordered by the court to do." IRCP 75(a)(6). 
i. A conditional civil contempt sanction must cease if the contemnor no longer 
has the present ability to purge the contempt by complying with the order violated. Shillitani v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) 
ii. The court must exercise the least possible power adequate to the end proposed 
and consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by the continued refusal to 
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perform the act and the probable effectiveness of the sanction in bringing about the desired 
result. Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560 (1983). 
D. "Criminal contempt is the commission of a disrespectful act directed at the court itself 
which obstructs justice. A criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and simply to 
vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in 
violation of an order of the court." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850,862 
(2002) 
E. IRCP 75(a)(7) defines "criminal sanction" and states, "Criminal sanction. A 
criminal sanction is one that is unconditional. The contemnor cannot avoid the sanction entirely 
or have it case by doing what the contemnor had been previously ordered by the court to do. A 
suspended sanction with probationary conditions is a criminal sanction, as is a sanction that 
includes provisions that are both conditional (civil) and unconditional (criminal). A criminal 
sanction maybe imposed for any contempt." IRCP 75(a)(7). 
F. IRCP 75(i)(2) sets forth the rights required to impose a Criminal Sanction and states, 
"(i) Nonsummary Proceedings; Trial. ... (2) Trial Rights Required to Impose a Criminal 
Sanction. The court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent 
was provided the following rights: ... , (D) the privilege against self-incrimination, ... IRCP 
75(i)(2). 
i. Pursuant to IRCP 75(i)(2)(D) the Court cannot impose a Criminal Sanction as 
Mr. Campbell was not provided his privilege against self-incrimination. He was required to take 
the witness stand and assert his Fifth Amendment right. 
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G. A serious fine cannot be imposed as a criminal contempt sanction unless the 
contemnor was given a jury trial. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837 & 838 (1994). A fine becomes serious somewhere between $10,000 
and $52,000,000.00. Id. at 838 n.5. 
G. "(I) Nonsummary proceedings; Imposition of sanctions. If the respondent ... is found 
in contempt following a trial, the court may impose sanctions as permitted by law, under the 
following conditions: ... (2) Right to call witnesses and speak regarding the sanction. The court 
cannot impose a criminal sanction without first giving the contemnor the right to call witnesses 
in mitigation of the sanction and the right to be heard in order to present matters in mitigation or 
otherwise attempt to make amends with the court." IRCP 75(1)(2). 
i. "The determination of whether a sanction or penalty should be imposed is 
within the discretion of the trial court." In the Matter of John Weick Contempt Appeal Rocky 
Watson and Mary Watson v. John Weick and Jule Weick v. Honorable John T. Mitchell, 142 
Idaho 275, 278 (2005). 
~ 
DATED this lL day of November, 2016. 
Lee P. Ritzau, A o eys for 
Defendant/Respo ent, Neil Campbell 
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CERTIFICA]',E OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of November, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon: 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax: 208-725-0076 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
By transmitting copies of the same to said attorney by facsimile machine process. 
By hand delivering the same to s i 1 ~tto 
"- /r, 
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Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
NOV 2 1 2016 
Jol..ynn ~. Cl-,Jc Dlstrlat 
Court l!llalne Coun teaho 
Luke L. Dauchot, CA Bar No. 229829, OH Bar No. 0039935, IL Bar No. 6193611 
Lauren Schweitzer, CA Bar No. 301654 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING 
BRIEF 
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Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership 
( collectively "Plaintiffs") hereby respond to the Sentencing Brief submitted by Defendant Neil 
Campbell ("Campbell"): 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
In his Sentencing Brief, Campbell does not accept responsibility for his actions; nor does 
he express remorse for his "ongoing effort to evade, frustrate, and delay Plaintiffs judgment 
collection efforts and frustrate and obstruct the lawful processes of the court." Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law re Civil and Criminal Contempt [hereinafter "Findings"] ,i 73. Instead, 
as to the civil counts, Campbell simply continues his cat-and-mouse game of taking begrudging 
baby-steps in the direction of compliance. As to the criminal counts, Campbell astoundingly 
asserts that he should receive no sanction at all for any of the 13 criminal contempt counts of 
which he is guilty. Campbell's response underscores that prison is the only appropriate sanction 
in this case. 
Certainly, imprisonment is a serious matter. But so too is flouting the Court's authority 
and lying repeatedly under oath. Campbell's conduct is corrosive to our system of justice. Left 
unpunished, it encourages contempt. 
Campbell has a longstanding history of refusing to provide discovery until cornered-and 
even then producing documents only in drips and drabs. Plaintiffs have been trying for 20 
months to obtain documents related to Campbell's fee payments to David Flyer ("Flyer") and the 
HSBC Hong Kong account. Yet even now, nearly three months after the contempt trial, 
Campbell still has not produced these documents. Campbell's consistent disregard for this 
Court's orders and continued recalcitrance show that imprisonment is the only effective means of 
coercing Campbell's compliance. This Court should thus imprison Campbell until he fully 
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complies with the Court's April 1, 2015 Amended Order by producing documents relating to his 
payment oflegal fees to Flyer and all records relating to the HSBC Hong Kong account. 
As to the criminal counts, Campbell's egregious behavior warrants a severe punishment. 
Campbell told numerous lies during his debtor's exam, making a mockery of the oath he took 
and the justice it serves to promote. As to the criminal counts, this Court should therefore 
imprison Campbell for 65 days (13 consecutive, 5-day sentences). 
II. STATEMENT OF LAW. 
Contempt sanction decisions are committed to the trial court's sound discretion. In re 
Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 278 (2005). The sanction for civil contempt is intended to be coercive. 
Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850,865. Thus, when the contempt consist of the failure 
to "perform an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned 
until he has performed it[.]" Idaho Code§ 7-611. 
The sanction for criminal contempt is punitive. See Camp, 137 Idaho at 862. For each 
criminal contempt count of which he is guilty, the contemnor may be fined up to five thousand 
dollars ($5,000), or he may be imprisoned for up to five days, or both. Idaho Code § 7-610. 
III. CAMPBELL SHOULD BE IMPRISONED UNTIL HE COMPLIES WITH 
THE COURT'S APRIL 1, 2015 ORDER. 
The Court found Campbell guilty of two counts of civil contempt because Campbell 
failed to produce: 
(1) documents evidencing the payments he made to David Flyer over the 
period of 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of 
the funds used to make those payments; and 
(2) all records relating to his HSBC bank account, including documents that 
identify any deposits made into and any disbursements of funds from that 
account. 
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Campbell's ongoing failure to produce these records has deprived Plaintiffs of the 
meaningful post-judgment discovery to which they are entitled. Moreover, Campbell's cat-and-
mouse game of refusing to produce documents shows that the only way to coerce his compliance 
is to imprison him until he does so. See Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 568, (1983) (quoting 
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947)) (court must consider "the 
character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable 
effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired"). 
A. Campbell Should be Imprisoned Until He Produces Records Relating to All 
Payments to Flyer 
This Court found that Campbell is presently able, but nevertheless failed to produce 
documents reflecting Campbell's payments to Flyer. See Findings ,i,i 40-49. Campbell initially 
refused to produce records of his payments to Flyer because Campbell asserted attorney-client 
privilege. Findings ,i 43. He next claimed that numerous lawyers, including Flyer, refused to 
provide payment records to Campbell because they are attorney work product and Campbell was 
a former client. Id. Campbell then modified his story, saying that some lawyers had no payment 
records while others, including Flyer, refused to provide them because they were those attorneys' 
work product. Id. Finally, on the eve of trial, Campbell produced payment records from seven 
attorneys-but none related to his payments to Flyer. Id. This Court therefore did "not find 
credible Campbell's statements that Flyer refuses to provide records." Id. 
Alongside his sentencing brief, Campbell submits a letter purportedly sent by his counsel 
to Flyer on July 28, 2016-the day after the contempt trial-and an email that his counsel sent 
on November 4, 2016--the day after the Court found Campbell guilty of contempt. See Ritzau 
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Deel., Exs. B & C. 1 Campbell's counsel thus did not contact Flyer regarding his purported 
failure to respond to an important request for four months, and did so only after the Court found 
Campbell guilty of contempt. This is not diligent behavior. More importantly, Campbell still 
has not produced any records evidencing his to payments to Flyer or any statement from Flyer 
refusing to provide such records.2 
At trial, Campbell argued that this Court should refrain from making findings on this 
count because Flyer might refuse to provide records to avoid being sued by Plaintiffs. The Court 
rejected this argument, stating that while "that may be true, there is no evidence to support 
Campbell's position[.]" Findings 'if 45. There is still no evidence that Flyer refuses to provide 
records to avoid being sued by Plaintiffs. In fact, the evidence shows that Flyer considers 
himself legally barred from doing so because of a privilege that Campbell controls. See Findings 
'if 46 ( citing RJN Ex. K at 1, Ex. L at 2). Thus, any argument by Campbell that Flyer refuses to 
provide records fails for the same reasons that this Court previously stated. 
In sum, over the course of 20 months, Campbell refused to produce records relating to his 
payments to Flyer, and incredibly claimed that Flyer refused to produce records for the same 
invalid reasons that Campbell himself asserted, only to now produce evidence of a half-hearted 
attempt to obtain these records. This behavior, considered in context of Campbell's long pattern 
1 Campbell also submits a complaint from a separate action filed by Plaintiffs against MLG 
Automotive Law and Walter Urban. See Ritzau Deel., Ex. A. This document is inadmissible 
because it is irrelevant: There is no evidence that Flyer had any knowledge of that lawsuit before 
Campbell's counsel so informed Flyer or that Flyer refused to produce records because of that 
suit. See Ritzau Deel., Ex. C. The complaint is also inadmissible because this uncertified copy 
is not authenticated. See Idaho R. Evid. 902. 
2 Mr. Ritzau states that he has "not received a response from David Flyer" to either of his 
communications. Ritzau Deel. 'if 5. However, Mr. Ritzau's declaration leaves open the 
possibility that someone else from Flyer's firm, such as Raquel Flyer (who signed for the letter) 
responded to it. He also leaves open the possibility that Flyer responded to Campbell directly 
using the contact information provided in Mr. Ritzau's letter. 
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of obfuscation and discovery abuses, shows that the only way to coerce Campbell to comply with 
the Court's order is to imprison him until he produces documents evidencing all of Campbell's 
payments to Flyer. 
B. Campbell Should be Imprisoned Until He Produces All Records Relating to 
the HSBC Hong Kong Account 
In "early 201 O" Campbell created a Hong Kong company called Mosaic Orange Limited 
("Mosaic Orange"), opened an account with HSBC Hong Kong in Mosaic Orange's name, and 
deposited $300,000 into the account. Campbell was the beneficiary of the HSBC Hong Kong 
Account. Findings ,r 54. In its April 1, 2015 Amended Order, the Court ordered Campbell to 
produce records relating to his financial accounts, including the HSBC Hong Kong Account. 
Findings ,r,r 53-57. Campbell first claimed he did not know the name of the company that 
owned the account. Then in April 2016, on the eve of the previously-scheduled trial date, 
Campbell admitted he knew the account owner was Mosaic Orange. Findings ,r,r 63 & 64. To 
date, Campbell has not produced a single record relating to the HSBC Hong Kong Account, and 
the Court found that Campbell "failed to take basic steps that could lead to the production of 
these records." Findings ,r 66. 
In his sentencing brief, Campbell does not deny that he is able to obtain the HSBC Hong 
Kong records. Instead, he submits a request for records that his counsel sent to HSBC Hong 
Kong on the day after the contempt trial. See Ritzau Deel., Ex. D. HSBC Hong Kong responded 
to Campbell's counsel on October 18, 2016, indicating that records were being prepared and 
directing Campbell to send payment for the copies. Ritzau Deel., Ex. E. Nevertheless, 
Campbell's counsel waited until after the Court issued its November 3, 2016 order finding 
Campbell guilty of contempt before responding to HSBC Hong Kong and sending the payment 
for the Mosaic Orange records. Ritzau Deel., Ex. F. 
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This chain of events epitomizes Campbell's games: Campbell waited for a year after the 
Court's Amended Order before disclosing the name of the company that owned the HSBC Hong 
Kong Account. He then waited until the day after trial to take basic steps to request records 
relating to it. Then, even after HSBC Hong Kong indicated that records were being prepared and 
Campbell should send payment, he took no action to obtain the records until after the Court 
found him guilty of contempt. It is thus far from certain that Campbell will actually produce any 
or all of the records that he receives from HSBC Hong Kong. The only way to coerce Campbell 
to produce all records relating to the HSBC Hong Kong account that the Court ordered him to 
produce is to imprison him until he does so. Anything less would be ineffective. 
IV. CAMPBELL SHOULD BE IMPRISONED FOR FIVE DAYS FOR EACH 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGE. 
A. Campbell Told Numerous, Egregious Lies During His Sworn Debtor's Exam 
During his August 2015 debtor's exam, Campbell made a mockery of his oath to tell the 
truth by repeatedly feigning ignorance of many basic facts about his finances and living 
situation. Findings ,r,r 72-73. As the Court recognized, "[t]he sheer volume of basic facts that 
Campbell claimed he did not remember during his August 2015 debtor' s examination shows that 
this testimony is not credible." Findings ,r 73. For example, Campbell lied about forgetting the 
name of the company that owned the HSBC Hong Kong Account into which Campbell deposited 
$300,000; keeping "tens of thousands of dollars in cash in his condo in Elkhorn"; and about the 
amount of cash that Campbell brought with him to Idaho from Florida (Campbell testified that he 
forgot, but later admitted to shipping "less than $1 OOK" of cash in his moving boxes). Findings 
,r,r 108, 127, 128, 137. These lies include testimony that was "substantially false or designed to 
avoid disclosing [Campbell's] cash resource[s]." Findings ,r 128. Moreover, Campbell's lies 
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during his August 2015 debtor's exam are only the latest in his ongoing pattern of deceiving 
Plaintiffs about his :finances. See Findings ,r 78. 
Because of Campbell's numerous under-oath lies, the Court found him guilty of 13 
separate counts of criminal contempt. To date, Campbell has not expressed remorse for his 
actions or even accepted responsibility for them. To the contrary, he insists that he should 
receive no punishment at all. 
B. Campbell's Argument that He Cannot Be Punished for Criminal Contempt 
Fails for the Same Reasons this Court Previously Stated 
Campbell claims that he cannot be punished for any of the 13 criminal contempt counts 
of which he was convicted because he was required to testify at trial as to the civil counts. 
Campbell made this same argument repeatedly during and after trial--each time, the Court 
resoundingly rejected it for the same reasons: As the Court explained in its Findings, at trial 
Campbell testified only as to the civil counts, Plaintiffs made no attempt to cross-examine 
Campbell as to the criminal counts, and the Court's :findings regarding the criminal counts were 
not based in any way on Campbell's testimony or any negative inference related to him invoking 
the Fifth Amendment while testifying. Findings ff 5, 6, 70. Campbell's latest attempt to 
resurrect this argument fails for the same reasons the Court stated in its Findings. 
C. Campbell Should Receive Consecutive, Maximum Prison Sentences for Each 
of His 13 Criminal Contempts 
If our judicial system is to function, oaths must have meaning and judgments must be 
enforceable. Campbell's numerous lies have turned the judgment enforcement process into an 
endless game ofwhac-a-mole, forcing Plaintiffs to spot Campbell's lies and debunk them before 
Campbell secrets his assets into a new hidey-hole. See Findings ,r 73 (Campbell's lies were part 
of his "ongoing effort to evade, frustrate, and delay Plaintiffs judgment collection efforts and 
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frustrate and obstruct the lawful processes of the court."). Our system cannot countenance such 
egregious behavior. 
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that the Court impose the maximum sentence of 
five days' imprisonment for each criminal count of which Campbell was convicted.3 This Court 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell told 13 distinct lies during his sworn debtor's 
exam, and therefore convicted Campbell of thirteen separate counts of criminal contempt. 
Campbell should be punished separately and sternly for each. Thus, Campbell's 13 sentences 
should run consecutively, for a total of sixty-five days of imprisonment. See State v. Elliott, 121 
Idaho 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991) (court has discretion to order sentences to run consecutively). This 
sentence is necessary to punish Campbell for his flagrant behavior, to deter him from future lies, 
and to protect the integrity of our judicial process. See State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 945 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (sentencing objectives include "the protection of society, the deterrence of crime ... 
and punishment or retribution"). 
V. CONCLUSION. 
This Court found Campbell guilty of2 counts of civil contempt and 13 counts of criminal 
contempt. In his sentencing brief, Campbell neither expresses remorse nor accepts responsibility 
for any of his actions. Instead, as to the civil counts, he makes begrudging, half-hearted efforts 
that inch closer to compliance-yet still does not produce any of the records that this Court 
ordered him to produce. Campbell's pattern of discovery abuses and continued recalcitrance 
show that imprisonment is the only effective means of coercing Campbell's compliance. 
Plaintiffs, therefore respectfully request that the Court imprisons Campbell until he fully 
complies with his obligations under the Court's Amended Order by producing to Plaintiffs: 
3 Given that the vast majority of the $24 million judgment against Campbell remains outstanding, 
fines are wholly inadequate to punish him for his lies. 
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(1) documents evidencing the payments he made to David Flyer over the 
period of 2009 to present, including documents evidencing the source of 
the funds used to make those payments; and 
(2) all records relating to his HSBC bank account, including documents that 
identify any deposits made into and any disbursements of funds from that 
account. 
As to the criminal counts, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to imprison Campbell for 
65 days (5 days for each of the 13 criminal counts, with sentences to run consecutively) 
following Campbell's imprisonment pending compliance with his discovery obligations. 
Plaintiffs also ask the Court to award attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-610. 
DATED: November 1-\ 2016 LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November2--( , 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of 
the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING BRIEF -10 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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Fl 
JoLynn o,.,, Clerk Dl6tiiiit 
Court Blairie Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
SENTENCING ORDERS 
REGARDING CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
Neil David Campbell was charged by Charging Affidavit with ten counts of Civil 
Contempt of Court, and with 24 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court in Counts 11 through 34. 
Trial was held before the Court on July 26 and 27, 2016. At or before trial Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed or withdrew eight of the ten counts of civil contempt. The Court thereafter found Mr. 
Campbell guilty of 2 counts of Civil Contempt of Court in Counts 1 and 8, and the Court found 
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Mr. Campbell guilty of 13 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court. As required by law and rule of 
Court, the Court made specific written findings as to the conduct constituting each contempt 
charge in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Civil and Criminal Contempt filed 
November 3, 2016. 
The parties appeared before the Court for sentencing on November 28, 2016. Neither 
party wished to present any evidence. Defendant/contemnor David Campbell was afforded an 
opportunity to speak on his own behalf. The Court made its own sentencing comments. Good 
cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER, 
1) That upon each of the counts of criminal contempt of court for which Neil Campbell 
has been found guilty, namely Counts Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, 
Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six, Thirty-One, and Thirty-Two, 
Mr. Campbell is ordered to serve five (5) days in the Blaine County Jail. These sentences are to 
run consecutively so that Mr. Campbell must serve 65 days in the Blaine County Jail. These 
sentences will commence upon the filing of an Order of Commitment following hearing on any 
forthcoming motion for stay pending appeal in the event a stay of execution of judgment pending 
appeal is denied. Mr. Campbell will not be required to pay any fine or court costs. The Court can 
find no authority to assess court costs on a criminal contempt of court case. The Court further 
finds that assessment of any fine payable pursuant to LC. § 7-610 would be counterproductive, 
and therefore none is ordered. 
2) As to Counts 1, and as to the finding that Neil Campbell is in civil contempt of court, 
the court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Campbell failed to produce 
documents evidencing Campbell's payments to California attorney David Flyer, that Campbell 
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has the present ability to produce those records, and that Campbell has failed to show that he 
cannot produce those records. Campbell will be incarcerated in the Blaine County Jail 
indefinitely until he complies with the Court's prior order to produce those records from his 
attorney David Flyer, or until Campbell satisfies this Court that he has made a full and complete 
formal complaint to the California Bar Association to the effect that attorney David Flyer has 
failed and refused to provide and produce records to his former client Neil Campbell upon 
Campbell's request. 
3) As to Count 8, and as to the finding that Neil Campbell is in civil contempt of court, 
the Court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that Neil Campbell failed to produce 
financial account records relating to his HSBC bank account in Hong Kong for the Mosaic 
Orange bank account, that Campbell has the present ability to produce those records, and that 
Campbell has failed to show that he cannot produce those records. Campbell will be 
incarcerated in the Blaine County Jail indefinitely until he complies with this Court's order to 
produce those records from HSBC bank. 
3) The Court has considered the harm caused by continued non-compliance by Mr. 
Campbell and weighed that against the probable effectiveness of this civil sanction. The Court is 
unable to conclude that any other lesser remedy is likely to be as effective as the sanction 
imposed. 
4) Whether the indefinite jail sentence for civil contempt starts before or after the 
determinate jail sentence of 65 days ordered on the criminal contempt charge will depend upon 
whether and to what extent this court or some other court of proper jurisdiction orders a stay of 
execution of any fixed jail sentence pending any appeal. At such time as Mr. Campbell 
commences service of his jail term for civil contempt the court will hold periodic status 
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conferences in order to determine whether Mr. Campbell still has the present ability to comply 
with this Court's order and/or to determine whether further incarceration will serve any purpose. 
5) Pursuant to IRCP 75(n) the Idaho Criminal Rules do not apply to this proceeding. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(a), proceedings are automatically stayed for 14 days 
following the filing of a notice of appeal "unless otherwise ordered by the district court." The 
Court previously advised Mr. Ritzau on the record, after he moved for a stay pending appeal, 
Campbell would be given a stay for 14 days from the entry of judgment in this case in order to 
move this Court for a further stay of proceedings pending appeal. In the event no motion for a 
further stay of execution is made within 14 days of the filing of the judgment herein, with or 
without the filing of an appeal, this Court will enter an Order of Commitment directing Mr. 
Campbell to commence immediate service of his sentence to jail, with the determinate sentence 
of 65 days to be served first, with no credit for good time. In the event a timely appeal is filed, 
the Court will determine upon proper motion made pursuant to IAR 13 whether and under what 
conditions any further stay of execution will be allowed pending appeal. 
6) Blaine County, by virtue of a recent filing, has challenged the payment of Campbell's 
attorney fees by Blaine County and seeks an order, among other things, terminating Mr. Ritzau's 
appointment immediately. The County notes that there is not necessarily a right to appeal a 
contempt citation pursuant to LC. §7-616 and the cases cited thereunder, and also asserts that 
Blaine County is not obligated to provide counsel on a charge of civil contempt. 
Unless otherwise ordered, appointment of counsel Lee Ritzau at county expense will 
terminate immediately after any hearing on a motion to stay execution of sentence pending 
appeal, or after the filing of a notice of appeal, whichever comes later. Prior to that time, the 
Court expects Mr. Ritzau to undertake or investigate whether and under what circumstances 
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either the County or the state ofldaho is obligated to provide counsel on appeal to Mr. Campbell. 
The Court will likely not require Blaine County to provide payment for any further 
representation of Mr. Campbell upon appeal without a specific showing, and following notice to 
the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney, that the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender will not 
undertake Mr. Campbell's representation and/or that Blaine County bears some obligation to 
provide counsel on appeal of either a civil or criminal sentence for contempt. 
5) A separate form of judgment will enter immediately. 
IT rs so ORDERED. 
DATED this l_ day of December, 2016. 
RorertJ.e~ 
District Judge 
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Ketchum, ID 83340 
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DEC - 1 2016 
JoLynn D~. Clerk Dlstrtat 
Court Blairie Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FOREST AL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
JUDGMENT 
1) Neil David Campbell is ordered to serve a determinate sentence of five (5) days in the 
Blaine County Jail for each of the 13 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court for which he has 
been found guilty. Each of the sentences of five (5) days injail will run consecutively, for a total 
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sentence of sixty-five (65) days in jail. This sentence will commence upon the issuance of an 
Order of Commitment, which will depend upon whether any Court grants any stay of execution 
of the sentence. No credit will be given by the sheriff for good time for any of these jail days. 
2) On Counts 1 and 8, Neil David Campbell will serve an indeterminate sentence in the 
Blaine County Jail unless and until he complies with prior court orders as set forth in the 
Sentencing Orders Regarding Civil and Criminal Contempt, or until this Court determines that a 
continuing sentence to jail will serve no further purpose and/or Mr. Campbell no longer has the 
present ability to comply with this Court's order. This sentence will commence upon the 
issuance of an Order of Commitment, which will depend upon whether any Court grants a stay 
of execution of the sentence. The Court will hold a status review hearing every 30 days, or upon 
motion of Mr. Campbell, to review this sentence. 
3) Counts 2,3,4,5,6,7,9, and 10 set forth in the Charging Affidavit are voluntarily 
dismissed by plaintiff. Counts Seventeen ( 1 7), Eighteen (18), Twenty (20), Twenty-Two (22), 
Twenty-Three (23), Twenty-Seven (27), Twenty-Eight (28), Twenty-Nine (29), Thirty (30), 
Thirty-Three (33), and Thirty-Four (34) are dismissed with prejudice. Jeopardy has attached and 
Mr. Campbell may not be retried upon any of those counts for which Mr. Campbell has been 
found not guilty of criminal contempt of court. 
Dated this_(_ day of December, 2016. 
Robert/Ue¥ 
District Judge 
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Lee P. Ritzau 
LUBOVISKI, WYGLE, 
FALLOWFIELD & RITZAU, P.A. 
460 Sun Valley Road, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Tel: 208/726-8219 
Fax: 208/726-3750 
Email: lritzau@lwfrlaw.com 
ISB No. 5239 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent/Appellant Neil David Campbell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, 
LTD., and KARLIN HOLDINGS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondent, 
V. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, ) 
individually; NEIL DA YID CAMPBELL, ) 
individually; POWERS INVESTMENTS ) 
AND MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a ) 
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a ) 
corporation; PROTECCION FOREST AL ) 
DE TECA, S.S., a corporation; and DOES ) 
1 through 50 inclusive, ) 
Defendants/Respondent/ Appellant. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-407 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PETITIONERS, C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD AND 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, ERIN CLARK OF THE FIRM LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, 
PLLC., PO BOX 3310, KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340 AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT OF BLAINE COUNTY. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Designation of Appeal: The above-named Appellant, Neil David Campbell, appeals 
against the above-named Respondents, C&M Investment Group, LTD., ("C&M") and Karlin 
Holdings Limited Partnership, ("Karlin") to the Idaho Supreme Court from both the Judgment 
filed on December 1, 2016 ( attached hereto as Exhibit A), the Honorable Robert J. Elgee 
presiding as well as the Sentencing Orders Regarding Civil and Criminal Contempt filed on 
December 1, 2016 ( attached hereto as Exhibit B), the Honorable Robert J. Elgee presiding. 
Pursuant to Rule 17(e)(l), I.A.R., this NOTICE OF APPEAL shall be deemed to include 
and present on appeal all judgments, orders, and decrees entered prior to the order appealed and 
all orders, judgments, or decrees entered after the order appealed. 
2. Jurisdictional Statement: Appellant, Neil David Campbell, has a right to appeal to 
the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described in paragraph 1 is appealable pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(4), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues on Appeal: The following list of issues on appeal is 
preliminary in nature and is based on such preliminary research and legal analysis as could 
reasonably be conducted to date. Appellant therefore reserves the right to assert additional issues 
on appeal. 
At present, Appellant intends to assert the following issues on appeal: 
A. Whether the District Court erred in imposing a Criminal Sanction without 
honoring Appellant's privilege against self-incrimination as described in IRCP 75(i)(2)(D); 
B. Whether the District Court erred in admitting unswom testimony from Erin 
Clark as described in IRE 603; 
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C. Whether the District Court erred in determining C&M and Karlin were the 
prevailing parties and thus entitled to attorney fees and costs given the issues on appeal asserted 
by Mr. Campbell in this case; and 
D. Whether Defendant is entitled to attorney fees under either LC.§ 7-610 and/or 
IRCP 75(m). 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Reporter's Transcripts: 
A. Is a reporter's transcript requested: Yes. The transcript for July 26 and 27, 
2016 has already been prepared. The transcript for November 28, 2016 has not yet been 
prepared. 
B. The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format. 
i. Transcript of all of the court trial held on July 26 and 27, 2016, where 
Susan Israel was the Court Reporter. This transcript has already been prepared; and 
ii. Transcript of all the hearings held on November 28, 2016, where Susan 
Israel was the Court Reporter. 
6. Clerk's Record: The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in 
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28(b)(l), I.A.R: 
A. Pursuant to I.A.R. 28(a) the following documents: 
June 19, 2012; 
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i. Petitioners' Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment filed on June 1, 2012; 
ii. Petitioners' Motion for Issuance of Order of Domestication filed on 
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February 23, 2016; 
iii. The Order of Domestication filed on or about June 21, 2012; 
iv. The Notice of Admit/Deny Hearing filed on or about February 2, 2016; 
v. The Advisement of Rights Regarding Contempt filed on or about 
vi. The Notification of Rights filed on or about February 23, 2016; 
vii. Defendant: Campbell, Neil David Order Appointing Public Defender 
Lee Philip Ritzau filed on or about May 26, 2016; 
viii. Respondent's Trial Brief filed on or about July 21, 2016; 
ix. Neil Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
filed on or about August 19, 2016; 
x. Affidavit of Lee Ritzau Regarding Information for Sentencing Hearing 
filed on or about November 14, 2016; and 
xi. Points of Law for Sentencing Hearing. filed on November 14, 2016 by 
Mr. Campbell. 
7. Exhibits: The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered 
or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
a. Petitioners' trial exhibits denoted as Exhibit Nos. 1 through 8, 9 through 13, 15 
through 18, 32, 34, and 36: 
No. Description 
1 Transcript for 8-24-15 Debtor Examination of Neil Campbell 
2 Transcript of2-20-15 Debtor Examination of Neil Campbell 
3 Campbell's 5-28-15 Document Production 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/4 
615 of 636
8. I certify: 
4 Campbell's 4-25-16 Document Production 
5 Campbell's 4-25-16 Letter to Erin Clark 
6 Campbell's 4-26-16 Document Production 
7 7-10-15 faxed letter from Campbell to Clark 
8 Campbell's Sworn Opposition to Motion for Contempt 
10 Transcript from 10-28-10 Deposition 
11 Campbell's 11-25-14 Responses to Interrogatories in California 
12 6-21-12 Order of Domestication 
13 4-1-15 Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment Debtor's 
Examination 
15 4-23-15 Letter from Campbell to Clark 
16 4-30-15 Letter from Clark to Campbell 
17 5-19-15 Letter from Clark to Campbell 
18 6-19-15 Letter from Clark to Campbell 
32 Campbell's 4-27-16 Document Production 
34 Campbell's Signed Affidavit of Compliance 
36 11-3-15 Affidavit ofE. Clark with Exhibit A 
A. That a copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
i. Reporter for the Hearings or Trial held on July 26 and 27, 2016 and 
November 28, 2016: 
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Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244 
Official Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 1379 
Ketchum, Idaho, 83340 
B. That Appellant is exempt from paying the fee for the reporter's transcript. The 
Court previously found Appellant to be a "needy person" who is "facing a serious crime" in its 
Order Regarding Appointment dated May 31, 2016. The finding Appellant is a "needy person" 
who is "facing a serious crime" is equivalent to a finding he is indigent. The fees for the 
reporter's transcript are waived pursuant to JAR 23(c) and/or LC.§ 31-3220. The Public 
Defender Application completed by Appellant and filed with the District Court on May 11, 2016 
satisfies the requirements of LC. § 31-3220(3). 
C. That appellant is exempt from paying the fee for the clerk's record. The Court 
previously found Appellant to be a "needy person" who is "facing a serious crime" in its Order 
Regarding Appointment dated May 31, 2016. The finding Appellant is a "needy person" who is 
"facing a serious crime" is equivalent to a finding he is indigent. The fees for the reporter's 
transcript are waived pursuant to JAR 24(h) and/or LC. § 31-3220. The Public Defender 
Application completed by Appellant and filed with the District Court on May 11, 2016 satisfies 
the requirements of LC. § 31-3220(3). 
D. That appellant is exempt from paying the filing fees. The Court previously 
found Appellant to be a "needy person" who is "facing a serious crime" in its Order Regarding 
Appointment dated May 31, 2016. The finding Appellant is a "needy person" who is "facing a 
serious crime" is equivalent to a finding he is indigent. The filing fees for the appeal are waived 
pursuant to IAR 27(t) and/or LC.§ 31-3220. The Public Defender Application completed by 
Appellant and filed with the District Court on May 11, 2016 satisfies the requirements of LC.§ 
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31-3220(3). 
E. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.AR., and counsel for Respondent. 
F. Respondent/Appellant, Neil Campbell, reserves the right to seek his attorneys' 
fees on appeal to the extent allowed by law pursuant to I.AR. 41. 
+~ 
DATED this Bday of December, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/7 
By_----t+~"""""'--l----'--------i-----:~.L=-=--
Lee . Ritzau, Attorneys fi 
Neil David Campbell 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11:__~y of December, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the parties named below, in the manner 
noted: 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax: 208-725-0076 
Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244 
Official Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 1379 
Ketchum, Idaho, 83340 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
Attn: Tim Graves 
219 l51 A venue South, Ste. 201 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Fax: 208-788-5554 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
~ By hand delivering copies of the same. 
By transmitting copies of the same to the offices of above-named counsel by facsimile 
machine process. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/8 
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,· 
JoLynn. ~. Cieri< Dlstdct 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRJS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 tlu·ough 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
JUDGMENT 
1) Neil David Campbell is ordered to serve a determinate sentence of five (5) days in the 
Blaine County Jail for each of the 13 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court for which he has 
been found guilty. Each of the sentences of five (5) days injail will run consecutively, for a total 
Judgment ELE1·.:~· ON!Cfil:,Y Page 1 
.... ' , .... ~ . ., 
~II .,:.)J .. ,,;.'· :. ,.---~'~'"" .. , -~ 
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sentence of sixty-five (65) days in jail. This sentence will commence upon the issuance of an 
Order of Commitment, which will depend upon whether any Court grants any stay of execution 
of the sentence. No credit will be given by the sheriff for good time for any of these jail days. 
2) On Counts 1 and 8, Neil David Campbell will serve an indeterminate sentence in the 
Blaine County Jail unless and until he complies with prior court orders as set forth in the 
Sentencing Orders Regarding Civil and Criminal Contempt, or until this Court determines that a 
continuing sentence to jail win serve no further purpose and/or Mr. Campbell no longer has the 
present ability to comply with this Court's order. This sentence will commence upon the 
issuance of an Order of Commitment, which will depend upon whether any Court grants a stay 
of execution of the sentence. The Court will hold a status review hearing every 30 days, or upon 
motion of Mr. Campbell, to review this sentence. 
3) Counts 2,3,4,5,6,7,9, and 10 set forth in the Charging Affidavit are voluntarily 
dismissed by plaintiff. Counts Seventeen (17), Eighteen (18), Twenty (20), Twenty-Two (22), 
Twenty-Three (23), Twenty-Seven (27), Twenty-Eight (28), Twenty-Nine (29), Thirty (30), 
Thirty-Three (33), and Thirty-Four (34) are dismissed with prejudice. Jeopardy has attached and 
Mr. Campbell may not be retried upon any of those counts for which Mr. Campbell has been 
found not guilty of criminal contempt of court. 
Dated this ( day of December, 2016. 
Robert~¥ 
District Judge 
Judgment Page 2 
l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on~ov@meer \ , 2016, I caused to be served a true copy 
• 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax:208-725-0076 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 59 
Deputy Clerk 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
.... 
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F 
DEC - 1 2016 
=' ,P,_'m9, Clerlc Olstr1ct 
....,.,.,., Cou Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
a corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
SENTENCING ORDERS 
REGARDING CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
Neil David Campbell was charged by Charging Affidavit with ten counts of Civil 
Contempt of Court, and with 24 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court in Counts 11 through 34. 
Trial was held before the Court on July 26 and 27, 2016. At or before trial Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed or withdrew eight of the ten counts of civil contempt. The Court thereafter found Mr. 
Campbel] guilty of2 counts of Civil Contempt of Court in Counts 1 and 8, and the Court found 
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Mr. Campbell guilty of 13 counts of Criminal Contempt of Court. As required by law and rule of 
Court, the Court made specific written findings as to the conduct constituting each contempt 
charge in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Civil and Criminal Contempt filed 
November 3, 2016. 
The parties appeared before the Court for sentencing on November 28, 2016. Neither 
party wished to present any evidence. Defendant/contemnor David Campbell was afforded an 
opportunity to speak on his own behalf. The Court made its own sentencing comments. Good 
cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER, 
1) That upon each of the counts of crimirial contempt of court for which Neil Campbell 
has been found guilty, namely Counts Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, 
Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six, Thirty-One, and Thirty-Two, 
Mr. Campbell is ordered to serve five (5) days in the Blaine County Jail. These sentences are to 
run consecutively so that Mr. Campbell must serve 65 days in the Blaine County Jail. These 
sentences will commence upon the filing of an Order of Commitment following hearing on any 
forthcoming motion for stay pending appeal in the event a stay of execution of judgment pending 
appeal is denied. Mr. Campbell will not be required to pay any fine or court costs. The Court can 
find no authority to assess court costs on a criminal contempt of court case. The Court further 
finds that assessment of any fine payable pursuant to LC. § 7-610 would be counterproductive, 
and therefore none is ordered. 
2) As to Counts 1, and as to the finding that Neil Campbell is in civil contempt of court, 
the court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Campbell failed to produce 
documents evidencing Campbell's payments to California attorney David Flyer, that Campbell 
2 
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has the present ability to produce those records, and that Campbell has failed to show that he 
cannot produce those records. Campbell will be incarcerated in the Blaine County Jail 
indefinitely until he complies with the Court's prior order to produce those records from his 
attorney David Flyer, or until Campbell satisfies this Court that he has made a full and complete 
formal complaint to the California Bar Association to the effect that attorney David Flyer has 
failed and refused to provide and produce records to his former client Neil Campbell upon 
Campbell's request. 
3) As to Count 8, and as to the finding that Neil Campbell is in civil contempt of comi, 
the Court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that Neil Campbell failed to produce 
financial account records relating to his HSBC bank account in Hong Kong for the Mosaic 
Orange bank account, that Campbell has the present ability to produce those records, and that 
Campbell has failed to show that be cannot produce those records. Campbell will be 
incarcerated in the Blaine County Jail indefinitely until he complies with this Court's order to 
produce those records from HSBC bank. 
3) The Court has considered the harm caused by continued non-compliance by Mr. 
Campbell and weighed that against the probable effectiveness of this civil sanction. The Court is 
unable to conclude that any other lesser remedy is likely to be as effective as the sanction 
imposed. 
4) Whether the indefinite jail sentence for civil contempt starts before or after the 
determinate jail sentence of 65 days ordered on the criminal contempt charge will depend upon 
whether and to what extent this court or some other court of proper jurisdiction orders a stay of 
execution of any fixed jail sentence pending any appeal. At such time as Mr. Campbell 
commences service of his jail term for civil contempt the court will hold periodic status 
3 
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conferences in order to determine whether Mr. Campbell still has the present ability to comply 
with this Court's order and/or to determine whether further incarceration will serve any purpose. 
5) Pursuant to IRCP 7S(n) the Idaho Criminal Rules do not apply to this proceeding. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(a), proceedings are automatically stayed for 14 days 
following the filing of a notice of appeal "unless otherwise ordered by the district court." The 
Court previously advised Mr. Ritzau on the record, after he moved for a stay pending appeal, 
Can1pbell would be given a stay for 14 days from the entry of judgment in this case in order to 
move this Court for a further stay of proceedings pending appeal. In the event no motion for a 
further stay of execution is made within 14 days of the filing of the judgment herein, with or 
without the filing of an appeal, this Court will enter an Order of Commitment directing Mr. 
Campbell to commence immediate service of his sentence to jail, with the determinate sentence 
of 65 days to be served first, with no credit for good time. In the event a timely appeal is filed, 
the Court will determine upon proper motion made pursuant to IAR 13 whether and under what 
conditions any further stay of execution will be allowed pending appeal. 
6) Blaine County, by virtue of a recent filing, has challenged the payment of Campbell's 
attorney fees by Blaine County and seeks an order, among other things, terminating Mr. Ritzau's 
appointment immediately. The County notes that there is not necessarily a right to appeal a 
contempt citation pursuant to J.C. §7~616 and the cases cited thereunder, and also asserts that 
Blaine County is not obligated to provide counsel on a charge of civil contempt. 
Unless otherwise ordered, appointment of counsel Lee Ritzau at county expense will 
terminate immediately after any hearing on a motion to stay execution of sentence pending 
appeal, or after the filing of a notice of appe_al, whichever comes later. Prior to that time, the 
Court expects Mr. Ritzau to undertake or· investigate whether and under what circumstances 
4 
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either the County or the state ofldaho is obligated to provide counsel on appeal to Mr. Campbell. 
The Court will likely not require Blaine County to provide payment for any fmiher 
representation of Mr. Campbell upon appeal without a specific showing, and following notice to 
the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney, that the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender will not 
undertake Mr. Campbell's representation and/or that Blaine County bears some obligation to 
provide counsel on appeal of either a civil or criminal sentence for contempt. 
5) A separate form of judgment will enter immediately. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this L day of December, 2016. 
RobertJ.~~ 
District Judge 
5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-~-• 2016, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Erin Clark 
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax: 208-725-0076 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 59 
_/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
Deputy Clerk~ 
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.. 
Erin F. Clark, ISB No. 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Luke L. Dauchot, CA Bar No. 229829, OH Bar No. 0039935, IL Bar No. 6193611 
Lauren Schweitzer, CA Bar No. 301654 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
333 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 680-8400 
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs C&M Investment Group 
And Karlin Holding Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Case No.: CV-12-407 
DEC 3 0 2016 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE CLERK'S 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
V. 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, et al., 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT, NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, AND HIS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, LEE RITZAU, AND THE CLERK OF OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Plaintiffs/Respondents C&M Investment Group, 
LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership ( collectively "Plaintiffs") in the above entitled 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
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proceeding hereby requests pursuant to 1.A.R. 19 the inclusion of the following material in the 
clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal. 
1. Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit Nos. 19-31. 
2. Campbell's Trial Exhibits 501 through 510. 
3. Jan. 28, 2016 Charging Affidavit of E. Clark 
4. Plaintiffs' Revised Trial Brief, filed July 22, 2016. 
5. Plaintiffs Amended Request for Judicial Notice, filed July 22, 2016, with its attached 
exhibits A through M. 
6. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time to Assert Affirmative Defenses 
and to Dismiss Contempt Charges, filed July 25, 2016. 
7. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed August 19, 2016. 
8. Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant Neil Campbell's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, filed September 2, 2016. 
9. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued by the Court on November 3, 2016. 
10. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Sentencing Brief, filed November 21, 2016. 
11. Sentencing Orders, issued by the Court on December 1, 2016. 
12. Judgment entered by the Court on December 1, 2016. 
13. April 22, 2015 Motion for Contempt and Notice of Hearing on Motion. 
DATED: Decembe~016 LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT THE CLER.K'S RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December ?;fl!, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of 
the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Lee P. Ritzau 
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield 
& Ritzau, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1172 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
~ Overnight Mail 
V_ Telecopy 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -3 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 44719 
RE: C&M INVESTMENT GROUP 
vs. 
NEIL CAMPBELL 
Notice is hereby given that on March 22, 
k,v/ 2 7 2017 
2017, a Reporter's Transcript on Appeal in the 
above-entitled case, consisting of 379 total pages, 
was lodged with the District Court Clerk of the 
County of Blaine, State of Idaho. 
The hearings included in the transcript are as follows: 
July 26-27, 2016 - Court Trial (Volume I) 
November 28, 2016 - Sentencing (Volume II) 
SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR NO. 244 
DATE 
*Appeal Transcript emailed to: Erin Clark@ 
efc@lawsonlaski.com 
Neil Campbell@ 
ndcampbell17@gmail.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondents, 
vs. 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually, 
Defendant/Respondent/ Appellant 
And 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
A corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
Inclusive, · 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 44719 
EXHIBIT LIST 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the following documents will 
be submitted as exhibits to the Record: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 
EXH. No. Description Obj. Date Admitted 
1 Transcript from 8/24/15 Debtor Examination of Campbell X 7/26/16 X 
2 Transcript from 2/20/15 Debtor's Examination of Campbell X 7/26/16 X 
in CA 
3 Campbell's 5/28/15 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
letter and produced documents) EXCLUDING 3-3 to 3-8 
4 Campbell's 4/25/16 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
email from Campbell) 
4-1 .1 Front Page Campbell's 4/25/16 Document Production X 7/27/16 X 
(includinQ cover email from Campbell) 
5 Campbell's 4/25/16 Letter to Clark re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
6 Campbell's 4/26/16 Document Production X 7/26/16 X 
7 7 /10/15 Faxed Letter from Campbell to Clark X 7/26/16 X 
8 Campbell's Sworn Opposition to Motion for Contempt X 7/26/16 X 
10. Transcript from 10/29/10 Deposition of Campbell in CA X 7/26/16 X 
EXHIBIT LIST-1 
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11 Campbell's 11/25/14 Responses to Plfs 1st Set of X 7/26/16 X 
lnterrooatories in CA action 
12 6/21/12 Order of Domestication 7/26/16 X 
13 4/1 /15 Amended Order Granting Motion for Judgment 7/26/16 X 
Debtor's Examination 
15 4/23/15 Letter from Campbell to Clark re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
16 4/30/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
17 5/19/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
18 6/19/15 Letter from Clark to Campbell re Document X 7/26/16 X 
Production 
32 Campbell's 4/27/16 Document Production (including cover X 7/26/16 X 
email) 
33 May 2016 Emails between Campbell and Clark re Informal 7/26/16 
Interview 
34 Campbell's Sianed Affidavit of Compliance X 7/26/16 X 
36 11 /3/15 Affidavit of Clark with Exh. A 7/26/16 X 
Defendant's Exhibits 
EXH. No. Description Obj. Date Admitted 
501 Limited Power of Attorney-David Flyer X 7/27/16 X 
502 Limited Power of Attorney-Michael Taiteman X 7/27/16 X 
503 Limited Power of Attorney-Robert Turffs X 7/27/16 X 
504 Limited Power of Attomev-Jonathan Michaels X 7/27/16 X 
505 Limited Power of Attorney-Steve Thompson X 7/27/16 X 
506 Limited Power of Attornev-Dvke Huish X 7/27/16 X 
507 Limited Power of Attorney-Susan Roy X 7/27/16 X 
508 Limited Power of Attorney-HSBC Bank X 7/27/16 X 
509 Limited Power of Attornev-Bank of America X 7/27/16 X 
510 Limited Power of Attornev-Bank of American X 7/27/16 X 
Taking Judicial Notice Exhibits 
EXH. Description Obj. Date 
No. 
19 10/10/07 Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, X 7/26/16 
Ltd. V. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. A of 
Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) 
20 11/17/08 Amended Complaint filed in the case captioned C&M X 7/26/16 
Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership V. 
Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. B of Plfs 
Request for Judicial Notice) 
21 Los Angeles Superior Court's 2/4/10 Order Granting Plfs Motion for X 7/26/16 
Summary Judgment Adjudication Against Def. Campbell for 
Constructive Fraud (Exh. C to Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) 
22 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11/2/10 Minute Order Imposing X 7/26/16 
Terminating Sanctions and Entering Default as to Defendants in the 
case captioned C&M Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. 
BC378888) (Exh. D to Plfs Reauest for Judicial Notice) 
EXHIBIT LIST-2 
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23 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11/1/11 Minute Order Imposing Monetary X 7/26/16 
Sanctions Against Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M 
Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. 
Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh.E to Plfs 
Request for Judicial Notice) 
24 Los Angeles Superior Court's 12/13/11 Order Granting Plfs Motion for X 7/26/16 
Summary Judgment Against Defendant Neil David Campbell in the 
case captioned C&M Investment Group, Ltd. And Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers etal. (Case No. 
BC378888) (Exh. F to Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) 
25 Los Angeles Superior Court's 11 /13/11 Judgment Against Defendant X 7/26/16 
Neil David Campbell in the case captioned C&M Investment Group, 
Ltd. And Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership v. Philip Richard Powers 
etal. (Case No. BC378888) (Exh. G to Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) 
26 Chapter 615-the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist X 7/26/16 
Financing (Financial Institutions) Ordinance, Part 3, Sec. 20 (Exh. H to 
Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) 
27 31 C.F.R. Sec. 1010.430 (Exh. I to Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
28 31 C.F.R. Sec. 1020.410 (Exh. J to Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
29 CA Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 6148 (Exh. K to Plfs Request for Judicial X 7/26/16 
Notice) 
30 CA Prof. Conduct Rule 3-700 (Exh. L of Plfs Request for Judicial X 7/26/16 
Notice) 
31 FL St. Bar Rule 4-1.4 (Exh. M of Plfs Request for Judicial Notice) X 7/26/16 
IN WITNESS WHERE0/1:p~ve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this (g day of £./ L.,.. , 2017. 
EXHIBIT LIST-3 
Jolynn Dr 
By~~..:.....~ ----~~..:a:!:.-~.:::...._~ 
Crystal Rigby, Deputy !erk 
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1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD. , and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondents, 
vs. 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually, 
Defendant/Respondent/Appellant 
And 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A.1,·a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A, a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
A corp~ration; and DOES 1 through 50 
Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Blaine ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 44719 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
r do ·further cert[fy that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause and 
exhibits requested by. th·e Appella.nt will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along 
witt,the·c1erk:'s·Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I ha~nto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this ..J..£.. day of L, 2016. 
'''""''· ..... 
.. ~J<· -
. ~.y.;. .. --
.,, .. .,... . .. 
0 • r f:\ 
.. - . 
.. ·Yl f1r l\{ \ 
·~. ~ 
' , 11) : JUD~ l L 
~ .. -~ l)tSTR\CT 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE,;;- 1 
·, 
', i. 
', 
Jolynn Ora e, Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and 
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 44719 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondents, 
vs. 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually, 
Defendant/Respondent/ Appellant 
And 
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually; 
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A , a corporation; 
GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a corporation; 
PROTECCION FORESTAL DE TECA, S.S., 
A corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in· and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Court Reporter's Transcript to 
each of the Attorneys ·of Record in this cause as follows: 
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL 
PQ Box.3372 
Ketchum, 10.83340 .. 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/ 
Appellant 
ERIN CLARK 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners/ 
Respondents 
. . IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this lo day of B:90..u , 2017. 
.. {. 
- .• 
~ERTIFICATE O.F~R~!CEc:;r·· 
'• ... 
I "''' 'I I \'\ Iii,\ 
: #) , 
. ;,, ' 
.. ~ 
•• 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
By~~~c:::.;Q,~ .....__., '.'.".___.C>r..,~ ---~ 
Crystal Rigby, Dep~ 
